¶MARCVS *Tullius Ciceroes*

three bookes of duetie, to Marcus his sonne, turned out of latine into Englishe, by Nicholas Grumaide. Wherrunto the latine is adioyned.

¶Cum priuilegio.

Anno Domini.

1574.



¶ TO THE RIGHT RE-
uerend father in god, and his singu-
lar good Lorde, Thomas, Bishop of
Elie, one of the king, & Quenes
Maiesties moste ho-
norable priuie
Counsell.

Auinge re-
course of late
(right reue-
rend father)
to the olde stu
dies, that I
once applied
in ỹ vniuer-
sitie: and get
ting somme
frute of qui-
et life to the perusing, & recording of
those things, wherin time paste I
felt my self greatly both delited, & fur-
thered: I gaue my minde chiefly to
such kinde of learning, as iwold serue
best bothe to the order of my studie, &
also to the gouernance of my life, so
that comparing my experience, and
readinge togither, I might make my
priuate diligence in studynge do ser-

uice to the open vse of liuing. In fo-
lowing of which intent, what by in-
crease of iugemẽt for yeres, what by
trauailig abrode in ỹ world, I founde
euer more and more so new profits,
& cõmodities: ỹ whereas, me thought,
I had sene but the shadow of thinges
now I begin more to see (as it wer)
the holle bodie thereof. And most of
all, this proofe I haue, in the gretest
and most profitable parte of philoso-
phie, which is concerning maners:
and namely in the bokes, that of du-
ties be written, by Marcus Tullius
Cicero: a matter cõteining the holle
trade, how to liue among men dys-
creetly, and honestly: and so rightlye
pointing out the pathway to all ver-
tue: as none can bee righter, onely
Scripture excepted. Insomuch, that
when I had well considered altogy-
ther: I saide with my selfe, cõcerning
this, as did a certain learned mã, not
long ago, by Homer: This is the fift
time, I haue redde ouer this author:
and as oft as I reade him, so oft sõe-
what I finde, that I marked not be-
fore: and that hath neede to be depely
pondered: so ỹ I fansied, at the firste,

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he was easie: but now, methinks, he requieres a verie heedful, & a musing reader. Wherfore not without marvailous great pleasure, espyeng: ỹ either in private life, to attain quietnesse and contentation: or in office bearing, to winne fame, and honour: or in euery estate, both to auoide disorder, and enormity, and also to kepe a right rule, and commendable behauiour: this boke plainly is the mirrour of wisõe, the fortres of iustice, the master of manlines, the schoole of temperãce, the iewel of comlines: I wished, many mo to bee parteners of such sweetenesse, as I had partely felt my selfe: & to declare, that I mẽt nolesse, than I wished: I laied to, my helping hand: endeuouring, by translation, to do likewise for my contrymen: as Italians, Frenchemenne, Spaniardes, Duchemen, & other foreins haue liberally done for theirs. So, chiefely for our vnlatined people I haue made this latin writer, englisch: & haue now brought into lighte, that from them so long was hidde: & haue caused an auncient writinge to becomme, in a maner, new againe:

and a booke, vsed but of fewe, to war cõmon to a great meany: so that our mẽ, vnderstanding, what a treasure is among them, for the fashioning of their life: and beinge by nature most of all other nations giuen to ciuilitie, & humanite: whẽ they shall be aided, and directed by these perfite precepts: may in all pointes of good demeanour, becõme people perfecte.

Yet iudge I all this laboure litle worthe, & smaliy, or nothing able to preuaile: without your honorable lordship were patrone herof: to whõ I do dedicate both my good hert, and my worke also: (I call it mine, as Plautus, and Terence called the comedies theyrs, which they made out of Greeke) not as to teach your lordship ought, that you haue not alredy: but by your auctoritie, to gette it the more estimacion with other.

For as Tullies treatise, being so ful of learning, asketh a learned mans iugement: which whoso refuse, they shew them selues to be vnwise: euen so such a noble Coũseler of Englãd seemeth most meete to receiue so noble a Senatour of Rome into a straunge

straunge region. Doutlesse amonge so many honorable deedes of youre lordships, it shall not be the least honorable: if ye doo marcus Tullius this honour, to welcome him hither: and to be the very cause, that so famous a Romane maye becomme familiar with our English menne. So shall a worthy pere be worthylye entreated as very curteiy requireth: so youre lordships iudgment muste needes bee wel liked: which is wonte to alowe onely knowledge, & goodnesse: so will the cõmon people more hyely esteme the thing: as it is expedient for them to doo: and the soner also wil they folowe these hollesome lessons: whiche is full necessary, in a wel ordered state: to be short, youre lordshippe, for a chosen patrone: my translation, for a welcome worke: & Tullie shall be taken for such a Tullie, as he is. And like as Marc9 Cicero, with the autoritie of a father, commended these bookes to his yong Cicero: so when our English youth shal beholde them once authorised by so reuerend a father in God: no doute, they will be the rather in loue wyth

them: and will counte it pleasaunt paines taking here to enriche themselues with enformations of vertue, ensamples out of stories, morall doctrine, politike prudence, antiquitie, varietie of meruailous matters: so conningly, and oratorially treated, and endited: as he was able to declare, & expresse: who was the first, and the chiefe that euer cladde ladie Philosophie in romane attire.

Thus, verie lothe to let your lordship from your weighty affaires, I make an end: & pray god, long to preserue your honorable lordship in helth, with encrease of honour.

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Your humble orator.
Nicholas Grimald.

All things in the world (good reader) bee made for some vse, & ende, whiche ende is more worth, thã all, that dothe seruice therunto. and where both the ende is good, and what so serues thereto: there the holle doing is likewise good. In vs the best worke is, to vse our selues well, and worthely: who in the order of naturall things are of the best, and worthyest kinde. For what is their, ẏ can vse it selfe: oneleſſe it be enfourmed with reasõ: and vnderstanding: Dũme creaturs, and liueleſſe of other bee vsed: but themselues can they neuer vse.

Beastes endewed with life, and sense may seeme to haue some semblãt herof: in ẏ, they vse their feding. lodging, & other necessaries: yet therby they obtaine neither praise, nor dispraise: seeing they do it not of any free choise: but onely by the motion of kinde, & as their appetite draweth them.

them. But we, who haue the great gift of wit, and reaſō, muſt not moſt of all ſtick ſtil in that appetite: to get nothing els, but pleaſure, & profite: but enſuinge the heauenly guyde of oure nature, muſt be led to the deſire of trouth, honoure, and ſeemelineſſe: wherewith the more that we be decked, adourned, & beautified: the farder wee be from the brutiſhneſſe of beaſtes, and the nerer approche we to the nature deuine.

In aſmuche then as euery thinge is borne to do that whiche to his kinde is moſte agreable: and vs it beſemeth moſte to vſe our ſelues: our parte wout doute, and our duetie ſhall we do beſt: if we emploie the vſing of our ſelues to deedes, ỳ be honeſt, & commēdable. Other things whē we vſe: as landes, houſes, armoure, horſes, hownes, money, clothes, or ſtuffe: we can not yet vſe them at al tymes: and with them we muſte enforce, and buſie oure ſelues alſo: whereas the vſinge of our ſelues is in euery place at hand, and at no ſeaſon to ſeeke.

For whether we be doing ſomwhat, or at reſt: whether we abide in the countrey,

countrey, or in the citie: whether we be occupied in earnest, or in game: no pawse there is at all, but night & daye we vse oure selues continually.

Whiche thinge sith in euery portion of a mannes life it hath place: yf it be well, and wisely, and conueniently done: we shall be weal full, and in a blessed case: if vngraciously, & fondly, and wickedly: wretched shal we be, and in a wofull plight. Thys are we taught to much, by the cõmon life of men: who for default of skil, how to behaue themselues, be confounded in deepe darknes of erroure, & ignorance: and wantinge the right rule, thei take chalke for cheese, as the saienge is: they can not frame they^r affections, nor keepe them in temper. But such manner clowdes be clerely dissolued, by the beames of Philosophie: whiche set before our eiesight the verye endes, and markes, that selfe nature hath appointed vs.

For in this worlde here beneath are three kindes of liuing wights: whereof somme haue no more, but life, as plantes, herbes, and trees growinge out of the grounde: somme haue not

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onely life, but senses also: as sheepe, oxen, & other beastes: the third comprehēdeth both these: & ouer life, and senses, hath the souerain ruler Reason: as in the nature of manne we se them al conioyned. It remains therfore, and meete it is for him, such doinges to practise: as may both seuerallie agree with eche of these parts, and generallie with thē altogither.

To the parcell inferiour (by whiche we receiue our nourishment, our growing, & the state of our body) welfare is appointed the vtmost ende: wherin the thing consisteth that wee call profitable: which concernes the getting, mainteining, or recouering of helth. Of the soule, or life endewed with sēces, pleasures is the end, that it would enioy. The thirde nature, which is partener of reason, hath this pricke to shoot at (if you consider it by it selfe alone) sciēce, & knowledge of trouthe: if you beholde it with the other two accompanied, it hathe honestie, worshippe, and honour.

These bee the verie endes, whereto mannes life, and nature must endeuour

nour to attain: hither doth Philoso-
phie promise to bring a man, by her
information. For when she hath
told in a generaltie, what is honest,
comely, vailable, praisewoorthy, and
in euery point conuenient: then may
men, by intelligence perceiuing the
trouthe, truly expresse the same in
euery particular deede.

Wherfoore seing reason conteins the
holle life of man: and to it, as to their
captain, ỹ other parts bee obediēt, or
at least wise ought to be: first: marke
we the peculiar propertie of reason:
then, how with the other powers it
exerciseth mā, afterward, the comely
behauiour, and dutiefull dealing in
the opē resort, and felowship of men.
Wannes minde is contented, and sa-
tisfied with nothing so much, as the
clere vnderstanding, and the vnde-
ceauable science of soothe. Chiefly
standeth his minde in contemplation
of immortall, and pardurable thigs:
therto, in suche as fade, and fall, it
teacheth, ordeineth, appointeth, cō-
maūdeth. Wherupō ỹ order, course,
figure, light, influēce of sonne, mone,

and

and sterres it obserueth: conceiueth intelligences, aungels, soules, and fourmes immateriall: proceedeth frō them, and so mounteth vp to the very author, and prince of this worlders vniuersitie: whome it knoweth, and knowledgeth to be one, the best, the mightiest, the trueest, the moste righteous, and euerlastinge. Yet is the selfsame minde by the felowship, and companie of the senses, and deyres many a time called awaye from that principall office, to consider these vnstable, and mutable thinges: and somtime to caste in conceite fourmes disseuered frō the matter, mathematically: and somtime to view thinges sensible, that can in no wise be sondered from the materiall substance: as elements, beastes, herbes, trees, metals, stones, and such lyke: all the which must nedes be fensed, and fortified with the trade of debating doutes, and discerninge of trouth from vntrouth: which is the arte of Logik, the verie rule of reason, and instrument of all discourse.

Now, to speake of the vsing of the holle man: by the continuall tenour,

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and ſtedfaſt rate of bodies celeſtiall, and naturall, the minde of man learneth order, obedience, and concorde. For like as God gouerneth thynges manyfolde moueable, and fallynge awaie, being himſelfe but one, vnremoouable, and euer duringe: ſo reaſon within vs ought to rule ranging luſts, and raſh motions of the minde, and the other vnworthier, and weaker partes: beinge it ſelfe ſtedfaſte, ſage, principall, and ſtrongly eſtabliſhed.

In caſe a man loue any one parte of himſelf to much: or ſew after the end thereof by a wronge way, and cleane out of faſhion: he ſhall not leade a life al euen, and ſtreight, but hooked, and croked: nor eaſie, and quiet, but miſerablie diſtempered. For who ſo be ouermuche enclined to paumpering, and pleaſing of the vitall portion: they be all bent to gather good, and holly giuen to gaine. They, that alonely ſerue their ſenſes, and ſett their delite to feele the pleaſures of the ſame: be exceſſiue eyther in ryotting, and banketing, or in outragious fleſhlondynges, or in other ſuchs paſtaunces,

pastaunces, as bee sensuall. They, which holde them content to leade a life contẽplatiue, hauing no regard, ne respect to the forenamed parcels: doo proue sowre, lowring, blockish, rusticall, and farre from all ciuilnesse of life. Ye, in whom reason ioines with the senses, for to do them seruice: will enforce himselfe to win worldly glorie, and soueraintie.

Ye that can comprise in his thought no large compasse, nor depe consideration: but is faint, feeble, wauering, and full of infirmitie: wil show forth himselfe chieflie with appareling, or with some outward bragge, to supplie his want within.

To such sortes of annoyaunce, and disconuenience, light, and moderation is brought by morall doctrine: the which, Marcus Tullius Cicero, in these bokes of duties, professieth. This learning teacheth, somuche to graunt the vital part, and the netherest: as will bee suffisant to preserue the lyfe in helth, and welfare.

It willeth also the feeling portion so to take fruition of pleasures: ỳ neyther it defraude the lower part of

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the pfits therto appropriat: nor with importune egging annoie the minde which aspireth vnto veritie of opinions, and vprightnes of maners.

Without mo woordes, it assigneth that for to reigne, which is borne to reigne: & that to be obeysaunt, which is framed for obeysaunce.

Now, when a man is so enstructed with philosophie: that he can full cōueniently liue sole, & at point deuice by him self: he must be brought forth abrode into the face of the worlde: to the intent he may procure, not onely that becomes him selfe to do, but also the welth of other folke. He must remember the three folde state, & diuersitie, that he hath espied, and practised in him self: and must transferre the same to the gouernaunce both of his housholde priuatly, and of the holle commons openly. So shall the meanest sorte, lyke the vitall parcell in man, bee occupied aboute the moste seruile, and nedefull workes: men of middle degree, like the sensiue soule, shall attend to affaires, and sciences more liberall: the nobilitie in the cōmon gouernment, like reason in the

nature of mã, shal rule all the multitude. That things also doth Tullie touche in this treatise: and sheweth men in auctoritie their duties, both in warr, and peas: wherby they may make themselues, and their subiects happy, and fortunate.

And not onely them, but al sortes of mẽ he admonisheth: what they haue to do, throughout their life: according to their age, trade, and estate: with respect to the circumstances of times, places, and persons.

In the first booke, he first deuideth dutie into the perfit, and the meane: leauing the one (which belongeth to the ende of good: & is in it self right) to men of perfection: & prosecutyng ỳ other in certain rules, & precepts: so that therby euery man may frame and order his life. Then he leades vs to the findyng out of duties, by taking aduisement about the choise of honest things, and refusal of the vnhonest. Afterward he sets forth the originall causes, and the chiefe parts of honestie, with their duties, and propeties. At the last, he warneth vs to discerne ỳ more, or most honest thing

thing frō the leſſe, or leaſt: & alwayes, in the vſe therof, to preferre ỹ greter. In the ſecond, reherſing profitable, & vnprofitable thinges: he ſhoweth, how to attein, and to vſe the profitable, & how to eſchew the contrarie: & in the ende makes a compariſon of profits: teaching to preferre the greter before the ſmaller, or the mo before the fewer.

In the third, he compareth profit wt honeſtie, & with euery part thereof: not as if ther could in deede be contrarietie betweene them, but bee meanes the profit, which ſemeth not honeſt, & the honeſtie, which ſeemeth not profitable: or of eyther of thē the apparant ſhow: and he tels vs, what is to be done, when theſe ſeeme ſo to ſtriue, one with an other: that honeſtie alureth vs one way, and profit calleth vs an other way.

Thus the holle matter is referred, and applied to honeſtie, and profitte, two principall pointes of good: the third (which we call pleaſure, and is placed by the Peripatetikes in the noumber of good thynges) Tullie, like a Stoik, doth but brie ely

touch as a thing impertinent.
But of the other two places, conteining all the doings of men, Cicero hathe tolde hys minde, and left it vs in this boke: euen as fully, as in hys lifetime he conceiued it in his hed.
For who euer sawe in so few leaues so mouch morall doctrine, and politicall, set out with so many connyng cautes, and feates oratoriall: What a sort of stories be there so notable of themselues, so handsomely applyed, so elegantly tolde? You shall not lightly reade the like, within so litle compasse, in any historian, that of purpose doth nothing els.
How finely, & featly be ỹ poets verses alledged: With what a discretion ar some auncient writers reproued: With what subtilitie, and finesse of wit be certein cõtrouersies debated: Either of ỹ chiefe philosophie, or of al humanitie what point is ther lacking? Aristotle artificially hathe written of maners: but, what for the lightsommesse, & eloquent handelyng of ỹ treatise, what for ỹ latine tong, which we do vse more than ỹ greeke: Tullie is aboue him. Panetiꝰ wrote

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of dutifull demeanour: but though his worke in some points was Tullies pattern: yet in all poynts, by all their iugemēts, ỹ euer saw thē both: Tullie is aboue him. Xeno ỹ Stoik wrote of dutie: but seeinge diuers Grekes, who ar Tullies inferiours, wer as good as he: certesse Tullie is aboue him. Possidonius, a Rhodiane, medled with the same matter: but nothing to Tullius. So did Hecato: but nothing to Tullius. And many other mo of later tyme: but, lord, how farre be they frō Tullius: Tullius, in his graue yeres, after he hadde hearde a nounber of learned men: after he had redde the mosse approued authors: after he had endited so many volumes: and his style was waren ripe, his wit sage, his lerning full, his iudgemēt perfit: enterprised to drawe this draught, & made it of such excellence: as we may well wōder at in viewing, & yet not attaine in following. Tullius, hauyng done many glorious acts, in a state of gouernment most triumphant, learned the most part of these lessons by experience. Tullius out of the Greeke

authors, of whome also somme had been gouernours in florishing empires: translated a great deale. Tullius to Marcus, hys welbeloued sonne, abyding euen at Athenes, among the best Philosophers, was not afraid to sende this parcel of philosophie. No doute as welcõe it was to the lerned Atheniãs: as ỹ Greeks doings were to the Romaines: or as now adayes, the French, & Italians welframed writigs be to those Englishmen, that vnderstand them: yea and so much the more welcome: as it was a rare thing then, to see that kinde of knowlege expressed in pure latine. But in Rome, in Italie, in Europa, in all quarters, where latine speche had place: O, so it was embraced at all times, of all men, in euery degree, order, & estate. Rulers haue here found much witty policie, apperteininge to the gouernance of realmes. Householders, and parents haue pyked out of these bookes vertuous instructions for their children, and their seruauntes. Doctors, and diuines haue here met with morall

sentence

sentence, and ensamples, verie excellent. Ciuil lawyers haue espied, touching iustice, and equitie, both rules appointed, and cases discussed. Scoolemen haue taken herehence problemes, and questions, to debate at large: and haue fetched from hence philosophicall conclusions, with reasons, and argumentes to proue, and to disproue. Oratours haue been well furnyshed hereby with sondry graces and ornamentes of speech: and in the like maner of matter, haue marked, how to bestowe their stile. Rhetoriciãs, who for their exercise, do vse declamatiõs: haue taken out of this common places, like large fieldes, where mẽ may walk at libertie. Scoolemaisters neuer wiste of fyner phrases, for to make theyr scholars acquainted with the very veine of the latine language. At few wordes, al men, that of wisdome be studious, may gette sommewhat herein to sharpe the wyt, to store the intelligence, to fede the mynde, to quicken the sprite, to augment ỹ reason, to direct the appetite, to frame the tounge, to fashion the maners:

moreouer to rule, to obey, to dispute, to determine, to teache, to persuade, & to euery needeful purpose in a mās life. Onlesse the selfe thing witnesse as much, as I saie, let me not be credited: but in case both ý boke speake for it selfe: & to my testimoniall I am able to adioyne princely peres, well beknowne, and well approued: then shall bothe the worthynesse of the worke, and also the weight of the authoritie winne credit, & assent. Tullies duties when Ceasar Augustus had redde ouer, still standing on hys feete: as he againe deliuered them to his neuiew, of whō he had thē: Eloquent (quoth he) was this man, eloquent he was in deede: & one ý loued wel his countrie. Tullies duties had Seuerus, the noble emperour, in so greate price, and reputacion: that of all the Romanes bokes, to reade thē, he thought him best apaide. Tullies duties haue I knowne good clerks, and well learned men beare about in their bosōmes: layenge it full neare their hertes, ý they would haue lodged in their heades: and entirely louing Tullies heauenly companie,

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which waye so euer they went. Tullies duties did Erasmus, ỹ Rotterodame, so greatly commend: ỹ in making mention of them, hee could not choose but breake forthe into these wordes. What: writeth an ethnike all this to ethnikes: a prophane man, to the prophane: Yet in his preceptes of conuersation, O lorde, what an equitie: what an holinesse: what sinceritie: what veritie: How well doth all to gether accorde wt̄ nature: how is al framed euē by good reasō: What a conscience requireth hee of such, as gouern ỹ state: How plainly sets he before our eies the maruailous, and the amiable beautifulnesse of vertue: How much, how religiously, yea how like a diuine doth he teache of helping, & releeuing other men: of getting, and mainteyninge of loue, and frendshipe: of the contēpt of those vanities: for which the comō sorte of Christien folke will eyther do, or suffer, they care not what: Finally, he deemeth them full worthy, & full meete both for schoolemasters in their schooles to reade vnto the youthe: and also for olde men againe

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and againe to vse, and to peruse. These richesse, and treasures of wit, and wisedome, as Cicero trãspoꝛted out of Greece into Italie: so haue I fetched from thence, & conueied them into England: and haue caused also Marcus Tullius (moꝛe, thã he could do, whẽ he was aliue) to speake English. Maruailous is the matter, flowing the eloquence, rich the stoꝛe of stuff, & full artificiall the enditinge: but how I, in our maner of speache, haue expꝛessed the same: the moꝛe the booke bee peruled, the better it maye chaũce to appeꝛe. None other trãslatiõ in our toũg haue I seen, but one: which is of all men of any learning so well liked: ꝑ they repute it, & coũt it as none: yet if ye list to cõpare thys somwhat with that nothing: peraũẽture this somwhat wil seme somme-what the moꝛe. Howbeit loke, what rule the Rhetoꝛicia giues in pꝛecept, to be obserued of an Oꝛatour, in telling of his tale: ꝑ it be shoꝛt, & without ydle woꝛds: ꝑ it be plain, & without dark sence: that it bee pꝛonable, & without anye swaruinge from the trouthe: the same rule should be vsed

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in examining, & iudging of trãslatiõ. For if it be not as brief, as the verie authors text requireth: what so is added to his perfite stile, shall appere superfluous, & to serue rather to the making of some paraphrase, or commentarie. Therto, if it be vttered wᵗ vnkhorne termes, & not with vsuall wordes: or if it be phrased wᵗ wrested or farrefetched fourmes of speeche: not fine, but harshe, not easie, but hard, not natural, but violent it shal seme to be. Then also, in case it yelde not the meaning of the author: but eyther following fansie, or misledde by errour, forsakes the true patern: it cãnot be approued for a faithfull, & sure enterpretacion: which ought to be takẽ for the greatest praise of all. These pointes as I haue studied to parfourme: so where I haue not alwayes attained vnto them: I shal desire you, gentle reader, gẽtly to consider both the excelence of the author, who is a perfit orator: & also ẏ gretnes of the matter, which is profound philosophie.

Neuertheles, such as be erquisite in both the languages already: may

(And

(& that with some profit, & pleasure) trye, what I haue done, & what they can do, all vnder one: if, layeng my translation apart, they will set the latine before thē, & so assay their owne beine. Eyther they shall like themselues the better: when they conferre it with my poore workmāship: or els perchaūce conne me the more thank for attempting, folowing, & accōplishing of this enterprise. Be it so, one hath neither the latine, nor the englisch eloquēce: yet, by the benefite of nature, sythe a mā may do much: namely if he therto adioyne vse, & exercise: here is for him occasion bothe to whet his wit, & also to file his toung. For although an Englisch man hath his mother toung: & can talke apace, as he lerned of his dame: yet is it one thing to tittle tattle, I wot not how, or to chatter like a iay: and an other, to bestowe his woordes wisely, orderly, pleasauntly, & pythiely. Such as haue englisch meatly well, & but a smattering, or small tast in ỹ lattine, which noumber is great, among the scholars of this realme: may hereby fall into suche acquayntaunce, and fa-

familiaritie with this moſt excellent latine man: that neither ſhall his deuiſe ſeme hard, nor his arte obſcure, nor his ſtyle ſtraunge. I dare well ſay, if this worke happe into a good ſtudents hand: hee will not think it ynough to runne ouer it once: as we fare with trifles, and toyes: but aduiſedly, and with good leaſure, three, or foure, or fiue times, he will reade it, and reade it, and reade it agayne: firſt, by the principall pointes, by the definitions, and the deuiſions: to ſee, what is treated, how farre forthe, in wat order, and with what varietie: then, to mark the preceptes, reaſons, concluſions, & common places: after, vnto the ſayde places to referre all the ſtories, with the verſes poeticall: finally, as well in the englyſh, as the latine, to weygh well properties of wordes, faſhions of phraſes, and the ornamentes of both. Moreouer, many clerks haue I knowne, eare thys: which could conceiue, & vnderſtande full well: whoſe toung neuertheleſſe in vtteraũce, and vſe of ſpeache, was in a maner maymed: yea and ſome, that could alſo ſpeake latine reddily,

and

and wel fauozedly: who to haue done as much in our language, & to haue handled the same matter, wold haue bin half blãk. what nede mo wozds? I desire, my trauaill none otherwise to be taken in wozthe, than the diligent peruser shall in effect find frute therof.

Now therfoze, good reader, fare you well: and remember, how vnfit (as Aristotle saith) and vnprofitable hearers of mozall science yong men be: as long as either they folow their youthly affections oz do continue vnskilful, and rude in the dedes, that of dutie belong to mans life.

Foz, all the while, they yeeld themselues to be led a way of their madde moodes, if you talke to them of vertues, and of maners, ye doo but sing the deaffe a song. And how shall they be able to iudge, what is discreetly, rightfully, valiantly, moderately, & wozthely done: who neither haue any such qualitie, noz vnderstande by experiẽce any point of the same: Yet forasmuch as it must of necessity be knowne, what is vertue, & vice: before a mã can wel, & wisely liue, embzacing

bracing ẏ one, & eschewing the other either to make sound the sicke minde (incase it be miseased, & hath a will to be relieued) take this doctrine, as a medicine: or els to cõfirme the holle: that is to mean: incase you haue been wel, & honestly trayned vp: more perfitely to perceiue the path of good maners: wherin you may walke with entire delite, and come to the honour of a laudable life. Thus haue I holdẽ you, good reader, with my homely tale: now will I not borow your pacience any lenger: but for your gẽtlenes, and studious dispositiõ, wil streight way send you from the scholar to the master: and from me to the speeche of this diuine orator and worthy philosopher.

(:)

¶ MARCVS Tullius Ciceroes firſt booke of duties, to Marcus hys ſonne.

ALl though you ſonne Marke, hauinge nowe a yere heard Cratippus, and ẏ in Athenes, muſt needes knowe full of rules and leſſons of philoſophie: becauſe of the paſſing great excellencie both of your teacher, and of the citie: wherof the one may ſtore you with knowledge, the other with enſamples: yet as my ſelfe, to myne owne furderaunce, haue euermore ioyned the latine with the greeke: and haue done that, not onely in philoſophie, but alſo in the practiſe of oratorie: I think it meete for you to do the ſame, that alike you may be in the redineſſe of bothe the kindes of eloquence. To the which purpoſe verelye, we (as we ſuppoſe) haue brought great ayde to our countrimen: that not onely the

¶ MARCI TVLLII Ciceronis de officijs ad Marcum filium. Li. I.

QVanquã te Marce fili annum iam audientem Cratippum, idq; Athenis, abũdare oportet præceptis, inſtitutiſq; philoſophiæ, propter ſummã & doctoris authoritatem, & vrbis: quorum alter te ſcientia augere poteſt, altera exemplis: tamen vt ipſe ad meam vtilitatem ſemper cum græcis latina coniunxi, neque id in philoſophia ſolùm, ſed etiam in dicendi exercitatione feci: idem tibi cenſeo faciendum, vt parſus in vtriuſq; orationis facultate. Q nã quidem ad rem nos (vt videmur) magnum attulimus adiumentum hominibus noſtris: vt non modo græcarum

literarum rudes, sed etiam docti aliquantum se arbitrentur adeptos & ad dicendum, & ad iudicandum. Quamobrem discès tu quidem à principe huius ætatis philosophorũ & discès quãdiu voles, tam diu autem velle debebis, quoad tu quantũm proficias non pœnitebit. Sed tamen nostra legens non multum à Peripateticis dissidentia, quoniam vtriq; & Socratici & Platonici essevolumus, de rebus ipsis vtere tuo iudicio: nihil enim impedio, orationem autem latinam efficies profectò legendis nostris plenorem. Nec vero arroganter hoc dictum existimari velim: nam philosophã discentiam concedens multis quod est oratoris proprium aptè, distinctè, ornate q; dicere quoniam in eo studio ætatẽ consumpsi, si id mihi assumo,

the ignorant of the greeke tongue, but also the learned reckon themselues therby to haue atteyned somewhat, bothe to speache eloquente, and also to iudgment. Wherfore you shall learne in deede of the prince of philosophers in this age: and you shall learne so longe as you wyll: so longe perdie ought you to be wyllynge, as it shall not repent ye, how much ye profite. But yet reading my bookes, not greatly varyaunt from the Peripatetikes, because we will bee both Socratians, and Platomans, of the very matters, vse your owne iudgement: for I nothing let you but of trouth, by readinge my workes you shall make youre latine tongue the fuller. For yet I would haue thys supposed of a vaunte to be spoken. For giuinge place to manny in the knowledge of philosophie, yf I take vpon me that, whiche is an oratours propretie, aptlye, orderly, and finelt to speake: because I haue passed my tyme in the studie, I seeme

after

after a certaine sorte, as in mine owne right, to chaleng it. For whiche cause, I earnestly exhort you, my Cicero: that diligently you reade not onely my orations, but these bookes also of philosophie, whiche now writte to those have exercised themselues in quarrelle. For there is a greater force of eloquence in those: but thys ceuen, and tempered kynde of style is also to bee regarded. And this truelye I see, hathe happened to none of the Greckes, as yet: that one man translated in bothe the kindes: and followed as well that lawyerlie trade of pleading, as this quiet forme of reasoninge: excepte perchaunce Demetrius Phalereus maye bee counted in this nombre: who was a suttle reasoner, no vehement orator: plaisaūt yet, so as you maye knowe him for Theophrastus scholar. But howe muche wee haue profited in bothe, I referre it to other mennes iudgement: certes we haue followed both, & thinke verilye

videor id meo iure quodam modo vēdicare. Quamobrē magnopere te hortor mi Cicero: vt nō solum orationes meas, sed hos etiam de philosophia libros, qui se iam illis ferè æquarūt, studiosè legas. Vis enim dicēdi maior est in illis: sed hoc quoq; colendum est æquabile, & temperatum orationis genus. Et id quidē nemini græcorum video adhuc contigisse, vt idem vtroq; in genere laboraret, sequereturq; et illud forense dicēdi, & hoc quietum disputandi genus. Nisi forte Demetrius Phalereꝰ in hoc numero haberi potest, disputator subtilis, orator parum vehemens: dulcis tamen, vt Theophrasti discipulum possis agnoscere. Nos autem quantum in vtroq; profecerimus, aliorum sit iudicium. vtrumq; certè secuti sumus. Equidem &

Platonẽ existimo, si genus id
forẽse dicẽdi tractare volu-
isset, grauissimè, et copiosis-
simè potuisse dicere. Et De-
mosthenem, si illa quæ à
Platone didicerat, tenuisset,
et pronunciare voluisset, or-
natè, splendideq; facere po-
tuisse. Eodẽq; modo de Aris-
totele et Isocrate iudico: quo-
rũ vterq; suo studio delecta-
tus, contempsit alterum. Sed
cum statuissem aliquid hoc
tẽpore ad te scribere, et mul-
ta post hac, ab eo exordiri vo-
lui maximè, q; et ætati tuæ
esset aptissimum, & autho-
ritati meæ grauissimum.
Nam cum multa sint in phi-
losophia & grauia et vtilia
accuratè, copioseque à phi-
losophis disputata: latissi-
me patere videntur ea, quæ
de officijs tradita ab illis
præcepta sunt. Nulla enim
vitæ pars, neq; publicis, neq;

Plato could haue spoken very graueli: e plentifully if he woulde haue practised ẏ lawlike sort of pleading. & also Demosthenes coulde haue donne full finelie, and semely: if he had kept still, & woide haue vttered those things, which he learned of Plato. And after ẏ same sort I iudge of Aristotle, and Isocrates: either of which delighted with hys owne studie, despised the other.

But when I had determined to write somewhat vnto you at this season, and many thinges hereafter: I was most willing to begin with that, which bothe for your age should bee fittest, and for my authoritie the graueſt. For whereas many matters in philosophie, both weightie, and profitable, be diligentlie, & plentifully disputed by philosophers, those seeme moste largely to spreade, which of duties by them haue beene taught, and prescribed. For no part of mans life, neyther in comen, nor priuate

affayres

affayres, neither in maters abrode, nor at home, neither yf ye doe ought alone, nor if ye contracte wyth an other, maie be withoute dutie: and in regarding therof resteth all honestie of life, & in despising the same, dishonestie. And this no doutz is a common matter with al the philosophers, For who is he, which geuing no rules of duetie, dare name himself a philosopher?

But there be sundrye doctrines, whiche in settinge forth the endes of good and badde, do misturne all dutie. For who in suche wyse appointeth the soueraine good that it hath nothinge adioyned with vertue: and measureth the same by his commodities, and not by honestie: it commeth to passe, that thys man, if in himselfe he agree, and bee not somtime ouercome with the goodnesse of nature: can vse neyther friendshyp, neither iustice, nor liberalitie: & in no wise doubtlesse, can he be a manly man, who iudgeth paine the vtterest euell: nor he

priuatis, neq; forensibus, neque domesticis in re b̄, neq; si tecum agas quid, neq; sicum altero cōtrahas, vacare offi-
cio potest. In eoq; colendo sita vitæ est honestas omnis, & in negligēdo turpitudo. Atque hæc quidem quæstio communis est omniū philosophorū. Quis enī est, qui nullis officij præceptis tradēdis philosophum se audeat dicere? Sed sunt nō nullæ disciplinæ quæ propositis bonorū et malorum finibus, officiū omne peruertunt. Nam qui summum bonum sic instituit, vt nihil habeat cum virtute coniunctum: idq; suis cōmodis, nō honestate metitur: hic si sibi ipse consentiat, & non interdum naturæ bonitate vincatur, neque amicitiam colere possit, nec iustitiā, nec liberalitatē. Fortis vero dolorē sūmū malū iudicās, aut

temperans, voluptatem ſummum bonũ ſtatuens, eſſe certe nullo modo poteſt. Quæ quanq; ita ſunt in promptis, vt res diſputationẽ nõ egeat: ſunt tamen à nobis alio loco diſputata. Hæ diſciplinæ igitur, ſi ſibi conſentione eſſe velint, de officio nihil q̃ant dicere: neq; vlla officij præcepta ſũma, ſtabilia, coniuncta naturæ tradi poſsũt, niſi aut ab iis qui ſolã virtutem, aut ab iis qui maxime honeſtaq̃ propter ſe dicãt expetendã. Ita q̃ propria eſt ea præceptio Stoicorum, & Academicorũ & Peripateticorum, quoniam Ariſtonis, Pyrrhonis, et Herilli iampridẽ exploſa ſentẽtia eſt, qui tamen haberẽt ius ſuũ diſputandi de officio, ſi rem aliq̃ delectũ reliquiſſent, vt ad officij inuentionem aditus eſſet. Sequimur igitur hoc quidem tempore et in hac quæſtione potiſſimũ Stoicos:

hea temperat man, who coũteth pleaſure ỹ greteſt good. whiche pointes, though they be ſo apparaunt that ỹ thing needeth no diſputation: yet they be debated by vs in an other place. Theſe doctrines then, yf they wyll in themſelues accorde, can ſaye nothinge of duetie: nether of duetie can there bee giuen any preceptes, ſure, ſtedfaſte, and wyth nature agreable, but by them, who maintaine, that either onelie, or chiefely, honeſty for it ſelfe is to bee embraced. And therefore the teachinges thereof propelie belonges to the Stoikes, and Academikes, and Peripatetikes, becauſe Ariſtoes, Pirhoes and Herillus opinion longe ſins hathe been hiſt oute of the ſchooles, who neuer the leſſe ſhould haue theyr lawfull libertie to reaſon of duetie, yf they hadde lefte any choyſe of thinges, that to the outfindinge of duetie there mighte haue been an entrie. we will folowe therefore at this ſeaſon, and in this matter, chiefly the Stoikes, not

as a

as a translatoure, but, as we are accustomed, we will draw out of their fountaines, after our own minde, & iugemente as much and in such sorte, as shall seeme good

It lyketh me then, sithens all my discourse muste be of duetie, to define before, what is duetie, which I meruaile, was ouerskaped of Panetius. For euery teachinge of ante matter, that by an ordre ly trade is taken in hande, muste begin the processe at a definition, that it may be perceiued, what the thinge ys, whereof the treatinge goeth.

All the question of duetie is twoo folde. One kinde there is, that belonges to the ende of good, an other, that standeth in preceptes, by the whiche the trade of life may be fashioned in euery condicion. Of the former kynde suche exaumples there bee, whether all duelies bee perfite, or not: whether one duetie be more than an other: and suche, as be of the same sorte. But those duelies, whereof preceptes be giuen, thoughe they appertaine to

non vt interpretes, sed (vt solemus) de fontibus eorum, iudicio, arbitrioque nostro, quātū quoq; modo videbitur hauriemus. Placet igitur (quoniā disputatio omnis de officio futura est) ante definire quid sit officium: q̄ à Panætio prætermissū esse miror. Omnis enim, quæ à ratione suscipitur de aliqua re institutio, debet à definitione proficisci: vt intelligatur quid sit de quo disputetur. Omnis de officio duplex est quæstio vnius generis est, q̄ pertinet ad finem bonorū: alterū q̄ positū est in præceptis, quibus in omnes partes vsus vitæ confirmari possit. Superioris generis huiusmodi exēpla sunt. Omnia ne officia perfecta sint? nunquid officiū aliud alio māius sit: & quæ sunt generis eiusdem. Vtrum autem officiorū præcepta tradūtur: ea quanquam pertinent ad

tegnem bonorũ, tamẽ id minus apparet, quia magis ad institutionẽ vitæ cõmunis spectare videntur: de quibus est nobis his libris explicãdũ. Atque etiã alia diuisio est officij. Nam et mediũ quoddam officium dicitur, & perfectum. Perfectũ officiũ rectum (opinor) vocemus, q3 græci κατόρθωμα. Hoc autem commune officium καθῆκον vocãt. Atq3 ea sic definiũt vt rectũ quod sit, id perfectum officium esse definiant. Medium autem officium id esse dicunt quod cur factum sit, ratio probabilis reddi possit. Triplex igitur est, vt Panætio videtur, cõsilii capiendi deliberatio. Nã honestum ne fastu sit, an turpe dubitant, id quod in deliberationẽ cadit in quo considerãdo, sæpe animi in cõtrarias sententias

the ende of good, yet ẏ same doth lesse appeare, because they seeme rather to belong to the framing of life, of the which, in these bookes, wee haue to opẽ our minde. And also, there is an other diuision of duetie. For there is saide to bee both a certaine meane duetie, and a perfite. I suppose, we maie call the perfite, or the right duette, *Rectum*, whiche ẏ Greekes do terme κατόρθωμα and this meane, or common duetie, *Commune*, whiche they call καθῆκον

And those they doe thus define ẏ the same, whiche is *Rectum*, they define to bee ẏ perfite duetie: & that, they saye, is the meane duetie, for the whiche a prouable reason may bee renoerd, why it is done.

A duisement then in coũsel taking is threefolde, as semeth to Panetio. For firste men dout, whether it, ẏ falleth in aduisement be honest to bee done, or dishonest: in weying wherof many times mens myndes are diuersiye

drawen

drawen into contrarie opinions. Sexte, they searche, and caste whether it, wherevpon they take aduisement, auaile or noe, to commoditie, and pleasantnesse of lyfe, to riches, and plenty of goodes, to power, and swey of rule: whereby they maie helpe bothe them selues, and theirs: all which aduisement falleth into the nature of profite. The thirde kinde of douting is: when it, that appeareth to bee profitable, seemeth to stryue with honesty. For whereas profite dothe seeme to drawe to her honestie contrariwise, to cal back to her: it commeth to passe, that the minde in aduisinge is haled to and fro, and it bringeth a perplexed studie of imagination. Whereas in diuidinge, it is a foule fault to leaue out any thinge: twoo thynges bee ouerslipped in this diuision. For not onely whether that thinge be honest, or dishonest, is vsed to bee aduised vpon: but also twoo honest thinges layed before vs, whether is the honester: and lykewyse twoo pro-

distrahuntur. Tum autem aut inquirunt, aut consultant ad vitæ commoditatem iucunditatemq́, ad facultates rerum, atque copias, ad opes, ad potentiã, quibus & se possint iuuare et suos, conducat id nec ne, de quo deliberãt, quæ deliberatio omnis in rationem vtilitatis cadit. Tertium dubitandi genus est, cũ pugnare videtur cũ honesto id, quod videtur vtile. Cum enim vtilitas ad se rapere, honestas cõtra reuocare ad se videtur: fit vt distrahatur in deliberando animus, afferatq́, anceps curã cogitandi. Hac diuisione (cum præterire aliquid maximum vitium in diuidendo sit) duo prætermissa sunt. Nec enim solum vtrũ honestum an turpe sit, deliberari solet: sed etiam duobus propositis honestis vtrũ honestius. Itẽq́ue duob

propositis vtilibus, vtrũ vtilius. Ita quam ille triplicem putauit esse rationem: in quẽ q; partes distribui debere reperitur. Primum igitur est de honesto, sed de honesto dupliciter: tũ pari ratione de vtili: post de comparatione eorum disserendũ. Principio generi animãtiũ omni est à natura tributum, vt se, vitã, corpusque tueatur, declinetq; ea, quæ ei nocitura videantur: omniaq;, quæ sint ad viuẽdũ necessaria inquirat, et paret, vt pastũ, vt latibula, vt alia eiusdem generis. Commune autem animantiũ omniũ est, coniunctionis appetitus, procreandi causa, et cura quædã eorũ, quæ procreata sunt. Sed inter hominẽ et beluã hoc maxime interest, q; hæc tãtũ quãtũ sensu mouentur ad id solũ q; adest quodq; præsens est se accõmodat, paulũ admodũ sentiens præteritum, aut futurũ

profitable thinges set before vs, whether is the more profitable. So ẏ way whiche he tooke to be but threefolde, is founde meete to bee deuided into fiue partes. Firste then we haue to treate of honestye but that in twoo sortes, nexte, as many waies, of profit, lastly, of ẏ cõparisõ of thẽ bothe.

From the beginninge, to euery kinde of liuinge creature it is giuen by nature, to defend himselfe, his life, & his body, and auoyde these thynges, whiche may seeme likely to bee harmefull, and seeke, & get all thinges, that be necessarie to liue witha l, as feedinge, as couerts, as other of the same sorte. The appetite also of comming together for engendringe sake and a certain tenderne ouer them that be engendred, is a common thinge to all liuinge creatures. But betwene man and beaste, this chiefly is the difference, ẏ a beaste, so farre as he is moued by sense, bendeth himselfe, to that onely, which is present, & at hande, verye smallye perceiuynge ought paste, or to come, but

man,

man, who is partaker of reason, wherby he seeth sequels beholdeth grounds, & causes of thinges, is not ignorant of their proceedinges, and as it were their forgoinges, cõpareth semblances, and with thinges present, ioyneth and knitteth things to come both soone espie the course of hys holie life, and to the leading thereof purueieth things necessarie.

And the saide nature, thorough the power of reason, wynneth man to man, to a felowship both in talke, & also of lyfe, & engendreth a certaine speciall fauour chiefly tõ themward, that are of thẽ begotten, and stirreth vp the companies of men, that they bee willinge bothe to bee assembled together, and also to bee seruiseable one to an other, and for those causes, that they studie to purueie such thinges, as may furnish them for their apparell, and for sustinance, not onely for themselues, but for theyr wiues, children, & other, who they holde deare, and ought to defende, whiche care sturreth

Homo autem, quoniam rationis est particeps, consequentia cernit, principia & causas rerum videt, earumque progressu, & quasi antcessiones non ignorat: similitudines comparat: rebusq; præsentibus adiungit, atque annectit futuras: facile totius vitæ cursum videt, ad eamq; degendam præparat res necessarias. Eademq; natura vt rationis hominem conciliat homini & ad orationis, et ad vitæ societatem. Ingeneratq; inprimis præcipuũ quendam amorem in eos, qui procreati sunt: impellitq;, vt hominum cœtus & celebrari inter se, & sibi obedire velit: ob easq; causas studeat parare ea, quæ suppeditent & ad cultum & ad victum, nec sibi soli, sed coniugi, liberis, cæterisque, quo charos habeat, tueriq; debeat. Quæ cura

exſuſcitat etiam animos, & maiores ad rem gerẽdam facit. Inprimiſq; hominis eſt ꝓpria veri inquiſitio, atque inueſtigatio. Itaq; cũ ſumus neceſſarijs negotijs, curiſq; vacui, tum auemus aliquid videre, audire, ac diſcere, cognitionemq; rerũ, aut occultarũ, aut admirabilium ad bene, beateq; viuẽdũ neceſſariam ducimus. Ex quo intelligitur, quod verũ, ſimplex, ſinceruq; ſit, id eſſe naturæ hominis aptiſſimum.

Huic veri vidẽdi cupiditati adiuncta eſt appetitio quædã prĩcipat⁹: vt nemini pare re anim⁹ bene à natura informatus velit, niſi præcipiẽti, aut docenti, aut vtilitatis cauſa iuſte et legitime ĩperãti ex quo animi magnitudo exiſtit, humanarũq; rerũ cõtẽptio. Nec vero illa pua vis naturæ eſt rationiſq;, q; vnũ hoc animal ſẽtit quid ſit ordo

reth vp alſo mens ſpirites, and makes them of more corage to doo their buſines.

Alſo ſearching, & tracinge oute of trouthe is chiefly mans propriete. Therefore when we be voyde of neceſſarye cares, & buſines, then we couet to ſee, to heare, & to learne ſomewhat: and we thynke the knowledge of thynges either hydden, or wonderous, very neceſſarie to good and bleſſefull life. Whereof is gathered, that what ſo is true, ſimple, and pure, is fittest for the nature of man.

There is ioyned to this loue of eſpying the trouth a certeine deſire of ſouereinty: ſo as a well framed mynde by nature is willinge to obey no man, but him, that enſtructeth, and teacheth: or hym, that, for cauſe of hys weale, iuſtlie, and lawfully gouerneth: wherin ſtandeth ẏ greatnes of corage, and the cõtẽpt of worldly vanities.

And that truely is no ſmal power of nature & reaſon, ẏ this creature onely perceues what is order: what it is, ẏ become

becommeth in dedes, and wordes: & what is measure. And therfore, of those faine thinges which dee discerned by sight, no other creature perceiueth the beautie, the grace, and the proportion of parts which frome nature and reason conueying from the yies to the minde, dothe more iuge a beautie, a stedfastnes, & an order in counselles, & dedes fit to bee obserued: & is hedefull, ẏ it do nothing vncomely, or womannishlie: & therto bothe in all thoughts, & dedes, ẏ nothing wantonly either it doo, or imagin. Of which things is forged, and made that honestie, that we seke: which though it bee not announced, yet honestie it is, & we truely say, though of no man it be commēded, is yet commēdable by nature. You see, sonne Marke, the very fourme doutlesse, and (as it were) the face of honestie: which in case it might bee beholden with the yies, woulde stirre vp (as sayth Plato) a marueilous loue of wisdome.

quid deceat in factis dictisq; qui sit mod⁹. Itaq; eorū ipsorum, quæ aspectu sentiūtur, nullū aliud animal pulcritudinem, venustatem, cōuenientiam partiū sentit. Q uā similitudinè natura ratioq; ab oculis ad animū trāsferēs multo etiā magis pulchritudinem constantiā, ordinē in consilijs, factisq;, cōseruandū putat: cauetq; ne quid indecorè, effœminatéue faciat: itā in omnibus et opinionibus et factis ne quid libidinosè aut faciat, aut cogitet. Q uibus exrebus cōflatur, et officitur id q; q̄rimus honestū, q; etiā ignobilitatū nonsū, tamè honestū sit: quodq; veredicim⁹ etiāsi a nullo laudetur, laudabile esse natura. Formam quidem ipsam Marce fili, et tanquam faciem honesti vides: quæ si oculis cerneretur, mirabiles amores (vt ait Plato) excitare it sapientiæ.

But

Sed omne q̄ honestum est, id quatuor partiū oritur ex aliqua. Aut enim in perspiciētia veri, solertiaq̄ versatur: aut in hominū societate tuēda, tribuendoq̄ quod suū est cuiq̄, & rerū contractarum fide: aut in animi excelsi, atq̄ inuicti magnitudine ac robore: aut in omniū, quæ fiunt quaq̄ dicūtur, ordine et modo, in quo inest modestia & temperantia. Quæ quatuor quanq̄ inter se colligata, atq̄ implicita sunt: tamen ex singulis certa officiorum genera nascūtur: velut ex ea parte, quæ primò descriptio est, in qua sapientiā et prudentiam ponim⁹, inest indagatio atq̄ inuentio veri: eiusq̄ virtutis hoc munus est ꝓpriū. Vt enim quisq̄ maxime ꝓspicit, quid in re quaq̄: verissimum sit, quiq̄ & acutissimè & celerrime potest et videre et explicare rationem, is prudentissimus & sapientissimus vir

But all ꝑ is honest, springeth out of some one of the fower braunches. For it is occupyed either in the insighte of trouth, and wisefull nesse: or in preseruing the felowship of men, and giuinge euery body his owne, & keepinge a faithfulnesse in contractes: or in the greatnesse & mightinesse of haute, and vnconquerable courage: or elis in the ordre, and measure of all thinges, that are done, and saide, wherin resteth discretion & temperance. which fower, thoughe they be linked, & tangled togethers: yet certayne seuerall kyndes of duties do grow out of euery one of them: as out of ꝑ braunche, that furst was described (wherein wee place wisedome & prudence) issues the searchinge, and tryinge out of trouth: and this is the very propre worke of that vertue. For who so thorow seeth moste, what in euerye case is truest: and who moste wittily, and redily is able both to see, and giue the reason: he worthilie is wonte to be reputed the wittiest, & the wisest,

wyſeſt. wherefore to this vertue trouth is appoynted as the matter, whereupon to worke, and wherein to bee occupied. But to the other three vertues are aſſigned neceſſities, to get, and keepe thoſe thinges, whereby the trade of mans lyfe is mayntained: to the intent the fellowſhip, and neighbourhood of men be preſerued: and the worthines, and greatneſſe of courage may ſhyne abroade: not onely in augmentinge of ſubſtaunce, and procuring of commodities bothe to hym and his, but alſo muche more in deſpiſing of theſame.

But order, and ſtedfaſtnes, and meaſure keping, & ſuche like, haue to do in that kinde: whereunto muſt be ioyned a certaine doinge, and not onely an earneſt occupyinge of ỹ witte. For applyinge a certaine mean, and order to ſuch thinges as bee medled wyth in mans lyfe, we ſhall obſerue bothe honeſtie, and comelineſſe.

Now of theſe fower places, whereinto we haue dyuided the nature & ſtrength of ho-

haberi ſolet. Quo circa hinc quaſi materia quam tractet, & in qua verſetur, ſubiecta eſt veritas. Reliquis autem tribus virtutibus neceſſitates propoſitæ ſunt ad eas res parandas, tuendasq;, quibus actio vitæ continetur: vt & ſocietas hominum, coniunctioq́ ſeruetur, & animi excellentia, magnitudoq;, cum in augendis opibus, vtilitatibusq; & ſibi & ſuis cõparãdis, tũ multo magis in his ipſis deſpiciendis eluceat. Ordo autẽ et cõſtantia, et moderatio, et ea, quæ ſunt his ſimilia verſantur in eo genere, ad q adhibẽda eſt quadã actio, non ſolum mentis agitatio. His enim rebus, quæ tractãtur in vita, modum quendam adhibentes & ordinem honeſtatem & decus conſeruabimus. Ex quatuor autẽ locis in quos honeſti naturam

vimqũe diuiſimus, prim⁹ ille qui in veri cognitione cõſiſtit maximè naturã attingit humanã. Omnes enim trahimur et ducimur ad cognitionis et ſcictiæ cupiditatẽ: in qua excellere pulchrũ putam⁹: labi autẽ, et errare, neſcire, et decipi, et malũ, et turpe ducim⁹. In hoc genere et naturali, et honeſto duo vitia vitanda ſunt: vnũ ne incognita ꝓ incognitis habeam⁹, hiſqúe temerè aſſẽtiamur, ꝙ vitiũ effugere qui volet (omnes autẽ velle debẽt) adhibebit ad cõſiderandas res, et tẽpus, et diligentiam. Alterũ eſt vitiũ, quod quidam nimis magnum ſtudium, multamqúe operam in res obſcuras, atq; difficiles conferunt, eaſdemq; non neceſſarias. Quibus vitijs declinatis, ꝙ in reb⁹ honeſtis et cognitione dignis operæ curæ qúe ponetur, id iure laudabi

of honeſtie, that ſame firſt, ꝙ conſiſteth in knowledge of trouth, toucheth many kind nereſt of all. For we bee all drawne, and lede to a deſyre of knowledge, and ſcience: wherin to paſſe other, we thinke it a goodlie matter: but to ſlide, to erre, to bee ignorannt, to bee decepued, we count it both euill, and diſhoneſt. In this kinde of vertue, which is both naturall: & honeſt, twoo fautes muſt be auoided: one, ꝙ we take not thinges, we knowe not, as though we knewe them, & raſhlie aſſent to thẽ. Which fault whoſo will eſchew (and all ought to be willing) muſt employ to the conſidering of maters both leaſure, & diligence. An other fault there is, ꝙ ſome beſtow ouer greate ſtudie, & to much trauayl, in derk, and difficult thinges, and the ſame nothinge neceſſary. Which faultes auoided, whatſoeuer labour, and diligence ſhall bee ſpent in honeſt thinges, and worthie of knowledge, the ſame of ryght ſhall bee commended

as

as in Astrologie, we haue herd, what Caius Sulpitius was, in Geometrye, we knew, what Sextus Pompeius could doe, manye in Logik, mo in the ciuil law, which sciences be all occupyed in tracynge oute the trouthe, with the studye wherof to be drawen from trauayling in matters, it is against dutie. For vertues whole praise cõsisteth in doyng, from which yet oftentimes there is had a resting whyle, and there be graunted manye recourses agayne vnto studye, yea and the musing of the mynde, that neuer ceaseth, maye continue vs in the studies of cõtemplacion, euen without oute trauaile. But let euery thought, and motyng of ỹ mynde be occupyed eyther in takyng of aduisement about honest matters, and perteining to the good, and blissful life, or els in studies of science, and knowledge. And thus haue we spoken of the first fountain of dutie. Now of the other three vertues remaynyng, that kind

tur vt in astrologia C. Sulpitiũ audiuim⁹: in geometria Sextum Pompeium ipsi cognouim⁹: multos in dialecticis, plures in iure ciuili, quæ omnes artes in veri inuestigatione versãtur: cuius studio à reb⁹ agẽdis abduci contra officiũ est. Virtutis enim laus omnis in actione consistit: à qua tamen sæpe fit intermissio, multiq; dantur ad studia reditus: tum agitatio mẽtis quæ nunquam acquiescit, potest nos in studijs cogitationis etiã sine operæ nostra continere. Omnis autem cogitatio, motusq́ animi, aut in consilijs capiendis de rebus honestis, & pertinentibus ad bene, beateq́ viuendũ, aut in studijs scientiæ, cognitioniq; versatur. Ac de primo quidem officij fonte diximus. De reliquis autem reliquus latissimè

patet ea ratio, qua societas hominum inter ipsos, & vita quasi communitas continetur. Cuius partes duæ sunt. Iustitia, in qua virtutis splendor est maximus, ex qua boni viri nominantur: & huic coniuncta beneficentia, quam eandem vel benignitatem, vel liberalitatem appellari licet. Sed iustitiæ primum munus est, vt nemo cui quis noceat, nisi lacessitus iniuria, deinde vt communibus pro communibus vtatur, priuatis autem vt suis. Sunt autem priuata nulla natura, sed aut vetere occupatione, vt qui quondam in vacua venerunt: aut victoria, vt qui bello potiti sunt: aut lege, pactione, conditione, sorte. Ex quo fit, vt ager Arpinas Arpinatium dicatur: Thusculanus

extendeth fardest, wherein is conteyned the felowship of men amonge themselues and (as it were) the interparcening of mens life.

Whereof there bee two partes: Iustice is one, in the whiche is the greatest brightnes of vertue, wherof good menne beare theyr name, and to this is ioyned bountifulnesse, which same we may terme eyther gentlenes, or liberalitie.

But the pryncipall duetie of iustice is, that no man harte another, vnlesse he bee prouoked by wronge: the next, that he vse thinges common, as common, and thinges priuate, as hys owne. How be it by nature, thynges priuate bee none, but either by auncient possession, as of theyrs, who in olde tyme came into waste groundes, or by victorye, as of theirs, who got thynges in warre: or by lawe, couenaunt, condicion, or lotte. Whereof it comes to passe, that the grounde Arpinas is counted the Arpinatian: the groūd Tusculane

the

the Tusculanians. And after this sort is the pointing out of priuate possessions. Wherappon seyng there is made a mans owne of euerye one of those thynges which by nature were common: let euerye one enioye that to euery one is be falle. More than that, yf any man will couet to him selfe, hee shall breake the lawe of mans fellowshyp. But by cause (as it is notably written of Plato) we be borne not for our selues alone, but somedeale of our birthe our countrey, somedeale our parentes, somdeale our frends do claime, and (as liketh the Stoikes) what so euer is breade vppon earthe, all to the vse of manne is created, but man for mannes owne cause is begotten, that they among them selues one maye helpe another, herein wee bee bounde to folowe nature our leader: and to set abrode, that maye serue for common commodities, by enterchaunge of duties in geuing, & takinge, and also by artes, by rea-

Thusculanorū, Similisq; est priuatarum possessionū descriptio. Ex quo, quia suum cuiusque fit eorum quæ natura fuerant communia, quod cuique obtigit, id quisque teneat. Eo si quis sibi plus appetet, violabit ius humanæ societatis. Sed quoniam (vt preclare scriptum est a Platone) non nobis solum nati sumus: ortusque nostri partem patria vendicat, partem parentes, partem amici, atque (vt placet Stoicis) quæ in terris gignuntur, ad vsum hominum omnia creari, homines autē hominum causa esse generatos, vt ipsi inter se alij alijs prodesse possint: in hoc naturam ducē debemus sequi, & communes vtilitates in medium affere mutatione officiorum, dando accipiendoque: tum artibus,

tam opera, tum facultatib⁹ deuincire hominũ inter homines societatem. Fundamentum autẽ iustitiæ est fides, id est dictorum, conuẽtorumq; cõstãtia, et veritas ex quo, quãquam hoc videbitur fortasse cupiã durius, tamen audeamus imitari Stoicos, qui studiosè exquirũt vnde verba sint ducta, credamusq; quia fiat q̃ dictum est, appellatam fidẽ Sed iniustitiæ duo genera sũt. vnũ eorum, qui inferũt: alterũ eorũ, qui ab his, quibus infertur si possent, non propulsant iniuriam. Nam qui iniustè impetum in quẽpiã facit, aut ira, aut aliqua perturbatione incitat⁹ is quasi manus violẽter videtur afferre socio: qui autẽ nõ defendit, nec obsistit, si potest iniuriæ, tã est in vitio, quam si parẽtes, aut amicos aut patriam deseret.

uaile by riches, to knit the felowshippe of man withe man.

But faithfulneſſe is the foundacion of iuſtice, which is in word, and couenaunt, a trouth, and ſtedfaſtneſſe Wherevpon thoughe thys ſhall ſeme to ſome perchaunce ouerharde: yet let vs be bold to folow the Stoiks which heedefully ſerch out from whence woordes bee fetched, and let vs thinke, that it is called faithfulnes, becauſe it is fulfilled, which was faithed.

Contrarywiſe, there bee two kinds of iniuſtice. One of ſuch as offer it: another, of thoſe, whoe though they be able do not defend wrõg from them to whome it is offered. For who ſo vniuſtly doth make aſſaute vppon any man, eyther ſtirred by choler, or any paſſion, he ſeemeth as with violence, to kyll his felowe, and who ſo defendeth not, nor withſtãdeth iniurie if he be able, is as farre in faulte: as if hee ſhould forſake his parents, his frendes, or his countrey

And

And in dede those iniuries, that are doone of purpose to hurt, do often times arise of feare, whē he who intendeth to hurt another, is afraide that vnlesse he do it to the other, he may hym selfe be touched with some discommoditie.

And for the moste parte many men take occasion to do wrong, of intent to compasse those thinges ỹ they haue coueted: in whiche kind of vice, couetousnes, most largely shewethe her selfe. Notwithstanding ryches be cousted, both for necessary vses of the like, and also to enioy pleasure. But in those in whom ther is a greater courage, couetyng of money hathe an eye to power, and ablenesse of pleasuryng, as of late Marcus Crassus denied anye substāce to be great inough for hym, that in a common weale woulde be a prince: while he were not able with his reuenue to maintaine an army. Sumptuouse furnitures do also delite, and countenaunce of life, wyth

Atq; illæ quidem iniuriæ, quæ nocēdi causa de industria inferūtur, sæpe a metu proficiscuntur: cū is qui alteri nocere cogitat, timet ne, nisi id alteri fecerit, ipse aliquo afficiatur incommodo. Maxima autē partem ad iniuriam faciēdā aggrediuntur nōnulli, vt adipiscātur ea quæ concupierunt: in quo vicio latissimē patet auaritia. Expetuntur autem diuitiæ, tum ad vsus vitæ necessarios, tū ad pfruendas voluptates. In quibus autē maior est animus, in his pecuniæ cupiditas spectat ad opes, et ad gratificandi facultatē, vt nuper M. Crassus negabat vllā satis magnā pecuniā esse ei, qui in re pub. prīceps vellet esse, cuius fructibus exercitū alere nō posset. delectāt etiā magnifici apparat⁹, vitæq; cult⁹, cū

elegãtia et copia. quibus rebus effectum est, vt infinita pecuniæ cupiditas esset. Nec vero reifamiliaris ãplificacio nemini nocẽs vituperanda est, sed fugienda sẽper iniuria. Maxime autẽ adducũtur plerique, vt eos iustitiæ capiat obliuio, cũ in imperiorũ, honorũ, gloriaue cupiditatẽ inciderint, quod enĩ apud Ennium. NVLLA SANCTA SOCIETAS, NEC FIDES REGNI EST. Id latius patet. nã quicquid ciusmodi est ĩ quo nõ possint plures excellere, in eo plerũq; fit tãta cõtẽtio, vt difficillimũ sit sanctã seruare societatẽ. Declarauit id modo temeritas C. Cæsaris qui omnia iura diuina & humana peruertit propter eũ quẽ sibi ipse opinionis errore finxerat principatũ. Est autẽ in hoc genere molestum, q; in maximis animis, splẽdidissimisq; ingenijs plerũq; existũt

kinnesse, and plentie. By which meanes it is come to passe that cudielle is the desire of riches.

And truely the enlargement of a mannes pryuate goodes, hurtful to no body. is not to be dispraised, but euermore iniurie is to bee shonned. But the moste parte of menne chiefely bee brought to forgette iustice: when they fall into the desire of rule, honour, or glorye. For that, whiche is in Ennius.

In Empire is no godly felowshippe, nor no faythe,

reacheth further. For what soeuer is of such sort, wherein manye cannot bee chiefe, therein commonlye happenethso greate contencion, that very harde it is to kepe a godly societie. The storme of Caius Cesar declared that of late, who tourned topset torne all the lawes of God, and man, for that soueraintles sake, which he to him self, by the errour of his owne cõceit, had imagined. And in this kinde, it is a grieffull case, that desires

of ho-

of honor, rule, power, & glo
ry be cõmonly in ỹ greteſt
corages, & goodlieſt wits,
wherfore ỹ more heede muſt
be taken, that we offend no
thing in that behalfe.

But there is a great di
uerſitie in al iniuſtice, whe-
ther the wrong bee done of
any ſturre of ỹ mynd, which
cõmonly is but ſhort, & for
a ſeaſõ, or els of purpoſe, &
aduiſedly. For the harmes
bee eaſier, that befall of ſome
ſodein mode, thã ſuch as be
done being deuiſed, and pre
pared for. And thus we
haue ſayd enough of doyng
iniury.

But there are wont to be
many cauſes, why we refuſe
to defẽd another, & do leaue
our dutie. For men be vn-
willing to take vpõ thẽ ei-
ther diſpleaſure or trauaile
or charges, or els they be ſo
geuẽ to negligence, ſlouth-
fulnes, idelnes, priuate ſtu
dies, or certayne buſineſſe,
that they ſuffer them to be
helpleſſe, whom they ought
to ſaue harmleſſe. wherfore
we muſt loke leſt it bee not
ſufficient, that is ſpoken of

honoris imperij, pecuniæ, glo-
riæ cupiditates. Q no ma-
gis cauendũ eſt, ne quid in eo
genere peccetur. Sed in omni
iniuſtitia permultũ intereſt
vtrũ perturbatione aliqua
animi, quæ plerũque breuis
eſt, & ad tẽpus, an conſulto
et cogitato fiat iniuria. Leui
ora enim ſunt ea, quæ repen-
tino aliquo motu accidunt,
quam ea, quæ meditata &
præparata inferũtur. Ac de
inferẽda quidẽ iniuria ſa-
tis eſt dictũ. Prætermitten-
dæ autem defenſionis, deſe-
rẽdiq; officij plures ſolẽt eſſe
cauſæ. Nã aut inimicitias,
aut laborẽ, aut ſũptꝰ ſuſcipe
re nolunt: aut etiã negligen-
tia, pigritia, inertia, aut ſu-
is ſtudijs, quibuſdamue oc-
cupationibus ſic impedi-
untur vt eos quos tutari
debeant, deſertos eſſe pati-
ãtur. Itaque videndũ eſt, ne
non ſatis ſit id, quod apud

Platonem est in Philosophos dictum: quòd in veri inuestigatione versentur, quodque ea, quæ plerique vehementer expetunt, de quibus inter se digladiari soleant, contemnant, & pro nihilo ducant, propterea iustos esse, nam dum alterum iusticiæ genus assequuntur, in inferenda ne cui noceant iniuria, in alterum incidunt, discendi enim studio impediti, quos tueri debent, deserunt, itaque eos ad Rempublicam ne accessuros quidem putat, nisi coactos. Aequius autem erat id voluntate fieri, nam hoc ipsum ita iustum est, quod recte fit: si est voluntarium. Sunt etiã qui aut studio rei familiaris tuendæ, aut odio quodã hominũ suũ se nego iũ agere dicant, ne facere cuiquam

Plato touchyng the Philosophers, that therefore they be iust, because they be occupyed in tracinge oute trouthe: and because they despyse, and sette at nought suche thynges as the moste part of men greedely desire and amonge themselues are wõt to be at daggers drawing for the same. For while they attayne one kynde of iustice, that they hurte no man with doyng of iniurye, they fall into the other. For beyng letted with the study of learnynge, they forsake them, whome they ought to defende. And therefore he thynkes, they would not enter into the cõmon wele, were they not compelled. But it were more reason, that voluntarilye it shoulde bee doone. For what so is ryghtly doone, the same thereby is iust, if it bee voluntarie. There bee also, who eyther for loue of sauyng theyr substaunce, or a certayne hatred to men, do say, that they meddle onely with theyr owne matters, lest they may seeme to doe any

anye bodye wronge, who, while they be voyde of one kynd of iniustice, do runne into the other. For they forsake the fellowshippe of life, because they bestow no studye, no labour, nor substance vpon it

Seing then after the declaring of the two kyndes of iniustice, we haue hytherto ioyned the causes of eyther kynde and haue sette oute those thinges afore, wherin iustice is contayned, we maye easely iudge, what is the duetie of euery season, except we fauor our selues to farre. For it is harde to haue a carefulnesse ouer othermēs matters, although that same Chremes in Terence counteth nothynge straunge to hym, of ought that pertaynes to man.

Neuertheles, because we perceiue and feele those thinges more, that do happen to oure selues, eyther luckely, or vnfortunately, than such as befall to other which (as ye would say) we beholde a great way of: we iudge otherwyse of them, then

videantur iniuriā, qui dū altero iniustitiæ genere vacant, in alterum incurrunt: deserunt enim vitæ societatem: quia nihil conferunt in eā studij, nihil operæ, nihil facultatum. Quoniam igitur duobus generibus iniustitiæ propositis adiunximus causas vtriusq; generis, easq́ue res ante cōstituimus, quibus iustitia cōtinetur: facile quod cuiusq; tēporis officium sit, poterim⁹ (nisi nosmetipsos valde amabimus) iudicare. Est enim difficilis cura rerū alienarum. quanquā Terentianus ille Chremes humani nihil à se alienū putat. Sed tamen quia magis ea percipim⁹ atq́ue sentim⁹, quæ nobis ipsis aut ꝓspera, aut aduersa eueniunt, quā illa, quæ ceteris, quæ quasi lōgo interuallo interiecto videm⁹ aliter de his

ac de nobis iudicam⁹. Quo circa bene præcipiũt, qui vetant quicquam agere, quod dubites æquũ sit, an iniquũ. Æquitas enim lucet ipsa per se: dubitatio autẽ cogitationem significat iniuriæ. Sed incidunt sæpe tẽpora, cum ea quæ maxime videntur digna esse iusto homine, eoq; quẽ virum bonum dicimus, cõmutantur, fiuntq; contraria: vt non reddere depositũ, etiam ne furioso promissum facere, quæq; pertinẽt ad veritatem, et ad fidẽ ea negare interdum, & non seruare sit iustũ. Referri enim decet ad ea, quæ posui in principio fundamẽta iustitiæ: primũ, vt ne cui noceatur: deinde vt cõmuni vtilitati seruiatur. Ea cum tẽpore cõmutantur commutatur officiũ: vt non sẽper sit idẽ. Potest enim accidere promissũ aliquod, et cõ ẽtũ, vt id effici sit inutile,

then of our selues. Therefore they teache well, that forbidde to doe any thyng, which ye doute, whether it be right or wrong. For the very right shineth of it self: but doubting declares an imagination of wrong. But often there befall seasons, & those duties, which seeme to be most meete for a iust mã, and him, whom we call a good man, be changed and become contrarious: so that sometime it is iust not to restore, that is layde to keepe, also, not to performe promise with a mad mãne, and to denye those thynges, whiche concerne ones trouth, and honestie. For it is meete, they bee referred to those foundacions of iustice, which I layd in the begynning: first, that no man be hurt, next, that common profite bee serued. When these bee chaunged by tyme, chaunged is duetie, that it remaines not alwayes alyke. For there may chaunce some promes, and couenant, that may be vnprofitable to bee performed

med, either to him, to whome it is promised: or els to him, that promised it. For (as it is in the fables) if Neptunus hadde not done, that to Theseus he promised. Theseus had not bene bereefte of his sonne Hippolitus. For of the three bonds (as is writtē) that was the thirde, whiche in his furie he asked, for the death of Hippolitus: & whē he had obtained it, he fell into heauy waylinges. Therfore neither those promises are to be fulfilled, whiche are vnprofitable to thē, to whom you made them: nor if they hurte you more, then they profit him, whom you promised.

It is againste dutie, the greater harme to bee rather admitted, than the lesse: as if you haue appointed your selfe, with any man: to come, as his counseller in his matter, that is in hand: and in ỹ meane season, your sonne begins to fall sore sicke: let it not be reckened against dutie, not to performe that ye promised: yea & he more shold swarue frō dutie, to whō ỹ promis

vel ei cui promissū sit, vel ei qui promiserit. Nam si (vt in fabulis est,) Neptunus quod Theseo promiserat, non fecisset: Theseus filio Hippolito non esset orbatus, ex tribus enim optatis, (vti scribitur) hoc erat tertium, quod de Hyppoliti interitu iratus optauit quo impetrato in maximos luctus incidit. Nec promissa igitur seruanda sunt ea, quae sint iis, quibus promiseris, inutilia, nec si plus tibi noceant, quàm illi prosint, cui promiseris. Contra officiū est, maius dānū anteponi minori, vt si constituerit te cuipiam aduocatum in rem presentem esse venturum, atque interim grauiter ægrotare filius cœperit, non sit contra officium, non facere quod dixeris, magisque ille, cui

promissum sit, ab officio discedat, si se destitutum queratur. Iam illis promissis non standum esse quis non videt, quæ coactus quis metu, aut deceptus dolo promiserit. Quæ quidem pleraque iure pretorio liberantur, non nulla legibus. Existūt etiam sæpe iniuriæ calumnia quadam, & nimis calida, sed malitiosa iuris interpretatione. Ex quo illud, summum ius, summa iniuria, factum est iam tritum sermone prouerbium, quo in genere etiam in Rep. multa peccantur: vt ille qui, cū centum triginta dierum essent cum hoste pactæ inducię, noctu populabatur agros, quod dierū essent pactæ, non noctiū induciæ: Nec noster quidem probandus est: si verū est, Q. uīum Fabiū Labeonē, seu quē

promis wis made, yf hee woulde complaine him selfe to be disapointed.

Now who seeth not that it is not meete, to stande to those promisses, which a mā hath promised beeyng constrained with feare, or deluded wyth guyle. Whych thinges, for the most parte, bee discharged by the Pretors court, and many of thē by statute.

Wronges also often times do rise vppon a certaine cauillacion, & ouer crafty, and suttle misconstruing of the law wherevppon that sayyng, Extreem law, extreem wrong, is now made a well worne prouerbe in communicacion. In which kynde many thinges be don amisse euen in the common weales matters, as he, who when the truce was taken wythe the enemy, for. xxx. dayes, ouerranne his land in the night because the truce was taken for dayes, and not for nightes. No nor yet ouer countremā is to be allowed if it be true that Quintus Fabius Labeo, or any other

man

man (for I haue nothinge, but by heareſaye) beinge by the Senate apointed dateſman to the Nolones, and Neapolitanes, aboue the boundes of there land, dyd commune with either of thē aparte, when he came to the place that they ſhoulde not do, nor couet any thing gredely, and that rather they woulde ſet backe, than encroche vppon eche other. Whiche when eyther of thē hadde ſo done, there was a parcel of grounde left in the middes. And ſo he cauſed theire boundes to be ſtaked out, euen as they had tolde him, the reſidue, that was in the middes, he adiudged to ỹ people of Rome. This plainly is to deceaue, and not to iudge. wherfore ſuch wylineſſe in euery caſe is to be auoided.

There be certaine duities alſo to be obſerued euen towarde them of whome you haue receiued wronge. For in reuenge, & chaſtiſement, there is a meaſure to be vſed. And I wotte not, whether it be ſufficient for him, that

alium (nihil enim preter auditum habeo) arbitrũ Nolanis & Neapolitanis definibus agri à Senatu datum: cum ad locum veniſſet, cum vtriſque ſeparatim locutum, ne cupide quid agerent, ne quid appeterent, atque vt regredi, quàm progredi mallent. Id cum vtrique feciſſent aliquantum agri in medio relictum eſt. Itaque illorum fines, ſicut ipſi dixerant, terminauit. in medio relictum, quod erat, Populo Romano adiudicauit. Decipere hoc quidem nõ iudicare eſt. Quocirca in omni refugienda eſt talis ſolertia. Sunt autem quædam officia etiã aduerſus eos ſeruanda, a quibus iniuriam acceperis. Eſt enim vlciſcendi & puniendi modus. Atque haud ſcio, an ſatis ſit eum qui

lacessierit iniuriæ suæ pœnitere, vt & ipse nequid tale post hac cõmittat, et cæteri sint ad iniuriam tardiores. Atque in Repub. maxime cõseruanda sunt iura belli. Nã cum sint duo genera decertandi: vnũ per disceptationem, alterũ per vim, cumq; illud proprium sit hominis, hoc beluarum, confugiendũ est ad posterius, si vti nõ licet superiore. Quare suscipienda quidem bella sunt ob eam causam, vt sine iniuria in pace viuatur, parta autẽ victoria, conseruandi sũt ij, qui nõ crudeles in bello, nec immanes fuerunt: vt maiores nostri Tusculanos Equos Volscos, Sabinos, Hernicos in ciuitatẽ etiam acceperũt at Charthaginẽ & Numãtiã funditus sustulerũt. Nolem Corinthũ: sed credo illos sensisse opportunitatem loci,

that began, to repent hym of the wronge: but that he bee punished, that he commit not the like offence againe: and that other also may bee the slower to do wrong.

And the lawe of armes must in any wise bee kept, in the cõmon weale. For where as there bee twoo kindes of contencion, one by reasoning, an other by violẽce: and the first is the propertie of man, the second, of beast: we must flee to the latter, if we may not vse the former.

wherfore to this ende, and purpose wee must enter in warre: that without iniurie we may liue in peace: & whẽ the victorie is gotten, they must be saued, who haue not ben cruell, nor vnmerciful in fight: as our auncetors euen into the citie receiued the Tusculanes, the Equianes, the Volscianes, the Sabines, & the Hernikes: but they vtterly razed Cartage, and Numance. Corinth I wolde, they hadde not: but I beleue, they chiefly respected the situacion: lest the very place might

myght encourage them, at any time to moue warre.

After my mynd certesse, it is mete alwayes to geue counsell to peace, that shall haue in it no fraude, nor gyple. Wherein if men had agreed to me, we shoulde haue had, although not the best, yet some common weale, which now is none. And not onely for them ye must prouyde, whome by force you haue subdued, but they also, who come in with prided weapons, vpon affiaunce in the captain (although the Ramme hath battered the wall) are to be receyued. In which poynte, iustice hath been so greatly regarded with our men, that they, who had taken cities to mercye, or nations conquered in warre, should be theyr patrones, by the custome of our auncesters. And the Iustice of warre is moste sincerely described, in the feciall lawe of the people of Rome. Whereby it may be perceiued, that no warre is iust, but whiche eyther for thinges

maximè ne posset aliquãdo ad bellum faciendum locus ipse adhortari. Mea quidem ΦΦ
sententia, paci quæ nihil haberet asperitatis insidiarum, semper est consulendum. In qua Φφa
simihi obtemperatum esset: & si non optimam, at aliquã Rem. (quæ nũc nulla est) haberemus. At cum iis, quos vi deuiseris, cãsulendum est: tũ ij, qui armis positis ad imperatorum fidẽ confugiunt (quamuis murũ aries percussrit) recipiendi Φra
sunt. In quo tantopere apud nostros iustitia culta est, vt ij, qui ciuitates, aut nationes deuictas bello in fidem recepissẽt: earũ patroni essẽt more maiorũ. Ac belli quidem æquitas sanctissime fa- γνũ
ciali Populi Romani iure perscripta est. Ex qua intellegi potest, nullum bellum esse iustum, nisi quod aut

rebus repetitis geratur, aut denunciatum ante sit, et indictum. Pompilius imperator tenebat prouinciã, in cuius exercitu Catonis filius Tiro militabat. Cum autem Pompilio videretur vnã dimittere legionẽ: Catonis quoque filium, qui in eadem legione militabat, dimisit. Sed cũ amore pugnandi in exercitu remansisset: Cato ad Põpiliũ scripsit, vt si cum pateretur in exercitu remanere, secũdo cũ obligat et militia sacramento: quia priore amisso iure pugnare cum hostibus nõ poterat. A deò sũma erat obseruatio in bello mouendo. Marci quidẽ Catonis senis est epistola ad M. filium: in qua scripsit se audisse eum missum factum esse à Consule, cum in Macedonia bello Persico miles esset. Monet igitur, vt caueat, ne

things in claime is moued, or is proclaimed before, & bidden by defiaunce. Pompilius ỹ Romanes generall kepte a prouince, in whose armye, Catoes sonne went for a põg souldiour a warfare. And when it lyked Põpilius to discharge one legion, he dyscharged Catoes sonne also who serued in that legiõ as a souldier. But when he, for loue of the warres, remayned in ỹ campe still, Cato dyd write to Pompilius, that yf he would suffer him to remain in ỹ armye, he should swere him souldiour agayne, because he might not lawfully fight with the enemye, ỹ former othe beyng discharged. So passig great regard they had in makinge their warres. There is a letter abrode, of Marcus Cato, the old mã, to Marcus his sonne, wherein he wrote, that he heard, he was dyscharged by the Consull, being a souldiour in Macedonie, at ỹ Persian warres. He warned him therfore to beware, that he enter not

the

the battle: for he denieth that it is lawfull for him, that is no souldier, to fight with the enemie.

And this also I note, that here, whiche by his proper name was *Perduellis*, that is to meane, an open enemy, was called *Hostis*, the mildnes of the worde asswaging the haynousnesse of the thig. For he was called *Hostis*, with our auncetors, whom now we name *Peregrin*° A straunger. That the twelue tables declare, *Aut status dies cum hoste* and again, *Aduersus hostem eterna auctoritas*. What may there be added to this kinde of gentlenes: to call him by so faire a name with whom you make warre. Notwithstandinge processe of tyme maketh that name nowe more odious: for it is gone from the signification of *Peregrin*°, that is to saie a stranger, & properlie it standes for him ỹ beareth armour against one. But whẽ ther is fighting for empire. ℣

C.i. glory

prælium ineat. Negat enim
ius esse, qui miles non sit,
pugnare cum hoste. Equi-
demillud etiam animaduer-
to, quod qui proprio nomi-
ne perduellis esset, is hostis
vocaretur, lenitate verbi
tristitiam reimitigante.
Hostis enim apud maiores
nostros is dicebatur, quem
nunc peregrinum dicimus.
Indicant. XII. tabulæ.
AVT STATVS DIES
CVM HOSTE Itemque,
ADVERSVS HOSTEM
AETERNA AVTHO-
RITAS. Quid ad hãc mã
suetudinem addi potest? eum
qui cum bellum geras, tam
molli nomine appellare? quã
quam id nomen diuius iam
offecit vetustas, à peregrino
enim recessit: et proprie in
eo, qui contra ferret arma,
remãsit. Cum vero de impe-
decertatur, belloq; quæritur

gloria causas omnino subesse, tamen oportet easdem, quas dixi paulo ante iustas causas esse bellorum. Sed ea bella, quibus imperij gloria proposita est minus acerbe gerenda sunt. Vt enim cum ciuiliter contendimus, aliter si est inimicus, aliter si competitor: cum altero certamen honoris, et dignitatis est: cum altero capitis, & famæ. Sic cum Celtiberis, cum Cimbris bellum, vt cũ inimicis gerebatur, vter esset, non vter imperaret. Cũ Latinis, Sabinis, Samnitib⁹ Pœnis, Pirrho, de imperio dimicabatur. Pœni fœdifragi, crudelis Anniball, reliqui iustiores. Pyrrhi quidem de captiuis reddendis illa præclara, sententia est.

glory is sought by warre: yet it behoueth alwayes, ỹ ỹ verie same causes be therin, which I declared a lyttle before to be the iust causes of warre. But those warres are not so cruellie to be made, which bee purposed for the glorie of empire. For as, when we striue in the citie, we doo otherwise, if one bee our enemie, otherwyse, if he be but suter agaynste vs: for with the one ỹ strife is for honour, and dignitie, with the other, for lyfe, and honestie: euen so war was holden with the Celtibers, & with the Cimbers, as with our enemyes, whether shoulde liue, and not whether should rule, but with ỹ Latines, the Sabines, the Samnites, the Penes, and with Pirrhus, the fighte was aboute empire, & dominõ. The Penes were leag breakers, Anniball was cruell, the rest were iuster men. That is a notable sayeng douteles of Pyrrhus, aboute the restoringe of prisoners.

No

No golde do I craue,
no price offer me:
No hucsters of warre,
warremen as we bee.
VVith dint for our life,
fight we, not with golde:
VVhether you fortoraigne,
or me the ladie wolde.
Chaunce trie we by force,
this answere eke haue:
VVhose manhod the happe
of battell will spare,
Their fredome I pur-
pose to fauour also.
Them giue I, them take:
the Goddes will it so.

Nec mî aurum posco:
nec mî pretium dederitis.
Nec cauponántes bellum,
sed belligerantes.
Ferro non auro vitam
cernamus vtriq;, (*hera*
Vosne velit, an me regnare
quidúe ferat sors,
Virtute experiamur,
et hoc simul accipe dictum.
Quorum virtuti belli
fortuna pepercit,
Eorũdem me libertati
parcere certum est.
Dono ducite, doq;, volentib
cum magnis dijs.

A princelie saying forsothe, and well beseeming the lynage of the Aeacidans.

Likewise if priuate men, driuen by occasions, shall promise ought to the enemie, they muste kepe theyre promes therin. As Regulus did, that was taken of the Carthaginers in the first Punik warres: who,

Regalis sanè & digna Acacidarum genere sententia.

Aiq́e etiam si quid singuli temporibus adducti hosti promiserint, est in ea ipso fides conseruanda, vt primo punico bello Regulus captus à Pœnis:

cum de captiuis commutandis Romam missus esset, iurasset q; se rediturum: primum vt venit, captiuos reddendos in senatu non censuit. Deinde cum retineretur à propinquis et ab amicis, ad supplicium redire maluit, quam fidem hosti datam fallere.

Secundo autem Punico bello, post cannensem pugnam, quos decem Annibal Romam adstrictos misit iurciurando se redituros esse, nisi de redimendis ijs, qui ceperant, impetrassent: eos omnes Censores, quoad quisque eorum vixit, qui peierassent, in aerarijs retinquerunt: minus illum, qui inuisitatam fraude culpam inuenerat.

Cum enim Annibalis permissu exisset e castris, rediit

when he was sent to Rome, about the enterchaunginge of prisoners, & had sworne, that he wolde returne. first, as soone as he came, the Senate adulse was in the Senatehouse, that the prisoners should not be restored, afterward, when he shoulde haue been stoped of his kinsfolke, and frendes: he was more willinge to returne to ponnishement, than to breake his promes giuen to the enemie.

And in the seconde Punike warres, after Cannas feelde, the Censors sessed at a perche fyne all those tenne (as longe as any of them liued, that tarted styll, and were forswore) which Annibal sent to Rome, vpon their othe, ỹ they shoulde returne: except they obteined the raunsominge of those, ỹ were prisoners there, & no lesse they sessed him, whiche for the deceiuing of his othe, had deuised an excuse. for whē by Annibals leaue, vpō his othe to returne, he was gone out ỹ cāpe, he returned

ned with a little while after, making his excuse, ỹ he had forgotten. I wot not what. Afterward, beinge gonne out of the cãpe, he thought himselfe discharged of hys othe, and in words he was, but not in deede. For alwais in promise must bee considered what ye meane, not what ye saye.

But the greatest example of iustice towarde the enemie was showed by your aũceters. When a runawaye traytour from Pyrrhus had promised the Senate, that he wolde giue the king poyson, and kill him, the Senate, and Caius Fabritius did deliuer the rũnaway traytour to Pyrrhus. In suche sorte, with tretherie, they allowed not the death of their enemie, and suche a one, as was bothe mightie, and mooued warre vnprouoked. Thus of warre faring duties ther is inough spoken.

Let vs remember also, that euen towarde the baseste sort there is a iustice to bee kept. The baseste degree,

paulò pòst quòd se oblitum nescio quid diceret. Deinde egressus è castris, iureiurando se solutum putabat: et erat verbis, ye non erat. Sẽper autem in fide, quid senseris, non quid dixeris, cogitandum. Maximum autem exemplũ est iustitiæ in hostem à maioribus nostris constitutum. Cùm a Pyrrho perfuga Senatui est pollicitus, se venenum Regi daturum, et eum necaturum. Senatꝰ, et C. Fabriciꝰ perfugam Pyrrho dedit. Ita ne hostis quidem, et potentis, et bellum vltrò inferentis, cũ scelere interitum approbauit.

Ac de bellicis quidem officijs satis dictum est. Meminerimus autem etiam aduersus infimos iustitiam esse seruandam. Est autem infima conditio &

fortuna seruorum: quibus non male præcipiunt, qui ita iubent vti, vt mercenariis, ad operam exigendam, et iusta præbenda. Cum autẽ duobus modis, id est aut vi, aut fraude fiat iniuria: fraus quasi vulpeculæ, vis leonis videtur: vtrunque ab homine alienissimum: sed fraus odio digna maiore. Totius autẽ iniustitiæ nulla capitalior est, quàm eorum, qui id cũ maxime fallunt id tamen agunt, vt viri boni esse videantur. De iustitia satis dictum est. Deinceps, vt erat propositum, de beneficentia ac liberalitate dicatur: quæ quidem nihil est naturæ hominis accommodatius. Sed habet multas cautiones. Videndum est enim primum, ne obsit beneficentia & his ipsis: quibus benigne videbitur fieri,

& state is of slaues: whome they, that will ye so to vse, as hyred men, in requiringe their worke, and giuinge them their due, doo teache you not amisse.

But where as iniuries may bee doone two waies ỹ is to say, other by force or by gyle: gyle seemes as of the fox, force as of the lyon: both in trouthe ar verye vnfitte for man, yet gyle deserueth the greater hatred. But of all iniustice none is more pestilent, than theirs: which when they begyle a man moste, yet so handle the matter, that they will seeme to be well meaning men. Of iustice here is saide inough.

Let vs now speake, as we purposed, of bountifulnesse, and liberalitie: for nothinge without doute is to the nature of man more agreeable.

Notwithstanding it hathe diuers exceptions. For first we must, see ỹ our bountifulnesse hurt not both those to whome bountifullie it shall seme to bee doone, and

and alſo other mo, next that our liberalitie be not moze, than our abilitie, thirdlie, ỹ to euery man bee gyuen, accordinge to hys worthynesse. For that is the foundation of iuſtice, wherto all theſe muſte bee applied .i. For both they, that pleaſure any bodie with that, whiche may hurt hym, whom they woulde ſeeme wyllinge to profit, ought to bee deemed not bountcous, nor liberall, but peſtilent flatterers, and they likewyſe, who do hurt ſome, that they may bee lyberall to other, do fall into the ſame iniuſtice, as if they ſhould turne other mennes goodes into their owne.

But there bee many, and namelie the deſirous of honour and glozie, who dos catche from ſome, that they may lauiſhe to an other, and theſe ſuppoſe, that they ſhall ſeeme bountefull to theire frendes, if they may enrich them any maner way.

But that is ſo farre of from dutie, that nothing may bee moze contrarious to dutie. We muſt ſee therfoze, that

et cæteris: deinde ne maior benignitas ſit, quàm facultates: tum vt pro dignitate cuiq; tribuatur. Idemim eſt iuſtitiæ fundamentum, ad quam hæc omnia ſunt referenda. Nam & qui gratificantur cuipiam, quod obſit illi, cui prodeſſe velle videantur, non benefici, neque liberales, ſed pernicioſi aſſectatores iudicandi ſunt. Et qui alijs nocent: vt in alios liberales ſint, in eadem ſunt iniuſtitia, vt ſi in ſuam rem alienã conuertant. Sunt autem multi, equidem cupidi ſplendoris et gloriæ, qui eripiũt alijs, quod alijs largiãtur. Hiq; arbitrãtur ſe benefícos in ſuos amicos viſũ iri, ſi locupletent eos quacunq; ratione. Id autem tantum abeſt ab officio, vt nihil magis officio poſſit eſſe contrarium. Videndũ eſt igitur, vt

ea liberalitate vtamur, quæ prosit amicis, noceat nemini. Quare L. Syllæ, & C. Cæsaris pecuniarum translatio à iustis dominis ad alienos, non debet liberalis videri. Nihil est enim liberale, quod non idem sit iustum. Alter locus erat cautionis, ne benignitas maior esset quam facultates: quod qui benigniores esse volunt, quam vires patitur, primum in eo peccant, q̃ inimici sunt in proximos. Quas enim copias his et suppeditari æquũ est, et relinqui, eas trãsferũt ad alienos. Inest autem in tali liberalitate cupiditas rapiẽdi plerũq́, et auferendi per iniuriã, vt ad largiẽdã suppetãt copiæ, videre videãmur. licẽt plerosq́ non tam natura liberales, quàm quadã gloria inductos, vt benefici videamur facere multa:

we vse suche liberalitie, as may profit our frendes, and hinder no bodie. wherefore Lucius Sillaes, & Caius Ceasars conueing of goods from the iuste owners to straungers muste not bee thought liberaltie. For nothing is liberall, which iame is not iust.

The seconde point of exception was, that our liberalitie shoulde not bee more than our abilitie, because whoso will bee lauisher, thã their goods will beare, they chiefly offende in this, that they be iniurious vnto their next akinne. For they conueye those same riches to frende folke, which it were more reason bothe to bee delt, and left to theire kinsfolke,

And there is in such liberaltie a greedinesse ostentimes of catching, and pulling awaie with iniurie, that there may bee store to lashe out. A man may see some also doo muche, not by nature so liberall, as ledde wyth a certaine glorye, that they may seeme bountefull, which

which thynges may bee thought to comme rather of a bragge than of a free harte. Such a faise fatning is a neacer neibour to vanitye, than eyther to liberalitie, or to honestie.

The thirde restraint, we spake of, is that in liberalitye there be a choice, of worthynesse. wherein ar to bee consydered bothe hys maners, vpon whome the benefite shall bee bestowed, and also hys good wyll towarde vs, and the enterpertening and felowshyp of life, & frendlie turnes doone before to our commodities, all which bee wishefull to meete togither, if not, the more causes, and the greater shall haue in them the more weight.

Howbeit because wee leade not our life with perfite men, and thoroughly wise, but wyth such as, in whome it is a goodlie matter, if there bee resemblaunces of vertue, I recken thys also meete to bee consydered, that wee despise no maner man, in whome any sygne of

quæ proficiſci ab oſtentatione magis quàm à voluntate videtur. Talis autem ſimulatio vanitati eſt cõiunctior, quam aut liberalitati, aut honeſtati. Tertium eſt propoſitum, vt in beneficentia delectus ſit dignitatis: in qua et mores eius erunt ſpectandi, in quem beneficium conferetur: & animus erga nos, & communitas, & ſocietas vitæ, & ad noſtras vtilitates officia ante collata.

Quæ vt cõcurrãt omnia, optabile eſt: ſi minus, plures cauſſæ maioreſque ponderis plus habebunt. Quoniam autem viuitur non cum perfectis hominib⁹, pleneq; ſapiẽtibus: ſed cum iis, in quibus, præclare agitur ſi ſint ſimulachra virtutis: etiam hoc intelligendum puto, neminẽ omnino eſſe negligẽdum in quo aliqua ſignificatio

virtutis appareat. Colendum autē esse ita quenquā maximè, vt quisque maximè his virtutibus lenioribus erit ornatus, modestia, temperantia, ac ipsa, de qua iam multa dicta sunt, iustitia. Nam fortis animus & magnus in homine non perfecto, nec sapiente, feruentior plerumq; est: illæ virtutes bonum virū videntur potius attingere. Atque hæc in moribus. De beneuolentia autem, quam quisque habeat erga nos, primum illud est in officio. vt ei plurimum tribuamus, à quo plurimum diligimur. Sed beneuolentiam non adolescentulorum more, ardore quodam amoris, sed stabilitate potius & constantia iudicemus. Sinerunt merita, vt non iucunda, sed referenda sit gratia maior quæda

of vertue doth appere: and speciallie, that euery man so bee regarded, as eche man chiefly shall bee garnished with these gentler kindes of vertues, sober moode, temperance, and this same iustyce, whereof alredie much hath been spoken. For a manlie corage, and a greatis commonlie somewhat to feruent in a manne, that wantes of perfection, and wysedome, but those other vertues seem rather to pertaine to a good man. Thus much in maners may be considered.

But concerning loue, that anye man beareth towarde vs, this is the chiefe pointe of dutie, that we giue most to hym, of whome wee are most beloued. But we must measure good will, not after the gise of yong men, by a certeine heate of loue, but rather by assurednesse, and stedfastnesse.

But in case a mannes deseruing bee suche, that wee haue not to seeke to creepe in fauour, but to requite hys kindenesse: a certayne greater

greater care is then to bee vsed. For there is no dutie more necessarie, than requiting of kindenesse: And if Hesiodus willes ye, to larger measure (if ye may) to restore suche thinges, as ye haue borowed to occuppe: what then ought we to do, prouoked by benefites? Must we not doo like the frutefull feeldes, that yelde much more, than they receyued? For if we sticke not to bestow pleasures vpon thē, who wee hope, will profite vs hereafter: what maner men ought wee to bee towarde them, that haue doon vs good alreadie? For whereas there be two kinds of liberalitie: one of dating a benefite, an other of requyting: whether wee will doo it or no, is in our own choyse: but to leaue ought vnrequited, is not lawfull for a good man: so he may doo it without iniurie. But there bee respectes too bee had of benefites receyued: and there is no doute, but moste is due to the greatest.

curæ adhibenda est. Nullū enim officiū referenda gratia magis necessarium est. Quod si ea q̄ acceperis vtē da, maiore mensura (si modo possis) iubet reddere Hesiodus: quid nam beneficio prouocati facere debemus? An non imitari agros fertiles, qui multo plus afferunt, quā acceperūt? Etenim si in eos, quos speramus nobis profuturos, non dubitamus officia conferre: quales in eos esse debemus, qui iam profuerunt? Nam cū duo genera liberalitatis sint, vnum dandi beneficij, alterum reddendi, dem⁹ nēc ne in nostra potestate est: non reddere, bono viro non licet modo id facere possit sine iniuria. Acceptorū aut ē beneficiorū sunt delectus habēdi. Nec dubiū, quin maximo cuiq; plurimū debeatur.

Wherin

In quo tamen inprimis quo quisq; animo studio, beneuolentia fecerit, ponderandum est. Multi enim multa faciũt temeritate quadam sine iudicio, vel modo in omnes: vel repentino quodam quasi vẽto, impetu animi incitati: quæ beneficia æque magna non sunt habenda, atq; ea, quæ iudicio, cõsideratè, constanterq; delata sunt. Sed in collocando beneficio, et inferenda gratia, si cætera paria sint, hoc maximè officii est, vt quisq; maximè opis indigeat, ita ei potissimum opitulari. Quod contrà fit à pleriscq;. A quo enim plurimũ sperant, etiã si ille his non eget, tamen ei potissimũ inseruiunt. Optime autem societas hominum, coniunctioq; seruabitur, si vt quisq; erit communissimus, ita in eum benignitatis plurimum

Wherein specially yet is to be weied of what minde, affection, and good will, a man hath done it. For many men doo many thinges of a certaine hedonesse, wythoute discretion, or measure towarde euerie man, or els with a certaine sodein braide of minde carried, as wyth the wynde, whych benefites are not to be counted a like great, as those, that bee offered with iudgement aduisedly, and constantlie. But in placing of benefite, and requiting kindnesse (if all other thinges be correspondent) thys is a principall poinct of dutie, that as euery man most needth help, so him most of all we ayde. Which contrarywyse is done of a great meante, for of whome they hope moste, although he hath no neede of them, yet to hym they are moste seruysable.

But the felowshyp, and neybourhode of men shall best bee mainteined, if as euery man shalbe nerest vs, so on hym wee bestow most

libera-

liberaltie.

But what bee natures principles of neiborhod, and the felowship of man. I thinke good to fetche somwhat farder of.

For the firste is that, which is to see in the felowship of all mankinde. The bond whereof is reason, and speache, which by teachinge, learning, conferring, reasoning, and iudging, winneth one man to an other, & ioineth them in a certaine naturall felowship. For by any thing furder we differ from the nature of sauage beastes, in whom we say oftentimes there is an hardyneste, as in horses, & lions, but we neuer say, they haue iustice, equitie, and goodneste, for they bee voide of reason, and of speeche. And surely this is the felowship that spreadeth most largelye with men among themselues, and with all among all, in the which ther must be kept a cõmonneste of all thinges, that nature hath bredde to the common vse of man, so as the thinges, whiche be appointed

conferetur. Sed quæ naturæ principia sũt communitatis et societatis humanæ, repetendum altius videtur. Est enim primum q̃ cernitur in vniuersi generis humani societate. Eius autem vinculũ est ratio, et oratio, quæ docẽdo, discendo, communicando, disceptando, iudicando conciliat inter se homines, coniungitq; naturali quadã societate. Neq; vllare longius absumus à natura feraꝝ, in quibus inesse fortitudinem sæpe dicimus, vt in equis, in leonibus: iustitiã, æquitatẽ, bonitatẽ, nõ dicim⁹: sũt enim rationis, et orationis expertes. Ac latissimè quidẽ patens hominibus inter ipsos omnib⁹ inter omnes sociu[illegible] hec est: in qua omn[illegible] quas ad cõmunẽ vsu[illegible] natura genuit, est [illegible] cõmunitas: et q̃ de sc[illegible]

legibus, & iure ciuili, hæc ita teneãtur, vt ſit cõſtitutũ, e quibus ipſis cætera ſic obſeruentur, vt in græcorũ prouerbio eſt. AMICORVM ESSE COMMVNIA OMNIA. Omni autem cõmunia hominum videntur ea, quæ ſunt generis eiuſdẽ, q̃ ab Ennio poſitũ in vnare, tranſferri in multas poteſt.

Homo, qui erranti comiter
monſtrat viam:
Q uaſi lumen de ſuo lumine accendat, facit,
Vt nihilominus ipſi luceat cum illi accenderit.

Vna enim ex re ſatis præcipitur, vt quicquid ſine detrimẽto poſſit cõmodari, id tribuatur cuiq̃, vel ignoto. Ex quo ſunt illa communia, non prohibere aquam profluentẽ: pati ab igne ignem capere

appointed by ſtatutes, and the ciuill law, bee obſerued in ſuch ſort, as it is ordeyned: beſide which, all other thinges are ſo to be obſerued as is in the Greeke prouerb: Emong frends all things be comon. But all thoſe things ſeeme common to all men, which bee of that kinde, as, beinge put for example by Ennius in one thinge, may bee applied to many. (way The mã, ỹ gẽſte ſhowes the vnto the wandring wight, Doth, as if he a cãdle ſholde at his own candle light. That natheles it light hiſſell when lighted is the other.

For ynoughe is taughte vs by one example: that whatſoeuer wee may lende without hinderaunce, it bee graunted to euerye bodye, yea to the vnknowne. Whereuppon theſe thynges bee common: Not to forbidde one the running water: To ſuffer one that wil, to take fire at our fire:

To

To gyue faythfull counsell to him that asketh aduyse: whych thinges bee profitable to those, that receiue them, and nothinge burdenous to the giuer. Wherefore we must both vse these thynges, and somewhat alwayes muste we doo to furder the common profite. But sithe eche priuate mans substaunce is small, and the multitude is endlesse, that nede it: common liberalitie muste bee referred to that end of Ennius: *That natheleſſe it light himſelfe:* So as there may bee an abilitie, wherewyth we may bee liberall to our owne.

ſi quis velit, conſilium fidele deliberanti dare: quæ ſunt ijs vtilia, qui accipiunt, danti non moleſta. Quare & ijs vtendum eſt & ſemper aliquid ad commùnem vtilitatem afferendum. Sed quoniam copiæ paruæ ſingulorum ſunt: eorum autem, qui his egeant, infinita eſt multitudo, vulgaris liberalitas referenda eſt ad illum Ennij finem. nihilominus vt ipſi luceat. Vt facultas ſit, qua in noſtros ſimus liberales.

There bee mo degrees yet of the felowshyp of menne. For, to leaue that endlesse nomber, there is a nier degree, to bee of one countrie, of one nation, of one language, by the whych, mē be chieflie knit to gither. A nerer also it is, to be of one citie. For there be many thinges comon to citizens among

Gradus autem plures ſunt ſocietatis hominum. Vt enim ab illa diſcedatur infinitate, propior eſt eiuſdē gentis, nationis, linguæ, qua maxime homines coniunguntur. Interius etiam eſt eiuſdem eſſe ciuitatis. Multa enim ſunt ciuibus

inter se communia, forum, fana, porticus, viæ, leges, iura, iudicia, suffragia, consuetudines: præterea, et familiaritates, multaq; cum multis res rationesq; contractæ.

Arctior vero colligatio est societatis propinquorũ. Ab illa enim immensa societate humani generis, in exiguũ, angustumque concluditur. Nam cũ sit hoc natura commune omnium animantiũ, vt habeant libidinem procreandi: primo societas in ipso est coniugio: proxima in liberis: deinde vna domꝰ communia omnia. Id autem est principiũ vrbis, & quasi seminariũ Reip. Sequuntur fratrum coniunctiones, post consobrinorum, sobrinorumque: qui cum vna domo iam capi non possint, in alias domos tanquam in colonias exeunt.

among them selues: as lawe courtes, churches, galerie walkes, hye wayes, statutes, lawes, iudgementes, voyces coustomes: and besides these, familiarities, and hauing to doo in sondrie matters, and bargains with sondrie folke.

But a faster knitting of men togither is the felowship of kinsfolke. For out of the innumerable felowship of mankinde, it is driuen to a litle, and narowe compasse. For whereas by nature this is common to all liuing creatures, to haue a lust to engendering: the firste felowship is in deade wedlock: the next in childzen, and after that, one house, and all thinges common. And thys is the ozyginall of a citie and as it were the seedeplotte of a commonweale. Then folow ỹ kinreds of brethern after, of brothers and sisters childern, who, when they nowe cannot bee conteined in one house, get them abrode to other houses, as into newe townes.

Then

Then folowe entermaria-
ges, and alliãces of whiche
also mo kinsefolke do arise.
Which multiplicacion, and
succession is the roote of
common weales. Surely
the matchyng of bloodes,
and good wyll that ryseth
thereof, knitteth menne in
loue together. For it is a
greate matter to haue the
lyke monumentes of aun-
ceters, to vse all one relgi-
on, and to haue the same bu-
riall places.

But of all felowshippes
there is none better, none
more assured, than when
good men alike in condici-
ons bee enfelowshipte in fa-
miliaritie together. For
that honestie (whiche we
haue often mencioned (al-
though we see it in an other,
yet it moueth vs & maketh
vs friendes to him in whom
the same seemeth to dwell.
And thoughe all vertue al-
lureth vs to her, and cau-
seth vs to loue them, in whõ
she seemeth to harber: yet
iustice, and liberalitie wor-
keth that moste of all. But
there is nothinge, that win-

D.i. neth

Sequuntur connubia, & affinitates: ex quibus etiam plures propinqui. Quæ propagatio & soboles origo est rerũ publicarum, sanguinis aut ẽ coniunctio, & benevolentia deuincit charitate homines. Magnum est enim eadem habere monumẽta maiorum, eisdem vt sacris: sepulchra habere communia. Sed omnium societatũ nulla præstantior est, nulla firmior quàm cum viri boni moribꝰ ſimiles familiaritate coniuncti sunt. Illud enim honestum (quod sæpe diximus) etiam si in alio cernimus, tamen nos mouet, atq; illi, in quo id inesse videtur, amicos facit. Et quanq̃ omnis virtus nos ad se allicit, facitq;, vt eos diligamus, in quibus ipsa inesse videatur: tamen iustitia, & liberalitas id maximè efficit. Nihil autem

amabilius, nec copulatius, quàm morum similitudo bonorum. In quibus enim eadem studia sunt, eadem voluntates: in his fit, vt æquè quisq; altero delectetur, ac se ipso: efficiturq; id quod Pithagoras vult in amicitia, vt vnus fiat ex pluribus. Magna etiam illa communitas est societatum, quæ cõficitur ex beneficijs vltro citroq; datis, acceptisq;. Quæ mutua & grata dum sunt, inter quos ea sunt, firma deuinciuntur societate. Sed cum omni ratione, animoq; lustraueris, omnium societatum nulla est gratior, nulla charior, quàm ea, quæ cum republica est vnicuique nostrum. Chari sunt parentes, chari liberi, propinqui, familiares: sed omnes omnium charitates patria

neth more loue, nor surelier knitteth men together, than a likenesse in good condicions. For in whome be like desires, and lyke myndes: it happeneth amonge them, that eyther with other is as muche delited, as wyth hym selfe: and it is brought to passe, that Pythagoras requires in amitie, that many become one.

That common felowship also is greate, whiche groweth of benefites to and fro, geuen, and taken. Whiche while thei be common from one to an other, and pleasurefull: thei among whom those happen, be tied in a fast felowship.

But when ye haue perused all these thynges in your reason, and mynde: of all felowshippes there is none more acceptable, nor dearer, than the same, wherein euery one of vs hathe with the common weale.

Dere be our parents, dere bee oure children, dere bee oure kinsefolke, and familiers: but oure countrey conteynes in yt alone all the

dere

deere lone of them all: for the whiche, what good man doubtes to take his death, if hee maye profyte the same? Whereby their beastly cruelte is the more to be abhorred: who haue rent asonder theyr countrey with all maner of mischiefe: and both be and haue been occupied in vtter ouerthrowinge therof.

But yf question, or comparison bee made, to whome the greatest duetie ought to be yelded: our countrey, and Parentes be the chiefe, by whose benefites we are most bounde: oure children, and all oure whole familie be the nexte: whiche hange al vpon vs alone, and can haue none other refuge, then bee oure kinsfolke, that agree well with vs, whiche commonly stande in the like estate.

Wherefore the necessarye aydes of life bee due to them chiefely, whome I spake of before, but conuersation and commonnesse of table, counselynges, communications, exhortacions, comfortynges, yea

complexa est: pro qua quis bonus dubitet mortem oppetere, si ei sit profuturus?

Quo est detestabilior istorum immanitas, qui laceraruntomni scelere patriam, et in ea funditus delenda occupati & sunt, & fuerunt. Sed si contentio quædam, & comparatio fiat, quibus plurimum tribuendum sit officij: principes sint, patria, & parentes, quorum beneficijs maximis obligati sumus: proximi liberi, totàq; domus quæ spectat in nos solos, neq; aliud vllum potest habere profugiū. Deinceps bene conuenientes propinqui quibuscum communis etiam fortuna plerunq; est. Quàmobrē necessaria vitæ præsidia debētur iis maximè, quos ante dixi, vita autē victꝰq; cōmunis cōsilia, sermones, cohortationes, cōsolatiōes interdū etiā

obiurgationis, in amicitijs vigent maximè, estq; ea iucundissima amicitia, quam similitudo morum coniugauit. Sed in his omnib⁹ officijs tribuendis, videndum erit quid cuiq; maximè necesse sit & quid quisq; nobiscum, vel sine nobis, aut possit cõsequi, aut non possit. Itaq; non ydẽ erunt necessitudinũ gradi⁹, qui & tẽporũ. Sunt quædam officia, quæ alijs magis, quàm alijs debeantur: vt vicinum citius adiueris in fructib⁹ percipiendis quam aut fratrem, aut familiarem. At si lis in iudicio sit, propinquum potius & amicũ, quàm vicinũ defenderis. Hæc igitur & talia circumspicienda sunt in omni officio: et cõsuetudo, exercitatioq; capienda, vt boni rationes officij vũ esse possim⁹ et addẽdo, deducẽdoq; videre

and chydynges otherwhyle amonge frendes bee moofte vſed: and that is the pleaſauneſt friendſhippe, which likeneſſe of condicions hath yoked in one.

But in doing al theſe duties, we muſte marke, what is moſte needefull for euerie man: and what euery bodye is able, or vnable by vs, or without vs, to atteyne. So the degrees of friendſhippes ſhall not bee alyke wyth the degrees of times: and there bee duties which ar due to ſome, more than to other ſome: as you ſhall ſooner helpe your neybour in inning his corne, than eyther your brother, or your familier frende: but if there bee atrauers in lawe: you ſhal rather defende your kinſman, and frende, than your neighbour. Theſe therefore, and ſuch like muſt bee thorowly conſidered in euery dutie: and we muſt ſo vſe, and practiſe our ſelues, that we may be good countmakers of duties: and ſee by adding and deducting,

what

what summe riseth of the rest: wherevpon we make vnderstande, howe much is due to euery manne. But as neyther physicians, nor captaines, nor oratours, although they haue conceyued the rules of their science, can attayne any thing worthy greate praise, without vse, and practise: so those rules of keepinge dutie are in deede taughte vs, that we oure selues shoulde putte them in vre: but the hardenesse of the matter also requireth vse, and exercise.

And howe honestie, from whiche duetie springeth, is fetched out of those thinges that bee within the lawe of mans felowshippe: we haue in a manner saide inoughe.

But we muste note, that whereas there be fower generall kyndes of vertues pointed out, from the which honestie, and duetie shoulde flowe: that seemes to shine brightest: which is wrought with a greate, and lofty courage, despising worldly vanities. And therefore in re-

quæ reliqui summa fiat: ex quo quantum cuiq; debeatur, intelligas. Sed ut nec medici, nec imperatores, nec oratores, quamuis artis præcepta perciperint, quicquam magna laude dignũ sine vsu, & exercitatione consequi possunt: sic officij conseruandi præcepta traduntur, illa quidem vt faciamus ipsi sed rei magnitudo vsum quoq;, exercitationemq; desiderat. Atq; ab ijs rebus, quæ sunt in iure societatis humanæ, quemadmodum ducatur honestum, ex quo ortum est officium, satis ferè diximus. Intelligendum est autem cum proposita sint genera quatuor, è quibus honestas, officiumq; manauit, splendidissimũ videri, quod animo magno, elatoq; humanas res despicientem factũ sit. Itaq; in

probris maximè in promptu est, si quid tale dici potest.
Vos etenim iuuenes
animos geritis muliebres:
Illaq; virgo viri.
& si quid est eiusmodi.
Salmacida spolia
sine sudore & sanguine.

Contraq; in laudibus, quæ magno animo & fortiter excellenterq; gesta sunt, canescio quo modo quasi peiore ore laudamus. Hinc rhetorum campus de Marathone, Salamine, Platæis, Thermopylis, Leuctris, Stratocle: hinc noster Cocles, hinc Decij, hinc Cn. & P. Scipiones, hinc M. Marcellus, et innumerabiles alij: maximeq; ipse popul⁹ Romæ animi magnitudine excellit. Declaratur autem studiũ bellicæ gloriæ.

ptoche it is commoly ready, if anye suche thinge maie bee sayde, as this.

Ye youngmen in wyes
cary womens hertes.
That virgin, a mannes.

Likewyse it oughte bee lyke to this.

A goodly great spoile,
at Salmacis wonne:
VVithout any bloode,
or swette was it donne.

And on the other syde, in prayses, those deedes, that be donne manfully, notably, and with greate courage, I wote not howe as with open mouth we commende. Hereof came the Rhetoricians large fielde vpon Marathon Salamis, Plateas, Thermopylanes, Leuctrians, and Stratocles, hereof our Cocles, hereof the Decians, hereof Cneus, and Publius the Scipios, hereof Marcus Marcellus, and other innumerable, and specially the people of Rome did excede in greatnesse of corage. And theyr desyre of martiall glorie is declared,

in

in that we see theyr images of honoure be set vp, for the moste parte, in warlike aray.

But if that hawtinesse of corage whiche is seene in perels, and trauailes, be voyde of iustice, and doth not fight for a common saftie, but for a priuate profite, it is to bee reckened faultye. For that not onely is not the propriete of vertue, but rather of brutishnesse, setting all humanitie aside.

Therefore manlynesse is well defined of the Stoikes where they saye, it is a vertue, that fighteth in defence of equitie. Wherefore no man, that hathe attained the glorie of manlinesse, euer got praise by wyly traynes, and craftynesse. For nothinge may be honest, that is voyde of iustice. A worthy sayinge therefore is that of Platoes who saith.

That not onelie the knowledge, which is seuered from iustice, is rather to bee called subtletie, than wysedome: but also the corage,

quòd statuas quoq; videmus ornatu fere militari. Sed ea animi elatio, quæ cernitur in periculis & laboribus si iustitia vacat, pugnatq; nō pro salute communi, sed pro suis commodis, in vitio est. Non modo enim id virtutis non est: sed potius immanitatis omnem humanitatem repellentis. Itaq; probè definitur à Stoicis fortitudo, cum eam virtutem esse dicunt propugnantem pro æquitate. Quocirca nemo qui fortitudinis gloriam consecutus est, insidijs & malitia laudē est adeptus. Nihil enim honestum esse potest, quod iustitia vacat. præclarum igitur Platonis illud. Non solū, inquit scientia, quæ est remota abiustitia, calliditas potius, quàm sapientia est appellanda: verùm etiam animus

paratus ad periculum, si sua cupiditate, non vtilitate cõmuni impellitur, audaciæ potius nomen habeat, quàm fortitudinis. Itaque viros fortes & magnanimos, eosdem bonos & simplices, veritatis amicos, minimeque fallaces esse volumus: quæ sunt ex media laude iustitiæ. Sed illud odiosum est, quòd in hac elatione & magnitudine animi facillime pertinacia, & nimia cupiditas principatus innascitur. Vt enim apud Platonem est, omnem morem Lacedemoniorũ inflammatum esse cupiditate vincendi. sic vt quisque animi magnitudine maxime excelli, ita maximè vult primus omnium, vel potius solus esse. Difficile autem est compraesare omnib⁹ cõcupientibus, seruare æquitatẽ quæ

which is forwarde to daunger, yf it be sette on for ones owne gr'dinesse, and not for a common profit: may rather beare the name of lewd hardinesse, than of manlinesse.

Wherefore who be manly men, and stoutharted: those same wee woulde haue also be good, and plaine louers of trouth, and nothing at all deceitfull: whiche come out of the middest of al the praises of iustice.

But this is odious, that in such hautinesse, and greatnesse of courage, ther groweth a wilfulnesse very soone, and an ouerseekinge of rule. For as it is in Plato, that it was all the manner of the Lacedemonians, to bee enflamed wyth desyre of conqueringe: so as euery man dothe moofte excell other in greatneste of courage, he wil likewise be the very higheste ouer all, or rather withoute pere. And when you conet to bee aboue all, it is harde to keepe an equitie, whyche

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is moste proper to iustice. Whereof comes to passe, that they canne not abyde to be bridles neyther wyth reasoning, nor with any common and rightfull order of lawe: and they become in the common weale for the moste parte guifte geuers, and partmakers: that they mate attaine to the greateste power, and be rather by myght superioure, than by iustice equall. But the harder it is to maister the affection, the worthyer is the maistry. For there is no season that ought to be without iustice. They therefore bee compted manly, and of great courage, not who do any wronge, but who wythstande it. But a true, and wise stoute hearte iudgeth that honestie, which nature chiefly folowth, to stande in deedes, and not in glorye: and hadde rather be, than seeme the chiefe. For who so hangeth vppon the wauieringe of the vnskilfull multitude, he is not to bee counted amonge the numbre of manlie menn. But as euery man is of the highieste

est iustitiæ maximè propria. Ex quo fit, vt neque disceptatione vincise, nec vllo publico ac legitimo iure patiantur. Existuntq; in Repub. plerumq; largitores & factiosi, vt opes quam maximas consequantur, & sint vi potius superiores, quàm iustitia pares. Sed quo id est difficilius, hoc præclarius.

Nullum enim est tempus quod iustitia vacare debeat. Fortis igitur et magnanimi sunt habendi, non qui faciunt, sed qui propulsant iniuriam. Vera autem & sapiens animi magnitudo honestum illud, quod maximè natura sequitur, in factis positum, non in gloria iudicat, principemque se esse mauult, quàm videri. Etenim qui ex errore imperitæ multitudinis pendet, hic in magnis viris non est habendus.

facillimè autem ad res iniustas impellitur, vt quisq; altissimi est animi & gloriæ cupido. Qui locus est sane lubricus: quòd vix inuenitur, qui laboribus susceptis, periculisq; aditis, non quasi mercedē rerū gestarū desideret gloriā. Omnino fortis animus & magnus duabus rēb⁹ maximè cernitur: quarū vna in rebus externarū despicientia ponitur: cū persuasū sit nihil hominē nisi quod honestū, decorūq; sit aut admirari, aut optare, aut expetere oportere: nulliq; neq; homini, neq; perturbationi animi, nec fortunæ succūbere. Altera est res, vt cū ita sis animo affect⁹, vt suprà dixi, res geras magnas illas quidē et maximè vtiles sed vehementer arduas, plenasq; laborū et periculorum, tū vitæ, tū multarū causa rerum, quæ ad vitam pertinent. Harum rerum duarum

courage, and desirous of glorie, so is he soonest edged to vniuste doinges. whiche is in deede a very slypper place. bycause scarce there is anie manne founde, who when he hathe sustained trauailes, and auentured daungers, dothe not desire glorie, as rewarde of his doinges.

A manly courage, and a greate is alwaies by twoo thynges chiefely discernes, whereof the one standes in the contempte of outwarde thynges, when it is perswaded, that a man ought not eyther to esteeme, eyther wishe, or desire anie thinge, but that is honest, and vnseemely to yelde to none, neither man, nor affection, nor chaunce of fortune. The other thinge is, that when you be so dyspoſed in courage as I sayde before, ye doe great enterpriſes, and those same righte profitable, but yet very harde, and full of trauaile, and daunger, both for life and for many thinges, that to life do belonge. All the glorye, & honour of these

twe

twe thinges, I adde thereto the profite, standes in the latter, but the cause, and meane, that makes manny menne, is in the former. For in it is that, whyche maketh excellent courages, and such as despise the worldes vanities. But this same resteth in two thinges, if bothe you iudge that onely to be good, whiche is honest, and also be free from all moodinesse of minde. For it is to be counted the parte of a greate, and manly courage, bothe to sette light by those thinges, which do seeme precious, and gorgeous to the greater noumber, and also to despise the same, with a stedfast, and grounded iudgement: and lykewyse it is a signe of mightie courage, and greate stedfastnes, so to beare those thinges, whyche seeme bitter and be much, & sundry waies toste in mans life, and fortune, as nothing you swarue from the order of nature, nor the worthinesse of a wyse man. And it is not meete, that he bee subdued with desire, who is not

splendor omnis & amplitudo, addo etiã vtilitatẽ, in posteriore est: causa autẽ & ratio efficiens magnos viros, est in priore. In eo enim est illud, quod excellentes animos, & humana contemnentes facit. Id autem ipsum cernitur in duobus sic & solum id, quod honestum sit, bonum iudices & ab omni animi perturbatione liberis. Nam & ea, quæ eximia plerúq; & præclara videntur, parua ducere eaq; ratione stabili, firmaq; contẽnere, fortis animi, magniq; ducendum sit. Et ea, quæ videntur acerba, quæ multa & varia in hominum vita, fortunaq; versantur, ita ferre, vt nihil à statu naturæ discedas, nihil à dignitate sapientis, hoc robusti animi est: magnæque constantiæ. Non est autem consentaneum, qui metu non frangatur

eumfrangi cupiditate : nec qui inuictũ se à labore præstiterit, vinci à voluptate. Quamobrem hæc vitanda sunt : & pecuniæ fugienda cupiditas. Nihil enim est tã angusti animi, tamq; parui, quàm amare diuitias. Nihil honestius, magnificentiusq;, quam pecuniam contemnere, si non habeas : si habeas, ad beneficentiã liberalitatemq; conferre. Cauenda est etiam gloriæ cupiditas, vt supra dixi. Eripit enim libertatẽ: pro qua magnanimis viris omnis debet esse contentio. Nec verò imperia expetenda ac potius aut non accipienda interdum, aut deponẽda nõ nunquam. Vacandum autẽ est omni animi perturbatione, tum cupiditate & metu, tum etiam ægritudine, & voluptate animi, et iracundia, vt tranquillitas adsit

not subdued with feare : nor that he bee ouercomme with pleasure, who hathe shewed him selfe vnable to be ouercome wyth trauaile. wherefore bothe these faultes are to bee auoyded, and also couetousnesse of monye is to bee eschewed. For nothinge is so muche a signe of a small, and slender courage, as to loue riches : nothinge there is honester, and nobler, than to despise money, if you haue it not : and if you haue yt, to bestowe it in bountifulnesse, and liberalitie. we muste also beware of desire of glorye, as I saide to fore. For it pulles awaie the freedome of the mynde: for the whiche, all the endeuoure of stouthartied menne shoulde bee. And verily we ought not to seeke for rule, but rather not to receiue it sometyme, or otherwhile to giue it ouer. And wee must be free from al troublesome sturre of minde : from desire and feare, from hertsickneſſe, and voluptuousnesse, and angrynesse : that we maye haue quietnesse of

minde

minde, and boldnes of tare: the whiche may bringe both stedfastnesse, and also a worthy estimation.

But dyuers there be, and haue been: who desiringe that same quietnesse, that I spake of, haue withdrawne them selues from common affayres, and haue gotte them to quyetnesse. Amonge these, bothe the noblest Philosophers, and the verye chiefe, and also certaine vpright, and graue menne neyther coulde abide the manners of the people, nor of the rulers: and many of them haue lyued in deserte places, as delited onely with their home matters.

These shoote at the same marke, that Kynges doo, that is, to haue neede of nothinge, to obey no man, and to vse their owne libertie, whose propretie is, to liue as ye lyste. Wherefore sith this is common bothe to the desirous of power, and those (whō I spake of) that leade the quiet lyfe: the one sorte doe thynke them selues able to compasse it, if they haue great

& securitas, quæ afferat tum constantiam, tum etiam dignitatem. Multi autem & sunt, & fuerunt, qui eam quam dico, tranquilitatem expetentes, à negotijs publicis se remouerunt, ad otiumq; profugerunt. In his & nobilissimi Philosophi, longeq; principes: & quidem homines seueri & graues, nec populi, nec principum mores ferre potuerunt. Vixeruntq; nonnulli in agris delectati re sua familiari: His idem propositum fuit, quod & regibus: vt ne quare egerent, ne cui parerent, libertate vterentur: cuius proprium est, sic viuere vt velis. Quare cum hoc commune sit potentiæ cupidorum, cum ijs, quos dixi otiosos: alteri se adipisci id posse arbitrantur, si opes magnas ha-

habeant: alteri, si contenti sint suo & paruo. In quo quidem neutrorum omnino contemnenda est sententia. Sed & facilior, & tutior, & minus alijs grauis, aut molestia vitae est otiosorum. Fructuosior autem hominum generi, & ad claritatem amplitudinemq; aptior: eorum, qui se ad Rempub. & ad res magnas gerendas accommodauerunt.

Quapropter & ijs forsitan concedendum sit, Reipub. non capiscentibus, qui excellenti ingenio, otio, doctrinaq; se dediderunt. Et is, qui aut valetudinis imbecillitate, aut aliqua grauiore causa impediti, à Republ. recesserunt, cum eius administrandae potestate alijs, laudiq; concederent. Quib° autem talis nulla sit causa,

greate welth: the other, yf they be contented with theyr owne, and a lyttle. Wherein verilie the opinion of nother of them is veterly to be despised: but the lyfe of the quiet lyuers is bothe easyer, and safer, and lesse greueus or troblesome to other: and theirs is the profitablier for mankynde, and fytter for fame, and honour: who haue applyed them selues to the common weale, and goinge thorroughe with greate matters. Wherefore perauenture bothe they are to bee borne withall, that take not in hande the common weale, who of an excellent wytte haue applyed them selues to learninge: and also they, who beyng letted eyther by sickelynesse, or some other more weyghtye cause, haue conueyed them selues awaye from the common weale: when they were well content to leaue to other the authoritie, and prayse of rulynge the same. Vnto to whome there is no suche occasion: yf

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they saye they set nought by those thynges, that moste men haue in admiration, as rule, and office bearinge: to these I thinke it worthye to bee counted not onelye no prayse, but also a faulte. Whose iudgemente yt were very harde to allowe, in that they dispise glorie, and esteeme it as nothinge: but they seeme to feare the troubles, and greeues bothe of geuinge offense, and hauing repulses, as a certaine reproche and defame. For there bee, who do little agree wyth them selues in thinges that be contrarye: as some moste earnestlye contempne pleasure, and in paine be somewhat tenderer: some regarde not glorye and bee broken wyth slaunder: and these thynges they doe not wyth sufficient stedfastnes. But all lingeringe set aside, offices are to bee taken, and the common weale to bee serued of those, who haue by nature the helpes of dyspatch of matters. For other wyse canne neyther the state be

si despicere se dicant ea, quæ plerique admirentur, imperia, & magistratus: iis non modo non laudi, verum etiam vitio dandum puto: quorum iudiciũ in eo, quod gloriam contemnant, & pro nihilo putent, difficile factu est non probare. Sed videntur labores, & molestias, tum offensionum, tum repulsarum, quasi quandam ignominiam timere & infamiam. Sunt enim qui in rebus contrarijs parum sibi constent. voluptatem seuerissimè contemnant, in dolore sint molliores: gloriam negligant, frangantur infamia: atque ea quidem non satis constanter. Sed ijs, qui habent à natura adiumẽta rerum gerendarũ abiecta omni cũctatione adipiscẽdi magistratꝰ sunt, & gerenda Resp. est. Nec enim aliter aut regi

eiuitas, aut declarari animi magnitudo potest. Capescentibus autem Rempub. nihil minus quàm Philosophus, haud scio an magis etiam & magnificentia & dispicientia adhibenda sit rerum humanarum (quam sæpe dico) & tranquillitas animi, atq; securitas. Siquidem nec anxij futuri sunt, & cum grauitate, constantiaq; victuri: quæ eo faciliora sunt Philosophis, quò minus patent multa in corum vita, quæ fortuna feriat: & quò minus multis rebus egent: & quia si quid aduersi eueniat, tam grauiter cadere non possunt. Quocirca non sine causa maiores motus animorum concitantur, maioraq; efficienda Rempub. gerentibus, quàm quietis: quo magis his & magnitudo animi est adhibēda, & vacuitas ab

be gouerned, nor the greatnesse of courage be declared. And of suche as take vppon them the common weale, no lesse than of Philosophers, yea and I wot not whether more, muste be vsed bothe a maiestie, and a contempte of worldly thinges (whiche I often repeate) and also a quietnesse of mynde, and voydnesse of care: for so thei shal not be thoughtful, and with grauitie, and stedfastnesse they shall leade theyr lyfe. Whiche thinges be so muche the easier to Philosophers, as the fewer thynges lye open in theyr life, that fortune maie stryke: and as the fewer thynges they stande in neede of: and bicause they canne not take so sore a fall, yf anye aduersitie betyde. Wherfore not without cause, greater motions of mindes be styred vp in thē: and greater interprises are meete to be compassed, by the gouernours of the common weale, than by the quiet liuers: and therefore the more greatenesse of courage, and voidnesse of greefes ought they

they to vse. But who so doth come to the doynge of matters, let him take heede: that not onely this he consider, how honest the matter is, but also that he haue an abilenesse to discharge the same. In the which poynte must bee considered: that neither ouer soone he despair for dastardlynesse, nor ouermuch haue affiaūce for greedinesse. And in all matters, before ye go about them, ther must bee vsed a diligent preparation.

But whereas moste men suppose martiall feates to bee greater, than citie causes: this opinion is to be abated. For manye haue sought warre oftentymes, vpon desire of glorye, and it cōmonlie befalleth in greate wittes, and corages, and so much the more, if they bee men fit for chiualrie, and desirous of warrefare. But if we minde to iudge truelye: there haue been manye citie matters greater, and nobler than martiall. For though Themistocles be rightfullye commended, and his name is

angoribus. Ad rem gerēdā autem qui accedit, caueat ne id modo cōsideret, quàm illa res honesta sit: sed etiam vt habeat efficiendi facultatē. In quo ipso considerandū est, ne aut temere desperet propter ignauiam: aut nimis confidat propter cupiditatē. In omnibus autē negotijs priusquàm aggrediare, adhibēda est preparatio diligens. Sed cūplerique arbitrētur res bellicas maiores esse quàm vrbanas, minuēda est hæc opinio. Multi enim bella sæpe quæsiuerunt propter gloriæ cupiditatem, atq; id in magnis animis, ingenijsq; pleruq; contingit: eoq; magis si sint ad rē militarē apti, et cupidi bellorū gerendorū. Verè autē si volumus iudicare, multæ res exiterūt vrbanæ maiores clariores q; quàm bellicæ. Quāuis enim Themistocles iure laudetur, et sit ei nomē

quàm Solonis illustrius: citetuŕq; Salamis clarissimæ testis victoriæ, quæ anteponatur consilio Solonis, ei, quo primũ constituit Areopagitas: non minus præclarum hoc, quàm illud iudicandum est. Illud enim semel profuit, hoc semper proderit ciuitati. Hoc cõsilio leges Athenensium, hoc maiorum instituta seruantur. Et Themistocles quidem nihil dixit in quo isse Areopagum adiuuerit? at ille verè adiuuit Themistoclem. Est enim bellum gestum consilio senatus eius, qui à Solone erat constitutus. Licet eadem de Pausania, Lysãdroq; dicere: quorum rebus gestis, quanquam imperiũ Lacedæmoniis dilatatum putatur: tamen ne minima quidem ex parte Lycurgi legibus & disciplinæ conferendi sunt, quin etiam ob has ipsas causas,

more famous, than Solõs: and Salamis is cited a witnesse of hys most glorious victorie, and it is preferde aboue that councell of Solon, wherewith he first ordeined the Areopagites, yet no lesse praise worthye is this, than that, to bee adiudged. For that but once auailed, this shall for euer auaile the citie. By thys counsell, the lawes of the Athenians, by this, the orders of their elders bee preserued. And Themistocles can alledge nothing, wherewith he furdered the Areopage, but Solon furdered Themistocles. For the warre was mainteyned by the aduise of that Senate, which by Solon was established. we may say as much of Pausanias, & Lysander: by whose deedes of armes though the Empire of the Lacedemonians is thought to haue been enlarged, yet verely they are not too bee compared in the least parte, wyth Lycurgus lawes, and order, yea more ouer by these occasyons,

they

they had theyr armies both forwarder, and vauntaunter. Neither when I was a childe me thought Marcus Scaurus gaue place to Caius Marius: nor when I had a doo in the common weale, Quintus Catulus, to Cneus Pompetus. For of small force is the warre abrode, onlesse there be good aduise at home.

Nor Africanus, both a singular man, & captaine also, did more profit the common weale in razing of Numãce than at that tyme, Publius Nasica, a priuate man dyd further it when he slewe Tyberius Gracchus. Howbeit this case in dede is not onlye a citie matter. For it belongeth also too the nature of martiall feates: sith it was wrought by force, and by strong hande. But yet that same was done by citie coũsell, without an armie. And that is a goodlye sayenge, wherewith I heare, that I am wont to bee touched of enuyous, and lewde persons.

& paratiores habuerũt, exercit° et fortiores. Mihi quidẽ neque pueris nobis M. Scaurus C. Mario, neq; cum verſaremur in Republica. Q. Catulus Cn. Pompeio cedere videbatur. Parua enim ſunt foris arma, niſi eſt conſilium domi. Nec plus Africanus ſingularis & vir & imperator in excidenda Numantia Reipub. profuit, quàm eodem tempore P. Naſica priuatus, cum Tiberium Gracchum interemit. Quãquã hæc quidem res non ſolum ex domeſtica eſt ratione, attingit enim & bellicam, quoniam vi, manuq; confecta eſt: ſed tamen id ipſum geſtum eſt conſilio vrbano ſine exercitu. Illud autem optimum eſt, in quo inuadi ſolere ab inuidis & improbis me audio.

Cedant armatogæ,
concedat laurea linguæ.
Vt enim alios omittam, nobis Remp. gubernantibus, nonne togæ arma cesserẽ? neque enim in Repub. periculum fuit grauius vnquam, nec maius odium. Ita consilijs, diligentiaq; nostra celeriter de manibus audacissimorum ciuium delapsa arma ipsa ceciderunt.
Quæ res igitur gesta est vnquam in bello tanta? quis triumphus conferendus? Licet enim mihi M. fili apud te gloriari: ad quem & hereditas huius gloriæ, & factorum imitatio pertinet.
Mihi quidem certe vir abũdans bellicis laudibus Cn. Pompeius multis audientibus hoc tribuit. vt diceret, frustra se tertium triumphum deportaturum fuisse, nisi meo in Rempub.

To the robe aboue armes
let glory belonge.
And the lawell yeue place
to the oratours tonge.

For, that I may passe ouer other, did not armes yeelde vnto the robe, when I gouerned the common weale? For neyther in the common weale was euer a sorer perell, nor yet a greater hatred So by our counsell, and diligence, the very weapons, full soone slydinge out of the boldest citizens handes, dyd fall too the grounde. What enterprise, I pray you, in warre was euer doone so greate? what triumphe is there, with it to bee compared: For I maye, sonne Marke, glorie before you, to whom bothe the inheritance of this glorie, and the imitacion of my dedes doth pertein Cneus Pompeius a man flowing full of martiall prayses, gaue me thys cõmendacion, in the hearing of many, ỹ he seyd, he should in vaine haue borne awaye the third triumph, except, by my furderãce in the common weale

weale, he shoulde haue had a place, where he myght haue triumphed. Home māhood then is not inferiour to martiall, in which also we must bestowe more labour and studie, than in this. For always that honestie whiche wee seeke in a hautie and a princely corage, is wrough t by the strength of the mind, and not of the body. Yet the body must be exercised, and brought in such plight, as it may bee able to folow counsell and reason, in executing matters, and sustaining trauaile. But that honestie whereafter we serche al hole consisteth in the care, and casting of the minde, wherin they bring no lesse commoditie, who robbed do gouerne the common weale, thā they do, who armed do make the warres. And therefore, by theyr aduyse oftentymes, warres bee either not begon or ended, and manytymes attempted, as by Marcus Catoes counsell, was the third Punike warre wherin the authoritie of the dead man auailed. wherefore ra-

beneficio vbi triumpharet, esset habiturus. Sunt ergo domesticæ fortitudines non inferiores, militaribus, in quibus plus etiā quàm in his operæ, studijq; ponendum est. Omnino enim illud honestū, quod ex animo excelso, magnificoq; quærimus, animi efficitur, non corporis viribus. Exercendū tamen corpus, & ita afficiendū est, vt obedire consilio, rationiq; possit in exequēdis negotijs, & in labore tollerando. Honestū autē id, quod exquirimus, totū est positū in animi cura et cogitatione. In quo non minorem vtilitatē afferunt, qui togati Reip. præsūt, quàm qui bella gerunt. Itaq; eorū consilio sæpe aut non suscepta, aut cōfecta bella sunt nonnunquā etiam illata: vt M. Catonis consilio bellum tertium Punicum, in quo etiam mortui valuit authoritas. Quare

expetenda quidem magis est decernendi ratio, quàm decertandi fortitudo. Sed cauẽdum ne id bellãdi magis fuga, quàm vtilitatis ratione faciamus. Bellũ autem ita suscipiatur, vt nihil aliud nisi pax quæsita videatur. Fortis vero animi et constãtis est, non perturbari in rebus asperis: nec tumultuantẽ de gradu deiici, vt dicitur: sed præsentis animi vti consilio: nec à ratione discedere. Quanquã hoc animi, illud etiam ingenij magni est percipere cogitatione futura: & aliquanto ante constituere, quid accidere possit in vtrãq; partem: & quid agendũ sit, cum quid euenerit: nec committere aliquid: vt aliquãdo dicendum sit, NON PVTARAM. Hæc sunt opera magni animi et excelsi vt prudẽtia, cõsilioq; fidẽtis.

ther wisedome in determyning, than mãlinesse in fyghting is to be desired: but wee muste beware that wee take not by the mattere by aduise, more to auoyde warthã for cause of profit. And so let warre be taken in hand as no other thinge may seme but peas, to haue ben sought And it is verilye a token of a manlye corage, and a constant, not to bee disquyeted in rough stormes, nor in makinge a hurle, to bee thrust frõ his place, as they say: but too folow the counsell of a present corage, not yet to swarue from reason. Notwithstanding, the one comes of corage: the other procedes of a great wit, to fore conceiue in minde things to come, and some what before to appoint vpon, what may befall on bothe sides, & what is to bee done, whẽ anything shall happẽ: nor to cõmit ought, that at anye tyme one shoide haue cause to say, Hadde I wiste. These bee the workes of a greate, and loftie corage, and leanynge vpon prudence, & counsell.

But

But for a man to vse him selfe rashely in fielde, & so to buckle with the enemie hād to hand, it is a certeine brutishe, and beastly thinge. but when time is, and necessitie requires, a man must fyght hand to hand, & prefer death before slaueric and shame.

But touching the razinge and sackinge of cities, thys greately is to be considered: that nothinge rashely, nothing cruelly bee done. And it is the condicion of a stoutherted man, in the ende of broiles, to punishe the offēders, to saue the multitude, in euery estate to maintayne right, & honestie. For lyke as there be (as I said tofore) who doo preferre martiall feates before cities causes: so may ye finde many, to whom daungerous, and hotebrayned deuises seeme glorioufer, and greater, than quiet counsels. We must neuer by seking to escape perel, deserue too seeme cowardes, and dastardes, but thys wee muste take hede of, that we put not our selues in daunger without cause:

Temere autē in acie versari, & manu cū hoste cōfligere immane quiddā: et belluarū simile est. Sed cū tempus, necessitasq; postulat, decertandū manu est, & mors seruituti, turpitudiniq; āteponēda. De euertendis autē, diripiendisq; vrbibus valde illud considerandū est: ne quid temere, ne quid crudeliter fiat. Idq; est viri magnanimi rebus agitatis punire sontes multitudinem conseruare: in omni fortuna, recta atq; honesta retinere. Vt enim sunt (quemadmodū supra dixi) qui vrbanis rebus bellicas anteponunt: sic reperies multos, quibus periculosa et callida cōsilia quietis cogitationibus splendidiora et maiora videantur. Nūquā omnino periculi fuga cōmittēdū est, vt ībelles, timidiq; videamur sed fugiēdū etiā illud, me offeram nos periculis sine causa

quo nihill potest esse stultius. Quapropter in adeũdis periculis consuetudo imitanda medicorum est, qui leuiter ægrotãtes, leuiter curãt: grauioribus autem morbis periculosas curationes et ancipites adhibere cogũtur. Quare in trãquillo tẽpestatẽ aduersã optare demẽtis est, subuenire autẽ tẽpestati quauis ratione, sapientis: coq; magis si plus adipiscarere explicata boni, quàm addubitata mali. Periculosæ autem rerũ actiones partim iis sunt, qui eas suscipiunt, partim Reipub. Itemque alij de vita, alij de gloria, & benevolentia ciuium in discrimen vocantur. Promptiores igitur debemus esse ad nostra pericula quàm ad communia: dimicareq; paratius de honore et gloria, quàm de cæteris commodis. Inuenti autem multi sunt, qui non modo

for there can be nothing foolisher, than so to do. wherfore in auenturing daũgers, the gyse of the phisicians is to be folowed, who do lightly cure the lightly diseased but too sore sicknesses they be dryuen to minister daungerous, and doutfull medecines. Therfore in a calme to wishe a sore tempest, it is a mad mãs part, but to make shift in a tempest, by al maner meanes, it is a wise mãs propertie, and so muche the more, if ye attaine more good when the thing is past, than harme, whan it was in dout. But the doing of matters bee daungerous, partly to those, which take them in hande, and partly to the cõmon weale. And also some bee brought in hasarde of their life, some of their glorie, some of the peoples fauour. we ought therefore to bee redier to aduenture our owne, than common perels, and to fight sooner for honour, and glorie, than for other commodities.

But there haue ben foũd many, who for theyr contrey

were

were redie to spende not only theyr substance, but also their lyfe: and those same yet woulde not bee content to lose one iote of their glorie, no not thought the common weale woulde require it, as Callicratides, who when he was capteyne of The Lacedemonians, in the Peloponnesian warre, and hadde done manye thinges worthely, in the ende, ouerturned all, when he dyd not folow their aduise, who thought good to transporte the naule from Arginnuses and not too fight with the Athenians. To whom he made aunswere, howe the Lacedemonians, that naule being lost, might make forth an other: he coulde not flee without his dishonour. And this was, no dout, to the Lacedemonyans a meetely sore plage, but it was a pestilent plage whereby the Lacedemonyans power fell flatte to the grounde, when Cleombrotus, fearing enuye, hadde rashelye encountred wyth Epaminondas.

pecuniam, sed vitam etiam profundere pro patria parati essent: idem gloriæ iacturam ne minimam quidem facere vellent, ne Reipubli: quidem postulante: vt Callicratides, qui cum Lacædemoniorum dux esset Peloponnesiaco bello, multaque fecisset egregiè, vertit ad extremum omnia, cum consilio non paruit eorum qui classem ab Arginusis remouendam, nec cum Atheniensibus dimicandum putabant: quibus ille respondit: Lacedæmonios classe illa amissa aliam parare posse: fugere sine suo dedecore nõ posse. Atq; hæc quidem Lacedæmonys plaga mediocris fuit: illa pestifera, qua cum Cleombrotus inuidiam timens temere cum Epaminũda conflixisset, Lacedemoniorum opes corruerũt.

How.

Quanto Q. Maximus melius? de quo Ennius.

Vnus homo nobis cunctando restituit rem,
Non ponebat enim
rumores ante salutem.
Ergo posteris magis
viri nunc gloria claret.

How much better did Quintus Fabius Maximus? of whome quoth Ennius:

One wight there is, that hath our welth restored by delayes:
For he before all rumours did our safetie set alwaies:
wherfore in lenger course of time, the greater is his praise.

Quod genus peccandi vitandum est etiam in iocis urbanis. Sunt enim qui quod sentiunt, etiam si optimum sit, tamen invidiæ metu non audent dicere. Omnino qui Reipub. præfuturi sunt, duo Platonis præcepta teneant. Vnum vt vtilitatem ciuium sic tueantur, vt quicquid agunt, ad eam referant, obliti commodorum suorum. Alterum vt totum corpus Reipub. curent: ne dum parte aliquam tueantur, reliquas deseant. Vt enim tutela

Whiche kynde of misdoynge must bee also auoyded in citie matters. For there bee men whoe, bee it neuer so goode, ỹ theye thinke, yet for feare of enuy they dare not vtter it. whoso shalbee gouernours of the common weale, let thē obserue twoo precepts of Platoes, one is that theye so maynteyne the profite of ỹ cōmons, that what euer theye doe, they referre it ther to, alwayes for getting theire owne commodities, the other is, that theye haue care ouer the hole bodye of the common weale, lest while theye vp holde some one parte the rest they leaue destitute. For lyke as gardenshypp, euen

euen so gouernement of the common weale ought too bee vsed too the profit of them, who are committed, and not of them, to whom it is committed. But who so prouide for parte of the people, & of parte rechlesse, they bring in sedition, and discorde, the thing most hurteful too the common weale: whereby it befalleth, that some doo seeme peoplepleasers, some affectionate to nobilitie, but fewe too the hole. Hereof sprange greate discention among the Athenians: and in our common weale, not onely sedition, but also sore ciuill warre: the which a graue and stout citizen, and worthy of rule in the common weale, wilflee and hate: and giue him selfe hole to the common weale, & nother hūt after riches, nor power: but will so defende the holle state, as he maye prouide for all men. For by false accusations will bee bring anye manne into hatred, or enuie: but alwayes will so cleaue too iustyce, and

sic procuratio Reip. ad vtilitatem eorum qui cōmissi sunt, non ad eorum quibus cōmissa est gerenda est. Qui enim parti ciuiū consulunt, partē negligunt, rem perniciosissimam in ciuitatē inducunt, seditionem atq; discordiam. Ex quo euenit, vt alij populares, alij studiosi optimi cuiusq; videamur, pauci vniuersorum. Hinc apud Athenienses magnæ discordiæ ortæ et in nostra Repub. nō solū seditiones, sed pestiferæ etiam bella ciuilia. Quæ grauis et fortis ciuis in Repub. dignus principatu fugiet atq; oderit tradetq; se totū Reip. neque opes aut potentiā consectabitur, totamq; eam sic tuebitur vt omnibus cōsulat. Nec vero criminibus falsis in odium, aut inuidiam quenquam vocabit: omninoq; ita iustitiæ, honestatiq; adhæresce-

*vt dum eam conſeruet, quẽ-
quis grauiter offendat: mor-
temque oppetat potius, quam
diſeratilla, quæ dixi. Mi-
ſerrima eſt omnino ambitio,
honorumq; contentio. De
qua preclare apud eundem
eſt Platonem: ſimiliter face-
re eos, qui inter ſe contende-
rent, vter potius Rempu. ad-
miniſtret, vt ſi nautæ cer-
tarent, quis eorum potiſſi-
mum gubernaret. Idemque
præcepit, vt eos aduerſarios
exiſtimemus, qui arma
contraferant, non eos, qui
ſuo iudicio tueri Rempub.
velint: qualis fuit inter P.
Africanum, & Q. Me-
tellum ſine acerbitate diſ-
ſencio.*

*Nec vero audiendi ſunt,
qui grauiter iraſcendum
inimicis putabunt,*

and honeſtie, that while he
may maintaine it, although
he ſore offende other, he
woulde deſire death rather,
than forſake thoſe thinges
that I haue ſpoken of. Am-
bition no doute, & ſtriuing
for promotion is a very mi-
ſerable thing, whereof it is
notably ſayde in the ſame
Plato, that ſemblably fare
they, who woulde ſtriue to-
gether, whether of them
ſhould rather rule the com-
mon weale, as if the mary-
ners ſhould be at variance,
which of thē ſhould chiefely
gouerne the helme. And the
ſame man hath taught vs, þ
thoſe wee take as enemies,
which woldе beare armour
againſte vs, and not thoſe
who by their diſcrecyon
meane to preſerue the com-
mon weale, as the diſcenti-
on betwene Publius Afri-
canus, and Quintus Me-
tellus was without all bit-
terneſſe of malice. Neyt-
her are they worthy to bee
heard, which holde opiny-
on that wee ſhoulde bee
throughly angrye with our
enemies, and doo thynke,

it is

it is the propertie of a stout harted, and manly man.

For there is nothinge more commendable, nothing more seemely for a great and noble man, than pleasablenes and mercie. But in free cities, and where there is an equalitie of law, there must be vsed also a myldenesse & noble corage, as they call it: leste, if wee bee angry eyther with commers out of time, or crauers without shame, we fall into a testifnesse of mynde, both vnprofitable, and hatefull. And yet meekenesse, and mercie is so to bee alowed: that for the common weales sake, a seuertie be vsed: wythoute which, a citie can not be gouerned. But all ponnishement, and chastysement must bee voyde of malyce, and not bee applyed to serue his turne. who ponnisheth or rebuketh any man, but to the common weales behofe. We must also beware, that the ponnishement bee not greater than the fault, & leste al for one matter, some be corrected, some not once spoken vnto

idq; magnanimi et fortis viri esse censent. Nihil enim laudabili°, nihil magno & præclaro viro dignius placabilitate atq; clemẽtia. In liberis vero populis, & iniuris æquabilitate exercẽda etiam est facilitas, et altitudo animi quæ dicitur: ne si irascamur, aut intẽpestiue accedẽtibus, aut imprudẽter rogãtibus, in morositatẽ inutilem & odiosã incidamus. Ettamẽ ita probãda est mãsuetudo atq; clemẽtia, vt adhibeatur Reipublicæ causa seueritas, sine qua administrari ciuitas nõ potest. Omnis autẽ & animaduersio, et castigatio, cõtumelia vacare debet: neq; ad eius, qui punit aliquẽ, aut verbis castigat, sed ad Reipub. vtilitatẽ referri. Cauendum etiam ne maior pœna quàm culpa sit, & ne eisdẽ de causis alij plectantur, alij ne appellẽtur quid-

Prohibenda autem maximè est ira in puniendo. Nunquam enim iratus qui accedet ad pœnam, mediocritatem illam tenebit, quæ est inter nimium & parum: quæ placet Peripateticis, & recte placet, modo ne laudarent iracundiam, & dicerẽt vtiliter à natura datam. Illa vero omnibus in rebus repudianda est, optandumque vt ij, qui præsunt Reipu. legũ similes sint: quæ ad puniẽdum non iracundia, sed æquitate ducũtur. Atq; etiã in rebus prosperis, & ad voluntatem nostram fluentibus superbiam, fastidium, arrogantiamque magnopere fugiamus. Nam vt aduersas res, sic secundas immoderatè ferre leuitatis est, præclaraq; est æquabilitas in omni vita, eadem semper vultus, eademque frons

vnto. And in punishing we must chiefely refrain frõ anger. For the angrye man that goth about punishment, shall neuer keepe that measure, that is betweene too muckle, & to little: ỹ which measure liketh the Peripatetikes: and of good cause it liketh them, were it so, they woulde not commende angrinesse, and saye, that it is profitably geuen of nature, But in all cases, that affection is to be refused: and it is to be wished, ỹ suche as gouerne the common weale be like the lawes: which bee moued too punish offenders not vpon anye wrathe, but vpon equitie.

More ouer in prosperitie, and when thinges flow euen at our will, let vs earnestlye flee pride, disdainefulnesse, and arrogancie. For as it is a point of lightnesse, vnmeasurably too beare aduersitie: so it is no lesse, vnmeasurably to vse prosperitie: & a continuall euennesse in all a mans life, and one chere euermore, and one maner of face is commendable,

as

as we haue hard of Socrates, and also of Caius Lelius. Certesse I see, howe Philip, king of the Macedonians, was excelled of his sonne, in prowesse, & glorye, yet in mildenesse, and gentleneſſe, he was farre aboue him. wherfore the one was alwayes noble, the other oftentymes full beastlie, so that they seeme rightlye to teach, which warne vs, that how much the hyer wee bee in degree, so muche the lowlyer we beare our selues.

Panetius reporteth, how Africanus, his scholar, and familier frende, was wõt to say, like as horses by reason of the dyuers fightes of warres waxing ouerhote, & corragious, men vse to put to riders, that they maye haue thẽ the redier, euen so men vnbridled with prosperitie, & ouertrustinge to thẽ selues shoulde bee brought as it were within the compasse of reason, and lerninge, that they myght thorowsee thee frailenesse of the worlde, and thy wauerynge of fortune.

vt de Socrate, itẽq; de C. Lelio accepimus. Philippũ quidẽ Macedonũ regem, reb⁹ gestis & gloria superatũ à filio: facilitate et humanitate, video superiorem fuisse. Itaq; alter semper magnus, alter sæpe turpissimus fuit. Vt rectè præcipere videantur qui monent, vt quãto superiores simus, tanto nos summissius geramus. Panetius quidem Africanum auditorem, & familiarem suum solitum ait dicere: vt equos propter crebras contentiones prælio-rum ferocitate exultantes domitoribus tradere soleãt, vt his facilioribꝰ possint vti, sic homines secundis rebus effrenatos, sibiq; præsidentes, tanquam in gyrum rationis, & doctrinæ duci oportere, vt perspicerent rerum humanarum imbecillitatem, varietatemq; Fortunæ.

More

Atq; etiam in ſecundiſſimis rebus maxime eſt vtendum conſilio amicorum: iisq; maior etiam quàm antè tribuenda eſt authoritas: iiſdemq; temporibus cauendum eſt, ne aſſentatoribus patefaciamus aures, nec adulari nos ſinamus: in quo falli facile eſt. Tales enim nos tunc eſſe putamus, vt iure laudemur, ex quo naſcuntur innumerabilia peccata: cum homines inflati opinionibus turpiter irridentur, et in maximis verſantur erroribus. Sed hæc quidem hactenus. Illud autem ſic eſt iudicandū: maximas geri res, & maximi animi abiis, qui Rempuire-gant, quòd eorum adminiſtratio latiſſime pateat, ad plurimoſq; pertineat. Eſſe autem magni animi, & fuiſſe multos etiam in vita otioſa, qui aut inueſtigarent, aut conarentur magna

Moze ouer in our hieſt proſperitie, we muſt moſt of all take the aduiſe of our frēds and wee muſt geue them alſo a greater authoritie, than we dyd before. and in thoſe ſeaſons, we muſt take hede, that we open not our eares to flatterers, noz ſuffer our ſelues to bee clawed wyth flatterye, wherein it is an eaſy thinge to bee begyled. For wee thinke our ſelues ſuch, that of right we maye bee praiſed. Whereof doo ſpring innumerable faultes, when men puffe vp with opinion bee ſhamefully ſcorned, and bee wrapt in foliſh errours. But of theſe matters thus farre we treate.

This then is to be taken thus, that the greteſt dedes and of the greateſte corage, bee done by them, whiche gouerne the common weale, bycauſe their miniſtracyon reacheth fardeſt, & to moſte men appertayneth. And that there be, and haue been many, euen in the quiet life, of gret corage, which eyther woulde trye out, oz take in hand certeyne greate enter-

enterprises: and wold kepe themselues within ỹ bouds of their owne matters: or els, placed betweene Philosophers, and those that rule the common weale, woulde be delyted wyth theyr home goodes: not heapinge vp the same, by all manner of meanes, nor daringe theirs from the vse thereof: but rather empartinge thē both to their friende, and to the commonweale, if at anie time there shoulde be neede. Whiche good, first, let it be wel gotten, and with no dishonest, or hatefull gayne: nexte, let it be readye to doo good, to manie, so they bee worthie: lastlie, lette it bee encreased with discretion, diligence, & thrift: and not lye open rather to luste, and ryot, than to liberalitie, and bountyfulnesse.

These forsaide lessons who so obserueth: may liue bothe honourable, grauelie, and stoutlie, and also plainely, faithfullie, and friendlye for the trade of mans lyfe.

It followes, that we speake of ỹ other parte of honestye,

quædam, seseq; suarum rerum finibus continerent: aut interiecti inter philosophos & eos qui Rempub. administrarent, delectarentur re sua familiari: non eam quidē omni ratione exaggerantes, neq; excludentes ab eius vsu suos, potiusq; & amicis imparietes, & Reipub. si quando vsus esset. Quæ primum bene parta sit, nullo neque turpi quæstu neq; odioso, tum quam plurimis (modo dignis) se vtilē præbeat, deinde augeatur ratione, diligentia parsimonia: nec libidini potius, luxuriæq;, quàm liberalitati, & beneficentiæ pateat. Hæc prescripta seruanti licet magnifice, grauiter, animoseq; viuere: atque etiam simpliciter, fideliter, vitaq; hominum amice.

Sequitur vt de illa reliqua parte honestatis dicēdum sit:

in qua verecundia, & quasi quidem ornatus vitæ, temperãtia & modestia, omnisq; sedatio perturbationum animi, & rerum modus cernitur. Hoc loco continetur id quod dici latine decorum potest: græce enim πρεπον dicitur huius vis est, vt ab honesto non queat seperari. Nam & quod decet honestum est: & quod honestum est, decet. Qualis autem differentia sit honesti, & decori: facilius intelligi, quàm explanari potest. Quicquid enim est quod deceat, id tum apparet, cum antegressa est honestas. Itaq; non solum in hac parte honestatis, de qua hoc loco disserendum est, sed etiam in tribus superioribus, quid deceat apparet. Nam & ratione vti atque oratione prudenter,

whiche remaineth, wherein shamefastnesse, and temperance, as it were the certaine ornamente of mans life, and sober moode, and all appeasement of passions of the mynde, and the measure of thynges is seene. In thys place also comelinesse is contained, the whiche maye bee named *Decorum* in Latine, for in Greeke it is calledd πρεπον. The nature hereof is such, that from honestie it can not bee sondred. For both what becommeth is honest and also what is honest, becommeth. But what difference there is betwene honestie, and comelynesse, it maie sooner bee conceiued, than expressed. For whatsoeuer it is, that becommeth, it then appeareth, when honesty is gone before. And therefore not onelye in this parte of honestie, whereof in thys place wee haue to dispute, but also in the three former partes it doth appere what becommeth. For as it becommeth one to vse reason, and speache discreetlie,

to do,

to doo, that hee shoulde doo, aduysedlie: to espie, and maintaine whatsoeuer is in euery thinge the trouth: so contrarywyse, to beee begyled, to erre, to fall, to be deceiued, as muche it myslbecommeth: as to dote, and be distraught in minde.

Thereto all iuste thinges be comelie: all vniuste things againe as they be dyshonest, so are they vncomelie.

Like is the nature of manlinesse. For what so is done manfullie, and with a greate corage, that doth seeme mete for a man, & comelie: whatso goeth contrarye: that as it is dishonest, euen so it is vncomelie.

Wherefore this comelinesse, whereof I speake, doth pertaine to all honestie in deede: and so pertaines, that not after a certaine hidden sorte it is seene, but stãds in open sight. For a certaine thinge there is that becõmeth: & the same is perceiued in euerye vertue: which more by imaginacion, than in deede, maie be seuered from vertue.

& agere quod agas considerate: omniq́ue in re quid sit veri videre & tueri decet: contraq́; falli, errare, labi, decipi, tam dedecet, quàm delirare, & mente captum esse. Et iusta omnia decora sunt iniusta contrà, vt turpia, sic indecora. Similis est ratio fortitudinis.

Quod enim viriliter animoq́; magno fit, id dignum vero & decorum videtur: quod contra, id vt turpe, sic indecorum. Quare pertinet quidem ad omnem honestatem hoc, quod dico decorum. & ita pertinet, vt non recondita quadam ratione cernatur, sed sit in promptis. Est enim quiddam (idque intelligitur in omni virtute) quod deceat: quod cogitatione magis à virtute potest: quàm re seperari:

& vt venustas, & pulchritudo corporis secerni non potest à valetudine: sic hoc, de quo loquimur decorũ, totum illud est quidem cũ virtute cõfusum, sed mente & cogitatione distinguitur. Est autẽ eius descriptio duplex, nã & generale quoddã decorũ intelligimus, q̃ in omni honestate versatur: & aliud huic subiectũ, q̃ pertinet ad singulas partes honestatis. Atq́, illud superius sic ferè definire solet. Decorũ id esse q̃ consentaneum sit hominis excellentiæ in eo, in quo natura eius à reliquis animantibus differat. Quæ autem pars subiecta generi est, eam sic definiunt, vt id decorum esse velint, q̃ ita naturæ cõsentaneũ sit, vt in eo moderatio & tẽperãtia appareat cũ specie quadam liberali. Hæc ita esse, intelligere possumus

For as goodlines, and beautie of bodye can not be parted from helth, so this comlinesse, whereof we treate, is altogither blended with vertue, but yet in ones minde, and thought it may be deuyded.

But the discription thereof is on two sortes. For bothe we conceaue a general comelinesse to be, whiche in all honestye hathe to doo, and an other speciall comelinesse vnder this, which belongeth to euerie particular parte of honestie. And the former thus in a manner is wonte to bee deſyned, that it is comelie, whiche is agreable to mans excellencie, in that, wherein his nature is differente from other lyuinge creatures. But thei define the parte, whiche is vnder the generall, in suche wise, ỹ yet thei wil haue it to be counted comelie, which is so to nature agreable, as it may appeare both in mesura bleneſſe, and temperaunce, with a certaine honest show. That theſe bee thus ment, of the Philosophers, we maye

gesse

geſſe by that commelineſſe, whyche the Poets folowe: whereof, in an other place, we are wonte to ſaye moze. But then, we ſaye, the poets keepe that grace, whiche becommeth: when it, that to eche perſon is ſittinge, bothe is doone, and ſayde: as yf either Eacus, oz Minos ſhoulde ſay:

Wel let them hate, a while they ſtande in feare: oz this,

His childzens graue the parent ſelfe nowe is.

Incomelie it ſhoulde ſeeme becauſe we haue harde, that they were tuſke menne. But Atreus ſaying ſo, it is lyked of the hearers, bycauſe the ſpeache is fitte foz the perſon.

But Poets will iudge by the perſon, what is comelie foz euery bodye: how be it nature her ſelfe hath put vpon vs a perſonage of gret excellence, and preeminence abone all other liuinge creatures. wherfoze poets, in the greate diuerſitie of perſons, will eſpie what is fitte, euen foz the wicked ſozte, & what becommeth them.

exeo decore, quod poetæ ſequuntur: de quo alio loco plura dici ſolent. Sed tum ſeruare illud poetas quod deceat dicimus, cum id quod quaque perſona dignum eſt & ſit, & dicitur. Vt ſi Aeacus aut Minos diceret. ODERINT DVM METVANT. aut, NATIS SEPVLCRVM IPSE EST PARENS: indecorũ videretur q̃ eos fuiſſe iuſtos accepimus. At Atreo dicente, plauſus excitantur: eſt. n. digna perſona oratio. Sed poetæ quid quẽq; deceat, ex perſona iudicabunt. Nobis autẽ perſonam impoſuit ipſa natura, magna cum excellentia, præſtantiaq; animantiũ reliquorũ. Quocirca poetæ in magna veritate perſonarum, etiam vitioſis quid conueniat & quid deceat, videbunt,

Nobis autem cum à natura constantiæ, moderationis, tẽperantiæ, verecũdiæ partes datæ sint, cumq; eadem natura doceat non negligere, quẽadmodũ nos aduersus homines geramus: efficitur, vt & illud q; ad omnẽ honestatem pertinet decorum, quàm latè fusum sit, appareat: & hoc q; spectatur in vno quoq; genere virtutis. Vt enim pulchritudo corporis apta cõpositione membrorum mouet oculos, & delectat hoc ipso, q; inter se omnes partes quodã lepore consentiunt: sic hoc decorum, quod elucet in vita, mouet approbationem eorũ, quibuscum viuitur, ordine, & constantia, & moderatione dictorum omnium atq; factorũ. Adhibẽda est igitur quædam reuerentia ad-cuiusque, & reliquorum.

But seeinge the partes of stedfastnesse, measurablenes, temperaunce, and shamefastnesse be appointed vs by nature, and seeinge the same nature, teacheth vs, not to be rechlesse, after what sorte wee behaue oure selues to euerye manne: yt comes to passe, that bothe it appeareth, howe farre the comelinesse whiche appertaynes to all honestie, doth reache, and this also, whiche is marked in euerie sere kynde of vertue. For as the beutifulnesse of the bodye wyth proportionable makynge of the limmes moueth a mans eies and delyteth them euen with this that all the parts with a certain grace agre togither: right so this comelinesse that shyneth abroade in our life, winneth their likinge wyth whome we liue, by an order, stedfastnesse, and measurablenesse in all oure wordes, and deedes. There muste be vsed therefore a certaine reuerence towarde menne, bothe to euerye one of the beste sorte, and also to the rest of meaner degree.

For

For it is not onelye a signe of an arrogante bodye, but also of one altogyther lawelesse, to be reckles, what euery man thinketh of him.

But there is a difference betweene iustice, and shamefastnesse, in euery respecte, that is to be hadde. It is the parte of iustice, to offer men no violence: of shamefastenesse, to offende nos bodie: wherein the nature of comelinesse is moste thoroughlye seene. These thinges then declared: I thinke it sufficiently conceiued, what thinge that is, whiche we saye, becommeth.

But the duetie, that proceedeth of comelinesse, chiefelye taketh this waie: which leadeth to the agreablenes, and preseruation of nature, whō if we will folow as guide, we shall neuer go amisse, & shall folow both that, which hathe in it witines, and thoroughsight by nature, & that, whiche is agreable for ỹ felowesship of men, & that, which is earnest, and manlye. But the greteste effect of cōelines stādeth in this parte of vertue,

Nam negligere quid de se quisq; sentiat, non solum arrogantis est, sed etiā omnino dissoluti. Est autem quod differat in hominum ratione habenda, inter iustitiā et verecundiā. Iustitiæ partes sunt nō violare homines: verecūdiæ nō offendere: in quo maxime perspicitur vis decori. His igitur expositis quale sit id, quod decere dicimus, intellectum puto. Officium autem quod ab eo ducitur, hanc primum habet viam, q̄ deducit ad conuenientiam, conseruationemq; naturæ: quam si sequemur ducem, nunquam aberrabimus, sequemurq; & id, quod acutum & perspicax natura est, & id quod ad hominum consotiationem accommodatum est, & id quod vehemens atq; fortè. Sed maxima vis decori in hac inest parte,

de qua disputamus. Neque enim solū corporis qui ad naturā apti sunt, sed multo etiam magis animi motus probandi, qui item ad naturam accōmodati sūt. Duplex est enī vis animorum atque naturæ. Vna pars in appetitu posita est, q̄ est, ὁρμὴ græce, quæ hominem huc & illuc rapit. Altera in ratione, quæ docet & explanat, quid faciēdum fugiendumue sit. Ita fit vt ratio præsit, appetitus obtemperet. Omnis autem actio vacare debet temeritate & negligentia. Nec vero agere quicq̄, cuius non possit causam probabilē reddere. Hæc est enim fere descriptio officij. Efficiendū autem est, vt appetitus rationi obediant: eamq̄; neq̄ præcurrant, propter temeritatem, nec propter pigritiam aut ignauiam deserant: sintque tranquilli,

whereof we now treate. For not only the mouinges of the bodye, whiche agree to nature are to be alowed: but muche more the motions of the minde, that lykewyse bee agreable to nature, are to be commended.

For the power of the minde and of nature stands in two partes. The one is placed in appetite, whiche in greke is ὁρμὴ: and this hyther & thither haleth a man: that other hathe place in reason: whiche teacheth, and showeth plainelie, what is to be donne, and what to be refused. So falleth it that reason ruleth, and appetite obeyeth. But al oure doinges muste be without rashnesse, and negligence: neither oughte a manne to doo anye thinge whereof hee is not able to render a prouable cause. For this in a manner is the definition of duetie. But we muste bring to passe that oure appetites obaye reason: and neyther runne before it, neither for slouth, or dasterdlnesse, dragge behinde it: and that they be quiet.

and

and voide of all sturre, and trouble of minde.

Whereby all stedfastnes, & measurableneſſe shall appeare in sight. For appetits, whiche go ouerfarre astraye: and (as it were) ouerhoote eyther in longyage after thynges, or fleeinge from thynges, bee not staied inoughe by reason: these (woute doubte) exceede theyr boundes and measure. For they forsake, and sette aside obedience: nor yet do yelde to reason, whereynto they be made subiect by ẏ lawe of nature. But (ẅ) such motions not onelie mens mindes bee troubled, but also their bodies. We may se it in the very faces of the angrie: or of them, who either with anye luste, or wyth feare be sturred, or in ouermuche pleasure doe reioyce: for therewith the countenance, voyce mouing, and resting of them all is chaunged: Of whiche thynges this is gathered (to the intente wee maye retourne to the fourme of duetie) that all appetites are to bee pulled in, and asswaged:

atq; omni animi perturbatione careant, ex quo elucebit omnis constantia, omnisq; moderatio. Nã qui appetitus longius euagantur, & tanquam exultantes siue cupiendo, siue fugiendo non satis à ratione retinentur, hi sine dubio finem & modũ transeunt. Relinquunt enim & abiiciunt obedientiã, nec rationi parent, cui sunt subiecti lege naturæ. A quibus non modo animi perturbantur, sed etiam corpora. Licet ora ipsa cernere iratorum, aut eorum, qui aut libidine sunt, aut voluptate nimia aliqua aut metu commoti gestiunt: quorum omnium vultus, voces, motus, statusque mutantur. Ex quibus illud intelligitur (vt ad officij formam reuertamur) appetitus omnes contrahendos, sedandosque esse:

and

excitãdamq; animaduersionem & diligẽtiã, vt ne quid temere, ac fortuito, incõsiderate, negligẽterq; agam°. Ne qñe. n. ita generati à natura sum°, vt ad ludũ & iocũ facti esse videamur, sed ad seueritatẽ pti°, & ad quaedam studia grauiora, atq; maiora. Ludo autẽ & ioco vti illis quidẽ licet. sed sicut somno & quietib° ceteris, tũ cũ grauibus seriisq; rebus satisfecerimus. Ipsũq; genus iocandi non pfusum, nec immodestũ sed ingenuum, & facetũ esse debet. Vt enim pueris non omnẽ licẽtiã ludendi dam°, sed eã q̃ ab honestatis actionib° non sit aliena: sic in ipso ioco aliquod pbi ingenij lumẽ eluceat. Duplex õnino est iocãdi genus. Vnũ illiberale petulãs, flagiosũ, obscœnum. Alterũ elegãs, vrbanũ, ingeniosũ, facetum, quo genere non modo Plautus noster,

nd that we muste take good heede, and diligence, that we do nothing rashlie, and vertuouslie, nor vnaduisedlye, and negligentlie. For we be not to this ende engendred of nature, that we shoulde seme to be created for plaie, and iest, but we be rather borne to sagenes, & to certain grauer, and greater studies yet we may lawfully vse iesting and pastime, but euen as we do sleape, and other restings at suche tyme, as wee haue sufficientlie ended graue, and erneste causes. And the verye manner of our iestinge must not be to large, nor vnsober but honest, and pleasaunte. For as we giue not children al manner libertie of plaieng but suche as swarueth not from honeste exercises, so in our verie iesting let ther appeare some lighte of honest witte. To be shorte, after twoo sortes is the manner of iestinge: the one, vnhoneste, saylenge, hurtfull, bawdie, the other, fyne, ciuill, witte, pleasaunt. With the whiche kinde, not onelye oure Plautus,

and

and the olde comedie of the Attikes, but also the bookes of Socraticall philosophers bee well stored: and there be of manie men many merye saide sawes, as those that of old Cato be gathered, which be called ἀποφθεγματα Easie therefore is the differēce betweene honest, and vnhonest: eithinge. The one is meete for an honest man, if it bee done in season, and with a light harte: the other meete for no man, if the vncleanlinesse of the matter be encreased with filthynesse of wordes.

Also in pastime, there is a certaine measure to be kept: that we be not therein all togyther excessiue, and puffed vp with pleasure, fall into some dishonestie. But bothe oure Martiall feelde, and also oure exercises of huntinge do finde vs honest examples of pastime.

But it belonges to the whole discourse of duetie, euermore to haue in mynde, howe farre mannes nature exceedeth the nature of beastes.

For

& Atticorum antiqua comœdia, sed etiam philosophorū Socraticorū libri referti sunt, multaq; multorum facete dicta: vt ea quæ sene Catone sunt collecta, quæ vocātur. ἀποφθεγματα Facilis igitur est distinctio ingenui & illiberalis ioci. Alter est, (si tempore fit, ac remisso animo) homine libero dign⁹. Alter ne homine quidem, si rerū turpitudini adhibetur verborū obscœnitas. Ludēdi etiā est quidam modus retinendus, vt ne nimis omnia profundamus, elatiq; voluptate in aliq̄ turpitudinē dilabamur. Suppeditant autē & campus noster, & studia venandi, honesta exempla ludendi. Sed pertinet ad omnē officij quæstionē semper in promptu habere, quantum natura hominis pecudibus reliquisq; bestijs antecedat.

Illæ enim nihil ſentiant niſi voluptatem, ad eamque feruntur omni impetu.

Hominis autem mens, diſcendo alitur, & cogitando ſemper aliquid aut inquirit, aut agit: videndiq; & audiendi delectatione ducitur.

Quin etiam ſi quis eſt paulò ad voluptates propenſior, modo ne ſit ex pecudum genere (ſunt enim quidem homines non re ſed nomine) ſed ſi quis eſt paulò erectior, quamuis voluptate capiatur, occultat & diſſimulat appetitum voluptatis, propter verecundiam. Ex quo intelligitur corporis voluptatem non ſatis eſſe dignam hominis præſtantia, eamq; contemni & reiici oportere. Sin ſit quiſpiam, qui aliquid tribuat voluptati, diligenter ei tenendum eſſe eius fruendæ modum. Itaq; uict⁹,

For they feele not hing, but pleaſure, and therevnto be carried wyth their whole ſweygh: but mannes witte is fedde with learninge: and by ſtudiynge either ſercheth, or dothe alwates ſomewhat: and is ledde with the delyte of ſeeinge and hearinge. yea moreouer if there be any ſomewhat with the moſte enclined to pleaſures: ſo hee be not of the beſtlie kinde: (for ſome there be not menne in deede, but in name) but if there bee any manne, that is ſomewhat more greedilye minded: thoughe with pleaſure hee bee caught e, hee hydeth, and diſſembleth hys appetite of pleaſure, for very ſhamefaſtneſſe. Wherof it is ſoone perceiued, ỹ pleaſure of ỹ bodye is not worthie to bee matched with the excellence of man: and that it oughte to be diſpiſed, and reiected. But if there be any manne, who ſommedeal yeeldeth vnto pleaſure, hee muſte verye warelie keepe a meaſure, in enioyenge the ſame.

And therefore let ỹ feeding, and

and apparaillynge of the bodye bee referred to helth, and strengthe, not to voluptuousnesse. And thereto if wee wyll consider, what an excelence, and a dignitie there is in nature, we shall vnderstande howe lowie yt ys to ouerflowe in ryotte, and lyue deliciously, and wantonlie, and howe honest it is, to leade oure life sauyngelie, chastelie, sagelie, and soberlie.

¶ We muste vnderstand also that wee be cladde by nature (as it were) with twoo parsons, whereof the one is cõmune, bicause we all be partakers of reason, and the preeminence, whereby wee surmounte beastes, from whiche reason, all honestye, and comelinesse is deryued, and oute of the whiche, the waye of findinge ductie ys soughte, the other is that whiche proprelie to echeman is assigned.

For as in bodyes there bee greate differences (for some we see passe other in swiftenesse to runne, somme in strength to wrastle, and likewise

cultusq; corporis ad valetudinẽ referantur, & ad vires, non ad voluptatem. Atque etiam si considerare volum⁹, quæ sit in natura hominis excellentia, & dignitas, intelligimus quam sit turpe diffluere luxuria, et delicate ac molliter viuere: quamque honestum parce, continenter, seuere, sobrieq;. Intelligendũ etiam est duabus quasi nos à natura indutos esse personis. Quarũ vna est cõmunis ex eo, q̃ omnes participes sumus rationis, præstantiæq; eius, qua antecellim⁹ bestijs: à qua omne honestũ, decorũq; trahitur: & ex qua ratio inueniendi officij exquiritur. Altera autem, q̃ propriè singulis est attributa. Vt. n. in corporibus magnæ dissimilitudines sunt, (alios enim videm⁹ velocitate ad cursũ, alios viribꝰ ad luctãdũ valere

item̃q; in formis alijs dignitatẽ ineſſe, in alijs venuſtatem, ſic in animis exiſtunt etiam maiores varietates. Erat in L. Craſſo, & in L. Philippo multus lepos: maior etiam, magisq; de industria in C. Cæſare Lucij filio. At iſdem temporib⁹ in M. Scauro, & in M. Druſo adoleſcente ſingularis ſeueritas: in C. Lælio multa hilaritas: in eius familiari Scipione ambitio maior, vita triſtior. De græcis autem dulcè & facetũ, feſtiuiq; ſermonis atq; in omni oratione ſimulatorem, quem εἴρωνα græci nominauerunt Socratẽ accepimus. Contra, Pithagoram & Periclem ſummam authoritatem conſecutos ſine vlla hilaritate. Callidum Hannibalem ex Pœnorum: ex noſtris ducib⁹. Q. Maximum accepimus, facile cælare, tacere, diſſimulare,

wyſe in faces, ſome haue a pozrtlie looke, ſome an amiabieneſſe) ſo alſo in myndes there be farre greater diuerſities.

There was in Lucio Craſſus, and Lucius Philippus muche pleaſauntneſſe: but greater and moze of ſet purpoſe, in Caius Ceſar, Lucius ſonne. And at thoſe dates in Marcus Scaurus, & in Marcus Dzuſus the yonge manne, there was a ſingular grauitie: in Caius Lelius, muche myzthe: in Scipio his familiar, bothe greater honoure ſeekinge, and a ſadder like.

But of the Grecians, Socrates, we haue heard, was pleaſaunt, and feate cõceited, a merry talker, and in al his wordes a mocker, whõ the Greekes named εἴρωνα contrariwiſe Pithagozas, & Pericles attained very high authozitie, wout any myzth at all. Of ẏ Penes, Annibal was crafty: of our captaines Quinto Maximo, wee haue herd ſay, hadde a meruailous conninge in clokinge, in keeping in, in diſſẽbling, in making

kinge a ſtale, in preuentinge the deuiſes of the enemie. In which kinde, the Grekes before all other doe preferre Themiſtocles the Athenian, and Jaſon the Pheraian And chiefely the ſuttle, and crafty deede of Solon, who that both his life ſhould be ſafer, and ſomwhat the more he might furder the common weale, fained himſelfe to bee madde. There be other farre vnlyke to theſe, plaine and open, whiche doo thinke nothing in ſecret, nothing with gyle, meete to be wrought, and bee louers of trouth, and enemies to diſceite. And againe, there be other, whoe would anie thinge endure, & do ſeruice to anie manne, ſo thei might obtaine that they deſire, as we did ſee Silla, and Marcus Craſſus vſe them ſelues. Of whiche ſorte, we haue herde, Lyſander the Lacedemonian, was the ſutteleſt, and could moſte abyde. And contrarywyſe, of Callicratides, whoe was Admiral of the naule, nexte after Liſander.

inſidiari, præripere hoſtium conſilia. In quo genere Græci Themiſtoclem Athenienſem, & Pheræum Iaſonẽ cæteris anteponũt in primiſque verſutum & calidũ factum Solonis: qui quo tutior vita eius eſſet, & plus aliquanto Reip. prodeſſet furere ſe ſimulauit. Sunt hi aly multum diſpares, ſimplices & aperti, qui nihil ex occulto, nihil ex inſidijs agendum putant, veritatis cultores, fraudis inimici. Itemq; aly, qui quiduis perpetiantur, cuiuis deſeruiant dum quod velint, conſequãtur: vt Syllam, & M. Craſſum videbamus.

Quo in genere verſutiſſimum et patientiſſimum Lacedæmonium Liſandrum accepimus: contraq; Callicratidem, qui præfectus claſſis proximo poſt Lyſandrũ fuit.

And

Itemq; in sermonibus alium quidem videmus, quamuis præpotens sit, efficere, vt vnus de multis esse videatur & in Catulo & in patre et in filio, itemq; & in Q. Mutio Mancino vidimus. Audiui ex maioribus natu hoc quidem fuisse in P. Scipione Nasica: contraq; patrẽ eius, illũ qui Tiberij Gracchi conatus perditos vindicauit, nullam comitatem habuisse sermonis nec Xenocratẽ quidem seueriſſimum philosophorum: ob eamq; rem ipsam & magnũ & clarum fuisse. Innumerabiles aliæ dissimilitudines sunt naturæ, morumq;, minime tamen vituperandorũ. Admodum autem tuenda sunt sua cuiq; non vitiosa, sed tamen propria, quo facilius decorum illud, quod quærimus, retineatur. Sic enim est faciendum, vt cõtra

And likewise we se an other man in talke, thoughe he be of greate authoritie, so order the matter, that hee seemes one of the common sorte. Which in Catulus, both the father and the sõne and the same in Quintus Mutius Mancinus, wee haue seene. I haue hearde moreouer of myne elders, the same to haue been in Publius Scipio Nasica. And contrariwyse, his father, euen hym that auenged Tiberius Gracchus wycked enterprises, to haue had noe gentle grace of speache. No nor Xenocrates, whoe was the sagest of the Philosophers, and for the selfe same thinge became greate, and famous.

Innumerable other dyuersities there bee of nature, & of maners, no deale yet dispraisable. But euery mans owne guiftes, not such as be faultie, but natural, ar erneſtly to be maintained, whereby the sooner may that cõlineſſe be kepte, whiche wee do seeke. For in suche wise we muste worke, as againſte

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all nature were neuer striue: which thing auoided, let vs folow our owne proper nature. So that though ther be other studies grauer, and better, yet let vs measure our owne, by natures rule. For neither is it to anye purpose to fight against nature nor to ensue any thynge that ye can not atteine.

Whereupon it more apperes, what manor of thynge thys comelinesse is: bicause nothig becõmeth, *mawger Minerua*, as they say, that is, nature withstanding, and resistynge it.

In brieefe, if ought bee comely, of trouth ther is nothing more seemely, than an euenneſſe in all mans lyfe, and euerye of hys doinges: which you can not keepe, if you counterfette an others nature, and iette passe your owne. For as wee ought to vse that speeche, which is knowne to vs, lest as some menne choppinge in Greeke wordes, wee bee worthelye mocked at: so in our doinges and all our life, wee ought to showe no contrarietie.

naturam vniuersã nihil contendamus. Eatamen conseruata propriã naturam sequamur, vt etiã si sint alia grauiora, atq; meliora, tamen nos studia nostra naturæ regula metiamur. Neq; enim naturæ attinet repugnare, nec quicquã sequi, quod assequi nequeas. Ex quo magis emergit quale sit decorum illud: ideo quia nihil decet inuita (vt aiũt) Minerua, id est, aduersante et repugnante natura. Omnino si quicquam est decorum, nihil est profecto magis quám æquabilitas vniuersæ vitæ, tũ singularũ actionũ, quã cõseruare non possis, si alienã naturam imiteris, omittas tuã. Vt enim sermone eo debemus vti, qui notus est nobis, ne (ut quidam) græca verba inculcantes, iure optimo irrideamur, sic in actiones omnemq; vitam nullã discrepantiã conferre debemus

G.i. And

Atq; hec differentia naturarũ tantã habet vim, vt nõ nunquã mortẽ sibi ipsi consciscere alius debeat, ali⁹ in eadẽ causa nõ debeat. Nũ enĩ alia in causa M. Cato fuit, alia cæteri, qui se in Africa Cæsari tradiderunt? Atqui cæteris forsitan vitio datum esset si se interemisset, propterea quod lenior corũ vita, & mores fuerũt faciliores. Catoni autẽ, cũ incredibilem tribuisset natura grauitatem, camq; ipse perpetua cõstantia roborauisset, semperq; in proposito, susceptoq; consilio permansisset, moriendum potius quã tirannũ vultus aspiciendus fuit. Q uàm multa passus est Vlisses in illo errore diuturno, cũ et mulierib⁹ (si Circe et Calipso mulieres appellãdæ sũt) inseruiret, et in omni sermone omnib⁹ affabilẽ & iucũdum se esse vellet?

And thys difference of natures hath so greate a power, that otherwhile some one man ought too kill him selfe, some other in the same quarell ought not. For Marcus Cato was not in one quarell, and the rest in another, who yelded thẽ selues vnto Cesar in Africa. Yet too the reste perchaunce it shoulde haue beene counted a reproche, if they hadde slayne them selues: bycause their life hadde beene deyntier, and their maners milder: but when nature hadde geuen Cato an vncredible grauitie, and the same hee hadde strengthened wyth a continuall stedfastnesse: and alwayes hadde remayned in his intent, and determined purpose, it was meete for him rather to dye, than too looke vpon the tyrauntes face. How many paynes susteyned Vlisses, in that longe wandering: when bothe too women hee dyd seruyce (if Circe, and Calypso are too bee named women) and too all men in all hys talke hee would bee faire spoken: and

and also at home dyd beare the spight of the slaues, and nieces, that hee might once attein to the thinge, whiche he desired. But Aiax, with the corage, that hee is reported of, had rather die a thowsand deathes, than too suffer those thinges of an other mā. Which diuersities when wee beholde, it shall bee necessary to weye, what eche man hath of his owne, and to order those giftes, and not to haue a mynde to trye, howe other mens graces would become hym. For that becommeth eche man, whiche is moste of all eche mannes owne. Let euery man therfore know his owne disposition, and let him make him selfe a sharpe iudge both of hys vyces, and of his vertues, lest players may seeme too haue more discretion thā wee. For they doo chose not the best enterludes, but the fittest for them selues. For who vpon theyr voices be bolde, they take Epigones, and Medea, who vpon gesture, doo take Menalippa

domi vero etiam contumelias seruorum, ancillarumq; pertulit: vt ad id aliquando, quod cupiebat, peruenire. At Aiax, quo animo traditur, millies oppetere mortem, quam illa perpeti ab alio maluisset. Quæ contemplantes expendere oportebit, quid quisq; habeat sui, eaq; moderari, nec velle experiri quàm se aliena deceant. Id enim quenq; decet, quod est cuiusque suum maximè. Suum igitur quisq; noscat ingenium: acremque se & bonorum & vitiorum suorum iudicem præbeat: ne scenicis plus, quàm nos, videantur habere prudentiæ. Illi enim non optimas, sed sibi accommodatissimas fabulas eligunt. Qui enim voce freti sunt, Epigonos, Medeamque. Qui gestu, Menalippam,

vel Clitemnestrã. Sæpe Rutilius, quẽ ego memini, Antiopã: non sæpe Æsopus Aiacẽ. Ergo histrio hoc videbit in scena, quod non videbit sapiens vir in vita? Ad quas igitur res aptissimi erimus, in iis potissimũ elaborabimꝰ. Sin aliquando necessitas nos ad ea detruserit, quæ nostri ingenij) nõ erũt, omnis adhibenda erit cura, meditatio, diligẽtia, vt ea, si nõ decore, at quã minime indecorè facere possimus. Nec tã est emendũ vt bona, quæ nobis data non sunt, sequamur, quam vt vitia fugiamus. Ac duabus his personis, quas supra dixi, tertia adiungitur, quã casus aliquis vel tempus imponit. Quarta etiam, quam nobismet ipsis iudicio nostro accommodabimus. Nam regna, imperia, nobilitates, honores, diuitiæ, opes, eaque, quæ sunt his cõ-

and Clytemnestre. Euermore Rutilus, whome I remember, tooke Antiopa, not often Æsopus toke Aiax. Shall a player then see this in the stage, that a wise man shall not see in his lyfe? wee shall chiefely therfore labour in these thinges, whereunto we shall bee most apte. But in case necessitie shall driue vs sometime to those thinges, which shall not bee for our disposition, all care, studie, and diligence, must bee employed, that, if we do them not comlye, yet wyth as lyttle vncomlynesse as may bee, neither ought wee so muche too endeuour our selues to folowe the vertues which bee not geuen vs, as to flee vices.

And vnto these two persons, whiche before I named, ther is a thirde persone ioyned, which some chaunce, or tyme casteth on vs. The fourth also is that, whiche we shall fashiõ to our selues after our owne minde For kingdomes, Empires, nobilitie, honour, riches, power, and those, which bee con-

trarye

trary to these, beinge placed in fortunes hande, bee ordered according to the tymes, but what persone wee our selues list to beare, proceedeth of our owne free wyll. And therefore some too phylosophie, some too the ciuill lawe, some to eloquence doo applye them selues, and for the vertues, some haue a more mynde to excell in one, and some in a nother, and whose fathers, or auncetors in any commendation haue been notable, the most parte of theirs doo studie in the same kinde of praise too excell, as Quintus Mutius, Publius sonne, did in the ciuill lawe: Africanus, Paulus sonne, in feates of armes But ouers doo adde some of their owne vnto those praises, that they receyued of their fathers, as this same Africanus with eloquence encreased the heape of hys martiall glorie, whiche selfesame Timotheus, Cononis sonne, did also, who when in praises of warre, to hys father he was not inferiour, did ioyne too that commen-

G.iii. dacion

traria, in casu sita, temporibus gubernantur. Ipsi autē quam partem genere velimus, à nostra voluntate trahi-scitur. Itaq; se alij ad philosophiam, alij ad ius ciuile, alij ad eloquentiā applicant: ipsarumq; virtutū in alia alius manu lt excellere. Quorū vero patres aut maiores in aliqua gloria prefuerunt, studet eorū plerique eodem in genere laudis excellere. vt Q. Mutius P. filius in iure ciuili: Pauli filius Africanus in re militari.

Quidā autē ad eas laudes, quas à patribus acceperunt, addunt aliquā suam. vt hic idem Africanus eloquentiæ cumulauit bellicam gloriā. Quod idem fecit Timotheus Cononis filius: qui cum belli laude non inferior fuisset quàm pater, ad eam laudem doctrinæ &

ingenij gloriam adiecit. Fit autē interdū, vt nonnulli omissa imitatione maiorū, suū quoddā instituū consequantur: maximeq; in eo plerunq; elaborant ij, qui magna sibi proponunt, obscuris orti maioribus. Hæc igitur omnia cū quærimus quid deceat, complecti animo & cogitatione debemus. Inprimis autē cōstituendū est, quos nos et quales esse velimus, et in quo genere vitæ: quæ deliberatio est omniū difficillima. Incunte enim adolescentia, cui inest maxima imbecillitas cōsilij, tum id sibi quisq; genus ætatis degendæ constituit, quod maxime adamauit. itaq; ante implicatur aliquo certo genere, cuiusq; viuendi, quam potuit quod optimum esset iudicare. Nam quod Herculem Prodicus dicit, vt est apud Xenophontem,

dacion the glorye of witte, and learning. But it so falleth now and then, that some lettinge go the imitacion of their auncetors, doo folow a certaine trade of ther owne, and therin, for the most parte they chiefely trauaile, who appoint them selues greate enterprises, beinge borne of scarce knowne parentes. In our mynde, and thought, then wee must calle all these thinges, when wee serche to knowe, what becommeth. But first of all wee must determine, whom, & what maner men we woulde haue our selues, and of what kinde of life. Which aduisement is the hardest of all. For at the entring into the yeres of discretion, when there is moste slenderneſſe of counsell, euery man doth appoynt hym selfe the trade of leading his lyfe, which he hath loued most of all, and so hee is entangled with some certeyne kinde, & course of lyfe, before he was able too iudge, what should bee best. For whereas Prodicus saythe, that Hercules (as is in Xenophon)

as

as soone as hee waxed whey berded, which time is graunted of nature, to those, what waye of lyuinge eche man will enter, went forth into deserte, and there sittynge, much, and a long while douted with him selfe, when hee behelde two wayes, the one of pleasure, the other of vertue: whether of them it were better to enter: this mighte perauenture happen to Hercules, that was borne of Iupiters seede, but not so too vs, who doo folow those, that euery one of vs list too folowe, and bee allured too theyr studies, and fashions. And for the moste parte, beinge traded with our parẽtes precepts, we encline to theyr guyse, and maner. Other bee caried after the iudgemente of the multitude, and long after those thynges moste, which too the greater parte seeme goodlyeste. Manye neuertheleſſe, whether of a certaine lucke, or of a goodnesse of nature, or by the instruction of theyr parentes, haue folowed ỹ right trade of life.

cũ primum puberesceret (quod tepus à natura ad deligendũ quã quisq; viã viuẽdi sit ingressurus, datũ est) exisse in solitudinẽ, atq; ibi sedentem diu secũ, multũq; dubitasse, cum duas cerneret vias, uã voluptatis, alteram virtutis, vtram ingredi melius esset. Hoc Herculi Iouis satu edito potuit fortasse contingere. nobis non idem, qui imitamur quos cuiq; visum est, atq; ad eorũ studia, institutaq; impellimur. Plerunq; autem parẽtum praeceptis imbuti ad eorum consuetudinem, moremq; deducimur. Alij multitudinis iudicio feruntur, quaeq; maiori parti pulcherrima videntur, ea maximè exoptant. Nõnulli tamen siue fœlicitate quadã, siue bonitate naturæ, siue parentum disciplina. rectam viæ secuti sũt viam,

Illud autẽ maximè rarũ genus est corũ, qui aut excellẽte ingenij magnitudine, aut præclara eruditione, atq; doctrina, aut vtraq; ornati, spatiũ etiã deliberãdi habuerũt, quẽ potissimũ vitæ cursum sequi vellẽt. In qua deliberatione ad suã cuiusque naturã consiliũ est omne reuocandũ. Nã cũ in omnibus, quæ aguntur, ex eo modo quo quisq; natus est (vt supra dictũ est) quid deceat, exquirimus, tũ in tota vita constituẽda, multo est eius rei cura maior adhibenda, vt constare in vitæ perpetuitate possimus nobismetipsis, nec in vllo officio claudicare. Ad hãc autẽ rationẽ quoniã maximã vim natura habet, fortuna proximam, vtriusq; omnino ratio habenda est in deligendo genere vitæ: sed naturæ magis. Multo enim & firmior est & constantior:

But that kinde of men is seldomest founde, who after they bee eyther of excellent profoundnesse of witte, or of a famous learning, and knowledge, or wyth bothe these adourned, haue got a tyme too take aduisemente: what race of lyfe they woulde the rathereste runne: in the which aduise, all a mannes councell is to bee applyed to eche mans proper nature. For sithens in all thynges, that be done, out of that nature, wherewith euerye man is borne (as before is sayde) we serche, what becommeth: euen, in pointinge out the hole lyfe, much more regard therof must bee hadde, that in the continuinge of our life wee may agree wyth our selues, and neuer haulte in any dutie.

But to this choise, seinge nature hathe the greatest power, and fortune the nexte: ther must consideration bee had of them both alwayes, in chooseinge the kynde of ones lyfe, but of nature, more. For nature is muche the surer, and the stedfaster,

so that

so that fortune manye tymes, as mortall her selfe, seemeth with immortall nature too fight. who so then wyll applye all the purpose of hys lyfe according to the kynde of his nature not corrupted, let him keepe a stedfastnes, for that becommeth moste of all, except perchaunce hee shall perceiue, that hee hath gone amisse, in chosinge hys kinde of life. which if it bee fall (as it may befall) there must bee made a chaunge of maners, and purposes. That chaunge then, if tyme shall further, wee shall the sooner, and more conuenientlye bring to passe, if not, faire & softly, and by lyttle and little it must be doone, like as frendshippes, which do not delyte vs, and are not well lyked, wisemen do iudge more cõuenient, stitch after stitch to rip, than sodenly too cutte a sunder. And when we haue once chaunged our kynde of lyfe, we must by all meanes take heede, that wee bee thought to haue done it vpon good aduisement.

But forasmuche as a little before

vt fortuna nonnunquam tãquam ipsa mortalis cum immortali natura pugnare videatur. Qui igitur a natura sua non vitiosa genus, consilium viuendi omne cõmutaturus constantiam teneat. Id enim maxime decet, nisi forte se erràsse intellexerit in deligendo genere vitæ. Quod si acciderit, (potest autẽ accidere) faciendamorũ, institutorũq; mutatio est. Eam mutationem si tempora adiuuabũt, facilius commodiusq; faciemus: sin minus, sensim erit, pedetentimq; faciendа: vt amicitias, quæ minus delectent, & minus probentur, magis decere censent sapiẽtes, sensim dissuere quàm repente præcidere. Cõmutato autem genere vitæ omni ratione curandum est, vt id bono consilio feciſſe videamur. Sed quoniam paulo

ante dictū est imitandos esse maiores, primū illud exceptū sit, ne vitia sint imitāda: deinde si natura non ferat, vt quædā imitari possint: vt superioris Africani filius, qui hūc Paulo Æmilio natum adoptauerat propter infirmitatem valetudinis, non tam potuit patri similis esse, quā ille, qui fuerat sui. Si igitur non poterit siue causas defensitare, siue populū cōcionibus tenere, siue bella gerere: illa tamē præstare debebit, quæ erūt in ipsius potestate, iustitiā, fidē, liberalitate, modestiā, tēperātiā: quo minus ab eo id quod desit requiratur.

Optima autē hereditas à patrib° traditur liberis, omni patrimonio præstātior, gloria virtutis, rerumq; gestarū: cui dedecori esse, nefas & vitium iudicandum est. Et quoniam officia non eadem disparibus ætatibus tribuuntur,

before it is sayde, that wee muste folowe our auncetors: firste, be this excepted: that their vices are not too bee folowed: nexte, that we folowe thē not in some thinges, that our nature wyll not beare: as the elder Africanus sōne, who adopted thys our Paulus sonne, coulde not be so like his father, bicause of sickelye weakeneſſe, as the other was like hys.

In case therfore one bee not able eyther too plede causes or to retein the people with orations, or too folowe the warres, those thinges yet he ought to performe, whiche shall be in his power, as iustice, faith, trulneſſe, liberalitie, sobermoode, & tēperātie: to thintent the thing, which he lackes may bee the lesse missed in him. Truelie the best inheritance that fathers leaue to their children, and more worth, than all riches is the glory of vertue, and worthy dedes, whereunto to be a staine, it is to be accoūted both vice, and shame.

And bicause not alike duties are assigned too vnlike

ages

ages, and some there bee for yongmen, and some for the elder sort, somwhat also wee haue to say of this diuersytie. It is therefore a yonge mans part, too reuerence hys elders, and of these too chose out the beste and moste commended, whose councell, & authoritie he maye leane vnto. For the vnskilfulnes of tender yeres, must by olde mens experience bee ordered and gouerned.

And this age specially from lust is too bee wayned, and to bee brought vp in labour, and paines takinge bothe of minde and bodie, that bothe in martiall, and ciuill duties, their diligence may appeare. Also when they wyll refreshe their wittes, and geue them selues to pastime, let them beware of intemperance, and remember shamefastnesse, which shalbee done the easier, if at suche thinges also their elders wyll bee in presence.

But for olde men, labours of ỹ bodie are to bee deminished and exercises of the mynde seeme meete to be encreased: and

aliaque sũt iuuenũ, alia seniorũ, aliquid etiam de hac destinctione dicendum est. Est igitur adolescentis maiores natu reuereri ex ijsq; eligere optimos & probatissimos: quorum consilio atq; authoritate nitatur. Ineuntis enim ætatis inscitia senum constituenda et regenda prudentia est. Maxime autè hæc ætas à libidinibus arcenda est, exercendaq; in labore, patientiaq; & animi & corporis, vt eorũ & in bellicis & ciuilibus officijs vigeat industria. Atque etiam cum relaxare animos, & dare se iucunditati volent, caueãt intẽperanitã, meminerint verecũdiæ, quod erit facilius, si in eiusmodi quoq; rebus maiores natu interesse velint: Senibus autẽ labores corporis minuendi: exercitationes animi etiam augendæ videntur.

Dãda vero opera, vt et amicos & iuuentutem & maxime Rempub. consilio & prudentia quàm plurimũ adiuuent. Nihil autem magis cauendum est senectuti, quàm, ne languori se, desidiæq; dedat. Luxuria vero cum omni ætati turpis, tum senectuti fœdissima est. Si autem libidinũ etiam intemperãtia accesserit, duplex malum est: quòd & ipsa senectus concipit dedecus: & facit adolescentum impudentiorem intemperantiam. Ac ne illud quidem alienum est, de magistratuum, de priuatorum, de ciuium, de peregrinorum officiis dicere. Est igitur proprium munus magistratus, intelligere se gerere personam ciuitatis, debereq; eius dignitatem & decus sustinere: seruare leges, iura describere, & ea fidei suæ commissa

and they must geue theyr diligence, that muche they aide their frendes, & youth, and specially the common weale with counsell, & wisedome. But no thing more of age is to bee taken heede of, than that it geeue not it selfe too litherodesse and idelenesse. As for tyotte, to euery age it is reprocheful: and for olde age moste shamefull. But if the intemperance of lustc bee ioyned with it, ther is a doble incõuenience, bicause bothe age selfe taketh shame by it, and it causeth ponge mens intẽperãce to bé more shameles.

And this truely is not out of the matter, to speake somwhat touchinge the duties of magistrates, of priuate men, of citizens, and of strãgers. It is therefore the proper office of a magistrat, to consider, he representes the person of the citie, and that he ought too maintayne the honour, and reputacion therof, & too keepe the orders of the same, & to set out lawes fit therefore, & too remember, they bee committed

to

to his charge.

A priuate man it behoues to liue in an equalitie, and likenesse of lawe with the citizens, neither as an vndering, and abiecte, nor bearing himselfe too hye, and also in the common weale to seeke those thinges, that bee quiet, and honest. For such a one we are wont both to call and coūt a good citezen.

But it is the dutie of a stranger, and alien inhabitaunt, to meddle & nothyng beyde hys owne byſineſſe, nor too enquire anye thynge touching an other man, and no whit in a straunge common weale too be curious.

Thus, for the moſt parte, duties shall bee founde out, when it shall bee soughte, what becommeth, and what is agreable for persones, times, and ages. And ther is nothing, that becomes a man so muche, as in euerie doing, and taking hed aduise to kepe a stedfastnes.

But bicause the same comlinesse appeareth in all bedes and wordes, & in the moning and

meminiſſe. Priuatum autem oportet æquo et pari cum ciuibus iure viuere, neque ſummiſſum et abiectum, neque ſe efferentem, tum in Repub, ea velle, quæ tranquilla & honeſta ſint. Talem enim et ſentire bonum ciuē & dicere ſolemus. Peregrini autem & incolæ officium eſt, nihil præter ſuum negotium agere, nihil de alieno inquirere, minimeq. in aliena eſſe Repub curioſum. Ita ferè officia reperientur, cum quæretur quid deceat, & quid aptum ſit perſonis, temporibus, ætatibus. Nihil eſt autem quod tā deceat, quàm in omni re gerenda, conſilioque capiendo ſeruare conſtātiam. Sed quoniam decorum illud in omnibus factis et dictis, in corporis denique motu

& ſtatu cernitur: idq; poſitũ eſt in trib⁹ reb⁹, formoſitate, ordine, ornatu ad actionem apto: difficilius ad eloquendũ ſed ſatis erit facile intelligi. In his autẽ tribus continetur cura etiam illa, vt probemur ijs, quibuſcũ, & apud quos viuamus. His quoq; de rebus pauca dicantur. Principio corporis noſtri magnã naturã ipſa videtur habuiſſe rationẽ: quæ formã noſtrã, reliquamq; figuram, in qua eſſet ſpecies honeſta, eam poſuit in promptu: quæ autem partes corporis ad naturæ neceſſitatem datæ aſpectum eſſẽt deformẽ habituræ atq; turpem formam eas contexit atq; abdidit. Hanc naturæ tam diligentẽ fabricã imitata eſt hominum verecundia. Quæ enim natura occultauit, ea omnes, qui ſana mente, remouent ab oculis:

and ſtayeng of the bodye, and the ſame conſiſteth in three thinges, welfauouredneſſe, order, and furniture meete for ones doynges (ſomwhat harde it is to expreſſe, but it ſhall ſuffice, ſo it bee conceyued) & in theſe three conteined is that care alſo, that we bee alowed of thoſe, with whom and amonge whom wee liue. Of theſe matters likewiſe a fewe wordes let vs ſay.

Firſte, verye nature ſeemeth to haue habde a greate reſpecte of our bodie, which hath ſette moſt in ſighte our phyſnomie, and the reſt of our ſhape, wherein ther is an honeſt ſhowe, but ſhee hath couered, and kept cloſe the partes of the bodye, giuẽ for natures neceſſitie: which elſ ſhoulde haue an euill fauoured, and fowle ſight.

Mennes ſhamefulneſſe hath followed this ſo conyng a frame of nature.

For what ſo nature hath hydden: the ſame all men, who bee well in theyr wittes: do kepe frõ the eye,

and

and they do they endeuour to serue very necessitie, as closely, as they may: and of what partes of the body the vse is seruile, neyther those partes, nor their seruice by their names they do call: and so, that, which too doo it is no shame, if it bee secretly, to tell it is vncleanlye.

ipsique necessitati dant operam, vt quam occultissime pareant: quarumque partium corporis vsus sunt necessarij, eas neque partes, neque earum vsus suis nominibus appellant: quodque facere turpe non est, modo occulte, id dicere obscœnum est. Itaque nec actio rerum illarum aperta petulantia vacat, nec orationis obscœnitas.

And therfore neither the open doing of those thynges is voide of vnshamefastnesse: nor the talke without fylthinesse.

Neither truelye are the Cynikes worthy to bee heard nor anie of ỹ Stoikes, which are almost Cynikes, who do reproue vs, and mock at vs, because we cal those things, in wordes shamefull too bee spoken vpon, which bee in deede not dishoneste: and yet those thinges, that bee vnhoneste, wee terme by their names. As to go a theeuing, to begyle one, to cõmit aduoutry, is a thing in dede dishoneste, but it is told, about dishonestie, likewise to get childrẽ in dede is honeste, but to be vttered in talke it wer vncleanly.

Nec vero audiendi sunt Cynici, aut si qui fuerunt Stoici pene Cinici, qui reprehendunt & irrident, quod ea quæ re turpia non sint, verbis flagitiosa dicamus: illa autem quæ turpia sunt, nominibus appellemus suis, latrocinari, fraudare, adulterare turpe est, sed dicitur non obscœne: liberis dare operam re honestũ est, nomine obscœnũ

And

plura q̃, in eã sententiam ab eisdem contra verecundiam disputantur. Nos autẽ naturam sequamur. et ab omni, quod abhorret ab ipsa oculorum auriumq; approbatione, fugiamus. Status, incessus, sessio, accubatio, vultus, oculi, manuũ motus teneãt illud decorum. Quibus in rebus duo sunt maximé fugienda, ne quid effœmitatũ aut molle, & ne quid durũ, aut rusticũ sit. Nec vero histrionibus, oratoribusq; concedendũ est, vt his hæc apta sint, nobis dissoluta. Scenicorum quidẽ mos tantam habẽt à vetere disciplina verecundiam, vt in scenam sine subligaculo prodeat nemo: verentur enim, ne si quo casu cuenerit, vt corporis partes quædam apparatu, aspiciantur non decore. Nostro quidem more cum parentibus puberes filij,

And mo thinges, for that purpose, bee reasoned by the sayde philosophers, against shamefastnes. But let vs follow nature, & shonne all thinges, that abhorre the very pleasinge of our eye, & eare. Let our standinge, going, sitting, lying, chere, eies, and mouing of handes kepe that sawe comelynesse. In which thinges, two faultes we must specially take hede of, that nothing womānishly, or daintilie, and nothinge blockishely, or carterly wee do. Neither must wee agree, that these thinges shoulde bee seemely in players, and orators, and leste looselye in our selues. The custome of the stageplayers, euen of an olde order, hath so great regarde too shamefastnesse, that no man commeth on the stage without breches. For they are afearde, leste, if it chaunce by anye mishappe, that some partes of the body be discouered, they should bee seene vncomly. And as the fashion is with vs, children growynge to mannes

state

state be not bathed wyth their parentes, nor sonnes in lawe, with theyr Fathers in law. Therfore this kinde of shamefastnesse is meete to be obserued, namelie when nature herselfe is guide, and maistresse.

But wheras there be two kindes of beutie: and in one of them there is a louelines, in the other, a maiestie: louelinesse, we muste thinke lõgs to the woman, and maiestie to the manne. Therefore all manner trimminge, that is vnsittinge for manne, muste be kepte from his outwarde fourme, and the lyke faulte to this muste be taken heede of in ones gesture, and mouinge. For bothe the sturringe like wrastlers is often times mysliked: and also many gestures lyke players are not wythoute foolyshe toyes, and in bothe these kindes, those thinges whiche bee righte, and naturall, be commended. But the maiestye of the fauoure ys preserued by goodnes of colore, and coloure by exercises of bodie.

cum soceris quidem generi non lauantur. Retinenda est igitur huius generis verecundia, præsertim natura ipsa magistra & duce. Cum autem pulchritudinis duo genera sint, quorum in altero venustas sit, in altero dignitas: venustatem mulicbrem ducere debemus, dignitatem virilem. Ergo & à forma remoueatur omnis vero non dignus ornatus: & huicsimile vitium in gestu, motuque caueatur. Nam & palæstrici motus sæpe sunt odiosiores: & histrionum non nulli gestus ineptijs non vacant: & in vtroque genere, quæ sunt recta & simplicia laudamur.

Formæ autem dignitas coloris bonitate, tuenda est, color exercitationibus corporis.

Adhibenda est præterea mũditia non odiosa neq; exquisita nimis: tamen q fugiat agrestẽ & inhumanam negligentiam. Eadẽ ratio est habenda vestitus: in quo sicut in pleriſq; rebus, mediocritas optima est. Cauendum est autẽ, ne aut tarditatibus vtamur ingressu molliorib⁹ vt similes pomparũ ferculis esse videamur: aut in festinationib⁹ suscipiam⁹ nimias celeritates: q cũ fiunt, anhelitus mouentur, vultus mutãtur, oratorquẽtur: ex quibus magna significatio fit nõ adesse constantiã. Sed multo etiã magis elaborandũ est, ne animi mot⁹ à natura recedãt quod assequemur, si cauebimus ne in perturbationes atq; exanimationes incidam⁹ & si attentos animos ad decori conseruationẽ tenebim⁹. Motus autẽ animorum duplices sunt, alteri cogitatiõis

There muste a cleanlinesse be vsed besides: that is not odious nor curious, but only eschueth carterlye, and vnnaturall slouenrye. The like regarde we muste haue of apparail: wherein a meane, as in moste parte of thinges is best. We muste take hede also, we vse neyther to nyce a slouenelie in oure pace, lyke Pageauntes in triumphes: neyther to muche haste in speede makinge, like wildebraines. For when it happens, that men doe so: there followes shorte breathynge, the countenance is changed, and the face disfigured: wher of comes a greate presumption, that they haue no stayednesse.

But we muste much more studye, that the affections of oure minde swarue not from nature: whiche we shall attaine, if we will beware, that we fall not into moodes, and mazes: and if we will continue in hauing hedeful minds to the kepinge of comelines.

But the motions of mindes be of two sortes: some proceede of intelligence.

some

some of appetite. Intelligence is chiefely occupied in searchinge out of trouth, appetite stirreth a manne to be doinge. We muste provide therefore, that wee vse intelligence aboute the beste matters, and that wee make oure appetite obedient to reason.

And because the power of speache is greate, & the same is in twoo sortes, the one of vehement speache, the other of common talke: let the vehemente speache, serue for pleadinges in iudgementes, orations in assembies, and debatinge in the Senatehowse, let talke be vsed in companies, in disputations, in metinges of familiers, and let it also be at feastings.

Of vehement speche ỹ Rhetoricians haue rulers of talk none at al, notwithstandinge I wotte not whether suche also may be et.

Howbe it for their studies, that will learne, there be teachers found, but none there be, that study this, with the route of Rhetoricians al places be repleni∫hed.

alteri appetitus. Cogitatio inuersa exquirendo maxime versatur: appetitus impellit ad agendum. Curandum est igitur vt cogitatione ad res quàm optimas vtamur: appetitum rationi obedientem præbeamus.

Et quoniam magna vis orationis est, eaq́, duplex: altera cõtentionis: altera sermonis: contentio disceptationibus tribuatur iudiciorum, concionum, senatus: sermo in circulis disputationibus, congressionibus familiarium versetur: persequatur etiam conuiuia.

Contentionis, præcepta rhetorum sunt multa, nulla sermonis: quanquam haud scio an possint hæc quoq, esse. Sed discentium studijs inueniuntur magistri. Huic autem qui studeant, sunt nulli: rhetorum turba referta omnia

H.ii. Rea-

Quanquam quæ verborũ, sententiarumque præcepta sunt eadem ad sermonem pertinebunt. Sed cum orationis indicem vocem habeam⁹: in voce autem duo sequamur, vt clara sit, vt suauis: vtrunque omnino à natura petendum est, verum alterum exercitatio augebit, alterũ imitatio presse loquentium & leniter: quod fuit aliud in Catulis, vt eos exquisito iudicio putaris vti literarum. (quanquam erant literati: sed & alij) hi autem optimè vti lingua latina putabãtur: sonus erat dulcis: literæ neque expressæ, neq; oppressæ ne aut obscurum esset aut pudibundum, sine contentione vox, nec languens, nec canora. Vberior oratio L. Crassi, nec minus faceta. Sed bene loquendi de Catulis opinio non minor.

Neuertheleſſe the ſame preceptes, whiche be of wordes, and ſentences, ſhall appertaine to talke. But ſithens we haue cure voyce to vtter ſpeache: and in voyce wee ſeeke two thinges, that it be cleare, and ſweete: thei both are to bee fetched from nature euermore: but exercyſe will encreaſe that one: imitacion of treatable, and ſofte ſpeakers wil help the other. What was in the Catuli, ye ſhoulde ſuppoſe them to vſe a perfite iudgemente in pronouncinge of letters. Howbeit they were learned: but ſo were other too: yet theſe were thoughte to vſe the latine tongue beſt. Their ſoundinge was ſweete: their letters neither to much mouthed, nor drowned: leſt eyther it ſhoulde be vnheard, or ouer harſhe. Their voice was without ſtrayinge, neither fainte nor ſhrill.

The ſpeache of Lucius Craſſus was more plentyfull, and no leſſe feate cõceited: but for well ſpeakinge, the Catuli wer in as much eſtimation.

Ceſar

Cesar was sawced with mirth, and merie conceites: Catullus vnkle exceeded all: so that in that lawfull kinde of p'eadinge, he with familiar speache passed the vehemence of other. In all these therefore we muste laboure, if in ail we searche, what becommeth.

Let then this familiar talke (in whiche the Socratians moste excell) be gentle, and nothynge obstinate let there bee therein a pleasantnesse. Do not let a man keepe oute other, as thoughe hee were entered into his owne possession: but as in other matters, so in cõmon talke, he muste thinke an enterchaunged course oftentimes meete to be vsed. And let hym see, firste of all, of what matters he speake: yf they bee earnest, lette him vse a sagenesse, yf they bee merie, a pleasauntnes. Specially let hym foresee, that his talke bewraye not some vice in hys maners: whiche then chiefely is wont to be fall: when eyther in mockage, or erneste, men

Sale vero conditus et facetijs Cæsar. Catuli patris frater vicit omnes: vt in illo ipso forensi genere dicendi cõtentiones aliorũ sermone vinceret. In omnibus igitur his elaborandum est, si in omnib⁹ quod decent exquirimus. Sit igitur hic sermo in quo Socratici maxime excellunt, lenis, minimeq; pertinax: insit in eo lepos, nec vero tanq; in possessionem suam venerit, excludat alios: sed cum reliquis in reb⁹, tum etiã in sermone communi, vicissitudine non nunquam vtendũ putet. Ac videat in primis quibus de rebus loquatur: si serijs, seueritatem adhibeat, si iocosis, leporem. In primisq; prouideat ne sermo vitium aliquod indicet inesse in moribus, quod maximè tum solet euenire, cum studiosè de absentibus detrahendi causa

aut per ridiculũ aut ſeuerè, aut maledicè, cõtumelioſéq; dicitur. Habentur autẽ plerumq; ſermones, aut de domeſticis negotijs, aut de Reipub. aut de artium ſtudijs & doctrina. Danda igitur opera eſt, vt etiamſi aberrarc ad alia cœperit, ad hæc reuocetur oratio. Sed vt cumq; ad erunt res (neq; enim eiſdem rebus nec omni tempore, nec ſimiliter delectamur) animaduertendum eſt etiã quatenus ſermo delectationem habeat: & vt incipiendi ratio fuerit ita ſit deſinẽdi modus. Sed quoniam in omni vita rectiſſime pcipitur, vt perturbationes fugiamus, id eſt motus animi nimios rationi non obtemperantes: ſic eiuſmodi motibus ſermo debet vacare, ne aut ira exiſtat, aut cupiditas aliqua: aut pigritia, aut ignauia,

do byſie themſelues to ſpeak railingly & ſpitefully of the abſent, to their ſclaunder.

But this common talke, for the moſte parte, is had either of houſeholde matters, or of the common weale or of learning, and teaching artes. We muſt therefore giue good heede, that when the communication beginne to straye to other thinges, to theſe it bee returned, yea howſoeuer the matter falles oute, that is in hande. For neither all wyth one matter, nor at euerie ſeaſon, nor alike we are delited. We muſte marke alſo, howe farre oure talke hathe in it a likinge, and as there was a waie to beginne it, ſo let there bee a meaſurable meane to ende it.

But becauſe it is verie well taughte: that in all oure ipſe wee flee paſſions, that is to ſaie vnmeaſurable moodes of mynde not ruled by reaſon, likewyſe oure talke muſte bee voyde of ſuche moodes, leſte eyther anger eryſe, or ſomme greedineſſe, or ſlouthfulneſſe, or cowardelyneſſe,

or

or some suche thyng appere. And moste of all, we muste haue regarde: that those with whom we keepe talke, we seeme both to reuerence, and to loue.

Chidinge also manie times commes in place, as necessary: in whiche, one must vse peraduenture both a greater straininge of voyce, and a sharper grauitie of words. It muste also be prouyded that we seeme not to do those thynges, as trefull: but as Phisicians doe come to searinge, and cuttinge: so let vs seldome, and vnwillingly fal to such manner of rebukinge: and not at all, vnlesse it bee of necessitie, when there will be founde none other remedie.

But yet let it be clerely voyde angre, wherewith nothinge rightly, nothing discretely can be done.

And for the moste parte, we maie vse a gentle maner of rebuking, yet tẽpered with a grauitie, so as bothe a soweresse be showed, and all spight refrained.

Yea & that same bitternes,

aut aliquid tale appareat. Maximeq; curandum est vt eos quibuscum sermonẽ conferimus, & vereri & diligere videamur. Obiurgationes etiã nõnunquã incidunt necessariæ in quibus vtendum est fortasse & vocis contentione maiore, & verborum grauitate acriore. Id agendũ etiam est, vt ne ea facere videamur iratis: sed vt ad vrẽdũ et secandũ medici veniũt sic ad hoc genꝰ castigãdi raro inuitiq; veniamꝰ, nec vnquam nisi necessario, si nulla reperietur alia medicina. Sed tamen ira procul absit, cum quanihil rectè fieri, nihil considerato potest. Magna autẽ ex parte clemẽti castigatione licet vti, grauitate tamẽ adiuncta, vt & seueritas adhibeatur, & contumelia repellatur. Atq; etiam illud ipsũ, ꝙ acerbitatis

habet obiurgatio, significandum est ipsi⁹ causa, qui obiurgetur, susceptum esse. Rectū est autem etiam in illis contentionibus, q̄ cum inimicissimis fiunt, etiam si nobis indigna, audiamus, tamē grauitatē retinere, iracundiam repellere. Q uæ enim cū aliqua perturbatione fiunt, ea nec constanter fieri possunt, nec ijs qui adsunt approbari. Deforme etiam est de seipso prædicare, falsa præsertim, & cum irrisione audientium imitari militem gloriosum. Et quoniam omnia persequimur (volum⁹ quidem certe) dicendum est etiam quidem hominis honorati & principis domum placeat esse: cuius finis est vsus, ad quem accommodanda est ædificandi descriptio: & tamen adhibenda dignitatis, commoditatisque diligentia.

whiche chydinge hathe in it, muste be declared, to be vsed for his sake, whoe is chidden. It is good also, euen in theise braules, whiche bee made with our bitterest enemies, although wee beare wordes vnmeete to bee spoken to vs: to keepe yet a grauitie, and to suppresse the angry moode. For these thinges that be wrought with any passion, neyther can bee constantlie doone, nor alowed of those, that are present. Euilfauored also it is, to tell praises of a mans selfe, specially if they be vntrue: and, with the mocking of the heaters, to resemble ỹ glorious souldiour.

And because we goe thoroughe all matters, or at the least be minded so to doe: we muste tell also, what manner of house, it liketh vs, an honourable man, and a prince shoulde haue. Whose ende is the occupieng thereof according to the which, the platte of ỹ building must be made: and neuertheless there must respect be hadde to a statelinesse and handsommenesse,

in

in the same. We haue heard late, it was an honoure to Cneus Octauius, whoe the first of the familie was made Consul: because in the palace, he hadde builded a gorgeous house & full of stately nesse: whiche when people resortinge thither had seene, was thought the further the maister, a man newely commen vp, to the attaininge of the Consulshippe. Thys did Scaurus pull downe, and enlarge the roume of his howses. And so Octauius into his howse firste brought ỹ Consulship: this other a noble, and famous mans sonne, into his enlarged howse not onelye brought repulse, but also a shame, and miserie. For a mannes honoure must be set oute by hys howse, and nat all hys honoure sought by hys howse: nor by the house the mayster, but by the maystery the howse must be honested. And as in all thinges els, regarde is to bee hadde not of a mannes selfe onelie, but of other also: likewise in a noble mannes house, into

Cn. Octauio, qui primus ex illa familia Consul fact⁹ est, honori fuisse accepimus, quod præclarum ædificasset in Palatio & plenam dignitatis domum: quæ cum vulgo viseretur, suffragata domino nouo homini ad consulatum putabatur. 58

Hanc Scaurus demolitus accessionem adiunxit ædibus. Itaque ille in suam domum consulatum primus attulit: hic summi & clarissimi viri filius in domum multiplicatam non repulsam solum retulit, sed ignominiam etiã & calamitatẽ. Ornanda enim est dignitas domo non ex domo dignitas tota querenda, nec domo dominus, sed domino domus honestanda est. Et vt in cæteris habenda ratio non sui solum sed etiam aliorum: sic in domo clari hominis,

inquam & hospites multi recipiendi sunt, & admittenda hominũ cuiusque generis multitudo, adhibenda est cura laxitatis.

Aliter ampla domus dedecori domino sæpe fit: si est in ea solitudo, & maxime si aliquando alio domino solita est frequentari.

Odiosum est enim cum à præterentib⁹ dicitur: O domus antiqua, heu quam dispari dominare domino.

Quod quidem his temporibus in multis licet dicere.

Cauendum est autem, præsertim si ipse ædifices, ne extra modum sumptu & magnificentia prodeas. quo in genere multum mali etiam exemplo est. Studiose enim plerique, præsertim in hanc partem, facta principum imitantur.

into the whiche bothe manie geastes are to be receaued, & a numbre of menne of euerie sorte is to be admitted: there muste be made a prouision for roomethinesse.

Otherwise a large howse prouoketh to the maister oftentimes a shame: if there bee in it a solitarinesse: and specially if once, with an other maister it was wonte to bee well filled. For an odious thinge it is, when of the bygoers it is saide.

O auncient howse, alas, we maie see,
How vnlike a lorde hathe lordship on thee.

Which a man may truely say nowe a dates of mannye. ye muste beware also namelie yf your selfe be a builder, that beyonde measure, in sumptuousnesse, and greate coste, you dooe not exceede: in the whiche kynde, euen of the ensaumple muche harme aryseth.

For diligentlye mosse menne, specially in thys pointe, doo folowe the doinges of princes: as, of Lucius

tius Lucullus, a singular manne, whoe ensewerh the vertue? Howe manie yet haue folowed the greate costlynesse of hys mansoure places? In whyche thynges there muste doubtles be vsed a measure, that to a meankeepinge muste bee reduced, and the same meankeepinge muste be referred to the common vse, and countenance of the tyme. But of these hytherto.

Nowe in euery deede, we take in hande, three pointes are to be kepte. First, that appetite obey reason: for nothing is meeter than that, for the maintaining of duties. Nexte, that it be considered, howe greate a thynge it is, whyche wee mynde to bryngе to passe, that neither lesse, neither more care, and payne be taken, than the case requireth. The thirde pointe is, that we haue an eye to vse a measure in those thynges whiche pertayne to an honest showe, and seemely grace.

The beste measure is to keepe the very seemelynesse, whereof

Vt Lucij Lucalli summi viri virtutem quis? at quam multi villarum magnificentiam imitati sunt? quarum quidem certe est adhibendus modus, ad mediocritatemque reuocandas: eademque mediocritas ad omnem vsum cultumque vitæ referenda est. Sed hæc hactenus.

In omni autem actione suscipienda, tria sunt tenenda. Primum, vt appetitus rationi pareat: quo nihil est ad officia conseruanda accommodatius. Deinde vt animaduertatur quanta illa res sit, quam efficere velim, vt neue maior, neue minor, cura & opera suscipiatur, quàm causa postulet.

Tertium est, vt caueamus, vt ea quæ pertinent ad liberalitatis speciem dignitate moderata sint. Modus autem est optimus decus ipsum tenere

de quo antedixim⁹ nec progredi longius. Horum autem triũ præstantissimum est appetitũ obtemperare rationi. Deinceps de ordine rerũm, & temporum oportunitate dicendum est. Hac autem scientia continetur ea, quam græci εὐταξίαν, *nominant non hãc, quam interpretamur modestiam, quo in verbo modus inest: sed illa est* εὐταξία *in qua intelligitur ordinis conseruatio itaque vt eandem nos modestiam appellemus, sic definitur à Stoicis. Vt modestia sit scientia earum rerum, q, agunt̃r aut dicũtur loco suo collocandarũ. Itaque videtur eadem vis ordinis et collocationis fore.*

Nam & ordinem sic definiunt: compositionem rerum aptis & accommodatis locis. Locum autem actionis,

wherof we spake before, and not to passe those boundes. But of these thre the chiefest is, that appetite obey reason.

Hereafter touchinge ordre of thinges and opportunitie of times, we haue to saie.

And this knowledge containeth that which the Greekes doe name εὐταξίαν: not this, whiche we interpret *Modestia*: in ẏ which word: *Modus* is comprehended.

But that is εὐταξία wherin is ment a keeping of ordre. And therefore that we maye call the same *Modestia* thus it is defined of the Stoikes: that *Modestia* (ẏ is to saye) discretion is the knowledge of settinge those thinges whiche are done, or saide, in their proper places. And so of ordre, and placing there seemes to bee all one propretie. For thus also they define ordre to be a framinge of thinges in apte, and conuenient places.

And place they saie, concerneth

ueth the doinge, opportunitye the time. And time conuenient for the doinge, in Greeke εὐκαιρία, in Latine is called *Occasio*. Doth teacheth it, that this discretion, whiche we interpret, euen as I saide, is the knowledge of opportunitie of fitte season to do a thinge.

But the same definition maye be of prudence: whereupon wee treated in the beginninge. But in this place we seatche after measure kepinge, and temperaunce, and other like vertues. Therefore, what were the propreties of prudence, in their place we haue spoken. But what propelie belonges to these vertues, whereof here we haue begonne to speake, whiche pertaine to shamefastnes, and to their liking, with whom we liue we muste nowe declare.

Suche an ordre therefore in our doinges is to be vsed: that as in an oration well builded, so in mans life all thynges be accordant, and agreeable togither.

oportunitatem tẽporis esse dicũt. Tẽpus autẽ actionis opportunum græce εὐκαιρία *latine appellatur occasio. Sic fit vt modestia, hæc quam interpretamur (ita vt dixi) scientia sit opportunitatis idoneorum ad agendũ tẽporũ. Sed potest eadem esse prudẽtiæ definitio, de qua principio diximus. Hoc autẽ loco de modcratione, & tẽperantia, & harũ similib⁹ virtutibus quærimus. Ita q, erant prudentia propria, suo loco dicta sunt. Quæ autem harum virtutum, de quibus iamdudum loquimur, quæ pertinent ad verecundiã, & ad eorũ approbationẽ, quib⁹ cum viuimus, nunc dicenda sunt. Talis esti igitur ordo actionũ adhibenaus: vt quemadmodum in oratione constanti, sic in vita omnia sint apta inter se & conuenièntia.*

For

Turpe est. n. valdeq; vitiosũ in re seuera, conuiuio dignũ aut delicatũ aliquẽ inferre sermonem. Bene Pericles cum haberet collegam in prætura Sophoclem poetã, iq; de communi officio conuenissent & casu formosus puer præteriret dixissetque Sophocles: O puerum pulchrũ Pericle: Pericles ait. At enim prætorem Sophocle decet nõ solũ manus sed etiam oculos abstinentes habere. Atq; hoc idẽ Sophocles si in Athletarũ approbatione dixisset, iusta reprehensione caruisset, Tanta vis est et loci, et tẽporis: vt si quis cũ causã sit acturus, in itinere, aut in ambulatione se eũ ipse meditetur, aut si quid aliud attentius cogitet, non reprehendatur at hoc idem si in conuiuio faciat, inhumanus videatur, inscitia tẽporis. Sed ea quæ multum ab humanitate discrepant

For a fowle hearinge it is, and verie faultie, in a sage matter to bringe in ante table talke, or wanton wordes.

Pericles sayde well, when he hadde Sophocles ioyned Prætor wyth hym, and they were commoninge about their office, and as by chaunce a well fauoured chylde passed by Sophocles sayde, Oh, there is a fayre boye Pericles, he aunswered, It becommes a Prætor, Sophocles, to haue not onelie forbearinge handes, but yies also. If Sophocles hadde sayd this same, where wrastelers bee allowed, he hadde been free from iuste reprooke. So great a force there is bothe of place, and tyme. As for example, yf a man, that shall pleade a cause, bee musing to himselfe in his iourney, or in his walke, or anye other thyng he mindeth heedfully, hee is not reproued, but if he do the like at a feast, hee may be thought vncivill for hauing no regard to the time. Howbeit those thinges wyche farre disagree from al

humani-

humanitie, as if any manne singe in the streat, or if any other greate dysorder there bee: by and by they appeare and they greatlie needе not oure admonition, or rules: but from these, whiche seeme to bee small faultes, and of many cannot bee perceiued, we muste the more diligently refraine. As in instruments soundinge by stringes or blast, though neuer so lyttle thet iarre, yet that of a cõninge manne is wonte to bee founde: so muste we liue in this life that nothing chaūce to iarre, yea and so much the more, as the concorde of deedes is greates, and better than of tunes. Wherefore as in instruments, musicians eares doe feele euen the leaste discorde, so if we wyll bee sharpe, and quicke iudges, and markers of faultes, we shall vnderstande oftentymes greate thynges by small.

We shall soone iudge by ỹ setting of the eie, by smoth looking, or bending of ỹ browes by sadnes, myrth, laughter, speaking, sylence, straininge, and

vt siquis in foro canet, aut si qua est alia magna peruersitas, facile apparēt, nec magnopere admonitionē & præcepta desiderant.

Quæ autem parua videntur esse delicta, neq; à multis intelligi possunt, ab his est diligentius declinandū: vt in fidibus aut in tibijs, quamuis paulum discrepent, tamē id à sciente animaduerti solet: Sic viuendum est in vita, ne forte quid discrepet, vel multo etiam magis, quo maior & melior actionū, q̃ sonorū concentus est. Itaq; vt in fidibus musicorum aures vel minima sentiunt: sic nos, si acres ac diligentes iudices esse volumus animaduersores q; vitiorum, magna intelligemus sæpe ex paruis. Ex oculorum obtutu, ex superciliorum aut remissione, aut cõtractione, ex mœstitia, ex hilaritate, ex risu, ex locutione, ex reticentia

ex contentione vocis, ex summitione, ex cæteris similibus facile iudicabimꝰ, quid eorũ apte fiat, quid ab officio naturaq; discrepet. Quo in genere non est incommodum quale quodq; eorũ sit ex alijs iudicare: vt si quid dedeceat in illis, vitemꝰ & ipsi. Fit. n. nescio quo modo, vt magis in alijs cernamus q̃in nobismet ipsis si quid delinquitur. Itaq; facillimè corrigũtur in discendo, quorũ vitia imitãtur emendandi causa magistri. Nec vero alienum est, ad ea eligenda, & dubitationem afferunt, adhibere doctos homines, vel etiam vsu peritos, & quid his de vnoquoq; genere officij placet exquirere. Maior enim pars eo ferè deferri solet, quò à natura ipsa deducitur, in quibꝰ videndũ est non modo quid quisque loquatur, sed etiam quid quisq; sentiat, atq; etiã qua de

and falling of the voyce, and other suche like: what is sittingly done: and what from ouety, and nature swarueth. In whiche kinde of thinges, it is not vnconuenient to iudge by other, of what sorte eche of them is, that if ought mysbecommeth an other, we shonne it also in oure selues. For it commes to passe, I wote not howe, that we see more in other, than in oure selues, if oughte be donne amisse. And therefore very soone those scholers bee corrected whose faultes their maisters doe counterfet, for to make them amended. For truelie out of the waye it is, in cholinge of thynges, which bringe a doubtfulnes to take learned mennes aduise, or skylfull by experience: and so to searche, what liketh them, concerninge euerie kinde of duetie. For the greater parte is commonlye wonte thither to bee caryed whither of very nature they be ledde. In which we must see not onelie what eche man sayth, but also, what eche man thinketh, and for what

cause

cause, eche man so thinketh. For as paynters, and they that graue images, and the right poetes also, be willynge too haue theyr workes seene of all sortes of mẽ: that in case ought bee reproued of manye, it may bee corrected, and therin bothe with them selues, and with other, they examine, what is done amisse: so after the iudgement of other, many thinges of vs bothe must be done, and leste vndone, and also changed, and amended.

As for thinges, which are done after custome, and ciuill ordinaunces, ther is no precept to be geuen of them. For they bee precepts of thẽ selues, neither it behoueth any man too bee ledde wyth this errour, if Socrates, or Aristippus haue done, or spoken anye thing againste ciuill order, and custome: that hee shoulde thinke the same lawfull for him too do. They obteined such a large libertie of faulte findinge, by their greate, and heauenlye giftes. But the hole fashion

causa quisq; sentiat. Vt enĩ pictores, & u qui signa fabricant, & veri etiam poetæ suum quisq; opus à vulgo considerari vult, vt si quid reprehensum sit à pluribus, id corrigatur, hiq; & secum, & cum aliis, quid in eo peccatum sit, exquirunt: sic aliorum iudicio permulta nobis & faciẽda & non facienda, & mutanda & corrigenda sunt. Quæ vero more aguntur, & institutis ciuilibus, de his nihil est præcipiendum, illa enim ipsa præcepta sunt.

Nec quenquam hoc errore duci oportet: vt si quid Socrates, aut Aristippus contra morem consuetudinemq; ciuilẽ fecerint locutiue sint idem sibi arbitretur licere, magnis enĩ illi et diuinis bonis hanc licẽtiã asse. quebãtur. Cynicorũ vero ratio tota

est ejicienda: est enim inimica verecundiæ: sine qua nihil rectum esse potest, nihil honestum. Eos autem quorum vita perspecta in rebus honestis, atq; magnis est, bene de Repub sentientes, ac bene meritos, aut merentes, aliquo honore, aut imperio affectos, obseruare & colere debemus. Tribuere etiam multum senectuti, cedere iis, qui magistratum habebunt: habere delectum ciuis & peregrini: in ipso quoq; peregrino, priuatimue an publicè venerit. Ad summan, ne agam de singulis, communem totius generis hominum consiliationem & consociationem colere, tueri, seruare debemus. Iam de artificijs & quæstibus, qui liberales habendi, qui

of the Cynikes is vtterlye too bee refused. For it is enemie too shamefastnesse: without which, there can be nothinge vpright, nor nothing honest.

But those we ought too reuerence, & giue attendãce vpõ thẽ: whose like hath ben tryed in honest, and worthy matters: who do meane well too the common weale, and haue well deserued, or do deserue well therof, and too anye honour, or rule bee aduaunced, also wee muste haue olde age in great estimacion: & must giue place to those, that beare office, & make difference betweene a citizen and a stráger: and in the verye stranger also wee ought to consider, whether he came of priuate byssinesse or for the common weales affaires. In a summe (that I treate not of euery particular) we are bound to loue, mainteine, and preserue the common attonement and fellowship of all mankinde.

Now, concerninge occupacions, & gainefull sciẽces which ar to be coũted honest

and

and whiche ar of base reputacion, thus commonly wee haue lerned. Firste, those gaynynges bee disalowed, that runne in hatred with all men, as the gayne of roifarmers, and vsurers. Out of estimacion also, and base be the gaines that men in wages do take, whose labour is bought, & not theyr cõning. For in thẽ the very hyer is as it were the obligacion of theyr bondage. They moreouer are too bee cõpted of the baser sort, who bye of marchauntes, that out of hand they retaile againe. For, nothing they profite, onelesse they lye a pace, and truely dishonester thinge is ther none thã a vaine tong. And all kind of handy craftesmen serue in meane occupacions.

Neither can the workeshop truely haue in it any gentlemanly doing, & nodeal to be praised are these occupacyons. whiche bee seruers of pleasures: as Trinkermen, butchers, cookes, puddingmakers, fishermẽ, which Terẽce speketh of, put to these

sordidi sint, hæc ferè accepimus. Primum improbãtur ij quæstus, qui in odio hominum incurrunt, vt portitorũ, et fœneratorum. Illiberales autem & sordidi quæstus mercenariorum omnium, quorum operæ, non quorum artes emuntur. Est enim in illis ipsa merces authoramentum seruitutis. Sordidi etiam putandi, qui mercantur à mercatoribus, quod statim vendant. Nihil enim proficiunt, nisi admodum mentiantur. Nec vero quicquam est turpi⁹ vanitate. Opificesq; omnes in sordida arte versantur. Nec enim quicquam ingenuum potest habere officina, minime artes eæ probandæ, quæ ministræ sunt voluptatum: cetarij, lanii, coqui, fartores, piscatores, vt ait Terentius: adde his

si placet, vnguentarios, saltatores, totũq; ludũ talariũ. Quib⁹ autẽ artib⁹, aut prudẽtia maior inest: aut nõ mediocris vtilitas quæritur, vt medicina, vt architectura, vt doctrina rerũ honestarũ, hæ sunt ijs, quorum ordini conueniunt, honestæ. Mercatura autẽ si tenuis est, sordida putanda est: sin magna & copiosa, multa vndiq; apportans, multisq; sine vanitate impartiens, non est admodũ vituperanda. Atq; etiam si satiata quæstu, vel contenta potius, vt sæpe ex alto in portum, sic ex ipso portu se in agros possessionesq; contulerit, videtur iure optimo posse laudari. Omnium autem rerum, ex quib⁹ aliquid acquiritur, nihil est agricultura melius, nil vberius, nil dulcius, nil homine libero dignius. De qua quoniam

ie pe liſt, perfumers, dauncers, and all hazarders.

But thoſe ſciences, wherin is greater wiſedome, and no meane profit ſought, as phyſicke, caſting of buyldinges, & learning of worthy knowledge, bee honeſt for them, with whoſe eſtate they agree. And marchaundiſe, if it bee ſmall, is to be counted of little eſtimacion: but if it bee great, and well ſtored, conueying many cõmodities rounde about, and diſparſinge thoſe ſame into many mens handes, without vaine wordes, it is not much to bee diſpraiſed, and ſardermore, if being ſatiſfied with gaine, or contented rather, as it hath often come from the ſea to the hauen: ſo it chaunge from the hauen into landes, and poſſeſſiõs, it ſeemeth, of verye good right it may be commended. For of all thinges, wherout anye gayne is ſought, nothing is better thã groundtilth and trimming, nothing yeeldinger, nothinge ſweeter, nothing meter for a free borne man, whereof becauſe

in

in Cato the elder wee haue spoken inough, thence shall you take, what so too this place shall apperteine.

But how duties doo proceede frō those partes, which belong to honestie: I thinke it sufficiētly declared. Now in those same thinges which bee honest, ther maye befall oftentimes a question, and comparison, of two honeste thinges, whether is the honester, whiche point is passed ouer of Panetius.

For where as all honestie springeth out of foure brāches, whereof one is of knowledge, an other of cōmon felowship, the third of greate corage, the fourth of measure keepinges, it muste nedes bee, that in choosyng of dutie these be often compared too gither. We thinke therefore, those duties bee more agreable with nature, which be borowed from cōmon felowship, than those, which be fetched frō knowledge, and that may be proued by this argument: bycause yf a wyse man happen on such a life, that hys be en-

in Catone maiore satis multa diximus, illinc assumes, quæ ad hunc locū pertinebūt. Sed ab iis partib⁹, quæ sūt honestatis, quēadmodū officia ducerentur, satis expositū videtur. Eorum autē ipsorū, quæ honesta sunt, potest incidere sæpe contētio et cōparatio de duobus honestis, vtrū honestius. qui locus à Panætio est prætermissus. Nam cū omnis honestas manet à partibus quatuor, quarū vna sit cognitionis, altera communitatis, tertia magnanimitatis, quarta moderationis: hæ in deligendo officio sæpe inter se comparentur necesse est. Placet igitur aptiora esse naturæ ea officia, quæ ex communitate, quàm ea quæ ex cognitione ducantur. Idque hoc argumento confirmari potest. Quod si contigerit ea vita sapienti, vt

omnium rerum affluentibus copijs ditetur: quamuis ea, quæ cognitione digna sunt, summo otio secum ipse cõsideret & cõtẽpletur, tamen si solitudo tanta sit, vt hominem videre non possit, excedat è vita. Princeps, omnium virtutum est illa sapientiã, quã σοφια græci vocant. Prudentia enim, quã græci φρόνησιν dicũt aliam quandam intelligimus: quæ est rerum expetendarum, fugiendarumque, scientia. Illa autem sapientia, quam principem dixi, rerum est diuinarum, atque humanarũ scientia: in qua continetur deorum et hominum communitas & societas ipsorũ inter ipsos. Ea si maxima est (vt est certe) necesse est, ea à cõmunitate ducatum officiũ, id esse maximũ

ryched with a flowing plentie of all maner substaunce, thoughe with verye greate leasure hee consider, an all too beholde with himselfe those thinges, which ar woꝛthey of knowledge, yet if his solitarines bee so great, that he can not haue the sight of a man, he would wishe to be out of the woꝛld. And that wisdome which the Grekes do terme σοφια is the princesse of all vertues, For prudence which the Grekes do call φρόνησιν we take to bee of an other nature: which is the knowledge of thinges too bee desired, and thinges meete too bee eschewed.

But that wisdome, whiche I named the princesse, is the science of heauẽly, & woꝛldly thinges, wherein is contayned the commonnesse of gods and men, and their societie together. Which vertue in case it bee the greatest as it is in deede, it must needes follow, that the dutie which is boꝛowed of commõnesse, also is the greteſt.

For

For the knowledge, and consideration of naturall causes shoulde, after a certeine sorte, bee maimed, and vnperfit, if no performaunce of deedes shoulde followe. And deedes muste appeare in defendynge of mens commodities. They belong therefore too the fellowshippe of men, and for that cause are to be preferred before knowledge.

And this euerie beste disposed man, whan it comes to the poynt, doth shewe, and declare. For who is so desirefull of thorowseing, and lerning ỹ nature of thinges: but, in case whyle hee were treatinge, and dewyng of matters moste worthye of knowledge, in the meane seasonhee shoulde sodenlye heare tydings of the hazard, and danger of his countrie, which he is able to succour, and withstande: he woulde leaue, and sette aside all those studies: yea though he thought, he were able to nõber the sterres, or to mesure the huge cõpasse of ỹ world & the same man also woulde do as much in his parentes,

Etenim cognitio, contemplatioq; naturæ manca quodammodo, atq; inchoata sit si nulla actio rerum consequatur. Ea vero actio in hominum commodis tuendis maxime cernitur. Pertinet igitur ad societatem generis humani. Ergo hæc cognitioni anteponẽda est. Atque id optimus quisq; re ipsa ostendit & indicat. Quis est enim tam cupidus in perspicienda, cognoscendaque rerum natura: vt si ei tractanti, contemplantiq; res cognitione dignissimas, subito sit allatum periculum, discrimenq; patriæ, cui subuenire, opitulariq; possit, non illa omnia relinquat, atque abiiciat, etiam si dinumerare se stellas, aut metiri mũdi magnitudinẽ posse arbitretur. Atq; hoc idẽ in parẽtis,

in amici re aut periculo fecerit. Quibꝰ rebus intelligitur, ſtudijs officijſq; ſcientiæ præponẽda eſſe officia iuſtitiæ, quæ pertinẽt ad hominũ vtilitatẽ: qua nihil homini eſſe debet antiquius. Atque illi ipſi quorũ ſtudia, vitaq; omnis in rerũ cognitione verſata eſt, tamen ab augendis hominũ vtilitatibus & commodis non receſſerunt. Nam & erudiere multos, quò meliores ciues, vtiliores q; in rebꝰ ſuis publicis eſſent: vt Thebanum Epaminundam Lyſias Pythagoræus: Syracuſium Dionem Plato, multiq; multos. Noſq; ipſi quicquid ad Rempub. attulimꝰ (ſi modo aliquid attulimus) à doctoribus, atq; doctrina inſtructi ad eam & ornati acceſſimus. Neq; ſolum viui atq; præſentes ſtudioſos diſcendi erudiunt,

and in his frends cauſe, and perell. By which thinges it is gathered, that before ỹ ſtudies, & duties of knowlege, ỹ duties of talkinge are to be preferred, which do belong to the profit of nedme thã the which, a man ought to holde nothing derer.

Alſo they, who haue ſpent their hole lyfe, and ſtudie in knowledge of thynges, haue not yet withdrawne them ſelues from helpynge to increaſe mens profites, and commodities. For they alſo haue inſtructed manye, to make them the better citezens, and the more profitable in their common weales. as Lyſis the Pythagorã ſcholed the Thebane Epaminondas. Plato taught Dion the Syracuſian, and many other, many mo, and what ſo euer wee our ſelfe brought too the common weale (if any thing we haue brought) we came too it enfourmed by teachers, and furniſhed with learnynge. And they not onelye while they lyue, and bee preſente, do ſchoole, and teach ỹ ſtudentes

dentes of lerninge, but after theyr death also, by their monumentes of learnynge, they do the same. For they haue not ouerpassed one poynte, that concerneth lawes, custome, and the common wealth knowlege, so as they maye seeme too haue employed their quiet studies to their common affaires.

Thus they being them selues geuen too the studies of lerning, and wisdome, do chiefly bestow their wysdome, prudence, and vnderstanding too mens commodities. For the same cause also, it is better too vtter plentifullye, so it be discreetly, than without eloquence too conceiue neuer so wittely, because ones conceit serueth onely within it selfe. whereas eloquence getteth within her reche those, with whom we are ioyned in cõmon felowshippe. And as swarmes of bees doo cluster to gether, not to this end, to make cõbes: but being swarming by kinde, they worke their combes, so men muche more,

atq; docent: sed hoc idẽ etiam post mortẽ monumẽtis litterarũ assequũtur. Nec enim locvllus prætermissus est ab iis, qui ad leges, qui ad mores, qui ad disciplinã Reip. pertineret: ita vt otium suũ ad nostrũ negotiũ contulisse videantur. Ita illi ipsi doctrinæ studijs et sapientiæ dediti ad hominũ vtilitatẽ suã sapientiã, prudentiã, intelligentiãq; potissimũ conferũt. Obeã etiã causã eloqui copiose modo prudenter, melius est, quàm vel acutissime sine eloquetia cogitare: quòd cogitatio in se ipsa vertitur. eloquẽtia verocõplectitur eos, quibuscũ communitate iũcti sumus. Atq; vt apũ examina nõ singẽdorũ fauorũ causa congregãtur: sed cum congregabilia natura sint, fingunt fauos: sic homines, ac multo etiam magis, na-

natura congregati, adhibent augendi congregandiq; solertiam. Itaque nisi ea virtus, quæ cõstat ex hominibus tuendis, id est ex societate generis humani, attingat rerum cognitionem, sola vaga cognitio, et ieiuna videatur. Itemque magnitudo animi remota à communitate coniunctioneq; humana, feritas sit quædam & immanitas. Ita fit vt vincat cognitionis studium, consociatio hominum, atq; communitas. Nec verũ est quod dicitur à quibusdam, propter necessitatẽ vitæ, quòd ea, quæ natura desideraret, et consequi sine alijs, atque efficere non possemus, idcirco istam esse cum hominib⁹ communitatem & societatem. Quod si omnia nobis, quæ ad victũ, cultumq; pertinẽt, quasi virgula diuina (vt aiunt)

more than they, by nature swarming, do vse theyr cõming of doing, and deuising. Therfore oneleſſe that same vertue, which conſiſteth in defendinge men, that is to ſay, the felowſhip of mankinde, doth meete with the knowledge of thinges: it may ſeeme a very bare and alone wandring knowlege, and likewiſe greatneſſe of corage, ſeuered from common felowſhippe, and neybourhodde of menne, muſte nedes bee a terreine ſauageneſſe, and beaſtly cruelltie. So it falles out, that the accompanyeng, and commõ felowſhip of men farre furmoũtes the ſtudie of knowledge.

Neither is it true, which is ſaid of ſommer that thys common knotte, and felowſhippe is hadde emong men, euen for neceſſitie of life: bicauſe without other, wee might not gette, and bringe to paſſe thoſe thinges, that nature dooth deſire: and that, if all thynges were foũde vs, euen by the grace of Godde (as they ſaye) which

whiche appertaine to foode, and furniture of life, then woulde euery one of a good witte, all busines layde aspar, settle himselfe holye to knowledge, and science. But that is not so. For he wold both flye solitarinesse, and choose a companion of studie, both teache, & learne: both heare, and speake. Wherfore all dutie, whiche auaileth too maintaine neybourhod, and frendship of mẽ, is to be preferred aboue that dutie, which consisteth in knowledge, and science.

This question peraduenture may bee well moued, whether this common felowshippe which is most of all agreable to nature, bee also alwayes to be preferred before meane, and measure keping. I thinke not so.

For there be some things partely so filthye, partely so haynous, that a wise man woulde not do them, no not to saue his countrie. Like thinges manye suche, Possidonius hath gathered together, but some of them so fowle, and so filthye: that

suppeditaretur: tum optimo quisque ingenio negotijs, omnibus omissis, totũ se in cognitione & scientia collocaret. Non est ita, nam & solitudinem fugeret, & socium studij quaereret tum docere, tum discere vellet. tum audire, tum dicere. Ergo omne officium, quod ad coniunctionem hominũ & ad societatem mẽdã valet, anteponẽdũ est illi officio, quod cognitione, & scientia cõtinetur. Illud fortasse quaerendum sit, num haec communitas, quae maxime est apta naturae, sit etiam moderationi, modestiaeque semper antepnẽda? non placet, sunt enim quaedam partim ita foeda, partim ita flagitiosa, vt ea ne conseruandae quidem patriae causa sapiẽs facturus sit. Ea Possidonius collegit permulta, sed ita tetra quaedam, ita obscaena

vt dictu quoque videantur turpia. Hæc igitur non ſuſcipiet quiſquam Reip. cauſa nec Reſp. quidem pro ſe ſuſcipi volet. Sed hæc commodius ſe res habet, quod nõ poteſt accidere tempus, vt interſit Reip. quiequã illorum facere ſapientẽ. Quare hoc quidem effectum ſit in officijs deligendis: hoc genus officiorũ excellere, quod teneatur hominũ ſocietate.

Etenim cognitionem, prudentiamq; ſequitur conſiderata actio. Ita fit, vt conſiderate agere pluris ſit quàm cogitare prudenter, atque hæc quidẽ hactenus. Patefactus eſt enim locus ipſe, vt non ſit difficile in exquirẽdo officio quid cuiq; ſit præponendum, videre. In ipſa autem cõmunitate ſunt gradus officiorũ, ex quib⁹ quid cuiq; præſtet, intelligi poſſit:

that euen too be ſpoken they ſeeme ſhamefull.

Thoſe therfore ought no man to take in hand, for the common weales cauſe, nother wold the commõ weale for her ſake haue them enterpriſed. But this matter ſtandes in better caſe, for that there can befal no time, that ỹ common weale ſholde neede too haue a wiſe man doo any of them.

Wherfore let this be concluded, in choiſe of duties that ſuche kynde of duties moſt excell, as concerne the felowſhip of men. For aduiſed doynge wyll folowe knowledge, and wiſedome. So it comes too paſſe, that too doe aduiſedlye is more worth, thã wiſely to deuyſe. And therof thus farre. For this place is plainly inough ſet out, that it is not harde, in ſerching out of dutie, too perceiue, among them all which afore other is to bee preferred.

Yet euen in common felowſhip ther be degrees of duties, wherby may be known what one is aboue ỹ other,

ſo

so as the first duties bee due too the gods immortall, the second, to our countrey, the third, to our parentes, and so forth by degrees, the rest to the rest.

Of the which matters, briefely debated, may be gathered, howe men are wont not onely too dout, whether a thing bee honest, or dishonest: but also twoo honest thinges layed before them, whether is the honester.

This pointe (as I sayde before) is ouerslipped by Panetius But now to the residuelette vs procede.

vt prima dijs immortalib°, secunda patriæ, tertia parẽtibus: deinceps gradatim reliqua reliquis debeantur.

Quibus ex rebus breuiter disputatis intelligi potest, nõ solum id homines solere dubitare honestum ne an turpe sit, sed etiam duobus propositis honestis vtrũ honestius.

Hic locus à Panetio est (vt supra dixi) prætermissus. Sed iam ad reliqua pergamus.

(:)

M. TVLLII CICERONIS, DE OFFICIJS. Liber secundus.

QVEM ADMODVM Officia ducerentur ab honestate Marce fili: atque ab omni genere virtutis, satis explicatum arbitror libro superiore. Sequitur vt hæc officiorum genera persequar, quæ pertinent ad vitæ cultum, et ad earum rerũ, quibus vtuntur homines facultatem, ad opes, ad copias. In quo tum queri dixi quid vtile, quid inutile, tũ ex vtilibus, quid vtilius, aut quid maxime vtile, de quibus dicere aggrediar, si pauca prio de instituto, ac de iudicio meo dixero. Quanquam enim libri nostri complures:

MARCVS TVLLIVS CICERæs seconde booke of duties to Marcus his sonne.

AFter what sort duties shoulde be take out of honestie, sonne Marke, and from euerye kynde of vertue: I suppose it sufficientlye declared in my former booke. It folowes, that we go forward with these kindes of duties: which belong to power, to riches, to the furniture of mans life, and too the plentie of those thinges, that men do occupie. wherin, I said, it is sought: both what is profitable, what vnprofitable: and also of profitable thinges which is the more profitable, or which the moste profitable. Of the which I wyl enter to speake if I shall saye a worde or two before, of my purpose, and meaning.

For though our bookes haue stirred vp many mẽ to the

the studie not onelye of reading, but also of writinge: yet otherwhile I feare, lest the name of philosophie bee hatefull to some good men: that they maruaile, I bestowe in it so much trauaill, and time. In dede as longe as the common weale was gouerned by them, to whom she had committed her selfe, I did employe all my care, and studie vppon it. But when one man kepte all in thraldome, and ther was no place at all for counsell, and authoritie: and I besides had forgone my companions of preseruing the state, who had been singuler men, neyther I gaue my selfe too greenes, wherwith I sholde haue been wasted, onelesse I had resisted thē, nor againe, too pleasures vnseemely for a learned man. And would god, that ỹ cōmō weale, had stoode in that state, wherein it began: and hadde not light vpon men, who were not so desirous of altringe, as ouerthrowing of thinges For first, as we were wont too, doo, when the common weale was standinge: we

non modo ad legēdi, sed etiā ad scribendi studiū excitauerint: tamē interdū vereor, ne quibusdā bonis viris philosophiæ nomen sit inuisum: mirenturq; in ea tantum me operæ & tēporis ponere. Ego autē quādiu Resp. pro eos gerebatur, quib' seipsa cōmisserat, omnes meas curas cogitationesq; in eam conferebā. Cum aute dominatu vnius omnia tenerentur, neq; esset vsquā consilio, aut authoritati locus: socios deniq; tuendæ Reip. summos viros amisissem: nec me angoribus dedi quibus essem confectus. nisi his restitissem: nec rursum indignis homine docto voluptatibus. Atque vtinam Respu. stetisset quo cœperat statu, nec in homines nō tā cōmutandarū rerū quàm euertēdarum cupidos incidisset. Primū enī, vt stā te Repub. facere solebamus,

in agendo plus quàm in scribendo operæ ponceremus. Deinde ipsis scriptis non ea quæ nunc, sed actiones nostras manderemus, vt sæpe fecimus. Cum autem Resp. in qua omnis mea cura, cogitatio, opera poni solebat, nulla esset omnino: illa scilicet literæ omnino conticuerunt forenses, & senatoriæ. Nihil autem agere cum animus non posset, in iis studijs ab initio versatus ætatis: existimaui honestissime molestias deponi posse, si me ad philosophiam retulissē. Cui cum multum adolescens discendi causa temporis tribuissem: postea quam honorib⁹ inseruire cœpi, meq; totum Reipublicæ tradidi, tantum erat philosophiæ loci, quātū superfucrat amicorū et Reipub. temporis. Id autem omne consumebatur in legendo:

we would take more labour in pleding, than in writing: afterwarde, in very writing we wold not put the things that wee do nowe, but our pledinges, as wee haue done diuers times.

But when the common weale, in which all my care, studie, and trauaile was wont too bee bestowed, was none at all, vereipe those lawyerly, and Senatehouse learninges were husht.

But seing my mind could not choose, but bee doinge: hauing bi occupied in those studies, from the beginning of my ponge age, I thought sorowes might be put away most honestly, if I returned my selfe to phylosophie. Whereunto whē being ponge I had geuen much time, too learne it, after that I began too attend honours, and betooke my selfe hole too the common weale, so muche leasures was lefte for philosophie, as remayned of the times spēt about my frends and the common weales causes. And that was all bestowed in readynge,

for

for writinge I had no tyme. In our moste miseries therfore, wee seeme to haue gotten thys so great a commoditie, that we myghte put those matters in wryptynge which were not sufficiently knowne to oure men, and yet were moste worthy of knowledge. For what is there in fayth more wyshfull, than wysedome? what more excellent? what to a man more worthie? what for a manne more honourable? They then, who doe desire thys, be named Philosophers: neither is philosophie oughte els, if ye will tell the meaninge of the worde, but the study of wisedome. And wisdome (as it is defined of auncient Philosophers) is the science of heauenly & worldlye thinges, and of the causes whereby these thynges bee vpholden. And whoe so dispraiseth the study thereof: I wote not verely, what there maie be that he would deeme praise worthy. For whether ỹ delitig of ỹ mind be sought and quietinge of care: what maie be compared with their

scribendi ocium non erat.

Maximis igitur in malis hoc tantum boni assecuti videmur: vt caliteris mandarem°, quæ nec satis erant nota nostris, & erant cogitatione dignissima. Quid est enim, per deos, optabili° sapientia? quid præstanti°? quid homini melius? quid homine dignius?

Hanc igitur qui expetunt, philosophi nominantur: nec quicquam aliud est philosophia (si interpretari velis) quam studium sapientiæ.

Sapientia autem est (vt à veteribus philosophis definitum est) rerum diuinarū & humanarum, causarumque, quib° hæ res continentur, scientia: cuius studium qui vituperat, haud sanè intelligo, quidnam sit, quod laudandū putet. Nā siue oblectatio quæritur animi, requiesq; curarum quæ conferri cum eorum

studijs potest, qui semper aliquid inquirunt, q̃ spectet, & valeat ad bene beateq́ viuendũ? Sine ratio cõstantiæ, virtutisq́ ducitur, aut hæc ars est, aut nulla omnino per q̃ eas assequamur. Nullã vero dicere maximarũ rerũ artẽ esse, cum minimarũ sine arte nulla sit, hominũ est parum considerate loquentiũ, atq́ in maximis rebus errãtiũ. Si autẽ est aliqua disciplina virtutis: vbi ea quæretur, cũ ab hoc discendi genere discesserit? Sed hæc cum ad philosophiã cohortamur, accuratiꝰ solent disputare: q̃ alio quidã libro fecimꝰ. Hoc autem tempore tantum nobis declarandum fuit cur orbati Reipu. muneribus ad hoc nos studiũ potissimũ contulissemus. Occurritur autẽ nobis & quidẽ à doctis et eruditis, q̃rentibus satis ne con-

studies, whoe alwayes gather somewhat that tendeth, and availeth wel, & wealfully to liue, or if ỹ way of stedfastnes, & vertue be sought, either this is ỹ arte, or there is none at all, whereby we may attaine thẽ. To vphold there is no arte of the greatest thinges. seeinge none of the leaste bee wythoute arte, it is a token of menne speakinge with smal aduisement and erringe in the greatest matters. But if there be any science of vertue, where shal it be sought, when you bee gone from this kynde of learninge?

But these thynges are wonte to bee more exactlie discoursed, when we exhorte menne to philosophie, which in deede wee haue done, in an other booke. But at this presente, onelie it was to bee declared of vs, whye wee gotte vs chiefely to this studye when we were beereste of oure common welth offices.

But it is gainsaid vs, and that of skilfull, and learned men demaũding whether we seeme to do cõstantli inough

wyo

who although wee holde, that nothyng can bee surely knowne: yet bothe weare wont to dyspute of other matters, & at this same tyme wee prosecute preceptes of duetye. To whom I would our opinion, were well knowne. For wee are not they whose mynde wãdereth in errour, & hath not at all, what to folowe. Is or what a minde should this bee, or rather a life: where the meane not only of disputing but also of liuinge is taken cleane awaye. But as other, whoe dos saie some thinges be certaine, some vncertain: so we dissenting from them, do saye againe some thinges be prouable, some vnprouable.

What is there then, that should let me to folow those thinges whiche to mee doo seme prouable: which contrariwise, to disproue: and to voide the presumption of affirming: no to flee rashenes, whiche disagreeth from wisedome moste of all,

But by oure men there is disputing againste al thinges:

stanter facere videamur: qui cũ percipi nihil posse dicam⁹ tamẽ et aliys de reb⁹ dissercre solcam⁹, & hoc ipso tempore præcepta officij psequamur. Q uibus vellẽ satis cognita esset nostra sententia. Nõ enĩ sumus ij, quorum vageturanimus errore, nec habeat vnq̃ quid sequatur. Q uæ enim esset ista, mens, vel quæ vita potius, nõ solum disputandi, sed etiam viuẽdi, ratione sublata? Nos autem vt cæteri, qui alia certa, alia incerta esse dicũt, sic ab his dissentientes, alia phabilia, cõtra alia non probabilia esse dicim⁹. Q uid est ergo quod me impediat, ea quæ mihi probabilia videãtur, sequi? quæ contra improbare? atq̃ affirmandi arrogatiam vitantem, fugere temeritatem, quæ à sapientia dissidet plurimum? Contrà autem omnia disputantur à nostris,

quòd hoc ipſum probabile elucere non poſſit, niſi ex vtraque parte cauſarum eſſet facta cõtentio. Sed hæc explanata ſunt in Academicis noſtris ſatis (vt arbitror) diligenter.

becauſe this ſame thing, that is profitable, cannot ſhine forthe: excepte there ſhould bee a conference of reaſons expreſſed vpon bothe ſides. But theſe matters, as I ſuppoſe, be diligẽtly inough made playne in oure Academikes.

Tibi autem, mi Cicero, quãquam in antiquiſſima, nobiliſſimaque philoſophia Cratippo authore verſaris, his ſimillimo qui iſta præclara pepererunt: tamen hæc noſtra finitima veſtris ignota eſſe nolui. Sed iam ad inſtituta pergamus.

But althoughe, my Cicero, you be exercised in the moſte auncient and moſt noble philoſophi. Cratippus beinge your author: a man full like vnto thoſe, who haue made theſe notable thinges: yet I would not theſe of ours, bery nere vnto yours, to you ſhoulde be vnknowen. But nowe lette vs go on to oure purpoſe.

Quinque igitur rationibus propoſitis officij perſequendi, quarum duæ ad decus, honeſtatemq; pertinent, duæ ad commoda vitæ, copias, opes, facultates, quinta ad eligendi iudicium, ſi quando ea, quæ dixi, pugnare inter ſe viderentur: honeſtatis pars perfecta eſt:

Seeinge then fiue waies be ſet out of treatinge vpon dutie: whereof two do perteine vnto commelineſſe, and honeſtie: other two belonge to the commodities of a mans life, to abundance, power, riches: the fifte doth ſerue to the iudgement of chooſinge if euer thoſe, whiche I ſpake of ſhoulde ſeeme to ſtriue together: the parte touchinge honeſtie is made an ende of

whiche

whiche truely I desire to be very well knowen to you. But this, whereof we treate now, is the very same, that is called profitable.

In the which terme custome failinge, hathe swarued oute of the waie: and by little and lyttle is broughte to thys pointe, that it woulde seuer profitable from honest: and woulde make somethyng honest, whiche shoulde not bee profitable, and some thinge profitable, whiche shoulde not be honest: than the which no greater danger coulde bee brought to mans life.

Philosophers surelie of very greate aucthoritie doo, graueste no doubte, and honestie, in imagination sonder these three confused kindes. For whatsoeuer is iuste, thei also iudge the same to be profitable: and likewise whatso is honest, they take the same to bee iuste: wherof is concluded, that whatsoeuer is honest, the same ys profitable. The which thing whoe smallie forsee: they oftentymes hauynge in admiration suttle wytted men,

quam quidem tibi cupio esse notissimam. Hoc autem de quo nunc agimus, idipsum est, quod vtile appellatur. In quo verbo lapsa consuetudo deflexit de via, sensimque eò deducta est, vt ab honesto vtile secerneret: & constitueret honestum esse aliquid, quod vtile non esset: & vtile quod non honestum: qua nulla pernicies maior hominum vitæ potuit afferri. Summa quidem auctoritate philosophi seuerè sanè, atque honestè hæc tria genera confusa, cogitatione distingunt. Quicquid enim iustum sit id vtile etiam esse censent: itemq; quod honestum, idem esse iustum. Ex quo efficitur vt quicquid honestũ sit, idem sit vtile. Quod qui parũ perspiciunt, hi sæpe versutos homines & callidos admirãtes

eorũ malitiam sapientiã iudicant. Quorum error eripiendus est: omnisq; opinio ad eã speciẽ traducenda, vt honestis cõsiliis, iustisq; factis non fraude & malitiose intelligãt ea, quæ velint, cõsequi posse. Quæ ergo ad vitã hominũ tuendã pertinent, partim sunt inanimata, vt aurũ argentũ, vt ea quæ gignuntur è terra, & aliae eiusdem generis, partim animata, q̃ habẽt suos impetus & rerum appetitus. Eorũ autẽ alia rationis expertia sunt alia ratione vtentia. Expertes rationis sunt equi, boues, & reliq; pecudes, & apes, quorũ opera efficitur aliquid ad hominũ vsum, atq; vitã. Ratione autẽ vtentiũ duo genera ponũtur. Deos placatos pietas efficiunt deorum, alterũ hominũ autẽ et secũdũ deos homines homi nib⁹ maxime vtiles esse possunt,

and crafte doe repute their willnes for wisdome. Whose errour must be taken awaie and their whole opinion is from that to be brought vnto this hope: that by honest counsel, and good deedes, not by guile, and craftines, they vnderstande themselues in possibilitie to attaine suche thinges, as thei would.

Some things than which appertaine to ỹ maintenãce, of mans life, be lucteſſe: as golde, and syluer, as thyes whiche are gotten out of the earthe, as other of the same sort: some be liuing, and feelinge whiche haue their motions, & appetites to things. And some of them be voyde of reason, some haue the vse of reason. Voide of reason be horses, oxen, and other catteil, and bees, by whose worke, somewhat is made for mans vse: & life. But of those ỹ haue vse of reso, two kindes there be put: one of gods, an other of mẽ. Deuotion, & holines will make the gods fauorable. But next of al, and after the gods, mẽ to men may be most profitable.

And

And againe there is the same diuision of those thinges, whiche anoye, & hurte. And because menne do not thinke the goddes do harme, these excepted they suppose men to menne to doe moste hurte, or profite.

For the moste parte of those same, whiche we called Inuesse be the effectes of mans worke, and neither we shold haue them, except hande, and crafte had been put thereto, neither without mens seruice, were shoulde vse them.

For neither preseruacion of helthe, nor saulinge, nor grounde tilth, & trimminge, nor the inninge, and sauinge of corne, and other fruites, without laboure of menne, coulde haue been any at all. Now we moreouer bothe catiage onte of those thynges, wherewith we were stored, and conuetance in of those, whiche we should nede, ther coulde bee doubtlesse none, excepte men shoulde do those offices. And in like manner, nother stones shoulde bee hewed oute of quarreis, necessarye to oure vse,

Earumq; iterũ rerũ quæ nocent & obsint, eadem diuisio est. Sed quia deos nocere non putant: his exceptis homines hominib⁹ plurimũ obesse vel prodesse arbitrantur. Ea ent ipsa quæ inanimata diximꝰ, pleraq; sunt hominũ effecta opere quæ nec haberemus nisi manus & ars accessissent, nec his sine hominum administratione vteremur. Neq; enim valetudinis curatio, neq; nauigatio, neq; agricultura, neq; frugũ fructuũq; reliquorũ perceptio, & conseruatio sine opera hominum vtila esse potuisset. Iam vero & earum rerum, quib⁹ abũdarcmus, exportatio, & earum, quibus egeremus inuectio certe nulla esset, nisi his muneribus homines fungerentur. Eadẽ ratione, nec lapides excideretur è terra ad vsum nostrum necessarij

nec ferrum, æs, aurũ, argentũ effoderetur penitꝰ abditum, sine hominũ labore & manu. Tecta vero quibꝰ & frigorũ vis pelleretur, & calorũ molestiæ sedarentur, vnde aut in initio generi humano dari potuisset, aut postea subvenire, si aut vi tempestatis, aut terremotis aut vetustate cecidissent: nisi cõmunis vita ab hominibꝰ harũ rerum auxilia petere didicisset? adde ductꝰ aquarũ, derivationes fluminum, agrorum irrigationes, moles appositas fluctibꝰ portꝰ manufactos: quæ non sine hominum opere habere possemꝰ. Ex quibus omnibus multisque alijs perspicuum est, qui fructus, quæq; vtilitates ex rebus ijs quæ sunt inanimata percipiantur, eas nos nullo modo sine hominum manu, atque opera capere potuisse. Qui deniq; ex bestijs, fructꝰ

nother yron, golde, braſſe, ſiluer deepe hydden coulde bee digged vp without the labore and hande of man.

Houſes alſo wherby bothe the ſharpneſſe of colde might be defended and the noyance of heate mighte be aſſwaged, from whence eyther at the beginninge, mought thei haue been geuen to mankinde? or after doe eaſe, if eyther by vyolence of tempeſte or by earthquakes, or oldneſſe thei hadde gonne to wracke? except common life had learned of menne to aſke the aide for theſe thinges.

Adde hereunto conduites of water, turninge of riuers, letting in water ouer groũds wharffes made agaynſt ſtreames, Hauens caſte by hande: whiche without mens worke, we might not haue.

By all whiche, and manie other thynges, it is euidente: that by no meanes, without mans hande, and trauaile, we coulde haue receiued the fruites, and profites, whiche be gotten of thoſe thynges, that be liueleſſe.

What fruites alſo of beaſtes,

or

or what commoditie coulde there be taken? but if menne shoulde helpe thereto. For euen they doubtlesse were men: who were the chiefe in deuysinge, what vse we mighte haue of eche beaste: nor at this season, without mennes seruice, mighte wee either keepe horses, or breake them, or saue them, or of thē take seasonable commodities: and by menne also both those beastes bee kylled, whiche doo hurte, and those bee taken, whiche may doo seruice

What shoulde I numbre vp a heape of artes? without whiche, mannes life coulde haue been none at all. For whoe shoulde ease the sicke? What delighte shoulde there bee amonge the healthfull? what diet? what apparaile? onlesse so many artes should serue vs. With which thinges mans life bee furnished, is become so farre differente from the feedinge, and cote of beastes.

Cities also, without the assemble of mē, could neither be builded, nor peopled.

Where-

aut quæ cōmoditas, nisi homines adiuuarent, percipi posset? Nam & qui principes inueniendi fuerunt quem ex quaq; bellua vsu habere possemus, homines certe fuerūt. Nec hoc tempore sine hominum opera, aut pascere eas, aut domare, aut tueri, aut tempestiuos fructus ex his capere possemus. Ab eisdemq; & ea, quæ nocent, interficiuntur: & quæ vsui possunt esse capiuntur. Quid enumerem artium multitudinē sine quibus vita hominis omnino nulla esse potuisset? Quis.n. ægris subuenisset? quæ esset oblectatio valētiū? qui victus, aut cultus? nisi tam multæ nobis artes ministrarentur? Quib⁹ reb⁹ exculta hominum vita tantum distat, à victu & cultu bestiarum. Vrbes vero sine hominum cœtu non potuisset, nec ædificari, nec frequentari.

Ex quo leges mores q. constituti, tum iuris æqua descriptio, certaq; viuendi disciplina, per quas bene beateq; viuitur, quas res & mansuetudo animorum consecuta, & verecundia est: effectumq;, vt esset vita munitior, atq; vt dando, & accipiendo, permutandisq; facultatibus & cõmodis nulla re egeremus. Longiores hoc loco sumus, quia necesse est. Quis est enim cui non perspicua sunt illa, quæ pluribus verbis à Panætio commemorantur? neminem neq; ducem in bello, nec principem domi, magnas res & salutares sine hominum studijs gerere potuisse. Commemorantur ab eo Themistocles Pericles, Cyrus, Agesilaus, Alexander, quos negat sine adiumentis hominum tantas res efficere potuisse.

Vtitur in re non dubia

Whereupon ordinaunces, and customes were made, also an indifferente settinge out of lawe, and a sure rule to liue after, by whiche, the lyfe ys ledde well and wealefully. Whiche thinges both the mildnesse of mindes and shamefastnesse hathe followed, and it is broughte to passe, that oure life shoulde bee the more safegarded, and that, by gaininge and takinge and enterchaungynge of goodes, and pleasures, wee shoulde wante nothing. We be longer in this place than neede requyres. For who is hee, to whome those thynges are not manifest, whyche in more wordes bee recyted of Panetius? that neither any captaine in warr nor prince at home, coulde haue atchiued greate feates and auayliable wythoute mennes endeuoure. Rehersed of him is Themistocles, Pericles, Cyrus, Agesilaus, Alexander, whome hee denieth to haue been able to compasse so greate thynges withoute the aide of menne. In a matter no whit doutful

he

hee vseth wytnesses no whit necessarie.

And as we obtaine great commodities, by the lyke minde, and consent of men: so there is none so lothsome a pestilence, which dothe not growe to man by man.

There is a booke of Dicearchus, vpon the death of men: who was a greate Peripatetik, and plentiful: and after the other causes gathered togyther, as of waterbrakes, of pestilence, of destruction, yea and of the sodein flockinge togither of beastes, by whose violence hee showeth howe certaine kindes of men were consumed: afterwarde, hee makes comparison, how many mo men haue bin destroyed by mens violence (that is) by warre or rebellion, than by al other misery.

Seeinge then this place hathe no maner of dous, but that men bothe profitte, and hurte menne very muche: I pointe this to be a propietie of vertue to wynne mennes heartes to her, and bynde them to her vse.

Ther-

testibus nõ necessarijs. Atq; vt magnas vtilitates adipiscimur conspiratione hominum, atq; consensu: sic nulla tam detestabilis pestis est, q; non homini ab homine nascatur. Est Dicæarchi liber de interitu hominũ, peripatetici magni, & copiosi: qui collectis cæteris causis eluuionis pestilentiuæ, vastitatis, beluarum etiã repentinæ multitudinis, quarũ impetu, docet quædam hominum genera esse cõsumpta. Deinde cõparat quanto plures deleti sunt homines, hominum impetis, id est bellis, aut seditionibus, quam omni reliqua calamitate. Cum igitur hic locus nihil habeat dubitationis, quin homines plurimum hominibus et prosint, & obsint: proprium hoc statuo esse virtutis, conciliare sibi animos hominum & ad vsus suos adiungere.

Itaq; quæ in rebus inanimis quæ ꝑ in vsu & tractatione, belluarum fiunt vtiliter ad hominum vitam, artibus ea tribuuntur operosis. Hominum autem studia ad amplificationē nostrarū rerū promta ac parata virorum præstantium sapientia et virtute excitantur. Etenim virtus omnis tribus in rebus ferè vertitur: quarum vna est in percipiendo quid in quaq; re verum, syncerumq; sit. quid consentaneum cuiq;: quid consequens, ex quo quæq; gignãtur: quæ cuiusq; rei sit causa. Alterum, cohibere motus animi turbatos, quos græci πα'θη nominant: appetitionesque, quas illi ὁρμας obedientes efficere rationi. Tertium, vs quibus cum cõgregamur vti moderatè & scienter: quorum studys ea, q; natura desiderat, expleta,

Therefore what so in things inuicte, and what so in the vse, & occuppinge of beastes is done profitablie to mans life: it is all appointed to the labourſome trades.

But mennes good wylles, that bee prest, and readie to the aduauncement of oure estate, be stirred vppe by the wisedome, and vertue of excellent men.

For all vertue in a maner consisteth in three pointes. Whereof one is in thorowe seeinge what in euery thinge is true, and perfite: what agreable to eche thinge: what is the sequele: whereof all thinges growe: what is the cause of euery thinge.

The other, to keepe in the troublesome moodes of the minde, whiche the Greekes name πα'θη and to make the appetites, which thei call ὁρμας, obediente vnto reason.

The thirde, to vse them soberlie, and skilfully, with whome we be conuersant: by whose good willes, we maie haue those thynges at fill,

and

and heaped, whiche nature desire, yea and by them, if any harme be brought vpon vs, we may it auoide, and maye be wreaked of those whiche haue gonne about to hurte vs, and maie pay them with so muche punishmente as equitie, and mans gentieneſſe doth beare.

But by what meanes we may cõpaſſe mens good wills, and reteine the same we ſhall ſate, and that not longe hereafter. But a fewe wordes are to be ſaide before.

That a greate power ther is in fortune, on either ſyde eyther for welfare, or euil fare who is ignorant? For bothe when we enioye her proſperous blaſte, we are caried to our deſpered ends, and whē her wīd is turned, we are afflicted. This ſame fortune then hath other chaunces, wych be ſeldomer, fyrſt, that come frō thynges liuieſſe, as ſea ſtormes, tempeſts, ſhyp wrakes downefalles, burnynges, then from beaſtes, as ſtripes, bytynges, ouertunninges

cum lataq́ habeamus: per eoſdemq́ ſi quid importetur nobis incõmodi propulſem⁹, vlciſcamurq́ eos, qui nocere nobis conati ſunt, tantaq́ue pœna afficiamus, quanta æquitas humanitaſq́ patitur.

Quib⁹ autē rationib⁹ hanc facultatē aſſequi poſſim⁹ vt hominū ſtudia cõplectamur caq́ teneamus, dicemus neq́ ita multo poſt: ſed pauca ante dicenda ſunt. Magnā vim eſſe in fortuna in vtrāque partem, vel adſecundas res vel aduerſas quis ignorat? Nam & cum proſpero flatu eius vtimur, ad exitus peruehimur optatos: & cum reflauit, affligimur.

Hæc igitur ipſa fortuna cæteros caſus rariores habet: primum ab inanimis, procellas, tempeſtates, naufragia, ruinas, incendia: deinde à beſtis ict⁹, morſus, im-

petus. Hæc igitur (vt dixi) varia. At vero interit° exercituum: vt proxime trium sæpe multorum clades imperatorum: vt nuper summi ac singularis viri. inuidiæ præterea uultitudinis, atq; ob eas bene meritorum sæpe ciuium expulsiones, calamitates, fugæ. Rursusq; secundæ res, honores, imperia, victoriæ, quanquã fortunata sunt tamen sine hominũ operibus & studijs neutram in partem effici possunt. Hoc igitur cognito dicendum est quonam modo hominum studia ad utilitates nostras allicere atque excitare possimus.

Quæ si longior fuerit oratio, cum magnitudine utilitatis, comparetur. Ita fortasse etiam breuior videbitur. Quæcunq; igitur homines homini tribuũt ad eũ agendum atq; honestandum,

runninges. These therefore (as I sayde) bee seldomer. But the destruction of Armies, as alate of three, often of manne slaughter of capteines, as latelie of a noble & singuler man, & enuienges moreouer of the multitude, and by reason of the same, oftentimes the banishmẽts, the miseries, the fleeinges away of the well deseruinge citizens: and againe, prosperitie, honoure, empire, victorie, although they bee in fortunes hande: yet without mens trauailes, and studies on neyther side thei can be brought to passe.

This then knowen: we muste declare, but by what meanes we maie allure, and styre vp mens good willes to oure profits. The whiche processe if it bee somewhat longe, lette it bee compared with the greateneſſe of the profitte: so perhaps euen somewhat to shorte it shall seeme.

Whatsoeuer then men gyue to a manne, to enriche, and aduaunce him eyther

ther they do it for good will, when for some cause they beare affection to anye: or els for honoures sake, yf they reuerence anye mannes vertue, and thinke him worthie of moste fortunate estate: or in whome they haue a trust, and do suppose them to prouyde well for theyr matters: or els whose power they feare, or contrariwyse of whome they looke after somewhat, as when vsurers and people pleasinge menne laye large guiftes before them, or at last, they bee ledde to meede, and reward. Which in deede is the vyleste waie, and the foulest bothe to them, who ar caught with the same, and to those, whoe do seeke to haue refuge there vnto. For the matter goeth not well, when the same that shoulde bee wrought by vertue, is attempted by money. But because manye tymes thys helpe is necessarie, we will tell howe it oughte to be vsed, if firste we shal haue spoken of those thinges, whiche be neerer to vertue.

aut beneuolentiæ gratia faciunt, cum aliqua de causa quempiam diligunt: aut honoris, si cuius virtutem suspiciunt, & siquẽ dignũ fortuna q̃ ampliſſima putant: aut cui fidem habẽt, & bene reb⁹ ſuis conſulere arbitrantur: aut cuius opes metuũt: aut contrà à quibus aliquid expectant: aut cum reges pp̃ populare ſuc homines largitiones aliquas proponant: aut poſtremo pretio ac mercede ducuntur. Q̃ ua ſordidiſſima quidẽ eſt ratio et inquinatiſſima, et iis, qui catenẽtur et illis qui ad eam confugere conantur. Male enim ſe res habet cũ q̃ virtute effici debet id tentatur, pecunia. Sed quoniam nonnunquam ſubſidium hoc neceſſarium eſt, quemadmodum ſit vtendum eo, dicemus, ſi primis iis de rebus, quæ virtuti propiores ſunt diximus.

And

Atque etiam subiciunt se homines imperio alterius & potestati pluribus de causis. Ducuntur enim, aut beneuolentia, aut beneficiorum magnitudine, aut dignitatis præstantia, aut spe sibi id vtile futurũ, aut metu, ne vi parare cogantur, aut spe largitionis, promissionisq; capti: aut postremo, vt sæpe in nostra Repub. videmus mercede conducti. Rerum autem omnium nec aptius est quicquam ad opes tuendas ac tenendas quã diligi, nec alienius, quàm timeri.

Præclare enim Ennius,

Quem metuunt oderunt,

Quem quisque odit perisse expetit.

Multorum autem odijs nullas opes posse obsistere: si antea fuit ignotum, nuper est cognitum. Nec vero huius tirãni solũ, quẽ armis oppressa

And likewise menne make thẽselues subiect to the rule, and auctho*r*itie of an other, fo*r* diuers causes.

Fo*r* thei be ledde eyther with good will, o*r* greatnesse of benefites, o*r* excellence of honoure, o*r* hope, it shall bee pro*f*itable to them: o*r* feare lest by power they be driuen to yeelde: o*r* as taken wyth hope of large guiftes, and promises: o*r* at laste, as we see often in oure commonweale, euen hyred fo*r* meede.

And certes of all thinges neither is there any fitter to maintetaine a power than to be loued, neither anye vnfitter than to be feared. Notably saith Ennius.

Whom thei feare, him they hate alway the moste:
Whome any man hateth, he wisheth him lost.

But if afore it was vnknowne, since alate it is well knowne, that no power can withstande the hatered of manie: And truelye not onely the death of thys tyrant, whome the citie being oppressed with force of armes

armes did ſuffer, doth de clare how much the hatred of menne preuailes too de=ſtruction: but the like endes of other trauntes do ſhow as much, of whom ſcaſelye any hath eſcaped the lyke death. For, feare is an cupll keper of countenance: and contrarye wyſe, good wyll is faythfull, yea for euer. But let a roughnes hardelye bee vſed of them: who by rule do kepe ſtraite ſuch as bee brought vnder by force, as of maiſters ouer ſeruauntes, if they cã not otherwiſe bee ſtaied. But who in a free citie ſo order them ſelues, that they bee feared, ther can nothing poſſiblie bee madder, than they bee. & for although the lawes bee ſounke by ſome mãs might: although liber=tie bee all to ſhaken, yet at length they ſwimme out againe, eyther by ſecrete iudgementes, or by priuie voyces in anaunting to ho=nour: & certeſſe the ſtinges of ceaſed libertie bee ſhar=per, than of libertie con=tinued. Lette vs then

pertulit ciuitas, interitus declarat, quãtũ odiũ homi=num valet ad peſtem: ſed re=liquorũ ſimiles exitus tirã=norũ: quorũ haud fere quiſ=quam talem interitum effu=git: malus enim cuſtos diu=turnitatis metus: contraque benevolentia fidelis eſt, vel ad perpetuitatẽ. Sed ijs, qui vi oppreſſos imperio coercẽt, ſit ſanè adhibenda ſæuitia, vt heris infamulos, ſi aliter teneri non poſſũt: Q ui ve=ro in libera ciuitate ita ſe in=ſtruunt, vt metuantur, his nihil poteſt eſſe dementius. Q uãuis enim demerſæ ſint leges alicuius opibus, quã=uis tremefacta libertas: emergunt tamen hæc ali=quando aut iudicijs tacitis, aut occultis de honore ſuffra=gijs. Acriores autẽ morſus ſunt intermiſſæ libertatis, quam retẽtæ Q uod igitur

latissime patet, neq; ad inco-
lumitatẽ solum, sed etiã ad
opes & potẽtiã valet plur-
mũ, id amplectamur, vt me-
tus absit, charitas retinea-
tur. Ita facillime quæ volu-
mus, et priuatis in rebus &
in Reipub. consequemur. Et
nim qui semetuẽ volẽt, a qui
bus metuuntur, eos dẽ metu-
ant ipsi necesse est. Quid
enim censemus superiorẽ illũ
Dionisiũ, quo cruciatu ti-
moris angi solitũ, qui cultros
metuẽs tonsorios cãdẽte car-
bone sibi adurebat capillũ?
Quid Alexandrũ Pheræ-
um, quo animo vixisse arbi-
tremur? qui (vt scriptũ legi-
mus (cũ vxorẽ Theben ad-
modũ diligeret: tamẽ ad eã
ex epulis in cubiculũ veniẽs
barbarum, & eum quidem
(vt scriptum est) compunc-
tũ notis Thraeicis districto
gladio iubebat anteire:

embrace that, whiche moste largely spreadeth, and moste auaileth not onely to safetie, but also to welth, & power: that feare bee banished, and loue retayned. So moste easely wee shall obtein what we desire, bothe in priuate matters, and in the common welth. For who so wyll thẽ selues too be hadde in feare, it must nedes bee, that they thẽ selues feare those same, of whom they bee feared. For what thinke wee of the first Dionisius? with what torment of feare was he wõt too bee troubled? who fearing ỹ barbers razers, with a reddhot cole singed of hys owne beardе.

what of Alexãder the Pheraian? with what an herte, do wee suppose, hee lyued: who (as wee reede written) when exceedinglye hee loued his wife, Thebe: yet comminge too her from banketinge into the chamber, hee commaunded a kerne, and hym also (as it is written) beyng prepared wyth Thracean markes, too goo before with a drawne sword: and

and hée sente of his garde afore, too ransacke the womens cofers, and seke, that no weapon were hydden in their garmentes.

O miserable manne, who thought both a kerne, and an yronbronded slaue faithfuller, thã his wife. And hys opinion did not deceiue him for by her hee was slaine for a iealousie of spousebreache. And truly ther is no strẽgth of Empire so great, whiche with suppressynge by feare, can be long continuing.

Witnesse is Phalaris, whose cruelitie is famed aboue others, who perished not by treason, as this Alexander did, whom euen nowe I spake of, nor by a fewe, as this our mã, but against him the holle commons of the Agrigentines rose with violence, what the Macedonians, did they not forsake Demetrius, & all holle gotte theym too Pyrrhus: what the Lacedemonians, rulyng vnrightfully: dyd not weinte all theyr leagfrendes sodenly forsake thẽ

præmittebatq; de stipatoribꝰ suis, qui perscrutarẽtur arculas mulichres, & ne quod in vestimentis occultaretur telũ, exquirerẽt. O miserum, qui fideliorẽ & barbarũ et stigmaticũ putaret quàm cõiugẽ. Nec cũ fefellit opinio: ab eaest enĩipse propter pellicatus suspicionẽ interfectꝰ Nec vero vlla vis imperij tãta est quæ premẽte metu possit esse diuturna. Testis est Phalaris, cuius est præter cæteros nobilitata crudelitas: qui nõ ex insidijs interijt, vt is, quẽ modo dixi, Alexander: nõ à paucis, vt hic noster, sed in quẽ vniuersa Agrigẽtinorũ multitudo impetũ fecit. Quid Macedones? nõne Demetriũ reliquerũt, vniuersi q; se ad Pyrrhũ cõtulerũt? Quid Lacedemonios iniusticimperãtes? nonne repente omnes ferè socij deseruerunt.

ſpectatoreſq. ſe otioſos præbu
erũt Leuctricæ calaminatis.
Externa libentius in tali re
quàm domeſtica recordor.
Veruntamẽ quandiu impe-
riũ Popu. Roma. beneficiis
tenebatur, non iniurijs. bella
aut pro ſocijs, aut de imperio
gerebãtur, exitus erãt bello-
rũ aut mites, aut neceſſarij:
Regũ, populorũ, nationum,
portus erat & refugiũ Sena
tus: noſtri autem magiſtra-
tꝰ, imperatoreſq. ex vna hac
re maximã laudẽ capere ſtu
debant, ſi prouincias, ſi ſo-
cios æquitate, & fide defen
diſſent. Itaq. illud patroci-
niũ orbis terræ verius quàm
imperium poterat nominari.
Senſim hanc conſuetudinem
& diſciplinam iam antea
minuebamus: poſt vero Syllæ
victoriã penitus amiſimus.
Deſitũ eſt enĩ videri quic-
quã in ſocios iniquum, cum
extitiſſet etiam in ciues tan-

and ſhewed them ſelues idle lokers on of the ouerthrow at Leuctra? Forein examples gladyer, than home deedes I reherſe, in ſuche a caſe. Neuertheleſſe as longe as the empire of the people of Rome was vpholden by worthy actes, not by wrõgs doinge, and warres were made, eyther for defence of leagfrendes, or for empire, then were the endes of warres, either merciſull or neceſſarie. The Senat was the hauen and refuge of kynges, of peoples, of nacions. And our magiſtrates, and captaines endeuored to get great praiſe, by this only meane, if prouinces, pl leagfrendes, in right, and truth, they hadde defended. Therfore it might haue ben named the protection more truly, thã the empire of the worlde. By little, and little we abated this cuſtom, and order, ſomwhat afore, but after Sillaes victorie, vterlye we loſt it. For men ceaſed to account any thing vnreſonable towarde leagfrends. whẽ ſo gret crueltie

was

was shewed euē against citi zēs. Therfore ther folowed in him of an honest quarell an vnhonest victorie. For whē ỹ salestaffe was pight e in ỹ market place he solde the goodes both of good mē and riche, e those euen cityzens, he was so bold to saye, that he made sale of his lawfull bootie. One succeded, who in a wicked cause, e a more shameful victorye, not only put the goodes of euery one of the citezens to opē sale, but in one state of misserie enwrapped holie prouinces, and regions, and so forein nacions being vexed, and vndone, we sawe Massilia borne about in triumph, for a shewe of our Empire lost, and triumph made ouer that citie, without whiche our capteines of warres neuer got any triumph, beyōd the alpes. I coulde reherse many mo cursed deedes beside done againste our leagfrendes, if the sonne hadde seen ought, more haynous, than this one. Iustly therefore ar wee scorged. For, had we not suffred ỹ wickednes

ta crudelitas. Ergo in illo secuta est honestā causam non honesta victoria. Est enim ausus dicere hasta posita cū bona in foro venderet, & honorum virorū & locupletū, & certe ciuium, prædam se suam vēdere. Secutus est qui in causa impia, victoria etiam fœdiore, non solū singulorū ciuium bona publicaret, sed vniuersas quoq; prouincias, regionesq; vno calamitatis genere cōprehenderet. Itaque vexatis, ac perditis exteris nationibus, ad exemplū amissi imperij, portare in triumpho Massiliam vidimus & ex ea vrbe triūphari, sine qua nūquā nostri imperatores extra alpinis bellis triumpharūt. Multa praterea cōmemorarē nefaria in socios: si hoc vno Sol quicquā vidisset indignius. Iure igitur plectimur. Nisi enim multo rū ipunita scelera tulissem

quam ad vnum tanta pecuniae uenisset licentia : à quo quidem rei familiaris ad paucos, cupiditatum ad multos improbos venit hæreditas. Nec vero vnquam bellorum ciuilium semen & causa decrit, dum homines perditi hastam illã cruentam & meminerint & sperabunt : quam P. Sylla cum vibrasset dictatore propinquo suo, idem sexto & tricesimo anno post à sceleratiore hasta eadem non recessit. Alter autem, qui in illa dictatura scriba fuerat, in hac fuit quæstor vrbanus. Ex quo debet intelligi, talibus præmijs propositis nunquam defuitura bella ciuilia. Itaque parietes vrbis modo stãt et manẽt, quæ ipsi iam extrema scelera metuentes : Rem verò publicam penitus amisimus.

of many to bee vnponished, suche a lawlesse libertie had neuer come to the handes of one, from whom sothly the inheritaunce of his goodes came to few, but of his greedie desires, to many naughtie menne. For truelye the seede, and cause of ciuill warres shall euer faile, as long as mischeuous menne shall both remember, and hope after that bloody falestaffe, whiche when Publius Sylla hadde shaken, hys nie kinsemanne beynge Dictator, the same steyte not once backe from the shaking of a like more mischeuous staffe, the sixte and thirtieth yere after. But the other, who in the Dictature had been Secretarie, in this was Treasurer for the citie. Whereupon ought too bee vndestanded, that whyle such booties bee layed afore men, ciuill warres shall neuer want. And so, onlye the walles of the citie do stand, and remaine, yea and thole same euẽ now dreding their last mischiefe, but the cõmõ weale we haue vtterly lost.

And

and into theſe deſtructions we are faine (for wee muſte returne too our purpoſe) whyle wee hadde rather too be feared, than too bee deare, and welbeloued. If all this coulde befall too the people of Rome, rulyng vnrightfullye: what ought euerye fere man to thinke? whyche thing ſith it is euident, that the power of good wyll is greate, of feare, ſlender, it folowes, that we make diſcourſe, by what meanes wee may ſonaſt, with honor, and vprightnes, attein that loue, which wee deſire.

But all we doo not alyke ſtande in neede of the ſame. For to the trading of eche mans life it muſt bee applyed, whether it be nedefull, of many, or ſufficient, of few too bee beloued. Lette thys therfore bee certaine, as the thyng, which is both principall, and moſt neceſſarie, too haue faithfull familiarities of frendes, louyng vs, and hyely eſteemiſige our vertues. For this is the onelye meane in dede, that ther bee not muche difference beetwene great, & meane men:

Atq; in has clades incidimus (redeundum eſt enim ad propoſitũ) dũ metui, quàm chari eſſe, & diligi malumus. Quæ ſi populo Romano inuiuſte imperãti accidere potuerũt, quid debẽt putare ſinguli? Quod cũ perſpicuũ ſit beneuolẽtiæ vim eſſe magnã, metus imbecillũ, ſequitur vt diſſeramus, quibus rebus facillime poſſimus eam quã volumus, adipiſci cum honore et fide charitatẽ. Sed ea non pariter omnes egẽt. Nã ad cuiuſq; vitã inſtituendam accõmodandum eſt, à multis ne opus ſit, an ſatis ſit a paucis diligi. Certum igitur hoc ſit, idq; & primum & maximè neceſſarium, familiaritates habere fidas amantium nos amicorũ, & noſtra mirãtiũ. Hæc enim eſt vnaves prorſus, vt non differat multum inter ſummos & mediocres viros:

eaq; est vtriq; propemodũ cõ parãda. Honore & gloria et beneuolentia ciuiũ fortasse nõ æque omnes egent: sed tamẽ si cui hæc suppetũt, adiuuãt aliquantũ cũ ad cætera, tũ ad amicitias cõparãdas. Sed de amicitia alio libro dictum est, qui inscribitur LAELIVS. Nunc dicamus de gloria, quanquã ea quoq; de re nostri libri duo sũt. Sed attingamus. quandoquidem ea in reb⁹ maioribus administrãdis adiuuat plurimũ. Summa igitur & perfecta gloria constat ex tribus his. Si diligit multitudo, si fidẽ habet, si cum admiratione quadã honore nos dignos putat. Hæc autẽ (si est simpliciter breuiterq; dicẽdũ) quibus rebus pariuntur à singulis, eisdẽ ferè à multitudine. Sed est alius quoq; quidã aditus ad multitudinem, vt

and it muste bee procured in a maner of them both. Not all perchaunce do standc in like neede of honour, & glorie, and citezens good wyls: but yet who so hath them: they further somwhat bothe to other thinges, and also to the purchasing of frendshippes. But of frendeship we haue spoken in the boke, whiche is entitled Lelius: now let vs speake of glory, though of that matter also ther bee two bokes of ours, yet let vs touch it, bicause the same auaileth much, in executinge of greater matters.

The hieste therfore, & perfite glorie standeth of these three, if the multitude fauour vs, if they haue a trust in vs, if with a certaine admiracio they count vs worthy of honour. And, if wee must speake it plainly, and briefly, as these be gotten at the hands of euery sere mã, by ỹ same meenes in a maner they be obtained of the multitude. But there is also a certaine other enteraũce into the multitude, that wee

may.

may (as ye wold say) flowe into the hertes of the hoole. And first let vs see touching those three, which before I called the preceptes of good wyll, that which no doute is caught most of all by benefites. And secondarilie, good will is alured by a wel willing mind, although perhaps abilitie sufficeth not. But wonderousli the loue of the multitude is al to stirred with the fame, and opinyon of liberalitie, bounteousnesse, iustice, faithfulnes, & of all those vertues, which apertaine too the mildenesse of maners, and gentlenes. For that very same, which wee name comlye and honest, bicause of it selfe it liketh vs, & with hys owne nature, and beautie moueth all our myndes, and principally shineth (as it wer) out of those vertues, whiche I haue rehersed, therefore by very nature we are enforced to fauour thē, in whom wee think those vertues too bee. And these verilye bee the weightiest causes of fauoringe, for other molyghter ther

in vniuersorū animos tanquā influere possimus. At primū de illis trib⁹, quæ ante dixi, beneuolentiæ precepta videamus quæ quidē beneficijs capitur maximè. Secūdo autē loco beneficia volūtate, beneuolētia mouetur, etiā si res forte non suppetit. Vehemēter autē amor multitudinis cōmouetur ipsa fama et opinione liberalitatis, beneficētiæ, iustitiæ, fidei, omniūq; carū virtutū, quæ pertinēt ad māsuetudinē morū ac facilitatē. Et enī illud ipsū, quod decorū honestūq; dicimus, quia per se nobis placet, animosq; omniū natura et specie sua commouet, maximeq; quasi perlucet. ex ijs, quas cōmemorauī, virtutibus: idcirco illis, in quib⁹ eas virtutes esse remur, à natura ipsa diligere cogimur, Atq; hæ quidem causæ sunt diligēdi grauissimæ. Possunt enim præterea nonnullæ:

esse leuiores. Fides autem vt habeatur, duab⁹ rebus effici potest: si existimabimur adepti cõiũctã cũ iustitia prudentiã. Nã & ijs fidẽ habemus, quos plus intelligere quàm nos arbitramur: quosq; & futura prospicere credim⁹ & cũ res agatur, in discrimenq; ventũ sit, expedire rẽ, & cõsiliũ extempore capere posse. Hanc enim omnes existimãt vtilẽ, veramq; prudẽtiã. Iustis autem & fidis hominib⁹, id est viris bonis ita fides habetur, vt nulla sit in his fraudis iniuriæq; suspicio. Itaq; his salutem nostrã, his fortũnas, his liberos rectissime cõmitti arbitramur. Harum igitur duarũ ad fidem faciendam iustitia pl⁹ pollet. Q. nippe cum ea sine prudentia satis habeat authoritatis: prudẽtia sine iustitia nihil valet ad faciẽdã fidẽ. Q. no enĩ quis versutior

ther may be beside.

But, that a truste maye bee had in vs, by two thinges it may bee brought to passe: if wee shall bee thought to haue attained prudence ioyned with Iustice. For both too them wee haue a truste, whom we suppose to vnderstand more, than our selues: and also too them, who, wee beleue, be able both to foresee thinges too come, and also to dispatche the businesse, and forthwith to take counsail, when the matter is in hand, and standes in hazard. For all men doo iudge thys the profitable, and true prudence. But in such wise credit is geuen to iust, & trustie men (that is) to good men: that in thẽ ther is no suspiciõ of deceit, & iniurie. Ther fore to these our life, to these our goodes, too these oure children we suppose very wel to bee committed. Of these two then iustice is of more power too win a credit, bycause it without prudence hath sufficient authoritie, prudence without iustice is nothinge worthe too gette credit. For, the sutteler,

and

and the craftier that a man is: so muche the more hee is hated, and suspected, when the opinion of hys honestie is pulled awaye. Wherefore iustice ioyned with vnderstanding, shal haue as much power as it list, to purchase credit, iustice without prudence shal be of much power, prudence without iustice shalbe nothing worth. But lest some mã haue maruaile: seing amongste all philosophers it is plaine, and by my selfe disputed oftẽ: him that shoul e haue one vertue, to haue all the vertues: why I doo nowe sonder thẽ so, as though ther may anye man bee iust, which same is not prudent, of one sort, is that suttlenesse, when verye trouth is reueled in disputacion, and of an other sorte is that talke, when it is all applyed to the common opinion. Wherefore we speake so in this place, as the commo sort do, that we call some one sort manly, some other good mẽ, some other prudẽt. For ẅ ẏ peoples wordes, & vsual termes, we must treat when

& callidior est, hoc inuisior et suspectior detracta opinione probitatis. Quamobrẽ intelligẽtiæ iustitia cõiuncta quãtũ volet habebit ad faciẽdã fidẽ virtũ. Iustitia sine prudẽtia multũ poterit, sine iustitia nihil valebit prudentia. Sed ne quis sit admiratus, cũ cum inter omnes philosophos constet, à meq; ip so sæpe disputatũ sit, qui vnã haberet omnes habere virtutes, nuncupata seiungã, quasi possit quisquã qui non idem prudens sit, iustus esse. Alia est illa, cum veritas ipsa limatur in disputatione, subtilitas: alia cũ ad opinionem cõmunẽ omnis accõmodatur oratio. Quamobrẽ vt vulgo, ita nos hoc loco loquimur, vt alios fortes, alios bonos viros, alios prudẽtes esse dicamus. Populæ ibus enim verbis est agendum & vsitatis,

cũ loquamur de opinione populari: idq; eodẽ modo fecit Panætius. Sed ad propositũ reuertamur. Erat igitur ex tribus, quæ ad gloriã pertinerẽt, hoc tertiũ, vt cũ admiratione hominum honore ab his digni iudicaremur. Admirantur igitur cõmuniter illi quidẽ omnia, quæ magna et præter opinionẽ suã animaduertunt, separatim autẽ in singulis, si pspiciũt nec opinata quidẽ bona. Itaq; eos viros suspiciant, maximisq; efferũt laudib⁹. in quib⁹ existimãt se excellentes quasdã et singulares virtutes perspicere. Despiciunt autẽ eos & contemnunt, in quibus nihil virtutis, nihil animi, nihil neruorũ putãt. Nõ enim omnes eos contẽnunt, de quibus male existimãt. Nã quos improbos, maledicos, fraudulẽtos, putant, & ad faciẽdam iniuriam instructos, eos haud contemnunt quidem,

whẽ wee speake of the cõmon peoples opinion, & that did Panetius, after ỹ same sort. But to the purpose let vs returne.

Of the three therfore, which should appertaine to glorie, this was the thirde, that with admiracion of menne, wee might by them bee thought worthy of honour. Generallye then they haue in admiracion doutlesse all thinges, which they haue noted to bee great, and beyonde their weining, and seuerally in euery seere man, if they perfitly see good thigs vnlooked for. Therfore they honour those men, and with highest praises set thẽ aloft: in whõ they thik thẽ selues to beholde certeine passing and singuler vertues. But those they dispise, and sette at nought: in whom no vertue, no corage, no strength, they iudge. For all mẽ do not despise them, of whom they thinke euill. For whõ they deme dishonest, misreporters, guilefull, and readie framed too do wrong, those they dispise not certesse, but

but of them they think euill. wherfore (as I sayd afore) they be despised: who neyther to them selues, nor to other do good, as they say. in whom ther is no painfull nesse, no diligence, no caring but they be reuerenced with a certein admiracion, who are thought too go before others in vertue, & too bee without bothe all vaseme-linesse, and also those vices, which other can not easelye withstand. For bothe pleasures, full flatering dames, do oftentimes wrest ỹ greater parte of the mynde from vertue, and also when the brandes of paines bee layde vnto them, most men beyõd measure bee all too fraied. Life, death, riches, pouertie, must mightilie moue all men. Which thinges who so on either side, with a lofty, and great corage do despise and whẽ before them is offered anye goodly, & honest thing, it turneth and haleth them hole to it selfe, thẽ who doth not maruell at the brightnes, and beautie of vertue: Therfore both this despi-

sed de his male existment. Quamobrẽ (vt ante dixi) cõtẽnũtur ij, qui nec sibi, nec alteri prosũt (vt dicitur) in quibus nullus labor, nulla ĩdustria, nulla cura est. Admiratione quada vero afficiuntur ij, qui anteire cæteris virtute putãtur: & cũ omni cauere dedecore, tum vero ijs vitijs, quib⁹ alij nõ facile possunt obsistere. Nã & voluptates blãdissimæ dominæ sæpe maiores partes animi à virtute detorquẽt, & dolorũ cũ admouẽtur faces, præter modũ plerique exterrẽtur, vita, mors, diuitiæ, paupertas omnes homines vehemẽtissime permouent. Quæ qui in vtrãq; partẽ excelso animo, magnoq; despiciũt, cũq; aliqua his ãpla et honesta re obiecta est, totos ad se cõuertit, et rapit: tũ quis nõ admiretur splẽdorẽ, pulchritudinẽ que virtutis? Ergo & hac

animi despiciẽtia admirabilitatẽ magnã facit: et maximè iustitia, ex qua vna virtute veri boni appellãtur, mirifica quædã res multitudini videtur: nec iniuria. Nemo enim iust⁹ esse potest, qui mortẽ, qui dolorẽ, qui exiliũ qui egestatẽ timet, aut qui ea quæ his sunt cõtraria, æquitati ãteponit. Maximeq; admirãtur cũ, qui pecuniã nõ mouetur: quod in quo viro perspectũ sit, hũc dignũ spectatu arbitrãtur. Itaq; illa tria, quæ ꝓposita sũt, ad gloriã, omnia iustitia cõficit, et beneuolẽtiã, quòd prodesse vult plurimis: et ob eandem causã fidẽ, et admirationem habet, quod eas res spernit et neglegit, ad quas pleriq; inflãmati auiditate rapiũtur. Ac mea quidẽ sẽtẽtia, omnis ratio & institutio vitæ adiumẽta hominũ desiderat. Inprimisq; vt habeas, quib⁹

despising mynde causeth a great wõdering, & specially iustice, of whiche vertue alone good mẽ bee named, seemeth to ỹ multitude a wonderfull thing, & not without cause. For none can be iust, who dreadeth death, paine, banishment or pouertie, nor any, that before equitie preferreth the contraries. And most of all, they wonder at him, who is not tẽpted with money, & in what man that is wel tried, him think they worthie too bee regarded.

Therfore iustice doth worke al those thre, which be pointed out for glorie, & gettes good will also, bycause it meanes to profite very manye, & for the same cause, it worketh credit likewise, and admiratiõ, bicause it despyseth, and nought regardeth those thinges, whereunto most menne enkindled with gredinesse bee haled. And surely, after my iudgement, euerie trade, & order of lyfe requireth the aydes of men: and chiefelye that ye haue some, with whom you maye debate in familiar talke:

which

whiche is harde, onelesse ye beare vpon you the show of an honest mane. Therefore opinion of iustice is necessarie euen too the alone liuer and one that leades hys lyfe in the fieldes, yea and so much the more, bycause yf they haue it not, vntust they shall bee counted, and being garded with no defence shal be vexed with many iniuries. And too these also, who do sell, bye, hyre, lette, and be entangled in bargaining bysinesse, iustice, too go thorow with their matters, is necessarie. whose power is so greate: that euen they, who be fedde with euill doinge, and mischiefe, can not possible liue without some percell of Justice. For who stealeth, or priuily pyketh any thinge from any of thē, with whom hee goth a theeuing, hee leaueth not hym selfe a place, no not in robberie. And onelesse hee, who is named the archpirate, deuide the prise egally, eyther hee shall bee slaine of hys mates, or els forsaken.

cū possis familiares conferre sermones: quod est difficile, nisi speciem præ te boni viri feras. Ergo etiā solitario homini, atq; in agro vitā agēti opinio iustitiæ necessaria est: eoq; etiā magis, quod si eā nō habebūt, iniusti habebūtur: et nullis præsidijs septi multis afficientur iniurijs. Atq; his etiā qui vēdūt, emūt, cōducūt, locāt, contrahendisq; negotijs implicātur, iustitia adhē gerēdā necessaria est. Cuius tāta vis est, vt nec illi quidē, qui maleficio et sceleri pascūtur, possint sine vlla particula iustitiæ viuere. Nā qui cōmunitā qui vnà latrocinātur, furatur aliquid, aut eripit, is sibi ne in latrocinio quidem relinquit locū. Ille autē, qui archipirata dicitur: nisi æquabiliter prædā dispartiat, aut occiditur à socijs, aut relinquitur.

Yea

Q uĩ etiã leges latronũ esse dicuntur, quibus pareant, quas obseruent. Itaq; propter æquabilẽ prædæ partitionem & bargulus Illiricus latro, (de quo est apud Theopompũ) magnas opes habuit: & multo maiores viriatus Lusitanus: cui quidem etiam exercitus nostri, imperatores q́ue cesserũt: quem C. Lælius, is qui sapiens vsurpatur, prætor fregit, & commi nuit, fœrocitatemq; eius ita repressit, vt facile bellum reliquis traderet. Cum igitur tanta vis iustitiæ sit, vt ea etiam latronum opes firmet, atq; augeat: quantam eius vim inter leges, & iudicia, & instituta Reip. fore putamus? Mihi quidem nõ apud Medos solum (vt ait Herodotus) sed apud etiam maiores nostros iustitiæ seruandæ causa videntur olim bene morati reges constituti.

Yea and it is saide, ther are lawes among theeues, whet to they obey, and do obserue them. And so, by reason of the euen portioninge of the prise, both Bargulus, the Illirian robber, of whom mention is made in Theopompus, had great richesse: and muche greater had Viriatus the Lusitane, to whõ of trouth euen our armies, and captaines gaue place: whõ Caius Lelius, he that was commonlie called the wise, being Prætor, did discomfite, and abate, and so alayed his kerseneſſe, that he lefte an easy warre to other. Seing then the strength of iustice is so great: that it also stablisheth, and encreaseth robbers richesse, howe great suppose we the power therof to bee, among lawes and iudgementes, and ordynaunces of a cõmon weale? Certesse me thinke, not only among the Medes (as teleth Herodotus) but also amonge our aunceters, in olde tyme, wel conditioned kinges haue been ordeined, for ỹ end of enioyẽg iustice.

For

For at the beginning, when the multitude was oppressed by them, who hadde the greater power: for refuge they fledde to some one, excelling in vertue, who when hee saued the weaker from iniurie, by paintinge oute an equite, kept the highest with the lowest in difference of lawe.

And the like cause ther was of makinge lawes, as of kings: for euermore an egall right hath been sought: for otherwyse yt were not a right:

If they obtained that same at the handes of one iuste, and good manne, with hym they were contented: when that chaunced not, lawes were deuysed: whiche with all men alwaies, in one, and alyke voyce shoulde speake. Wherefore this is doubtlesse a cleare case? that they were wonte to bee chooſen to gouerne: of whose iustice the oppinion of the multitude was greate. And this therto adioyned, that thei also myghte bee counted wyse:

Nam cum premeretur initio multitudo ab ijs qui maiores opes habebant, ad vnum aliquem confugiebant virtute præstantem: qui cū prohiberet iniuria tenuiores, æquitate constituenda, summos cum infimis pari iure retinebat. Eadem ī constituendarum legum fuit causa, q; regum. Ius enim semper est quæsitum æquabile. Neq; enim aliter esset ius. Id si ab vno bono & iusto viro consequebantur: eo erāt contenti. Cum id minus contingeret: leges sunt inuentæ, quæ cum omnibus semper vna atq; eadē voce loquerentur. Ergo hoc quidem perspicuum est, eos adimperandū deligi solitos, quorum de iustitia magna esset opinio multitudinis. Adiuncto vero hoc, vt idem etiam prudentes habereāur:

nihil erat q̃ homines his authoribus non posse consequi se arbitrarentur. Omni igitur ratione colenda & retinenda iustitia est, tum ipsa propter se (nam aliter iustitia non esset) tũ propter amplificationem honoris & gloriæ. Sed vt pecuniæ non quærendæ solum ratio est, verum etiã collocandæ, q̃ perpetuos sumptus suppeditat, nec solũ necessarios, sed etiã liberales: sic gloria & quærenda & collocanda ratione est.

Quanq̃ prædare Socrates, hanc viã ad gloriã proximã & quasi compendiariam dicebat esse si quis id ageret, vt qualis haberi vellet, talis esset. Quod si quis simulatione, & imani ostentatione & ficto non modò sermone sed etiam vultu stabilem se gloriam consequi posse rentur, vehementer errant.

ther was nothing, that men, vnder those guides, shoulde weene themselues vnable to attaine. Iustice therefore is by all manner meanes to be regarded, and maintained: bothe it for it selfe sake (for els it were not iustice) & also for the enlargment of honor and glorie. But as there is a waye not onely of getting money, but also of bestowinge it, whiche may suffice for continuall charges, not onelye suche as be necessary, but also liberall, so glorye muste be bothe gotten, and ordered by a mean.

Notwithstandinge notablye Socrates did saye, this to be the neareste, and (as it were) the gayne waie to glorie, if a manne woulde endeuoure this, to bee in deede suche as he wouldc be counted.

And yf anye doo deeme thẽselues able to attein stedfast glorye, by false, pretẽce, and vayne outshowe, bothe with fained spech, and countenance, thei bee farre oute of the waie.

The

The true glorie taketh depe roote . and also shootes abroade, all counterfet things be soone shedde , as doo the lattie flowers : neyther can there any forged thinge be durable . Witnesses verye many there be on both sides: but for shortenesse sake , we will be contented with one familie.

For Tybertius Gracchus Publius name so long shall be praised , as remembrance of the Romaine state shall stande.

But bys sonnes neyther liuinge were lyked of good men, and dyd goe in that nũber of menne rightfully put to death. Let them then , whoso the true glorye will attaine , perfourme the duties of iustice. What those were, it was tolde in the former booke. But to the ende that soone wee maie seeme suche manner menne as we be: although the greatest effecte is euen in this poynte, that wee bee suche, as wee wouide bee coumpted : yet certaine preceptes are to be gyuen.

Vera gloria radices agit, atq; etiam propagatur: ficta omnia celeriter tanq̃ flosculi decidunt : nec simulatum potest quicquã esse diuturnum. Testes sunt permulti in vtranq; partem , sed breuitatis causa , familia contenti erimus vna. Tibi enim Gracchus Publij filius, tamdiu laudabitur , dum memoria rerum Romanarum manebit . At eius filij nec viui probabantur à bonis & mortui numerum obtinẽt iure cæsorum . Qui igitur adipisci veram iustitiæ gloriam volet, iustitiæ fungatur officijs: ea quæ essent, dictum est in superiore libro. Sed vt facillimè quales simus, tales esse videamur. (& si in eo ipso vis maxima est, vt simus ij , qui haberi velimus) tamen quædam præcepta danda sunt.

Nã si quis ab incunte ætate habet causam celebritatis et nominis aut à patre acceptã (q̃ tibi mi Cicero arbitror contigisse) aut aliquo casu atq́ fortuna in hunc oculi omnium conyciũtur, atq́ in eum quid agat, quẽadmodũ viuat, inquiritur: et tanquã in clarissima luce versetur, ita vt nullũ obscurum potest nec dictũ eius esse, nec factũ. Quorum autẽ prima ætas propter humilitatẽ et obscuritatem in hominũ ignoratione versatur: hi simul ac iuuenes esse cœperunt, magna spectare, & ad ea rectis studijs debẽt contẽdere. Quod confirmiore animo faciẽt quia non modo non inuidetur illi ætati, verũ etiã fauetur. Prima igitur est adolescenti cõmendatio ad gloriã, si qua ex bellicis rebus cõparari potest in qua multi apud maiores nostros extiterunt. Sẽp. n. ferè

For yf any from his firſt entered age hathe cauſe of name, and fame: either receiued of his father, whiche to you, my Cicero, I ſuppoſe to haue happened, or by any chaunce, and fortune: on hym all mennes eyes are caſte: and of him there is ſerchinge, what he doth, & how he liueth: and ſo, as thoughe hee ſhoulde leade his lyfe in moſte open lyghte, nother worde, nor deede of his can be vnknowen.

But whoſe firſte age is paſſed without mens knowiege by reaſon of baſenes, and vnknowen name: theſe, as ſone as thei beginne to be yongemen, ought to loke after gret things: & to preaſe vnto the ſame with dyrecte ſtudyes. Whiche they ſhall doe with ſo muche the better courage: becauſe the age is not onelye not enuied, but alſo fauored. The chiefe ſettinge forth thẽ for a yonge man to glorie is, if any prayſe may bee gotten by feates of armes, wherein many haue ſhowed themſelues, among oure auncetors, for warres were almoſt cõtinuallie

nuallie kepte. But your age chaunced vpon that warre, where the one syde hadde to muche mischiefe, the other, little good fortune. In which warre yet, when Pō-peius hadde made you Cap-taine of the one wing, bothe of a man moste noble, and of the armie, you gotte greate praise, wyth rydynge, wyth throwing the darte, and sus-teininge all thynges with a souldiourlike painefullnes. And verely that your praise, and the commō weale fel to-gither. But of me this trea-tise is not taken in hande touchinge you, but touching the hole generalitie. Wher-fore lette vs go forwarde to suche thynges as doo re-mayne.

As then in other matters, the worke of the mynde bee muche more, than of the bo-dy, so those thinges, whiche with wit, and reason wee go thorough, be of more grace, thā those, which we do wyth strength.

The first commendation then proceedeth of sober moode, the nexte, of naturall

bella gerebantur. Tua au-tem ætas incidit in id bellū, cuius altera pars sceleris nimium habuit, altera fe-licitatis parum. Quo ta-men in bello cum te Pompei-us alæ alteri præfecisset. magnam laudem & à sum-mo viro & ab exercitu con-sequebare equitando, iacu-lando, omnia quę militare la-borare tolerando. Atq; ea quidem tua laus pariter cū Rep. cecidit. Mihi autem hæc oratio suscepta non de te est, sed de genere toto. Quā-obrem ad ea, quæ restant, p-gamus.

Vt igitur in reliquis rebus multa maiora sunt opera animi quā corporis, sic hæ res quas persequimur ingenio ac ratione, gratiores sunt q̄ illæ, quas viribus. Prima igitur commēdatio proficis-citur à modestia, tū pietate

in parentes, tum in suos beneuolentia.

Facillime autem & in optimam partem cognoscuntur adolescentes, qui se ad claros & sapientes viros bene consulentes Reipub. contulerunt: quibus cum sint frequentes sunt, opinionem afferunt populo, eorum fore se similes quos sibi ipsi delegerunt ad imitandum. Publii Rutilii adolescentiam ad opinionem & innocentiæ & iuris scientiæ P. Mutii commendauit domus.

Nam L. quidem Crassus, cum esset admodum adolescens, non aliunde mutuatus est: sed sibi ipse peperit maximam laudem exilla accusatione nobili et gloriosa.

Ex qua ætate qui exercentur, laudibus affici solent vt Demosthenē accepimꝰ, ea ætate Lu. Crassus ostendit,

duetie toward parentes: the thirde of goodwill towarde theirs.

But to the best commendation, yongmen be knowen soonest of all: who haue bestowed themselues with nobis and wisemen, well counsellinge the commonwele: on whome yf they bee attendaunt, thei bringe the people in beliefe that they will proue like them, whome thei haue chosen themselues to followe. Publius Mutius house dyd set forth Publius Rutilius youthfulnesse, for opinion bothe of harmelesse life, and of knowledge in the lawe.

For as for Lucius Crassus, when he was a very yonge man, he borowed not from any other place, but wanne himselfe a very great prayse by that noble, and glorious accusation.

And in whiche age, they whoe haue exercises, are wonte to bee adaunced wyth praise as wee haue heard by Demosthenes: in the same age Lucius Crassus, dyd showe hymselfe in

in open courte, to do that very well, hauing forestudied, whiche euen then at home, with praise her mighte haue exercised.

But whereas there be twoo sortes of speache, whereof in the one is familiar talke, in the other vehemence, it is no doubte, but the vehemence of speache may do moste, and hathe the greater furderance to glorie.

For that is the thing, whiche we do call eloquence, but yet it is harde to tell, howe muche a gentlenes, and familiarnes of speche winneth mens mindes.

There be letters abroade of Philippus to Alexander, and of Antipater to Cassander, and of Antigonus to Philippus, three very wisemen (for so we haue heard) in whiche they giue rules, that with gentle speache they allure the heartes of the multitude, to owe their good will and that they please them, souldiours by speakinge to them with fayre wordes.

id se in sermone optimè iam præmeditatum facere: & etiam tum poterat domi cum laude meditari. Sed cum duplex ratio sit orationis, quarum in altera sit sermo, in altera contentio: non est id quidem dubium, quin contentio orationis plurimũ possit, & maiorem vim habeat ad gloriã. Ea est enim, quam eloquentiam dicimus. Sed tamẽ difficile dictu est, quanto opere conciliet animos hominum comitas, affabilitas quę sermonis. Extant Epistolæ & Philippi ad Alexandrũ & Antipatri ad Cassandrum, & Antigoni ad Philippũ filium, trium prudentissimorum (sic enim accepimus) quibus præcipiunt vt oratione benigna multitudinis animos ad beuolentiam alliciant: militesq; blando appellando sermone deliniant

Quæ autem in multitudine cum contentione habetur oratio, ea sæpe vniuersam excitat gloriam. Magna est enim admiratio copiosè, sapienterq; dicentis: què qui audiũt, intelligere etiã & sapere plꝰ quam cæteros arbitrãtur. Si vero inest in oratione mixta modestiæ grauitas: nil admirabilius fieri potest: eoque magis si ea sunt in adolescẽte. Sed cum sint plurima causarum genera, quæ eloquentiã desiderant: multiq; in nostra Repu. adolescentes, & apud iudices & apud Senatum dicẽdo laudem assecuti sunt: maxima est admiratio in iudicijs. Quorum ratio duplex est. Nam ex accusatione & defensione constat. quarum etsi laudabilior est defensio, tamen etiam accusatio probata persæpe est. Dixi paulò antè de Crasso.

Idem fecit adolescens.

But that oration, whiche is made amonge the multitude with vehemence, oftentimes rayseth an vniuersall glorie. For great is the wonderment at him, that plentifullye, and wyselye speaketh: whome the heartes do iudge also to vnderstande more, and to be wiser, than other. And if in the oration there be grauenes mingled with sober moode: nothinge there can be done more wounderful: and so muche the more, if those be in a yonge man. But whereas there be verie manny kyndes of causes, whiche do requyre eloquence and many pongmen in oure common weale, bothe before the iudges, and before the Senate, haue attented prayse by speakinge in matters: the greatest admiration is in iudicial causes, the nature wherof is in two parts. For it standeth in accusation, and defence: of whiche albeit defence is the more commendable, yet also accusation is oftentimes allowed, I spake of Crassus, a little before: the like did

Mar-

Marcus Antonius, beynge a yonge man: an accusation also brought Publius Sulpitius eloquence to lyghte: when into iudgement he called the seditious, and vnprofitable citizen, Caius Norbanus. But this southsie is not often to bee done, nor at anie time: onelesse eyther for the common weales cause: as did the twoo Lucilli or for protection sake: as we did for the Sicilias, and for the Sardines: Iulius Cesar, for Marcus Albutius did the like. Also, Lucius Fusius diligēce was knowē in the accusinge of Marcus Aquilius. Once then it maie be donne, not often certelie But in case a manne muste needes do it often: lette him ascribe thys office to the common weale: whose enemyes to reuenge often, is not to be reproued: yet lette there be a measure presente. For of a harde harted man or rather scace a manne it seemes, vpon many to bring the daunger of life: for that both is daungerous to himselfe, and also a shamefull blot te

Mar. Antonius. P. Sulpitij eloquentiam accusatio illustrauit: cum seditiosum & inutilem ciuem C. Norbanum in iudicium vocauit. Sed hoc quidem non est sæpe faciendum, nec vnquā, nisi aut Reipub. causa, vt duo Lucilli: aut patrocinio, vt nos pro Siculis, pro Sardis: pro M. Albutio Iulius Cæsar. In accusando etiam Aquilio L. Fusij cognita industria est.

Semel igitur, aut non sæpe certè. Sin erit cur faciendum sit sæpius. Reipub. tribuat hoc muneris, cuius inimicos vlcisci sæpe, non est reprehendendum: modus tamen adsit. Duri enim hominis, vel potius vix hominis videtur, periculum capitis inferre multis.

Idenim cum periculosum ipsi est, tum etiam sordidum

adſamam committere, vt ac cuſator nominetur. Quod contigit M. Bruto ſummo genere nato illius filio, qui iuris ciuilis inprimis peritus fuit. Atq; etiam hoc præceptũ officij diligenter tenendũ eſt, ne quem vnquam innocentem iudicium capitis arceſſas id enim ſine ſcelere fieri nullo pacto poteſt.

Namquid eſt tam inhumanum, quàm eloquentiam à natura ad ſalutem hominũ & ad conſeruationem datam, ad bonorum peſtem, perniciemque conuertere? Nec tamen vt hoc fugiendum eſt, ita habendum eſt religioni, nocentem aliquando, & nefarium, impiumq; defẽdere. Vult hoc multitudo, patitur conſuetudo: fert etiam humanitas. Iudicis eſt ſẽper in cauſis verũ ſequi: patroni

blotte in his name, to giue cauſe, that he be named a promotour.

Whiche chaunced to Marcus Brutus, borne of a noble ſtocke, his ſonne, whoe was verie well ſkylled in the ciuill lawe. And thereto this rule of duetie muſte bee diligẽtly kept, that ye bringe no innocent, at any time, in iudgemẽt vpon life, for that cannot in noe wiſe bee doone without hainous wickednelle.

For what is there ſo vnnaturall, as to turne eloquẽce, beinge giuen of nature for ỹ ſafegarde, and preſeruac on of menne, to the harme and diſtruction of good menne? And yet, as this is to bee eſchewed, ſo it is not to be counted contrarie to godlynelle, to defende the guiltie otherwhile, and miſcheuous and wicked.

This the multitud deſireth, cuſtome beareth, humanitie alſo worketh.

The iudges parte is, euermore in cauſes to folow the trouth, the counſelers parte

many

manie tymes to defende the trouth lyke, though it be not so true: whiche to write I would not be bolde, namelie seeinge I treate of Philosophie: but that the same lik d Panetius, the grauest of the Stoikes.

But moste of al, by defendinge, both glorie, and fauoure is gotten: and so muche the more, if euer it be fal, that he be defended, who both seeme to be beset, and pressed with the richesse of any man of power: as oure selfe did, both often at other times, and also being yonge, for Sextus Roscius the Amerine, against the might of Lucio Sylla, bearing swai: whiche oration (as ye wote) is abroade.

But nowe we haue sette forth yongmennes duelies, whiche auaile to the attayning of glorie: hereafter wee maie speake of bountifulnes, and liberalitie.

Whereof two maner waies there be.

For liberall dealinge is showed to suche, as neede, either by trauaile, or with money,

Tuyes

nonnunquam verisimile, etiamsi minus sit verum, defendere. Quod scribere (præsertim cum de philosophia scriberem) non auderem, nisi hidem placeret grauissimo Stoicorum Panatio. Maxime autem & gloria paritur, et gratia defensionibus: eoq; maior si quando accidit, vt ei subueniatur, qui potentis alicuius opibus circumueniri vrgeriq; videatur: ut nos, et sepe alias, & adolescentes contra L Syllæ dominantis opes pro Sexto Roscio Amerino fecimus: quæ (ut scis) extat oratio. Sed expositis adolescentum officiis, quæ valeant ad gloriam adipiscendam, deinceps de beneficentia, ac liberalitate dicendum est, cuius est ratio duplex. Nam aut opera benigne fit indigentibus, aut pecunia

Facilior est hæc posterior, locupleti præsertim : sed illa lautior ac splendidior, & viro forti, claroque dignior. Quanq; enim in vtroq; inest gratificandi liberalis voluntas, tamen altera ex arca, altera ex virtute depromitur. Largitioq;, quæ fit ex re familiari, fontem ipsum benignitatis exhaurit. Ita benignitate benignitas tollitur: qua quo in plures vsus sis, eo minus in multos vti possis. At qui opera, id est virtute & industria benefici & liberales erunt : primum quò pluribus profuerint, eo plures ad benigne faciendum adiutores habebunt, deinde consuetudine beneficētiæ paratiores erunt, & tanquā excitatiores ad bene de multis promerendum. Præclare in epistola quadam Alexādrum filiū Philippꝰ accusat

Thys latter is the easyer, specially to the possessioner but that other is the goodlier, and more glorious, and meeter for a manye, and a noble manne. For thoughe ther is a liberal will of pleasuringe in bothe, yet the one oute of the cofer, the other out of vertue is taken, and the lauishing which is made of a mannes house goodes drayweth drye the very fountayne of liberalitie, so liberalitie is by liberalitie wasted, and toward the mo that you do vse it, the lesse ye can bee able to vse it towarde manie.

But who so shall be bountifull, and liberall of trauayle (that is) of vertue and diligence, first the mo thei haue profited, the moe furderers thei shall haue towarde dealinge liberalitie, afterwarde by customable vsing of bouteousnesse, the readyer they shall bee, and (as it were) the more practised to deserue wel of many.

Princelie dothe Philippus, in a certaine epistle, accuse Alexander hys Sonne, that,

that by lauishnesse, hee hunteth after the good wil of the Macedonians.

What reason, in a mischiefe, quoth he, hath brought you into this hope: that ye shoulde think, those would be to you faithfull, whome you hadde corrupted with money.

Why: goe ye aboute thys, that the Macedonians maye thinke you not their kinge, but their seruant and briber: Well, he saide, seruant, and briber, because it is vile for a kinge. Better also he sayde, in that hee called large gyuinge corruption. For he, that receiueth is made the worse thereby, and the readier alwayes to looke for the lyke. This saide hee to his sonne, but let vs thynke it giuen in precepte to vs all. Wherefore this certainlie is no doubte, but the same liberalitie, whiche standeth in trauaile, and diligence, both is honester, and also spreadeth farder, and is able to profite mo.

Oftentimes yet a manne muste giue largely, and thys kid of liberalitie is not to be vtter

quod largitione beneuolētiā Macedonum consectetur.

Quæ te malum, inquit, ratio in istam spem induxit: vt eos tibi fideles putares fore, quos pecunia corrupisses? An tu id agis, vt Macedones non te regem suum, sed ministrum & præbitorem putent. Quo quid sordidius regi? melius etiam, quod largitionem corruptelam dixit esse? Fit enim deterior qui accipit, atq; ad id idem semper expectandum paratior. Hoc ille filio: sed præceptum putemus omnibus.

Quamobrem id quidem non est dubium, quin illa benignitas, quæ constat ex opera & industria, & honestior sit, & latius pateat, & possit prodesse pluribus.

Nonnunquam tamen est largiendum: nec hoc benignitatis genus omnino

repudiandũ est: & sæpe idoneis hominibus indigentib⁹ de re familiari impertiẽdũ: sed diligẽter, atq; moderatè. Multi. n. patrimonia effuderũt incensultè largiendo. Quid autem est stultius, q̃ libenter facias curare, vt id diutius facere non possis? Atq; etiam sequuntur largitionem rapinæ. Cum enim dando egere cœperint, alienis bonis manus afferre coguntur. Ita cum benevolentiæ comparanda causa benefici esse velint: non tanta studia assequũtur eorum, quibus dederunt, quanta odia eorum, quibus ademerunt. Quamobrem nec ita claudenda est res familiaris, vt cam benignitas aperire non possit: nec ita reseranda, vt pateat omnib⁹. Mod⁹ adhibeatur, isq; referatur ad facultates. Omnino meminisse de-

vtterly caste of: and we must manuye tymes gyue parte of our substance to meete men, that haue neede: but wee muste doe it heedfully, and measurable.

For diuers haue spoilde out their liuelod, by lauyshinge it vnadutiedly. But what is foolyshes, than to cause, that you cannot no lengerdo the thinge, whiche ye loue to doo: And also spoyle foloweth of lauishynes.

For when by giuinge they begin to be needie: they bee driuen to lay hande on other mennes goods: so when thei woulde bee beneficiall for cause of good will gettinge thei purchase not so greate loue of theyrs, to whom they gaue: as of them they gette hatered, from whome they tooke.

Wherefore neither a mans substance is so to bee shutte vp, that liberalitie canne not open it, nor so to bee vnlocked, that it lye abroade for euery bodye. A measure is to be kept, and let it be referred to abilitie. In anye wise wee muste remembet that:

whiche

whiche with our men is very ofte in vſage, and nowe is come into the cuſtome of a prouerbe, that lauiſhneſſe findes no bottome.

For what ſtate can there be: when bothe thei, who are wonte to it, and other doo deſire one thing: In al there be two ſorts of large geuers of whiche the one bee called fooliarge, the other liberall.

Fooliarge we call them who with open feaſtes, and fleſhgifts, and fenſeſhowes, and furniture of ſights, and huntinges, power out their mony on thoſe things, whereof they ſhall leaue a memorie eyther ſhorte, or none at all.

But liberall thei be named, who with their riches bothe raunſome men take by prayſeekers, or for their friends ſakes, doo becomme ſuertie for debte, or doo ayde them, in their daughters preferment of mariage, or els do helpe them eyther in gettinge or increaſinge their goodes.

And therfore I maruaile, what

bemus id, quà noſtris hominibus ſæpiſſime vſurpatum, iamq; in prouerbij conſuetudinem venit: LARGITIONEM FVNDVM NON HABERE. Etenim quis poteſt eſſe modus, cũ idem & qui conſueuerunt, & idẽ illud alij deſiderent? Omnino duo ſunt genera largorum, quorũ alteri prodigi, alteri liberales. Prodigi qui epulis et viſeratiombus, et gladiatorũ muneribꝰ, ludorũ venationumq; apparatu pecunias profundunt in eas res, quarũ memoriã, aut breuẽ, aut nullam omnino ſint relicturi. Liberales autẽ, qui ſuis facultatibus, aut captos à prædonibus redimunt, aut æs alienum ſuſcipiunt amicorum cauſa, aut in filiarum collocatione adiuuant, aut opitulantur, vel re in q̃rẽda vel augenda. Itaq́ mirar

quid in mentem venerit Theophrasto in eo libro, quē de diuitijs scripsit: in quo multa præclarè, illud absurdè. Est enim mult⁹ in laudanda magnificentia & apparatione popularium munerum: aliumq; sumptuum facultatem, fructum diuitiarum putat. Mihi autē ille fructus liberalitatis, cuius exempla pauca posui, multo & maior videtur, et certior. Quāto Aristoteles grauiꝰ & veriꝰ non reprehēdit: qui has effusiones pecuniarū non admouemur, quæ fiunt ad multitudinē delenicndā: at si qui ab hostibus obsidentur si emere aquæ sextariū mina cogerentur, hoc primo audito incredibile nobis videri, omnesq; mirari. sed cū attenderint, veniam necessitati: dari: in his immanibus iacturis, infinitisq; sumptibus, nihil nos magnopere mirari

what came in Theophrastꝰ minde, in that booke, whiche he wrote of riches: wherein hee spake many thinges notably but this out of course. For he is muche in praising great sumptuousnesse, and furnishment of people pleasinge showes: and he demeth the ableneſſe of such charges to be the fruite of riches. But me thinketh that fruite of liberalitie, whereof I haue put a fewe examples, is bothe greater, and more certaine. Howe muche more granely, and truely dothe Aristotle reprone vs: who are not in a wondermente at these lasshynges oute of money, whiche be done to clawe the multitude: but in case they, who are besieged of enemies, shoulde be dryuen to by a quarte of water for tenne crownes: that thys at firste hearinge, seemeth to vs vncredible, and all make a maruaile at it: but whē we haue giuē good heede thereto, we holde with necessitie: yet we make no greate maruaile at theſe exceding losses

and

and endleſſe charges, when ſpecially neither neceſſitie is refuſed, nor worſhippe encreaſed, and that ſelfe ſame clawynge of the multitude ſhall endure for a ſhort, & a ſmall whyle, yea and that, with euerye of ỹ lightest mindes, and yet in the verye ſame, euen together with the fulneſſe, the remembraunce alſo of the pleaſure dieth. It is alſo well gathered, that theſe ſhowes bee well lyked of childrẽ, & women, & ſlaues, and freemen moſt like vnto ſlaues, but that no wayes they cã be allowed of a ſage man, and one, that with a grounded iudgement weyeth thoſe thinges, that bee done.

Neuertheleſſe I perceiue in our citie, it hath growen into vſe, nowe in this good world: that the gay ſhowes of the Ediles office is loked for, euen of the beſt menne. Therfore Publius Craſſus bothe by ſurname ryche, and alſo in ſubſtaunce, kept his Edile office maruelous ſumptuouſly. And ſoone after

cum præſertim neq; neceſſitati ſubueniatur, neq; dignitas augeatur: ipſaq; illa delenitio multitudinis ad breue, exiguumq; duratura ſit tempus: caq; à leuiſſimo quoq; animo, in quo tamen ipſo vnà cum ſatietate memoria quoque moriatur voluptatis. Bene etiam colligitur, hæc pueris, & mulierculis, & ſeruis, & ſeruorum ſimillimis liberis eſſe grata, graui vero homini, & ea quæ fiũt iudicio certo põderanti probari poſſe nullo modo. Quãquam intelligo in noſtra ciuitate inueteraſſe iam bonis temporibus, vt ſplendor ædilitatum ab optimis viris poſtuletur. Itaque P. Craſſus cum cognomine diues, tum etiam copijs, functus eſt ædilitio maximo munere. Et paulo

post L. Crassus cum omnium hominum moderatissimo, Quinto Mutio magnificentissima ædilitate fuctus est. Deinde. C. Claudi⁹ appij fili⁹, multi post vt: Lucullus, Hortensius, Syllanus. Omnes autem P. Lentulus me cõsule vicit superiores. Hunc est Scaurus imitatus. Magnificentissima vero nostri Pompeij munera secundo consulatu, in quibus omnib⁹, quid mihi placeat, vides. Vitanda tamen est suspicio auaritiæ. Nã Mamerco homini ditissimo prætermissio, ædilitatis consulatus repulsam attulit. Quæ etsi postulatur à populo, bonis viris sinon desiderantibus, attamen approbantibus, faciendũ est: modò pro facultatibus, nos ipsi vt fecimus. Etsi quando aliqua res maior, aut vtilior populari largitione acquiritur:

after Lucius Crassus, with Quintus Mutius, the greatest meanekeper of all men, kept the tyme of their Edile office most royallye. Then came Caius Claudius, Appius sonne. Afterward succeded many, as Lucullius, Hortẽsius, Sillanus. But Publius Lentulus, when I was Consull, passed all hys predecessours. Scaurus followed him. But our Pompeius showes, in his second Consulshippe, wer the costlier of all, in euerye deale wherof, you see what liketh me. We must yet auoide suspicion of couetousnesse. For the refusall of the Edileshippe brought too Mamercus, a verie riche man, a fall for the Consulshippe. Wherfore the thing is too be donz, both if it bee called for of the people, & good men, though they do not require it, do yet allowe it, so it bee accozding too ones abilitie, as wee our selfe haue done: and also, if any greater, and moze profitable thynge is wonne at anye tyme, by people pleasynge largesse, as

as of late, a greate honour to Oreſtes were the dinings in open wayes, in name of his tenthes. No nor it was not counted a reproche too Marcus Scius: that in a derth of corne, hee gaue to the people for foure pence a buſhell. For from a great, & a long feſtred enuie he deliuered him ſelfe, neither by a diſhoneſt loſſe, ſeing he was Edile, nor yet very great.

But alate, it was paſſinge hie honour to our Milo: becauſe for the cõmon weales ſake, whiche in our ſafetie conſiſteth, with hired fencemen hee ſuppreſſed all Publius Clodius attemps, and rages. There is therefore cauſe of largeſſe, if either it be neceſſarie, or profitable. And yet in theſe ſame, the rule of meankepinge is beſt. Certeſſe Lucius Philippus Quintus ſonne, a manne of greate witte, and moſte famous, was wont too glorie that hee, without anye gyfte geuyng, had atteined al maner dignities, whiche were counted moſt honorable. The like ſaide Cotta Curio.

vt Oreſti nuper prandia in ſemitis decumæ nomine magno honori fuerunt. Nec mar co quidē Scio vitio datū eſt, quod in caritate annonæ aſſe modiū populo dedit. Magna enim ſe & inueterata inuidia, nec turpi iactura, quādo erat ædilis, nec maxima liberauit. Sed honori ſummo nuper noſtro Miloni fuit, quod gladiatoribus emptis Reipub. cauſa, quæ ſalute noſtra continebatur, omnes P. Clodij conatus furoreſq; compreſſit. Cauſa igitur largitionis eſt, ſi aut neceſſe eſt aut vtile. In his autē ipſis mediocritatis regula optima eſt L. Quidem Philippus Q. Fabij filiꝰ magno vir ingenio, inprimiſq; clarus gloriari ſolebat: ſe ſine vllo munere adeptum eſſe omnia, quæ haberentur ampliſſima. Dicebat idem Cotta Curia.

Nobis quoq; licet in hoc quo-dãmodo gloriari. Nã pro amplitudine honorũ, quos cũctis ſuffragijs adepti ſumus, noſtro quidẽ anno (quod cõtigit eorũ nemini, quos modò nominaui) ſanè exiguus ſũptus ædilitatis fuit. Atq; etiã illæ impenſæ meliores ſunt, muri, naualia, portus, aquarũ ductus, omniaq; quæ ad vſũ Reipub. pertinẽt. Q uãquam quod præſẽs tanquam in manu datur iucundius eſt: tamẽ hæc in poſterũ gratiora, theatra, porticus: noua tẽpla verecundius reprehẽdo propter Pompeiũ: ſed doctiſſimi nõ probant, vt et hæc ipſe Panætius, quẽ multũ in his libris ſecutus ſum, non interpretatus: & phalereus Demetrius, qui Periclem principẽ Græciæ vituperat, quod tantam pecuniã in præclara illa propilæa cõiecerit.

Wee alſo in this may g'oꝛde, after a certaine ſoꝛte. ¶ oꝛ doutleſſe ſmall was the coſt of our Edileſhip: in reſpecte of ſuche large honours, as by all mennes voices we atteyned, euen in our yere: which hath befalne too none of them, whom I named erewhile. And alſo theſe expenſes be better, whiche are beſtowed vpon citie walles ſhippedockes, hauens, conduties, and all, that appertaine to the vſe of the common weale. Although that is moꝛe pleaſaunt, whiche pꝛeſẽtly is giuen (as yt were) in hand, yet foꝛ time to come theſe be moꝛe acceptable. Sightcourtes, galerywalkes, and new churches, the moꝛe reuerently I fynde fault with, foꝛ Pompeyus ſake, but the beſt lerned men do not alow thẽ: as both this ſame Panetius, whõ I haue folowed muche in theſe bookes, & yet not trãſlated him, & alſo Phalereus Demetrius, who dyſpꝛaiſed Pericles, ỹ pꝛince of Greece, becauſe he laied ſo much money vpõ thoſe goodly poꝛches.

But

But of this kinde vniuer-
sally, it is diligently disput-
ed, in those bookes, which I
wrote of a common weale.
The holle maner then of
suche largesse generalitye is
faultie, yet for certein tymes
it is necessarie, and then the
same is bothe too bee refer-
red too ones abilitie, and too
bee tempered with a mean-
kepting.

But in that other kynde
of large giuing, whiche pro-
ceedes of liberalitie, not all
alike in causes vnlike, wee
ought to be disposed. Other
wise is his case, who is
pressed with miserie, and o-
therwise his, who seeketh
more welth, hauinge no ad-
uersitie. Toward the mise-
rable, liberalitie ought too
bee forwarded, excepte per-
auenture they shall bee wor-
thie of miserie. wee ought
yet in no wise too be altogy-
ther pynchinge towarde
those, who woulde haue
them selues too bee holpen,
not that they maye feele no
affliction, but that they
maye ryse too hyer degree:
neuertheleſſe in choosynge

Sed de hoc genere toto in his libris quos de Rep. scripsi, ai ligẽter est disputatum. Tota igitur ratio talium largitionum genere vitiosa est, temporibus necessaria: et tamen ipsa et ad facultates accõmodanda, & mediocritate moderanda est. In illo autem altero genere largiẽdi, quod à liberalitate proficiscitur, non vno modo in disparibus causis affecti esse debemus. Alia causa est eius, qui calamitate premitur, & eius qui res meliores quærit, nullis suis rebus aduersis. Propensior benignitas esse debebit in calamitosos: nisi forte erunt digni calamitate. In ijs tamen, qui se adiuuari volent, non solum vt ne affligantur, sed etiã vt altiorem gradum ascendant, restricti omnino nullo modo esse debemus: sed in deligendis

idoneis iudicium, & diligentiã adhibere. Nam præclare Ennius.

BENEFACTA MALE LOCATA, MALEFACTA ARBITROR. Quod autem tributum est bono viro & grato, in eo cum ex ipso fructus est, tum etiam ex ceteris. Temeritate enim remota, gratissima est liberalitas, eoque eam studiosius pleriq; laudant, quòd summi cuiusq; bonitas commune profugium est omnium. Danda igitur opera est, vt hos beneficijs quamplurimis afficiamus, quorum memoria liberis, posterisq; prodatur, vt his ingratis esse non liceat. Omnes enim immemorem beneficij oderunt. eamq; iniuriam in deterenda liberalitate sibi etiã fieri: eumq; qui faciat,

out meete men, wee ought too vse a discretion, and a diligence. For notably sayth Ennius.

Good deedes, in case they
bee euyll placed,
Euyll deedes I counte,
and clene disgraced.

But what so is geuen too a good man, and a thankefull: therby bothe there commes frute from him, and also frõ other. For so rashenesse bee auoyded, liberalitie is very pleasurefull, & so much the more earnestly most men praise it, bicause euery great mans goodnesse is the common refuge of all. Our endeuour therefore is too bee done, that wee rewarde them with verye many benefites, to whose childrẽ, & offspringe a memory may bee lefte, so that of good right they can not bee vnthankefull. For al men doo hate the forgetter of a good turne, & doe deme that wronge euen too theym selues too bee done, in frayenge away ones liberalitie, and they take him, who causeth it, too bee a common

enemie

enemie of the poore. And this liberalitie also is profitable to the commō weale, too haue prisoners redemed out of captiuitie, and the poore enryched.

Whiche wee see written at large in the oratiō of Crassus, that it was wont to bee done abrode by vs of the Equestriall order. I place therfore this vsage of liberalitie before lauishnesse in shows. This is for graue men, and great, that other, (as it were) for flatterers of the people, tickeling, as ye would say, the lightnesse of the multitude with pleasure. But it is meete for a man, both to be liberall in geuing, and nothing eyger in requiring, and also in euery matter of bargainynge sellynge, byeng, hyring, letting, neybwellynges, and partye bounden, to be iust and gentle, and to remitte muche of his due too manye, but from trauers in lawe too restrayne as muche, as hee may, and I wotte not, whether somewhat more also, than he may.

cōmunem hostem tenuiorum putant. Atq; hæc benignitas etiam Reipub. vtilis est redimi è seruitute captos, locupletari tenuiores: quod quidē vulgo solitum fieri ab ordine nostro in oratione Crassi scriptum copiose videmus. Hanc ergo consuetudinē benignitatis largitioni munerum longè antepono. Hæc est grauiū hominū, atq; magnorum: illa quasi assentatorum populi, multitudinis leuitatem voluptate quasi titillātium. Conuenit autē tum in dando munificum esse, tū in exigendo non acerbū. In omniq; re cōtrahenda vēdendo, emēdo, conducendo, locando, in vicinitatibus & confinijs æquū & facilem multa multis de iure suo cedentem: à litibus vero quātum liceat (et nescio an paulo plus etiam quàm liceat) abhorrentem

Est enim non modo liberale, paulũ nõnunquã de suo iure decedere: sed interdũ etiã fructuosũ. Habẽda autẽ est ratio rei familiaris: quã quidẽ de labi sinere flagitiosũ est: sed ita, vt illiberalitatis, auaritiæq; absit suspicio. Posse enĩ liberalitate vti, nõ spoliantẽ se patrimonio, nimirũ est pecuniæ fructus maxim⁹. Re-

Electiã à Theophrasto est laudata hospitalitas. Est enim (vt mihi quidẽ videtur) val de decorũ, patere domos hominũ illustrium illustribus hospitibus. Idq; etiã Reipu. est ornamẽto: homines externos hoc liberalitatis genere in vrbe nostra non egere. Est etiam vehementer vtile iis, qui honestẽ multũ posse volũt per hospites apud externos populos valere opibus & gratia. Theophrastus scribit quidẽ Cimonẽ Athenis etiã in suos ciuiales Laciadas

For it is not onely a liberall point, to forgo sometime of his right other while, but sometime also profitable. But regarde of a mannes welth must bee hadde, which verely to suffer too decay, is a foule fau't, but so, as suspicion of niggardlines, and couetousnes, bee auoyded. For no dout it is the greatest frute of money: that a man bee able to vse liberalytie, not making spoile of hys liuelhod. wel also, is hospitalitie praised of Theophrastus. For it is (as me thynketh) verye seemely, noble mannes howses too bee open for noble gestes. And that also is an honor to the state: that outlandishe men in our citie do not want this kynde of liberalitie. It is also exceedyng profitable too them, who honestly desire too bee able to do muche, to preuaile in power, & fauour, by their geastes, among forein nacyons. Theophrastus in deede writeth, that Cimon at Athenes also was a good housekeeper, for the Laciadans of hys warde.

Wicause

Wicause he toke order so, & commaunded hys baylyes: all thinges should be offered too whatsoeuer Laciadan turned into his manour. But these benefites, whiche bee bestowed by trauaile, & not by large giftes, are employed both vpon the holle common weale, and vppon euery citizen a part, For in lawe to giue aduise, wyth counsell to helpe, and to furder verye manye with thys kinde of science, it auaileth very muche, both too the encrease of riches, and also too fauour. Therefore as ther were many worthy thynges of our aunceters, so alwaies in gret prise was the knowledge, & the openinge of the ryght well ordeyned ciuill lawe, which trulye, before this turmoile of times, rulers receyued in the due estimacion, now as honour, and as euerye degre of worshippe, so the glorye of thys science is blotted out. And that is so muche the shamefuller, bycause this happened at that time: when hee reigned, who in knowledge clerely

hoſpitalē fuiſſe. Ita enim inſtituiſſe, & villicis imperauiſſe, vt omnia præberentur, quicunq; Laciades in villam ſuā diuertiſſet. Quæ autem opera, nō largitione, beneficia dātur: hæc tū in vniuerſā Rēpub. tū in ſingulos ciues cōferūtur. Nā in iure cauere, cōſilio iuuare, atq; hoc ſcientiæ genere prodeſſe quàm plurimis, vehementer et ad opes auoēdas pertinet, & ad gratiā. Itaq; cū multa præclara maiorū, tū quàm optimè cōſtituti iuris ciuilis ſūmo ſēper in honore fuit cognitio, atq; interpretatio: quā quidē ante hāc confuſionē tēporum in poſſeſſione ſua principes retinuerūt. Nūc vt honores, vt omnes dignitatis gradus, ſic huius ſciētia ſplēdor delet⁹ eſt. Idq; eò indigni⁹ quòd eo tēpore hoc contigit, cum is eſſet, qui omnes ſuperiores,

quibus honore par esset, scientia facile vicisset. Hæc igitur opera grata multis, et ad beneficys obstringendos homines accommodata. Atque huic arti finitima est dicendi grauior facultas, & gratior, et ornatior. Quid enim eloquentia laudabilius, & præstabilius, vel admiratione audientium, vel spe indigentium, vel eorum, qui defensi sunt, gratia? Huic quoq; ergo à maioribus nostris est in tota dignitate principatus datus, diserti igitur hominis & facile laborantis quodq; in patrijs est moribus multorum causas & nõ graviatè, et gratuitò defẽdentis, beneficia & patrocinia latè patent. Admonebat ne res, vt hoc quoq; loco intermissionem eloquentiæ, ne dicam interitum, deplorarem: nisi vererer ne de meipso aliquid

clerelye exceded all his foregoers, to whom hee had ben pere in honour. This trauaile therfore is pleasurefull too many, and verye fitte, to binde men with benefites.

And the grauer, and gracefuller, and trimmer feate of oratorie is nere cosin to thys science.

For what is more praysworthy, and better thã eloquence: either for the admyration of the heares, or the hope of the needers, or for their cause, who haue ben defended. Therfore to thys likewise a preeminence in al honour was geuen of our eiders. The benefites then and the pledinge of a fynespoken man, and gladly taking paynes, and (as it is in his contrie fashion) both not vnwillingly, and also freely defending many mens causes, bee farre spredde abrode.

The matter hath put me in minde, that in this place also I should bewaile the dyscontinuance, I wyll not say the destruction of eloquẽce: but that I feared, leste touchinge

thing my selfe somewhate I shoulde seeme to complaine. Notwithstanding wee see what notable orators haue been put out of the waye: & how in a fewe a hope, in fewer a skill, in many a boldnesse ther remaines. But seing neither all, nor yet many can bee either conning in the lawe, or well spoken men, one yet with his trauaill may furder many, that seeweth for their commodyties, that speaketh in theire fauour too the iudges, and magistrates: that stepethe not out an others cause: that entreateth those same who either be counselers, or defenders, which who so doo, they atteine very muche fauour, and their painfulnesse floweth all abrode.

Now they ar not to be admonished of this (for it is well knowen) that they take heede: when they wyll helpe other, that they offend none. For oftentymes either they hurte thē, whō they shoulde not: or thē, whō it is not behoueable, if vnwarely they doo it, of negligence it is: if

viderer queri. Sed tamē vide m⁹ quib⁹ extinctis oratorib⁹ quàm in paucis spes, quanto in paucioribus facultas, quàm in multis sit audacia. Cum autem omnes non possint, ne multi quidem, aut ineris periti esse, aut diserti: licet tamen opera prodesse multis, beneficia petentem, commendantem iudicibus, aut magistratibus: vigilantè prouehere alterius, cosq; ipsos, qui aut consulunt, aut defendūt rogantem, quod qui faciunt, plurimum gratiæ consequūtur, latissimeq; eorum manat industria. Iam illud non sit admonendi (est enim in promptu) vt animaduertant, cum iuuare alios velint, ne quos offendant. Sæpe enim, aut eos lædunt, quos nō debēt: aut eos quos nō expedit si imprudētes, negligētiæ est:

si scientes, temeritatis. Vtendum enim est excusatione aduersus eos, quos inuitus offendas quacũq; possis, quare id quod feceris necesse fuerit nec aliter facere potueris, certisq; operis officijs erit id quod violatum est compensandum. Sed in hominibus iuuandis, aut mores spectari, aut fortuna soleat: dictu quidem est proclive: Itaque vulgo loquuntur, sese in beneficijs collocandis mores hominum, non fortunam sequi: honesta oratio est.

Sed quis est tandem, qui improbis & optimi veri causa, non anteponat in opera danda gratiam fortunati & potentis? A quo enim expeditior & celerior remuneratio fore videtur, in eum fere est voluntas nostra propensior. Sed animaduertendum est diligentius,

if wittingly, of rashenesse it comes you must vse also to them, whom you offende against your will, suche an excuse, as ye may: for what cause the same, that you haue done was necessarie, and you could not doo otherwise: and that which was done offensiuely, shalbe recompensed with other trauailes, and frendly doinges.

But wheras, in helpinge men, either their condicions ar wont to be considered, or their estate, in deede it is soone sayde, and so they doo commonly speake, that in bestowinge their benefites, they regarde mens maners, and not their estate. An honest saying it is, but who is ther at al, whiche in bestowynge his trauaile, doth not preferre the fauor of a riche man, and one of power, before the poore, and a right good mans cause? For from whom, wee thinke, a speedier, and redier recompence wyll come, too hymwarde commonly our good wyll is the more enclyned. But wee must marke more diligently, what

what is ỹ nature of thinges. For verely though the poore manne can not render due thankes: yet if he bee a good man, owe them forsoo he bee may. This surely was in place, whosoeuer sayde it: Money who haueth in hād: hath not payde, & who hathe payde, haueth in minde, but thankes bothe who hath payde, haueth in minde, and who haueth in mynde, hath rendered. But these, who count them selues riche, honorable, and wealfull, wyll not bee once bounde too a man for a pleasure, but they thinke rather, that they haue done a pleasure, when, yea althoughe they haue taken some great thinge, they suspect somwhat lykewise of them eyther to be craued, or loked for: but they recken it euen like a death: that they shoulde seeme too haue vsed ones furderance, or shoulde be called hāgers on. But ỹ other poore man, thinkinge him selfe regarded, and not his state, when any thinge is done vnto him, desires, that he may be thought thankfull not

quæ natura rerum sit. Nimium enim inops ille, si bonus est vir, etiam si referre gratiam non potest: quia benevolus habere certe potest. Commodè autem quicunq; dixit pecuniam qui habeat, non reddidisse: & qui reddiderit, non habere. Gratiam autem & qui retulerit habere, & qui habeat retulisse. At qui se locupletes, honoratos, beatos putant, hinc obligari quidem beneficio volunt: quin etiam beneficium se dedisse arbitrantur, cum ipsi quamuis aliquid magnū acceperint, atq; etiam a se aut postulari, aut expectari aliquid suspicantur. Patrocinio vero se vsos, aut clientes appellari, mortis instar putant. At vero ille tenuis cum quicquid factum sit, sese spectatum, non fortunam putat: non modo

illi, qui eſt meritus, ſed etiã illis, à quibus expectat (eget enim multis) gratũ ſe videri ſtudet. Neq; vero verbis auget ſuũ munꝰ, ſi quo forte ſu-gitur: ſed etiã extenuat, videndũq; illud idẽ, quòd ſi opus ſit, fortunatũq; defendere. in vno illo aut forte in liberis eius manet gratia. Sunt autẽ inopẽ, probũ tamen & modeſtũ, omnes non improbi humiles (quæ magna in populo multitudo eſt) præſidiũ ſibi paratũ vidẽt. Quamobrẽ melius apud bonos, quã apud fortunatos beneficium collocari puto. Danda tamen omni[illegible]peram eſt, vt omni generi ſatisfaccre poſſimus. Sed ſi res in contentionẽ veniet, nimirũ Themiſtocles eſt author adhibendus: qui cum conſuleretur vtrum bono viro pauperi, aut minꝰ probato diuiti filiam collocaret:

onely too him, who haue deſerued it, but alſo to thẽ (for he ſtãdes in neede of manye) of whõ he looketh for ought. For yet with wordes hee ſettes out his ſeruice, if perhappes hee doo any, but alſo abaceth it. And thiſſame point is to be cõſidered, that if you defende a riche, and a welthie man, the thanke remaines in him alone, or perchaunce in his children, but if you doo it for him, that is poore, and yet honeſt, & diſcrete: all the meane degree, being not diſhoneſt, (whiche is a great multitude amonge the people) doe ſee ſuccour prepared for them. Wherfore I thinke a benefite better to be beſtowed vpõ good men, than vppon riche. Yet alwayes wee muſte geue our endeuour, that wee may content al maner of men, but if the matter ſhall come into comparison, verely Themiſtocles is to be taken for an author. who, when he was aſked counſell, whether one ſhould beſtowe his daughter vpõ a good poore man, or a riche manne not ſo honeſt.

I (quod he) doo rather lyke a man, who lacketh moneye, than money which wanteth a man.

But maners bee corrupted, & marred, by ouerregarding riches. What doth the greate store therof pertein to euery one of vs? Peraduenture it helpeth him, that hath it: & that was not alwayes. But graunt, it helpes, in dede hee may bee the mightier, but which way maye he bee the honester manne? And if the riche man be also a good mā: lette not hys riches hynder him, & cause him to finde the less helpe, so they furder him not: and lette a mans hole iudgement be, not how rich, but what maner man eche one is. And in bestowing benefites, & trauaill, the last lesson is, that you labour nothing against equitie, and nothinge with wrong.

For iustice is the ground of a continuall cōmendacion, & fame, without whiche, nothing can bee praisable.

But seeing we haue spokē of such kind of benefites, as belong to eche seuerall man: here-

ego vero, inquit, malo virū, qui pecunia egeat, quàm pecuniā, quæ viro. Sed corrupti mores, deprauatiq; sunt admiratione diuitiarū: quarū magnitudo quid ad vnumquēq; nostrū pertinet: illum fortasse adiuuat, qui habet: ne id quidē sēper. Sed faciunaec, potētior sanè sit, honestior vero quomodo? Quòd si ctiā bonus erit vir: ne impediant diuitiæ, quo minus iuuetur, modò ne adiuuent, sitq; omne iudiciū non quàm locuples, sed qualis quisq; sit. Extremum autē præceptū in beneficijs operaq; danda est, ne quid contra æqui[illegible]tendas, ne quid pro iniuria. Fundamentū enim perpetuæ cōmendationis & famæ est iustitia, sine qua nihil potest esse laudabile, sed quoniā de eo genere beneficiorū dictū est, q; ad singulos spectāt,

deinceps de iis, quæ ad vniuersos, quæq; ad Remp. pertinent disputandum est. Eorum autem ipsorum partim eiusmodi sunt, vt ad vniuersos eius pertineant, partim singulos vt attingant, quæ sunt etiam gratiora. Danda est opera omnino, si possit vtrisq;, nec minus vt etiam singulis consulatur: sed ita vt cares aut prosit, aut certe ne obsit Reipub. C. Helij, & T. Gracchi frumentaria magna largitio fuit, exhauriebat igitur æra rium, modica M. octauij, & Reip. tolerabilis, & plebi necessaria: ergo & ciuibus & Reip. salutaris. In primis autem videndum erit ei, qui Remp. administrabit: vt suum quisq; teneat: neq; de bonis priuatorum publicè diminutio fiat. Pernitiose enim Philippus in tribunatu,

hereafter we muſt treate of thoſe which pertaine too all men, & too a common weale. And ſome of thoſe ſame bee of ſuch ſorte, that they perteine too the hole nomber of citizens, ſome that they concerne euery ſere man, which be alſo more fauourfull. A diligence doutleſſe ther muſt be geuen, if it may, that it be prouided for both, & no leſſe alſo, for euery one, but ſo, as the thinge either may furder or at leſt not hinder the commō weale. Caius Gracchus corne dole was gret, hee waſted therefore the treaſurie: Marcus Octauius made ſuche a one, as was meaſurable, and as the common weale might beare, and neceſſarie for the people, and therfore wealfull both to the citizens, & alſo too the ſtate. But ſpecially it muſte bee ſeene to of him, who ſhal gouerne the cōmon wele, that euery man keepe his owne: and that ther bee no impayring of priuate mens goods for common charges. For Philippus did dangerouſly in his Tribuneſhippe,

when

when he made the lawe concerninge landes, whiche yet hee soone suffered to bee repealed, and therein maruaillously he shewed himselfe a sober manne, but as hee dyd euill, in settinge forth many thinges people pleasinglye: so this he spake euill, that ther wer not in the citie two thowsande men, who hadde ame substance.

It is surely a mischeuous sayinge, and sounding to the making of goodes common, and what greater pestilence can there be, than that? For commonwealthes, and countries are ordeined to this ende specially, that men may kepe their owne.

For although menne assemble together, nature beynge guide, yet they soughte the defences of cities, for hope of safekeepinge of theyr goodes.

There muste also good heede be geuen, that (as often it happened amonge our auncetors) for the poorenes of the treasurie, and continuance of the warres, a tribute bee not needefull to bee

D.i. paid,

cum legem agrariam ferret quam tamen antiquari facilè passus est, & in co vehementer se moderatum præbuit, sed cum in agendo multa popularitèr, tum illud male dixit: non esse in ciuitate duo millia hominum, qui rem haberent.

Capitalis oratio est ad æquationem bonorum pertinens.

Qua peste quæ possit esse maior? Hanc enim ob causam maximè vt sua tuerentur, Resp. ciuitatesq; constitutæ sunt. Nam etsi duce natura congregabantur homines, tamen, spe custodiæ rerum suarum, vrbium præsidia quærebant.

Danda etiam opera est, ne (quod apud maiores nostros sæpe fiebat) propter eraryi tenuitatem, assiduitatemque bellorum tributum sit

conferendum. Idque ne eueniat, multò antè erit prouidendum. Sin quæ necessitas huius muneris alicui Reipub. obuenerit (malo enim alteri quàm nostræ ominari, neque tantum de nostra, sed de omni Repub, disputo) danda erit opera, vt omnes intelligant, si salui esse velint, necessitati esse parendum.

Atq; etiam omnes qui Rempub. gubernabunt, consulere debebunt, vt earum rerum copia sit, quæ sunt necessariæ. Quarum qualis comparatio fieri soleat, & debeat, non est necesse disputare, est enim in promptu: tantum locus attingendus fuit. Caput autem est in omni procuratione negotij et muneris publici, vt auaritiæ pellatur etiam minima suspicio,

payde. And longe before it muste be prouided, that it maie not fall. But if anye necessitie of this duetie shall happen vpon anye commonweale (for I had rather prophecie to some others, than to oures, and yet I reason not of oures, but of euerie common weale) there muste be geuen a diligence, that all men maye vnderstande, that if thei will be in saketie, they muste obey necessitie.

And moreuer, all suche as shall rule the commonweale, oughte to prouyde, that there bee store of those thynges, whiche are necessary.

Of which it is not needefull to dispute, what a prouision, is wonte, and ought, to bee made, for the matter is manifest, this place was no more but to be touched.

But the chiefe point is, in all administration of matters, and common weale offices, that euen the least suspicion of couetousnesse bee auoyded.

Woulde

Woulde God, quoth Caius Pontius the Samnite, fortune hadde reserued mee to those dayes, and I hadde then been borne, when the Romaines begonne once to take bribes, I woulde not suffer thē any lenger to rule. He needed not pwis to haue taried for many woorldes.

For of late this mischiefe entered into this commonweale. Therefore I am well content, that Pontius rather liued then, if there was in him so much māhode in deede.

Not yet a hundred, and tenne yeares be paste, sins the law of pillage was made by Lucius Piso, where as none before had beene.

But afterwarde followed so manye lawes, and euery of the latter, the harder, so manie accused, so many condempned, so great an Italian warre, raysed for feare of iudgementes: when lawes, and iudgementes were taken awaie, so greate pollinge, and robbinge of learge frienders,

vtinam inquit Caius Poncius Samnis, ad illa, tempora fortuna me seruasset, & tunc essem natus quando Romani dona accipere cœpissent. non essem passus eos diutius imperare. Ne illi quidem multa sæcula expectanda fuerunt modo enim hoc malum in hāc Rempublicam inuasit.

Itaque facile patior, tunc potius Pontium fuisse siquidem in illo tantum fuit roboris. Nondum centum & decem anni sunt, cum de pecunijs repetundis à Lu. Pisone lata est lex, nulla ante eam fuisset.

At vero postea tot leges & proxime quæque duriores tot rei, tot damnati, tantum Italicum bellum propter iudicium metum, excitatum, tanta sublatis legibus et iudicijs, expilatio, direptioque

sociorum,

vt imbicillitate aliorum nō nostra virtute valeamus.

Laudat affricanum Panætius, q̄ fuerit ab stinēs, quid ni laudet? sed in illo alia maiora. Laus enim abstinētiæ non hominis est solum, sed etiam temporum illorum.

Omni Macedonum gaza quæ fuit maxima, potitus est Paulus: tantum in ærarium pecuniæ inuexit, vt vnius imperatoris præda finem attulerit tributorum.

At hic nihil in domum suam intulit, præter memoriam nominis sempiternam Imitatus patrem Africanus nihilo locupletior Carthagine eversa. Quid? (qui eius collega in censura fuit) L. Mummius, nunquid copiosior cum copiosissimam vrbem funditus sustulisset? Italiam ornare, quam domum suam maluit. Quanq̄ Italia

that by the weakenesse of other, not by oure prowes, we do preuaile. Panetius praiseth Africanus, because hee was no taker.

Why shoulde he not bee praysed? But other greater thinggs there were in him. For the praise of restrayning from takyng is not only ỹ mans, but also that time Paulus got all the Macedoniens treasure: whiche was exceedinge greate, hee brought so muche riches into the treasurie, that one captaines booty made an ende of tributes: but he bore nothing into his house, saue an euerlastings memorie of his name.

Africanus folowed hys father, nowhit the more enriched by Carthage razed.

What of Lucius Mummius who was hys office fellowe in the Censorshippe: was hee any deale the richer when by the grounde he had ouer throwne the most riche citie.

He was willing rather to bewtifie Italie, than his owne house, although Italy beinge

beluge beautified. hys very howse seemeth to mee the beautifullie. No vice then is there fowler (that thither any talke may returne, from whence it is straied) than couetousenesse, specially, in prince, and common weale rulers.

For it is onely dishonest, but wicked also, and shame full to make a gaine of the common welth.

Therefore where as Apollo Pithius gaue out by oracle, that Sparta no other waye, but by couetousenesse shoulde come to distruction, the same he seemeth to haue prophecied not onely to the Lacedemonians but also to all welthie peoples.

For they who rule ouer the commonweale, may by no meanes sooner wynne the good will of the multitude than by a reframinge hande and staiednesse.

But who so will be people pleasares, and for that cause, doe either attempte the matter of landes, that the owe-ners may be driuen frō their holds, or els doe thinke mete

ornata, domus ipsa videtur mihi ornatior. Nullū igitur vitiū est tetrius (vt eó, vnde egressa est referat se oratio) quam auaricia, præsertim in principibus & Remp. gubernantibus. Habere enim quèstui Remp. non modo turpe est, sed sceleratum etiam & nefarium. Itaque quod Apollo Pythius oraculo edidit, Spartam nullare alia nisi auaritia esse perituram, id videtur non solum Lacedæmonijs, sed etiam omnibus opulentis populis prædixisse. Nulla autem re conciliare facilius benevolentiam multitudinis possunt ij, qui Reip. præsunt, quàm abstinentia & continentia.

Qui vero se populares volunt esse, ob eamque causam aut agrariam rem tentant vt possessores suis sedibus pellantur, aut pecunias creditas debitoribus

condonandas putant, ij labe factant fundamenta Reipublicæ, concordiam primum quæ esse non potest, quum aliis adimuntur alijs condonantur pecuniæ. deinde æquitatem, quæ tollitur omnis si habere suum, cuique non licet.

Id enim est proprium, vt supra dixi, ciuitatis atque vrbis, vt sit libera, & non solicita suæ rei cuiusque custodia. Atque in hac pernicie Reipub. ne illam quidem consequuntur, quam putant gratiam.

Nam cui res erepta est, est inimicus: cui data est etiam dissimulat se accipere voluisse, et maxime in pecunijs creditis occultat suum gaudium, ne videatur non fuisse soluendo

that loued mony be remitted to the detters: thei shake the foundacions of the common weale, syrste they take away concorde, whiche can not be when money is pulled from some, and forgeuen to other some, nexte they banyshe equitie, whiche is wholye rooted oute, if it be not lawefui for euerie manne to haue his owne.

For that is the proper ende, as I saide before of a citie, and borogh, that there be a free, and no troublesome kepinge of euery mannes owne good.

And in this mischiefe of the commonwealth, the doe not attaine suche fauour, as they suppose thei do.

For he from whome goodes bee taken, is becomme an enemie, he also to whome they are geuen makes, as thoughe he is not willing to take them, and moste of all hee hydes hys ioye in loued monye forgeuen. leaste hee may seme to haue byn vnable to paye it.

But surely he that receiueth the wronge, bothe beareth hys griefe in remembraunce, and sheweth it in sight neither if they bee moo, to whome wickedly it hathe been geuen, than they from whome vniustly it hathe ben taken, it folowerth that therfore thei be also more in power.

For these thinges be iudged not by number, but by weight. And what equitie is in this: that he shuld haue lande who hathe had none, & he shoulde forgo lande, who hathe hadde it manie yeares, yea or hundreds of yeares before continued in possession.

But, for this kinde of iniurie, the Lacedemonians draue oute Lysander the Ephorian, and they slewe Agis the kinge, whiche had neuer happened amonge thē before. Whereof folowed, at that time, so great discensions, that there arose Tyrantes, and their noble men were exiled and a verye well ordered commonweale went to ruine.

At vero ille qui accipit iniuriam & meminit, & præ se fert dolorem suum, nec si plures sunt. ij. quibus improbè datum est, quam illi quibus iniustè ademptū est, idcirco plus etiam valent. Non enim numero hæc iudicantur, sed pondere. Quam autem habet æquitatem, vt agrum multis annis, aut etiam sæculis antè possessum, qui nullum habuit, habeat, qui autem habuit, amittat? At propter hoc iniuriæ genus Lacedemonij Lysandrum Ephorum expulerunt: Agin regem (quod nunquam antea apud eos acciderat) necauerunt.

Ex quo tempore tantæ discordiæ secutæ sunt, vt tiranni existerent, & optimates, exterminarentur, & præclarissimè constituta Respubli. dilaberetur.

Nec vero solum ipsa cecidit: sed etiam reliquam Græciam euertit contagionibus malorum, quæ à Lacedemoniis profectæ manarunt latius. Quid? nostros Gracchos Tib. Gracchi summi viri filios, Africani nepotes; nonne agrariæ contentiones perdiderunt? At vero Aratus Sicyonius iure laudatur: qui cum eius ciuitas. L. annos à tyrannis teneretur, profectus Argis Sicyonem, clandestino introitu vrbe est potitus cumque tyrannum Nicoclem, improuiso oppressisset, sexcentos exules, qui fuerant eius ciuitatis locupletissimi restituit, Rem̃ pub. aduentu suo liberauit.

Sed cum magnum animaduerteret in bonis & possessionibus difficultatem quo & eos, quos & ipse

Nor truely they state onely had a fal: but also it ouerthrewe the rest of Greece, with the infections of mischiefes, whiche springinge from the Lacedemonians, did flowe farther abroade. What of our Gracchus, Tiberius Gracchus the noble mannes sonnes, Africanus childerns childern? dyd not landstriues bringe them to destruction?

But in deede Aratus the Sicyonia is rightfully commended: who, when his citie was fiftie yeares with holden by tyrauntes: being departed frō Argos to Sicien, with a priuie stoine entrie, gotte possession of the citie: and when, vpon a sodaine, he hadde ouerthrowen the tyraunte Nicoles: he restored home againe fyue hundred banisht men, who hadde been the greatest possessioners of the citie: and by his commynge, sette the common weale at libertie.

But when he perceiued the greate inconuenience in the goodes; and possessions, because bothe he thought it

verie

verie vnreasonable, that thei shoulde lacke whome he himselfe had restored, whose goodes other had possessed: and againe to remoue fyftie yeares possession, hee iudged it not very indifferent: because that in so longe a space much by inheritaunce, much by sale, much by dower, was holden: without wronge he thoughte it was necessarie: neither the goodes to be taken from them, nor those to be vnsatisfied, whose thei hadde been before. When he hadde then determined, that he shoulde neede mony, for the orderinge of the matter: he saide he woulde make a vyage to Alexandria: and commaunded, the matter to remaine vntouched, vntill his returne.

And he with speede wente to Ptolomeus, whoe hadde been his entertainer: whiche then reigned the seconde, after the buildinge of Alexandria: to whome when he hadde declared, that he was minded to sette his countrie at libertie: and hadde enformed him of the case: ỹ noble man

restituerat, quorũ bona alij possiderant, egere iniquissimũ arbitrabatur: & L. Annorum possessiones mouere non nimis æquum putabat propterea quod tam longo spacio multa hereditatibus multa emptionibus, multa dotibus tenebantur, sine iniuria iudicauit, neque illis adimi, neque his non satisfieri, quorum illa fuerant, oportere.

Cum igitur statuisset opus esse ad eam rem cõstituendã pecunia: Alexandriam se proficisci velle dixit, remq; integram ad reditum suum iussit esse. Isq; celeriter ad Ptolomæum suum hospitem venit, qui tum regnabat alter post Alexandriam conditam: cui cum exposuisset, patriam se liberare velle, causamque docuisset: à rege opulento vir summus

facile impetrauit: vt grandi pecunia adiuuaretur.

Quam cum Sicyonem attulisset, adhibuit sibi in consilium quindecim principes: cum quibus causas cognouit, & eorum qui aliena tenebant, & eorum, qui sua amiserant, perfecitque æstimandis possessionibus, vt persuaderet alijs vt pecuniam accipere mallent, & possessionibus cederent: alijs, vt commodius putarent numerari sibi, quod tanti esset, quàm suum recuperare.

Ita perfectum est, vt omnes constituta cõcordia sine querela discederent.

O virum magnum, dignumque, qui in nostra Repub. natus esset.

Sic par est agere cum ciuib' non (vt bis tam vidimus)

manne soone obtained of the riche kinge, to be ayded with a masse of monye.

When he had brought into Sicyõ, he toke to him in councell fifteene of his nobles wyth whome he examined the cases bothe of them who did witholde other mens, and of theyrs, who had loste their owne, & dyd putte these fifteene in commission for the valewinge of possessions, and to perswade some, that they woulde be willinger to take monie, and to releale their possession, and other some to thinke, that to haue as muche payed them in valewe, it were more profite, than to recouer their owne. So it came to passe, that they all departed without complaynte, by a well ordered concorde.

O man of muche honoure, and worthie to haue been borne in oure commonweale.

Thus it is meete to deale with citizens, and not (as twyse already we haue seene

to

to pitche saleftake in the market place and to putte the goodes of the citizens in the cryers mouthe. But that Greeke thoughte meete to prouide for all, whiche was the parte of a wise, and a worthye manne. And that is the greatest discretion, and wisedome of an honorable citizen to defende, not to pull awaye the citizens commodities, and to contein them all within one maner of equitie.

haſtam in foro ponere, & bona ciuium voci ſubijcere preconis. At ille Græcus, illud quod fuit ſapientis & præſtantis viri, omnibus conſulendum putauit.

Eaque eſt ſumma ratio, & ſapientia boni ciuis, commoda ciuium defendere, nõ diuellere: atque omnes æquitate eadem continere.

But somme will saie, menne maie dwell rentfree in an others house, Why so? That when I haue bought it, haue buylded it, doo repaire it, do laie charges vpon it, thou shouldeſt haue the vſe of myne agaynſte my will? what is this els, but from some to take their owne, and to some to geue other mennes.

Habitant gratis in alieno. Quid ita? vt cum ego emerim, ædificauerim, tuear, impendam, tu me inuito fruare meo, quid eſt aliud alijs ſua eripere, alijs dare aliena?

And as for the newe tables what reason haue they: but that you maie bye lande with my monye, and poſſeſſe it youe ſelfe, and yet I maye not haue my monye.

Tabulæ vero nouæ quid habent argumenti, niſi vt emas mea pecunia fundum, & eum tu habeas, ego non habeam pecuniam.

where

Quamobrem ne sit æs alienum, quod Reipub. noceat prouidendum est. quod multis rationibus cauerí potest hoc si non fuerit, vt locupletes suum perdant, debitores lucrentur alienũ.

wherefore it muste be prouideo, that there be no dobte, whiche way hinder the commou weale, whiche thynge maye bee looked, to manie waies, if this be not suffered, that possessioners lose their owne, nor detters gain other mens.

Nec enim vlla res vehementius Rempub. continet quàm fides: quæ esse nulla potest, nisi erit necessaria solutio rerum creditarum.

For nothinge more stronglye preserueth a commonweale, than faithfulnesse, which can be none at all, excepte there bee of necessitie a paimente of thinges loned.

Nunquam vehementius actum est quam me consule, ne solueretur. Armis & castris tẽtata res est ab omni genere hominum & ordine quibus sic restiti, vt totum hoc malũ de Repub. tolleretur. Nunquam nec maius æs alienum fuit, nec melius nec facilius dissolutum est Fraudandi enim spe sublata, soluendi necessitas consecuta est. At vero hic noster victor, nunc quidem victus

For neuer more earnestlye it was gon about, than when I was Consull, that there shoulde be no paimentes.

The matter was attempted with speare, and shylde, by euery sorte, and degree of men, whome in suche wise I withstode, that this so great a mischefe was rooted oute of the commonweale. Neuer was there more dette, neyther better, nor easlier paied. For when hope of defraudinge was taken awaye, necessitie of paimente folowed.

But this our conquerour, now verelye conquered,

hath

hathe compaſſed thoſe thinges, whiche hee purpoſed, whereas nowe he is neuer a whit the better. So great was his deſire to doe naughtily, that euen the verye doynge of naughtines delited him, although hee had no occaſion. Then then who ſhall vpholde the commonweale, muſte kepe them awaye from this manner of large guiftes, that to ſomme they be giuen, and from other thei be taken, and ſpecialle muſte geue their diligence, that by equitie lawe, and iudgmente euerye man mate holde his owne, and neither the poorer ſorte, for their ſmall abilitie, be deceiued by couyne, nor enuye mate hinder the riche either to keepe, or recouer their owne, moreouer, by what meanes ſoeuer they canne, eyther in warre or peace, lette them enlarge the common weale, with dominion, lande, and reuenue.

Theſe be the deedes of noble men, theſe were practiſed among oure auncetors, theſe

quæ cogitarat, cum ipſius intererat, ea perfecit, cum eius iam nihil intereſſet.

Tanta in eo peccandi libido fuit, vt hoc ipſum cum delectaret, peccare, etiam ſi cauſa non eſſet. Ab hoc igitur genere largitionis, vt alijs detur, alijs auferatur, abeũt ij, qui Remp. tuebũtur. Inprimisque operam dabunt, vt iuris & iudiciorum æquitate ſuum quiſque teneat: & neq; tenuiores propter imbecilitatẽ circũueniantur: neq; locupletibus adſua vel tenenda, vel recuperanda obſit inuidia. Preterea quibuſcunq; rebus, vel bello vel domi poterunt, Rempub. augeant, imperio, agris, vectigalibus.

Hæc magnorum hominum ſunt hec apud maiores noſtros facta.

Hæc genera officiorum qui persequũtur, cum summa vtilitate Reipublicæ, magnũ ipsi adipiscentur & gratiam & gloriam.

In his autem vtilitatum præceptis, Antipater Tyrius Stoicus, qui Athenis nuper est mortuꝰ duo præterita censet esse à Panætio: valetudinis curationem, & pecuniæ: Quas res à summo philosopho præteritas arbitror, quod essent faciles, sunt tamen certe vtiles. Sed valetudo sustentatur notitia sui corporis, & obseruatione, quæ res aut prodesse soleant aut obesse: & continentia in victu omni atque cultu, corporis tuendi causa, et prætermittendis voluptatibus: postremo arte eorum, quorum ad scientiam hæc pertinent.

Res autem familiaris quæ-

these kindes of dueties who so folowe, shall with verye greate profite to the common weale, get themselues bothe great fauoure, and glorie.

But in these precepts of profite, Antipater of Tire, the Stoike, who alate dyed at Athens, thynkes, that two preceptes be ouerscaped of Panetius: tenderinge of helth, and prouision of monye.

Whiche thinges I suppose to haue been ouerpassed by the nobie philosopher, because thei wer light matters yet without doubte, they be profitable.

But helth is preserued, by knowledge, of ones owne bodye, and marking those thinges, whiche are wonte either to doo good, or harme and by a stayednes both in all a mannes diet, and apparail, for cherishinge of the bodye, and also forbearenge pleasures, and lasciue, by their conuynge, to whose science these thynges pertayne.

But a mannes substance

muste bee gotten, by those thinges, whiche be farre from dishonestye, and muste be saued by diligence, and honest, sparinge, and by those same meanes also, it muste be encreased.

Xenophon the Socratian hathe gonne thorough the these thynges verye handesomely, in that booke whiche is intituled Economicus, the whiche we tourned outs of Greeke into latine, when we were at the same age in a maner as you are nowe.

But comparinge of profites (because this fourthe place was ouerpassed by Panetius,) is oftentimes necessarie. For bothe the guiftes of the bodie, ar wont to bee compared with fortunes guiftes, and also fortunes guiftes with the bodies guiftes, and those of the body one with an other, and those that fortune geues, likewise one with an other. The bodyes gifts be compared with fortunes, after this sort, that ye had rather bee in helth, than be riche, fortunes gifts be cõpared wt ỹ bodies in

ri debet ijs rebus à quibus abest turpitudo, conseruari autem diligentia & parsimonia, eiusdem etiam rebus augeri.

Has res commodissime Xenophon Socraticus persecutus est in eo libro, qui Economicus inscribitur: quem nos ista ferè ætate cum essemus, quæ es tu nunc, è græco in latinum conuertimus.

Sed vtilitatum comparatio (quoniam hic locus erat quartus à Panætio prætermissus) sæpe est necessaria. Nam & corporis commoda cum externis, & externa cum corporis: & ipsa inter se corporis: & externa cum externis comparari solent.

Cum externis corporis, hoc modo comparantur valere vt malis, quàm diues esse. Cum corporis externa,

Hoc modo, diues esse potius quàm maximis corporis viribus.

Ipsa inter se corporis sic: vt bona valetudo voluptati anteponatur, vires celeritati. Externorum autem, vt gloria diuitijs, vectigalia vrbana rusticis. Ex quo genere comparationis illud est Catonis senis à quo cum quæreretur quid maxime in re familiari expediret: respondit, bene pascere. Quid secundum? satis bene pascere: Quid tertium? bene vestire.

Quid quartum? arare.

Et cum ille qui quæsierat dixisset: quid fœnerari? quid ita, quid hominem, occidere?

, & multis alijs bet, vtilitatem nes soleri fieri:

in this wyse, that you hadde rather be riche, than of verye great strength.

Whose of the body be compared one with an other, thus that good helth be preferred before pleasure, and strength before swiftnesse. But fortunes guiftes be compared togither, this waie, that glorie be esteemed before riches, and citie tribute before the countries.

Of the whiche kinde of comparison is that sayinge of Cato the olde manne, of whom when it was demaunded, what was moste profitable for a mans substaunce, he made aunswer, To feede wel, what the seconde, To feede sufficiently well, what the thirde, To clothe well, what the fourth, To plowe. And whē he, who hadde moued the question, had sayde, What, to lende vpon vsurie then, what is it, quoth Cato, to kill a man?

Whereupon, and of many other thinges it ought to be gathered, that comparisons of profites are wonte to bee made, and that this is verye

well

well adioyned for the fourt poynt of serchinge out of duties.

But of this holle matter, of gettyng money, of bestowyng the same, and also of vsing it, farre better it is disputed by certaine honest men, sitting at the middle Jane, than of any philosophers in any schole. Yet are they to bee knowne, and of them in this booke we haue treated. The rest wyll wee prosecute hereafter.

& Rectè hoc adiunctum esse quartum exquirendorũ officiorum genus. Sed toto hoc de gerere, de querẽda, de collocanda pecunia, etiam de vtenda, cõmodius à quibusdam optimis viris ad Ianum medium sedentibus, quã ab vllis philosophis vllain schola disputatur. Sunt tamen ea cognoscenda. Pertinent enim ad vtilitatem, de qua hoc libro disputatum est. Reliqua deinceps persequemur.

M. TVLLII CICERONIS, DE OFFICIJS Liber tertius.

PVBLIVM SCIpioni, Marce fili, cum qui primus Africanus appellatus est, dicere solitum scripsit Cato, qui fuit ferè eius æqualis. nunquam se minus otiosum esse, quàm cum otiosus: nec minus solum, quàm cum solus esset. Magnifica vero vox & magno viro ac sapiente digna: quæ declarat illum, & in otio de negotijs cogitare, et in solitudine secum loqui solitum: vt neq; cessaret vnquam, & interdum colloquio alterius non egeret: Itaq; duæ res, quæ languorem afferunt cæteris, illum

¶ MARCVS TVLLIVS CICEroes third booke of duties, to Marcus his sonne.

THe same Publius Scipio, sonne Marke, who the firste African was named, woulde commonlie save, as Cato hath written, who was in a maner hys lyke in yeres: That he was neuer moze leasureleste, then when hee was leasurefull: and neuer leste alone, then whan he was all alone. A noble saveng surely, & meete for a worthy, and wise man: whiche declareth, that hee both in his leasure was wōt too muse of matters too bee done, & also in his solitarnesse, too debate them with hym selfe, so as hee was nothing idle at any tyme, and sometime neded not the cōmunication of other. And so these two thinges, leasure, and solitarnesse, whiche bring a dulnesse vpon other made

made him the quicker. I wold wish, that we likewise might truelye saye the verye same. But although by imitation we are not able to attaine so greate excellence of witte, yet doubteleſſe in deſire wee come verye nere hym.

For both by wicked warre, and power, being put of frō common weale matters, and iudiciall causes, we take our quiet leasure, and for that cause leauing the citie, and walking abrode in the contrie, oftētimes we be alone. But neither this leasure is to bee compared with Africanus leasure: nor this solytarineſſe, with that of his. For hee ceasinge from the goodlye ministracion of the common weale, tooke hym selfe leasure otherwyle, and from the preaſe, and resorte of men, now and than into a solitarie place, as into a hauen, withdrew him selfe. But our leasure comes not of deſire of rest, but for lack of bysineſſe. For seynge the Senate is depoſed, and iudgementes abolyshed:

acuebant, otium & ſolitudo Vellem & nobis hoc idem verè dicere liceret. Sed ſi minus imitatione tantā ingenij præſtantiam conſequi poſſumus: volūtate certe proximè accedimus. Nam et a Reipu. forenſibuſq; negotijs armis impijs, viq; prohibiti, otium perſequimur, et ob eam cauſam vrbe relicta rura peragrantes ſæpe ſoli ſumus. Sed nec otium hoc cū Africani otio, nec ſolitudo hæc cū illa comparanda eſt. Ille enim requieſcens à Reip. pulcherrimis muneribus, otium ſibi ſumebat aliquando, & a cætu hominum, frequentiaq; interdum tanquam in portū ſe inſolitudinem recipiebat. Noſtrum autem otium negotij inopia, non requieſcendi ſtudio cōſtitutū eſt, extincto enī ſenatu deletiſq; iudicijs

quid est quod dignum nobis aut in curia, aut in foro agere possimus? Ita qui in maxima celebritate atq; in oculis ciuiũ quondã viximus, nũc fugientes conspectum sceleratorũ, quibus omnia redũdant, abdimus nos quantum licet, & sæpe soli sumus. Sed quia sic ab hominibus doctis accepimus, non solũ ex malis eligere minima oportere: sed etiã excerpere ex his ipsis, si quid inesset boni: propterea et otio fruor, non illo quidẽ, quo debeat vti is, qui quõdã peperisset otiũ ciuitati. Nec cã solitudinẽ languere patior, quã mihi affert necessitas non voluntas. Quanquam Africanus maiorem laudẽ meo iudicio assequebatur: nulla tamen eius ingenij monumenta mandata literis, nullum opus otij, nullum solitudinis munus extat.

what is there, that eyther in court, or in place of plea, meete for vs, wee may do.

Therfore wee, who in the greteſt aſſemble, and in the eyes of the citizẽs ſometime haue liued, now fleeinge the ſight of the wicked, wyth whom all places ſwarme: doo withdrawe our ſelues, as much as wee may, and ar oftentimes alone.

But bicauſe thus wee haue herd of lerned men, that not only wee ought of euyls too chooſe the leaſt, but alſo if ther were any goodneſſe in thẽ, too pike it out, therfore both I enioy quietneſſe, not ſuche twis, as hee ought too haue, who once procured quietneſſe to the holle citie, and alſo doo not ſuffer that ſolitarineſſe too waxe ydle: wiche neceſſitie brings vpon me, and not myne owne deſire. Although Africanus did gette greater praiſe, euẽ in my tudgement, yet no monumentes of his witte put in writing, no worke of hys quiet life, no frute of his ſolitarineſſe remaines abrode.

wherof

whereof it muste nedes bee gathered, that hee, by earneſt occuppenge of hys mynde, and by beating out thoſe thinges, which by muſing he atteined: was neyther ydle, nor at any time alone: but wee, who haue not ſo great depeneſſe of witte, that by ſecrete muſing wee bee drawene from ſolitarineſſe: do turne all our ſtudie, and endeuour to this trauaille of wryting. And therefore wee haue wrytten more in a ſhorte ſpace, ſins the ſtate was ouer throwene, than in many yeres, when it ſtode.

But where as all philoſophie, my Cicero, is verye good, and frutefull, nor any parte thereof is barreyne, and waſte, yet no place therin is more yelding, nor more pleintifull, than the place touching duties, from which be borowed the preceptes of lyuyng constantly, and honeſtly. wherefore although I truſt you dayly heare, and receiue thys ſame of our Cratippus, prince of Philoſophers in theſe dayes, neuertheleſſe I

Ex quo intelligi debet, illum mentis agitatione, inueſtigationeq; earũ rerũ, quas cogitando conſequebatur, nec otioſũ, nec ſolũ vnquã fuiſſe. Nos autẽ, qui non tantũ roboris habemus, vt cogitatione tacita à ſolitudine abſtrahamur, ad hanc ſcribendi operã omne ſtudiũ, curamq; cõuertimus. Itaq; plura breui tẽpore euerſa, quàm multis annis ſtante Rep. ſcripſimꝰ. Sed cũ tota philoſophia, mi Cicero, frugifera, et fructuoſa, nec vlla pars eius inculta ac deſerta ſit: tamẽ nullus feracior in ea locus eſt, nec vberior, quàm de officijs à quibus conſtãter, honeſteq; viuendi præcepta ducuntur. Quare quanquam à Cratippo noſtro principe huius memoriæ philoſophorum hæc te aſſiduè audire, atque accipere confido: tamen

conducere arbitror talibus aures tuas vocibus vndique circumsonare, nec eas, si fieri possit, quicquam aliud audire. Quod cum omnibus est faciendum, qui vitam honestam ingredi cogitant: tamen haud scio an nemini potius quàm tibi. Sustines enim non paruam expectationem imitandæ industriæ nostræ, magnam honorum, nonnullam fortasse nominis. Suscepisti onus præterea graue et Athenarum, & Cratippi ad quos cum tanquam ad mercaturam bonarum artium sis profectus, inanem redire turpissimum est, dedecorantem & vrbis authoritatem & magistri. Quare quantum conniti animo potes, quātū labore contēdere (si discēdi labor est potius quam voluptas) tantum fac

holde it profitable, that I ring about your eares with suche soundes, on euerye syde: and that they, if possible it maye bee done, heare none other thinge. Whiche both is to be done of al those that mynde too enter the honest life, and I wotte not whether of any man more, than of your selfe. For you carie an expectation, not small of folowing our trade, great of commynge too our honour, some paraduenture of arreynyng too our fame. You haue taken vpon you moreouer a greate charge, both by reason of Athenes, and also of Cratippus, too the which seinge, as too the marte of good sciences, you haue trauelled: too returne emptie, a greate reproche it is, staynyng the worshippe bothe of the citie, and also of your maister. Wherfore as muche as by wytte you ar able to compasse: as much as by payne you can endeuour (if to studie bee rather a payne, than pleasure) so muche see, that you doo in deede,

deede, and giue no occasi-
on that seing all thinges are
suffised by vs, you shoulde
seeme too haue disappointed
your selfe. But of these
matters hitherto. For wee
haue oftentymes written
much vnto you, in way of
exhortacion. Nowe too the
parte remaynynge of the
foresayde diuision lette vs
returne.

Panetius therefore, who
without doute of duties
hath moste diligentlye dis-
puted, and whom wee, vs-
ing a certeine correction,
haue chiefelie followed, when
hee hadde sette forth three
kyndes, in which menne are
wont too counsell, and ad-
vise them selues of dutie,
the one, when they shoulde
dout, whether it, wherwith
they were in handes, were
honest, or dishonest, the other
whether it were profitable,
or vnprofitable, the thirde,
if that, which shoulde haue
the shewe of honestie, should
striue with it, that see-
med profytable: howe
it shoulde be necessarye

vt efficias: neue committas,
vt cum omnia suppeditata
sint à nobis, tute tibi defu-
isse videare, Sed hec hactē-
nus. Multa enim sæpe ad te
cohortandi gratia scripsi-
mus. Nunc ad reliquam par-
tem propositæ diuisionis re-
uertamur.

Panætius igitur, qui
sine controuersia de offi-
cijs accuratissimè disputa-
uit: quemq; nos correctione
quadam adhibita potissimū
secuti sumus: tribus gene-
ribus propositis, in quibus de-
liberare homines et cōsulta-
re de officio solerēt: vno cum
dubitarent honestum ne id
esset, de quo ageretur, an
turpe: altero vtile ne, an in-
utile: tertio si id, quod spe-
ciem haberet honesti pugna-
ret cum eo, quod vtile vide-
retur, quomodo ea discerni

ōporteret: de duobus generibus primis tribus libris explicauit: de tertio autē genere deinceps se scripsit dicturū, nec exoluit id quod promiserat. Quod eo magis miror quia scriptū a discipulo eius Possidonio est, triginta annos vixisse Panætiū postquā illos libros edidisset. Quē locum miror à Possidonio breuiter esse tactū in quibusdā cōmentarijs: præsertim cum scribat nullū esse locū in tota Philosophia tā necessariū. Minime vero assentior ijs, qui negant eū locū à Panætio prætermissū: sed consulto relictum: nec omnino scribēdū fuisse, quia nūquā posset vtilitas cū honestate pugnare. De quo alterū potest habere dubitationē, adhibendum nè fuerit hoc genus, quod in diuisione Panætij tertium est, an planè omittendum.

those same to bee discerned: of the first twoo kindes, in three bookes hee opened his mynde: and of the thirde kinde, hee wrote, hee woulde speake afterwarde: and that did hee not performe, whiche hee had promysed. Whereat I maruaile the more: bycause it is written by his scholer Possidonius: that Panetius liued thirtie yeres after hee hadde set forth those bokes. Whiche place I wonder, it was so briefely touched of Possidonius in certayne abridgementes: specially seyng hee writtes, there is no place in all Philosophie so necessarie. But in no wise I agree with thē: which denie, this place did ouerskape Panetius: but that of purpose it was lefte out: and that it was not too bee written at all, bycause profite myght neuer striue with honestie. Touching the whiche, the one may haue in it a doute: whether this part, whiche in Panetius diuision is the thirde, was too bee added, or vtterly too bee lefte oute, the

the other can not bee douted of, but of Panetius it was taken in hande, and yet lefte vntreated. For who so of a threeparted deuision twoo partes hath fynished, too hym the thirde must needes remain. Moreouer, in his thirde booke, toward the ende, hee promiseth, that afterwarde hee wyll speake of this parte.

Hereto commeth a substanciall witnesse, Possidonius who also wryteth in a certeyne letter, that Publius Rutilius Rufus, whiche hadde hearde Panetius, was wont too saye, lyke as no painter might bee found, who coulde finishe vp that parte of Venus, which Apelles hadde lefte vnfynyshed, (for the beautie of her face tooke awaye the hope of counterfettynge the rest of her bodye) so those thinges, that Panetius hadde ouerpassed, and had not finished, there was no man to prosecute, bicause of the excellence of those matters, which he had gone thorow withall. wherefore of Pa-

Alterum dubitari non potest, quin à Panætio susceptum sit, sed relictum. Nam qui è diuisione tripertita duas partes absolucrit: huic necesse est restare tertiam. Præterea in extremo libro tertio, de hac parte pollicetur se deinceps esse dicturũ. Accedet eodem testis locuples Possidonius, qui etiam scribit in quadam epistola P. Rutilium Rufum dicere solere, qui Panætium audiuerat: vt nemo pictor esset inuentus, qui Veneris eam partem, quam Appelles inchoatam reliquisset, absolueret (oris enim pulchritudo reliqui corporis imitandi spem auferebat) sic ea, quæ Panetius prætermisisset & non perfecisset, propter eorum, quæ fecisset præstantiam, neminem esse persecutum. Quamobrem de

iudicio Panætij dubitare nõ poteſt, rectè ne autẽ hanc tertiã partẽ ad exquirendũ officiũ adiunxerit, an ſecꝰ: de eo fortaſſe dubitari poteſt. Nam ſiue honeſtũ ſolũ bonũ eſt, vt Stoicis placet: ſiue quod honeſtũ eſt, id ita ſummũ bonũ eſt (quẽadmodũ Peripateticis noſtris videtur) vt omnia ex altera parte collocata, vix minimi momẽti inſtar habeant: dubitãdũ non eſt, quin nũquã poſſit vtilitas cũ honeſtate cõtẽdere. Itaq; accepimus Socratẽ ſolitũ execrari eos, qui primũ hac natura coherentia, opinione diſtraxiſſent. Cui quidẽ ita ſunt Stoici aſſenſi, vt et quicquid honeſtũ eſſet, id vtile eſſe cẽſerent: nec vtile quicquã, quod nõ honeſtũ. Quod ſi is eſſet Panætius, qui virtutẽ propterea colendam diceret, quod ea efficiens vtilitatis eſſet: vt ij, qui res expetendas

Panetius iudgement it can not bee douted, but whether hee too the ſetchynge out of dutie this thirde parte adioyned well, or no, thereof peraduenture it may bee douted. For whether honeſtie bee the onely good, as liketh the Stoikes, or els honeſtie in ſuch ſort bee the ſouerayne good (as ſeemeth to our Peripatetikes) that they count all thinges, ſet on the other ſide, of very ſmall weyght in compariſon, it is not too bee douted, but that profite can neuer bee at ſtrife with honeſtie. Therfore we haue herde ſaye, Socrates was wont to curſe thẽ, who firſt parted a ſonder in opinion theſe, that by nature were coupled together. To whõ doubtleſſe the Stoikes ſo aſſented, that what ſo were honeſt, the ſame alſo they iudged to be profitable, nor any thing too bee profitable whiche were not honeſte. If Panetius were ỹ manne. who would ſaie, that vertue therfore ſhoelde bee honored, bicauſe it is the cauſer of profite, as they, who meaſure thynges meere

to

too bee desired eyther by pleasure, or vngrieffulnes: hee might maintayne, that honestie somtyme strives with profite. But seyng he is the manne, who suggesteth that onely good, whiche is honest, and that mannes lyfe is made neyther the better, by encrease of such thinges, as bee repugnant too honestie vnder a certayne showe of profite, nor by decreate of them, the worse, it seemes hee should not haue brought in suche maner tayntyng of adulsement, wherein that, which shoulde seeme profytable, shoulde bee compared with that, which is honest. For that, whiche of the Stoikes is called the soueraigne good, as too lyue agreeably to nature, it hath (as I suppose) this meanyng, with vertues alwayes to agree, & other thinges, which shoulde bee according to nature, so too chose, if to vertue they wer not repugnant. Whiche seyng it is so, some suppose, this comparison was not well brought in: nor anye thing at al, touching ỹ brãch should

vel voluptate, vel indolentia metiũtur: liceret ei dicere honestatẽ aliquando cũ vtilitate pugnare. Sed cum sit is qui ad solum bonum iudicet quod honestũ sit: quæ autem huic repugnent specie quadã vtilitatis, eorũ neq; accessione meliorẽ vitã fieri, nec decessione peiorem non videtur huiusmodi debuisse deliberationẽ introducere: in qua quod vile videretur, cum eo quod honestũ est, cõpararetur. Etenim quod summum bonũ à Stoicis dicitur, cõgruenter naturæ viuere, id habet hãc (vt opinor) sententiã, naturã cũ virtute cõgruere sẽper cætera autẽque secũdum naturam essent, ita legere, si ea virtuti non repugnarent. Quod cũ ita sit, putãt quidẽ hanc cõparationẽ non esse rectè introductam, nec omnino de eo genere quicquam

præcipiẽdũ fuisse. Atq; illud quidẽ honestũ, quod propriè vereq; dicitur id in sapiẽtib⁹ est solis, neq; a virtute diuelli vnquã potest. In ijs autẽ, in quib⁹ sapiẽtia perfecta nõ est ipsũ illud quidẽ perfectũ honestũ nullo modo, sed similitudines honesti esse possunt. Hæc enim omnia officia, de quib⁹ his libris disputamus, media Stoici appellãt: & ea cõmunia sũt, & latè patent: quæ et ingenij bonitate multi assequũtur, et progressione discẽdi. Illud autẽ quod rectũ ijdẽ appellãt, perfectũ atq; absolutũ est: & vt ijdẽ dicũt omnes numeros habet: nec præter sapiẽtẽ cadere in quẽquã potest. Cũ autẽ aliquid actũ est, in quo media officia cõparãtur, id cumulatè videtur esse perfectũ: propterea quòd vulg⁹ quid absit à perfecto, fere non ex toto intelligit: quatenus: autem in-

should haue been taught. And surelye that honestye, which is properlie, and truly so called, is in the wyse only, and from vertue can neuer bee seuered, but in those, in whom is not perfecte wisedome, doutlesse that same perfecte honestye can in no wyse bee, semblaunces of honestie there may bee. All theise duties therfore, wherupon in theise bookes we dispute, the Stoikes call the meane duties: and those bee common duties, and do spread farre, which manye attepne, bothe by goodnesse of witte, and by gounge forwarde in learnyng. But that, which they call *Rectum*, is the perfite, and absolute dutie, and, as they also say, it hath all hys partes, neither can happen to any, but a wyse man. And when anye thinge is doone, wherein the meane duties may appeare, it seemeth too be fully perfite, bycause the common people almost vnderstandeth not at all, what it wanteth of perfite, but as farre as they vnderstand,

they

they thinke, nothing is lefte vndone. And whereas it commonly chaũceth in meeters, and paintinges, and in other thinges mo, that the vnskilfull bee delited, and praise those thinges, that ar not to bee praised, for that cause, I beleue, they doo so, that in those there is some good grace, that catcheth ỹ ignorannt, who in deede be not able too discerne, what fault is in euery thinge. And therfore whẽ they be taught of the skilfull, they sone fal from their opinion. The Stoikes then say, that these duties, whereupon in these bookes wee treate, bee (as who sayth) certaine seconde sortes of honestie, not proper only to the wise, but cõmõ also to all maner of men. Therfore al be allured with these, in whom ther is a forwardnesse of vertue. And when the two Decii, or the two Scipioes bee vouched for manly men, or els when Fabricius, or Aristides bee alledged as iust, neither of thẽ for mãlines, nor of these for iustice the example is brought

telligit, nihil putat prætermissũ. Quod autẽ in Poematibus & in picturis vsu venit, in aliisq; cõplurib⁹, vt delectentur imperiti, laudẽtq; ea quæ laudãda non sint ob eã credo causã, quod insit in his aliquid probi, quod capiat ignaros, qui ydẽ quid in vnaquaq; re vitij sit, nequeãt iudicare. Itaq; cũ sint docti a peritis, facile desistũt à sẽtẽtia. Hæc igitur officiat de quib⁹ his libris disserim⁹, quasi secũda quædã honesta, dicũt esse, non sapiẽtiũ modò propria, sed cũ omni hominũ genere cõmunia. Itaq; his omnes, in quibus est virtutis indoles, cõmouẽtur. Nec vero cũ duo Decij, aut duo Scipiones, fortes viri commemorãtur, aut cum Fabritius, aut Aristides iust⁹ nominatur, aut ab illis fortitudinis, aut ab his iustitiæ tãquã à sapiẽ

tib⁹ petitur exemplū. Nemo enī horū sic sapiēs est, vt sapientē volumus hic intelligi. Nec ij, qui sapientes habiti sūt et nominati. M. Cato, et C. Lælius sapientes fuerūt, nec illi quidē septē, sed ex mediorū officiorū frequētia, similitudinē quandā gerebant, speciēq; sapiēciū. Q uocirca nec id, quod verè honestū est, fas est, cū vtilis repugnantia cōparari: nec id, quod communiter appellamus honestum, quodq; colitur ab ijs, qui bonos se viros haberi volunt, cū emolumentis vnquam est cōparandum. Tanq; id honestū, quod in nostram intelligentiam cadit, tuendum, cōseruandumq; nobis est, quàm illud, quod propriè dicitur, vereq; est honestum sapientibus. Aliter enim teneri non potest, si qua ad virtutem est facta progressio.

brought, as of perfite wyse men. For none of these in such sort is wise, as in this place wee wyll haue a wyse manne taken: nor Marcus Cato, and Caius Lelius, who wer counted, and called wise, were perfite wyse menne: no nor those seuen sages of Greece: but by the often vsing of the meane, & common duties, they bore a certaine semblaunce, and showe of wise men. Wherfore neither it is lawful that the thing, which in deede is honest, bee compared with ꝑ contrarietie of the profitable: neither that, which commonly wee call honest, and which is exercised of them who wyll haue them selues good men to be coūted, with commodities at any tyme is to be compared, and as well that honestie, which falleth into our vnderstandinge, is of vs to be mayntayned, and kept, as that is, of the wyse, which the properly is called, and in deede is honestie. For otherwise it can not be holdē on, if ther bee attained any proceeding too vertue,

Fut

But this wee saye by them, who by keepyng of duties ar esteemed for good menne. But who doe measure all thynges by profytes, and commodities, and wyll not the same too bee ouerweyed with honestie, these ar wont in aduisement taking to cõpare honestie with it, which they reckon profitable, good men vse not so to do. Therfore I thinke, Panetius, when hee sayde, menne are wont in this comparison too dout, ment the verye same that he spake, that men only er wõt, but not, that they must needes. For not onelye to iudge the thinge, that semeth profitable more worth than that, which is honest, but also too compare these togither, and in thẽ too caste doutes, a verye fowle shame it is. what is it then, that many tymes is wõt to bring a doutfulnesse? and seemeth meete too bee considered? I suppose, it is, if at any tyme ther befall a doutfulnesse: what maner of thynge it is, wherof cõsideration is takẽ.

For

Sed hæc quidem de ijs, qui cõseruatione officiorum existimantur boni. Qui autẽ omnia metiũtur emolumentis & commodis, neq; ea volunt præpõderari honestate: hi solent in deliberando, honestum cũ eo, quod vtile putant, comparare: boni viri nõ solent. Itaq; existimo Panætium cũ dixerit homines solere in hac comparatione dubitare, hoc ipsũ sensisse quod dixerit: solere modo, non etiã oportere. Etenim non modò pluris putare quod vtile videatur, quàm illud quòd honestũ, sed hæc etiam inter se comparare, & in his dubitare, turpissimum est. quid est ergo quod nõnunquã ad dubitationem afferre soleat, considerandumque videatur? Credo si quando dubitatio accidit, quale sit id de quo consideretur.

Sæpe enim tẽpore fit, vt quod plerunq; turpe haberi soleat, inueniatur non esse turpe. Exempli causa, ponatur aliquid quod pateat latius. Quod potest esse maius scelus, quàm non modo hominẽ, sed etiam familiarem occidere? Nũ igitur se obstrinxit scelere, si quis tyrannum occidit, quanuis familiarem? Populo quidem Romano non videtur, qui ex omnib⁹ præclaris factis illud pulcherrimum existimat. Vicit igitur vtilitas honestatem, immò vero honestas vtilitatem secuta est. Itaq; vt sine vllo errore diiudicare possimus, si quando cum illo, quod honestum intelligim⁹, pugnare id videbitur, quod appellam⁹ vtile, formula quedã cõstituenda est, quam si sequemur in cõparatione rerũ, ab officio nunquam recedemus.

For often, by the tyme, it comes to passe, ỹt it, which for the most part is wont to be counted dishonest is foũd not too bee dishonest. For examples sake, let there bee put some case, that more largelye extendeth. what greater mischiefe can ther be than one too kyll not onely a man, but also his familiar? Hath hee than gyltied hymselfe of murder, who hath slain a tirãt, although he wer his familiar? To the people of Rome doutlesse it semeth not so, who of all worthye dedes estemeth that the noblest. with them therfore profit passed honestie: yet rather honestie folowed after profite.

Therefore, that without any errour wee may bee able to iudge, if euer that, which wee call profitable, shall seeme too striue wyth it, which is known for honeste a certaine rule is too bee appointed, which if wee wyll folowe in the comparison of thynges, from dutye wee shall neuer swarue.

And

And this rule shall be moste agreable with the trade, and doctrine of the Stoikes: whiche verily in these bokes we therefore folowe, because although of the auncient Academikes, and oure Peripatetikes (who were once al one with the Academikes) those thinges, whiche be honest bee preferred before suche, as seme profitable: yet these more goodlily bee disputed of ỹ Stoikes: to whõe what so is honest: ỹ same semeth profitable: & nothinge semes profitable which is not honest: thã it is of those who reckon somwhat to be honest and not profitable, or somewhat profitable, and not honest. But to vs oure Academia giues great libertie: that whatsoeuer moste prouable cões in place, ỹ same by oure prerogatiue we may lawfully defend. But I returne to the rule. To pul away thẽ any thing from an other, and a man to encrease his commodities with an other mannes discommoditie, it is more againste nature: than death, than pouertie, than paine,

Erit autẽ hæc formula Stoicorum rationi disciplinæque maximè consentanea: q̃ quidẽ in his libris propterea sequimur quod quanq̃ à veteribus Academicis & Peripateticis nostris quiquondã idem erant, qui Academici q̃ honesta sunt anteponuntur ijs, quæ videntur vtilia: tamen ſplendidius hæc ab eis differuntur, quib⁹ quicquid honeſtũ est, idẽ vtile videtur nec vtile quicq̃, q̃ non honeſtum q̃ ab ijs, quibus aut honeſtum aliquid nõ vtile, aut vtile non honeſtum eſt. Nobis autẽ noſtra Academia magnã licentiã dat: vt quodcũq; maximè probabile occurrat, id noſtro iure liceat defendere. Sed redeo ad formulam. Detrahere igitur aliquid alteri, et hominem hominis incõmodo ſuũ augere cõmodũ, magis eſt contra naturã quã mors, q̃ paupertas, quã dolor

quà cætera quæ possunt aut corpori accidere, aut rebus externis. Nam principio tollit conuictum humanum & societatem. Si enim sic erimus affecti, vt propter suum quisq; emolumẽtum spoliet aut violet alterũ, disrumpi necesse est eam, quæ maximè est secundũ naturã humani generis societatem. Vt si vnumquodq; membrũ sensum hunc haberet, vt posse putaret se valere, si proximi membri valetudinẽ ad se traduxisset, debilitari & interire totum corpus necesse esset: sic si vnusquisq; nostrũ rapiat ad se cõmoda aliorũ detrahatq; quicquid possit, emolumẽti sui gratia, societas hominum & cõmunitas euertatur necesse est. Nam vt sibi quisq; malit quæ ad vsum vitæ pertineant quæ alteri acquirere, concessum est non repugnante natura.

and other thynges whiche maye happen eyther to the bodye, or to the outwarde state. For firste of all it takes awaye the conuersation, and felowship of men. For if we shalbe so disposed: that euery manne for his owne commoditie, spoile, & wronge an other: ye felowshippe of mãkinde whiche is moste according to nature muste needes be broken. As if euerie parte of the bodie shoulde haue this ymagination: to thinke, it might be strong, if it had conueied to it selfe the strength of the next limmes: of force it shoulde folow that the whole bodye shoulde bee weakened, and perishe euen so if euery one of vs catche to himselfe the commodities of other, and pulleth from eche man what he can, for his owne profits sake, the felowship, and common companie of men must needes be ouerthrowne. For it is sufferable, & nature not against it: ye euerie man be more willing for himselfe, than for an other man to get what so pertemeth to the vse of his life.

Thys

This doubtlesse nature bothe not suffer ꝥ, wyth the spoyle of other, wee encrease oure riches, substãce, and welth. And not onely it is ordeined by nature, that is to witte, by the vniuersall lawe of nations, but also in like manner, by the lawes of people, whereby in euerye Citie the commonwealth is vpholden, that it should not be lawfull, for a mans owne profits sake, to hurte an other. For the lawes tende to this, and this they meane that the felowshippe of citizens bee in safetie, whiche who so riue a sonder, those with death, banishemente, prisonment, and penalties, they punishe. And this muche more dothe the verye course of nature require, which is the law of God and man, ꝥ whiche whoso is willing to obey (all truely will obey it, ꝥ haue a minde to liue accordinge to nature) shall neuer so offend, that an other mans goodes he woulde couet, and take to himself, that he hath pulled from an other For muche more accordinge

Illud quidẽ natura non patitur, vt aliorum spoliis nostras facultates, copias, opes augeamus. Neq; vero hoc solũ natura, id est, iure gentiũ sed & legibus populorũ, quibus in singulis ciuitatibus Resp. continentur, eodẽ modo constitutum est, vt non liceat sui commodi causa, nocere alteri. Hoc enim spectant leges, hoc volunt: incolumem esse ciuium coniunctionem, quã qui dirimũt, eos morte, exilio, vinculis, damno coercent. Atq; hoc multo magis exigit ipsa naturæ ratio, quæ est lex diuina & humana: cui parere qui velit (omnes autem parebunt qui secundum naturam volunt viuere) nunquam committet, vt alienum appetat, & id, quod alteri detraxerit, sibi assumat. Etenim multo magis est secundum

naturam celsitas & animi magnitudo, itemq; cõmunitas, iustitia, liberalitas, q̃ voluptas, q̃ vita, quam diuitiæ.

Quæ quidem contemnere & pro nihilo ducere comparantẽ cum vtilitate cõmuni, magni animi & excelsi est. Detrahere autem alteri sui cõmodi causa magis est contra naturam quã mors, quam dolor, quam cætera generis eiusdem. Itemq; magis est secundum naturã pro omnibus gentibus (si fieri possit) conseruandis, aut iuuandis maximos labores molestiasq; suscipere, imitantes Herculẽ illum, quẽ hominum fama beneficiorum memor in concilio cœlestiũ collocauit: q̃ viuere in solitudine non modo sine vllis molestiis, sed etiam in maximis voluptatibus abũdantem omnibus copijs, vt excellas etiã pulchritudine & viribus.

to nature is the highest, and greatnesse of courage: & likewise common felowship, iustice, and liberalitie: than pleasure, than life, than rychesse.

Which things doubtlesse for a man to despise and sette at naughte, in comparison of common profite: is a signe of a greate, and hawte corage.

But to pull from an other, for ones owne profites sake, is more against nature: than death, than sorowe, than the rest of the same kinde.

And in lyke manner, more accordinge to nature it is, for the sauinge, and aydinge all nations (if it may possible be done) to vndertake greate trauailes, and paines: folowinge that notable Hercules whom mens reporte, the recorder of deedes, hathe placed in the companie of them aboue: than to liue in solitarinesse, not onely without any paynes, but also in greate pleasures, flowinge full of all ryches: yea thoughe moreouer you may excell all other, in beautie, and strength.

wherefore euerie man of the best, and moste nobie disposition, preferreth that life far before this Wherofit comes to passe, that a man obedient to nature cannot hurte a man.

Furdermore, who so wrongeth an other, that hymselfe may gette some commoditie: eyther beleues, thathe dothe nothinge againste nature, or wenes that he shoulde shone deathe, pouertie, sorowe, the losse also of childre, kinsfolke, friends, rather thā the doing of iniury to any man.

If he thinketh nothinge to be done againste nature, in wrongynge of menne: what shoulde you reason with him whiche cleane takes awaye mā frō mā: But if he plainely thinkethe ỹ meete to be auoided: & yet these hee demeth muche worse, deathe, pouerty sorow: he is in this point out of the way: that he taketh any discommoditie eyther of the body, or of fortune to be forer, than the vices of the minde.

Therefore there must be in all menne one entent:

Q.iii. that

Quocirca optimo quisque splēdidissimoq; ingenio longè illam vitam huic anteponit. Ex quo efficitur, hominē naturæ obedientem, homini nocere nō posse. Deīde qui alterum violat, vt ipse aliquid commodi consequatur: aut nihil se existimat contra naturā facere: aut magis fugienda censet mortem, paupertatem, dolorē, amissionē etiā liberorum, propinquorum, amicorum, q̄ facere cuipiam iniuriam. Si nihil existimat contra naturam fieri hominibus violandis: quid cum eo disseras, qui omnino hominem ex homine tollat? Sin fugiendum id quidem censet, sed multò illa peiora, mortem, paupertatem, dolorem: errat in eo quòd vllum aut corporis aut fortunæ vitium, animi vitijs grauius existimat. Ergo vnum debet esse omnibus propositum

vt eadem sit vtilitas vniuscuiusq; & vniuersorum: q̃ si ad se quisq. rapiat, dissoluetur omnis humana consociatio. Atq; sicuti hoc natura prascribit, vt homo homini quicunq; sit, ob eam ipsam causam, quod is homo sit, cõsulitũ velit: necesse est secundum eandem naturã, omniũ vtilitatem esse communem. Quod si ita est, vna continemur omnes, & eadem lege naturæ. Idq; ipsum, si ita est, certe violare alterũ naturæ lege prohibemur, verũ auctem primum verum igitur et extremum. Nam illud quidem absurdum est, q̃ quidam dicunt, parenti se aut fratri nihil detracturos commodi sui causa. Sed aliam rationem esse ciuium reliquorum. His sibi nihil iuris & nullam societatem communis vtilitatis causa statuunt esse cum

that alike may be the profite of euery sere man, & of al vniuersally. Which profit if eche man plucke vnto himself, all mans felowship shall be dissolued. And if nature dothe also appointe this, that man woulde haue menne prouyded for, whatsoeuer hee bee, yet euen for this same respecte, because he is a man, it muste needes folow, that accordinge to the same nature the profite of all be in common. Whiche if it be so, we al be contained in one, and the like lawe of nature. And if the same be so, doubtlesse, by the lawe of nature, wee are forbidden one to wronge an other.

Nowe, the antecedente is true, therefore true also is the consequente. For that verelie is reasonlesse, that some say, from their parent, or brother, thei will take nothinge awaye, for cause of their owne profite, but of other citizens, that there is an other respect to be hadde. These bee in opinion, that they haue no lawe, nor felowshippe to keepe wyth citie-

citizens, for a comō profittes sake, whiche opinion dothe rippe a sonder all the societie of a citie.

And thei that saie, there muste regarde be hadde of citiezens, and none of forainers, doo ryue a sonder the common felowshippe of mankinde, whiche beinge destroied, all bountifulnesse, liberalitie, goodnesse, and iustice, is vtterly rooted vppe, whiche who so take awaie, euen towarde the goddes immortall are to bee countpted irreligious. For suche doo ouerthrowe the felowshyp by them amonge men ordeined. Of the whiche felowship the surest boande, is to thinke it to bee more against nature, for one manne to vse extortion to an other, for hys owne profitts sake, than to suffer all discommodities, either outwarde, or of the bodye, yea or of the minde: whiche happen without iust deseruinge.

For this vertue, Iustice of all vertues is the ladie, and Quene.

ciuibus: quæ sententia omnē societatem distrahit ciuitatis. Qui autem ciuium rationem dicunt esse habendam, externorum negant hi dirimunt communem humani generis societatem: qua sublata, beneficentia, liberalitas, bonitas iustitia funditus tollitur. Quæ qui tollunt, etiam aduersus deos immortales impij iudicandi sunt, ab his enim cōstitutam inter homines societatem euertunt: cuius societatis arctissimum vinculum est, magis arbitrari esse cōtra naturam hominem homini detrahere sui commodi causa, quàm omnia incommoda subire vel externa, vel corporis, vel etiam ipsius animi, quæ vacent iustitia.

Hæc enim vna virtus omnium est domina & regina virtutum.

Forsitan quispiam dixerit, nonne igitur sapiens, si fame ipse conficiatur, abstulerit cibũ alteri homini ad nullã rem vtilẽ minimè vero. Non enim mihi est vita mea vtilior, q̃ animi talis affectio, neminem vt violem commodi mei gratia. Quid si Phalarim crudelem tyrannum & immanem vir bonus, ne ipse frigore cõficiatur, vestitu spoliare possit, nõne faciat? Hac adiudicanda sunt facillima. Nã si quid ab homine ad nullam partem vtilitatis tuæ causa detraxeris: inhumane feceris, contraq̃ naturæ legẽ. Sin autem is tu sis, qui multã vtilitatẽ Reip. atq̃ hominũ societati, si in vita remaneas afferre possis si quid ob eam causam alteri detraxeris, non sit reprehendendũ. Sin autẽ id nõ sit eiusmodi, suũ cuiq̃ incõmodum ferendum est potius,

Peraduenture, some will say: Shall not then the wyse man, if he bee driuen by famine, take awaye meate from an other man good for nothing: no doubte he. For my life is no more profitable to mee: than such a disposition of mynde, that I wronge no body for my profites sake.

What if a good manne could spoyle the cruell, and beastly tirant Phalaris of his clothing, that he shoulde not die for colde himselfe: might he not do it? These be full easie to iudge.

If ye take ought, from a man on no behalfe profitable, for loue of youre owne commoditie: ye shall doe vnkindly, and against the lawe of nature: but if you be the man, who may bringe muche profit vnto the cõmonweale, & the felowshyp of mẽ, if you remain aliue: in case ye take awaye oughte from an other, vpon that consideration: it is not to bee reproued: but if ỹ matter standeth not euen so: euery manne must rather beare his own discõmoditie,

than

than pull awaie of an others commodities. Sickenesse thē or pouertie, or any such like is not more against nature: than extorcion, and gredines of an other mannes goodes. But to leaue alone the common profite, is against nature: for it is vniuste.

Therefore the verie lawe of nature, which preserueth, and maintaineth mens profite: appointeth without dout: that from the vile, and vnprofitable manne, necessarie thinges to liue with bee conueyed to the wise, the good, and the manlie man: whoe, if he shoulde dye for want, shoulde drawe awaye with him muche of the commō profite: and yet so he must doe it: that neither by ouerweeninge in himselfe, nor louinge of himselfe to well, hee make this a pretenced colour to do wronge. Therefore alwaies let him do his duetie, prouidinge for the profite of mē, & that felowship amonge men, which I oftentimes repeate. For as touchinge Phalaris case, the iudgemēt is very easie.

quam de alterius commodis detrahendū. Non igitur magis est contra naturā morbus aut egestas, aut quid eiusmodi, q̄ detractio atq; appetitio alieni. Sed communis vtilitatis derelictio contra naturā est: est enim iniusta. Itaq; lex ipsa naturæ q. vtilitatē hominū conseruat, & cōtinet, decernit profectō, vt ab homine inerti atq; inutili ad sapientē bonum, fortemq; virum transferantur res ad viuendum necessarie, qui si occiderit, multum de cōmuni vtilitate detraxerit modo hoc ita faciat, vt ne ipse de se bene existimans, seseque diligens, hanc causā habeat ad iniuriam. Itaq; semp officio fungatur, vtilitati consulens hominū, & ei, q̄ sæpe commemoro, humanæ societati. Nam quod ad Phalarim attinet, perfacile iudiciū est.

For

Nulla.n. nobis cum tirannis societas est, sed potius summa distractio, neq; est contra naturam spoliare eum si possis, quē honestū est necare. Atq; hoc omne genus pestiferum atque impium ex hominum cōmuniate exterminandum est. Etenim vt membra quædam amputantur, si & ipsa sanguine & tanq; spiritu carere cœperunt, et nocent reliquis partibus corporis: sic ista in figura hominis feritas & immanitas belua à cōmuni tanq; humanitate corporis segreganda est. Huius generis q̄stiones sunt omnes ea, in quib⁹ ex tēpore officiū exquiritur. Eiusmodi igitur credo res Panætium persecuturum fuisse, nisi aliquis casus aut occupatio cōsiliū ei⁹ peremisset. Ad quas ipsas cōsultationes ex superioribus libris satis multa p̄cepta sunt,

For wyth tyrantes we haue no societie, but rather bee at extreeme dissentiō with thē, neither is it againste nature to spoile hym, if ye can whom it is honest to kill, and all suche pestilent, and wicked rables are to be dryuen oute of the companies of men.

For euen as certaine limmes be cutte of if they once begin both to lacke bloode, and life (as you would say) and also do hurte the other partes of the bodie, so thys sauagenesse, and crueltie of a beaste, vnder the shape of a man, muste be parted (as it were) from the common naturalnesse, of mannes bodye.

Of this sorte be all those questions, wherein dutie is sought out by circumstaunce of time.

Suche matters therefore I beleue, Panetius would haue treated, hadde not some chaunce or businesse preuented his purpose. Concerning which manner of takinge aduisemente, in my bookes afore, many thinges be sufficientlye taughte, by

which

whiche, it may be perceaued, what is to be auoyded, for dishonestie, and what is not to be shonned, because it is not dishonest.

But forasmuche as of oure worke begonne, yet almoste ended, nowe (as who sayth) wee set on the roofe, as the Geometers are wont not to proue al, but to requyre, that certaine things be graunted them, to the intent, they maie more easilie sette oute their purpose, so doo I require of you my Cicero, that ye graunt mee, yf ye maye, that nothinge but that, whiche is honest, is for it selfe to be desired.

But if it maie not be graunted, because of Cratippus, yet this no doubte you wyll graunte mee, that the thynge whiche is honest, is chiefelye for it selfe to be desired.

Whether ye will, is ynoughe for mee, and bothe the one, and the other seemes the more proueable, neither anye thinge els appeareth proueable.

And fyrste, in thys poynte Panetius is to be defēded, because

quib⁹ perspici possit quid sit propter turpitudinem fugiendum quid sit id, quidcirco fugiendū non sit quia omnino turpe nō sit. Sed quoniā operi inchoato prope tamen absoluto tanq̄ fastigium imponim⁹ vt geometræ solent non omnia docere, sed postulare vt quædam sibi concedantur, quo facilius quæ velint explicent: sic ego à te postulo mi Cicero, vt mihi concedas, si potes, nihil præter id, quod honestum sit, esse propter se expetendum.

Siu hoc non licet propter Cratippum: at illud certe dabis, quòd honestum sit. id esse maxime propter se expetendum. Mihi vtrum vis satis est: & tum hoc, tum illud probabilius videtur: nec præterea quicquam probabile. Ac primum Panætius in hoc defendendus est,

quod non vtilia cum honestis pugnare aliquando posse dixerit (neque enim ei fas erat (sed eaquæ viderentur vtilia. Nihil vero vtile, q̃ non idem honestum: Nihil honestum quod non idẽ vtile sit sæpe testatur: negat̃ vllam pestem maiorem in vitam hominum inuasisse, quã eorum opinionẽ, qui ista distraxerint.

Ita q̃ non vt aliquando anteponerimus vtilia honestis: sed vt ea sine errore dijudicaremus, si quando incidissent, induxit eam, quæ videretur esse, non quæ esset, repugnantiam.

Hanc igitur partem relictam explebimus, nulli ad miniculis, sed (vt dicitur) Marte nostro. Neque enim quicquam de hac parte post Panætium explicatum est,

because he sayd not, y profitable thinges at anye tyme strywe wythe honest (for it was not lawfull for hym so to saye) but those whiche seme profitable, might strywe wyth honestye. But he often witnesseth, that nothing is profitable: whiche same is not honest: nor honest which same is not profitable: and he denieth any greater pestilence to haue crepte into mans life: than ther opinion, who haue deuided these two a sonder.

Therfore he brought in the repugnance: which did seme to be, and was not in deede: not that, at any tyme, wee should preferre profitable thinges before honest: but that without errour, wee might discerne them, if euer they fell in place.

This parte therfore lefte vntouched, we will supply: with no others ayde, but (as they say in warre) euen with our owne force. For touching this percell, ther hath been, synce Panetius wrote, nothinge set, oute

that

that liked me: of al, that euer came to oure handes.

Therefore, when any shewe of profitte is offered vs, we muste nedes bee styred: but if, when ye giue good heede, ye see dishonestye ioyned with that thing, whiche bringeth a shewe of profitte, then the profite is not to be desired, butte wee muste thinke, where dishonestye is there profite canne not be.

Now, if nothing there be so muche againste nature, as dishonestie (for nature dothe desire good, and conuenient, and stedfast thinges, & despiseth the contrarie (and again there is nothing so accordyng to nature, as profite, doubtles in the same profitable thinge dishonesty can not be. And also, if we bee borne to honestie: and it is either onely to be desired, as to Zeno it seemed, or in all estimation, is to be coumpted of more valew, than al other thynges, as pleaseth Aristotle, it muste needes bee, that the thinge, whiche is honest, is either the onelye, or the

quod mihi quidem probaretur, de ijs, quæ in manus meas venerũt. Cum igitur aliqua species vtilitatis obiecta est: nos cõmoueri necesse est. Sed si cum animũ attenderis, turpitudinẽ videas adiunctã ei rei, quæ specie vtilitatis attulerit: tũc nõ vtilitas requirenda est: sed intelligendum, vbi turpitudo sit, ibi vtilitatem esse non posse. Quòd si nihil est tã cõtra naturã q̃ turpitudo (recta.n. et cõuenientia & constantia natura desyderat a spernaturq̃ cõtraria) nihil q̃ tam secũdũ naturã, q̃ vtilitas certè in eadem re vtili turpitudò esse, non potest. Itemq̃ si ad honestatem nati sumus, eaq̃ aut sola expetenda est, vt Zenoni est visum: aut certè omni pondere grauior habenda, q̃ reliqua omnia, quod Aristoteli placet: necesse est quod honestum sit, id esse aut solum,

aut ſummum bonum: quod autem bonum, id certè vtile. Itaque quicquid honeſtum, id vtile. Quare error hominum non proborum, cum aliquid, quod vtile viſum eſt arripuit: id continuo ſecernit ab honeſto.

Hinc ſicæ, hinc venena, hinc falſa teſtamenta naſcuntur: hinc furta, peculatus, expilationes, direptioneſque ſociorum & ciuium: hinc opum nimiarum potentiæ non ferendæ: poſtremò etiam in liberis ciuitatibus exiſtunt regnandi cupiditates: quibus nihil nec terrius, nec fœdius excogitari poteſt. Emolumenta enim rerum, fallacibus iudicijs vident: pœnam, non dico legum, quas ſæpe perrumpunt, ſed ipſius turpitudinis, quæ acerbiſſima eſt non vident.

or the ſouereigne good, and what ſo is good, the ſame doubtleſſe is profitable And ſo all, that is honeſt, is profitable.

Wherefore when the errowre of mē not honeſt hath caught holde of ſomewhat that ſeemeth profitable, by and by it deuides the ſame from honeſtie.

Hereof murders, hereof poyſonynges, hereof counterfette willes doo ſpryng, hereof felony, hereof robbing the treaſurie, pillage, and extortions from leagfrends, and citizens, hereof groweth the power of two exceedinge riches, not to be ſuffered, & finally in free cities there bee the deſires of rulinge, whereas nothynge eyther more cruel, than they, or more deteſtable, can be ymaginèd.

For with deceiuable eies they ſee the gaine of thinges but the punishment, I will not ſay, of the lawes whiche they often breake thorough, but of diſhoneſtie it ſelfe, whiche is worſt of all, they ſee not.

Wher-

Wherefore let such takers of aduisement bee driuen from amonge vs (for they are altogither wicked, and vngodlye) who vse aduisemēt whether thei maye folowe that, whiche seemes to be honest, or wittingly staine thēselues with dishonestie.

For in the very doubtinge a great fault ther is, although they neuer come to the doing of it.

Therefore those thinges are not to be aduised on at all, in which the very taking af aduisement is dishonest.

And also in all deliberation, the hope, and opinion of concealing, and hidinge of matters is to be put away.

For fullie (in case wee haue any whit profited in philosophie) we oughte to be perswaded, thoughe we coulde hide it from all goddes, and men, that nothinge yet couetously, nothing vniustly, nothing wantonly, nothing vnstatedly is meete to be done.

Herevpon that Gyges is brought in by Plato, who, when the earth had opened in certaine greate stormes went

Quamobrem hoc quidē deliberantiū genus pellatur è medio (est enim totum sceleratū et impiū) qui deliberās virū id sequantur q̄ honestū esse videant, an sc scientes scelere contaminent. In ipsa enim dubitatione facinus inest etiāsi ad id non peruenerint. Ergo ea deliberanda omnino non sunt, in quibus est turpis ipsa deliberatio.

Atq; etiā ex omni deliberatione celandi, & occultandi spes opinioq; remouenda est. Satius enim nobis (si modò in philosophia aliquid profecimus) persuasum esse debet, si omnes deos homines q̄ celare possim⁹ nihil tamē auarè nihil iniustè, nihil libidinosè, nihil incontinenter esse faciendū. Hinc ille Giges inducitur à Platone, qui cum terra discessisset magnis quibusdam imbribus,

in illum hiatum descendit, eneumq; equum (vt ferunt fabulæ) animaduertit, cuius in lateribus fores essent: quibus apertis, hominis mortui vidit corporis magnitudine insignia, anulumq; aureũ in digito. quem vt detraxit, atq; ipse induit (erat aut ẽ regius pastor) tum in concilium pastorum se recepit: ibi cum palam eius anuli ad palmam conuerterat, à nullo videbatur, ipse autem omnia videbat: idem rursus videbatur, cum in locum anulum conuerterat. Itaq; hac opportunitate anuli vsus, reginæ stuprum intulit: eaq; adiutrice regem dominum interemit, sustulitq; quo obstare arbitrabatur, nec in his quisquam eum facinoribus videre potuit. sic repente anuli beneficio Rex exortus est Lidyæ.

wente downe into ỹ gapyng hole: and spyed a brazen horse, (as the fables tell) in whose sides were dores: which beinge opened, he saw the corse of a deade manne, of an vnwonted hugenesse: and a golde ringe vpon hys finger: whiche as sone as he pulled of, he putte it on hys owne finger (For this Gyges was the kinges shepparde) Then he got hymself agayne to the cõpany of sheppardes. There when hee had turned the hed of that ringe toward the palme of his hande: he was seene of no bodie, yet he sawe euery thinge: & he was seen agayne, when he hadde turned the ringe in sight. And so vsinge this vantage of the ringe, he laye with the queene: and by her ayde, he slewe the kynge hys mayster: and made dispatche of them, whome he thoughte to stande in his way. Neyther coulde anie man se hym beinge aboute these mischieuous deedes.

So by the commoditie of his ringe, he became sodeinly kinge of Lydia.

This

This same ryng then if a parfit wise man shold haue: he would thinke it nomore lawfull for him too offende, thã if he had it not. For honest things, not secret thigs by good men be sought.

And in thys place certeyne philosophers, and those not of the worst, but yet not all of the finest fay: that Plato tolde a fayned, and deuised fable, as though hee defendeth, that eyther the thynge was done, or was possible to be done.

Thys is the effecte of thys ringe, and of thys example: if no man shold know or no man shold one suspect, when you shoulde doo anye thyng, for regard of riches, power, rule or lust, yea if it shoulde bee vnknowne for euer both of god, and man: whether you woulde doe it, or no. They denie it possyble too befall: and although it can not so befall in deede: yet I demaunde, in case that might befall, which they deny to be possible what wold they doo? They force on, grossely in good sothe.

Hunc igitur ipsum anulum si habeat sapiens, nihilò plus sibi licere putet peccare, q̃ si non haberet. Honesta.n. bonis viris non occulta quærunt. Atq́ hoc loco philosophi quidã, minimè mali illi quidẽ, sed non satis acuti, fictam & commentitiam fabulam dicunt prolatam à Platone, quasi verò ille aut factum id esse, aut fieri potuisse defendat. Hæc est vis huius anuli et huius exempli: si nemo sciturus, nemo ne suspicaturus quidem sit, cũ aliquid diuitiarum, potentiæ, dominationis, libidinis causa feceris: si id dijs, hominibusq; futurum sit semper ignotum, sis ne factur⁹? Negant id fieri posse quanquam potest id quidem. Sed quæro: quod negãt posse id si posset, quidnam facerent? Vrgent sanè rusticè

negant enim posse, & in eo perstant. Hoc verbum, si, quid valeat, non vident. Cum enim quærimus, si possint cælare, quid facturi sint, non quærimus, possint ne cælare: sed tanquam tormenta quædam adhibemus: vt si responderint se impunitate proposita facturos quod expediat, facinorosos se esse fateantur: si negent, omnia turpia per se ipsa fugienda esse concedant.

Sed iam ad propositum reuertamur. Incidunt sæpe multæ causæ, quæ conturbant animos vtilitatis specie, non cum hoc deliberetur relinquendane sit honestas propter vtilitatis magnitudinem (nam id quidem improbum est) sed illud, possit ne id, quod vtile videatur, fieri non turpiter.

For they holde, it is vnpossible, and therein they stay still.

What thys worde, if, importeth, they see not. For when we demaunde, if they bee able too conceale, what they wyll doo? wee doo not demaunde whether they bee able to conceale it, or no, but wee lay before them as it were the racke, and certeyne manikles, that if they aunswer, they would doo, what them liked, bring sure to skape scotfree, they confesse themselues to bee wycked, if they say, they would not, they graunt, all dishonest thinges for themselues, meete too be eschewed. But now let vs returne too our purpose.

Ther doo oftentimes befall diuers matters, which trouble mens mindes, vnder a showe of profite, not when thys is aduised vpon whether honestie is too bee lefte for the greatnesse of profit (for ỹ plainly is wicked) but whether the thinge which semeth profitable, may bee done without dishonestye.

when

When Brutus toke a waye the rule from Collatinus Tarquinius, his office felowe, hee myght haue been thought to doo it vniustlye, for, in dryuyng out ỹ kings, he had been Brut⁹ assistant, and ayder also of hys counsels.

But when the rulers had agreed thus in counsell, that the kynred of Superbus, & the name of the Tarquinians, and the memorie of the kingdome shold bee vtterly driuen out, because it was profitable too prouide for their cõtrey, the same was in such wise honest, that euẽ every Collatinus ought too haue liked it. And so profit preuayled, because of honestye, without which, profite coulde not haue been at all.

But wyth the kyng, who buylded thys citie, it fared not so. For a showe of profit strake in hys minde, too whõ when it appered more profitable, for hym too rule alone, than with an other, he slew hys brother. Thys man forgot both godlinesse,

Cum Collatino Tarquinio Collegæ Brutus imperium abrogabat: poterat videri facere id iniuste, fuerat enim in regibus expellendis socius Bruti consiliorum, & adiutor.

Cum autem consilium hoc principes cepissent: cognationem superbi, nomenq; Tarquinionum, & memoriam regni esse tollendam: quod erat vtile patriæ consulere, id erat ita honestum, vt etiam ipsi Collatino placere deberet. Itaque vtilitas valuit propter honestatem, sine qua nec vtilitas quidem esse potuisset.

At in eo rege qui vrbem condidit, non ita. Species.n. vtilitatis animum impulit eius cui cũ visum esset vtilius solum, q̃ cum altero regnare, fratrem interemit.

Omisit hic & pietatem

& humanitatem, vt id, quod vtile videbatur, neque erat, assequi posset: & tamen muri causam opposuit speciem honestatis, nec probabilem, nec satis idoneam. Peccauit igitur, pace vel Quirini vel Romuli dixerim.

Nec tamen nostræ nobis vtilitates omittendæ sunt aliis què tradendæ, cum his ipsi egeam°: sed suæcuique vtilitati, quod sine alterius iniuria fiat, seruiendum est.

Scitè Chrisippus, vt multa, Qui stadium (inquit) currit, enitì & contendere debet quam maximè possit, vt vincat: supplantare eum, qui cum certet, aut manu depellere nullo modo debet.

and naturalnesse: that hee might obteyne the thinge, that seemed profitable, and was not so in deede, and yet hys brothers leapinge ouer the wall hee alledged, for a colour of honestie, neyther alowable, nor sufficient ynought.

He offended therfore, that by Quirinus, Romulus fauour I may say it.

Notwithstãding wee ought not too leaue our own commodities, and gyue them too other, when our selues doo neede the same, but euerye man must serue hys owne profit so farre, as without an others iniurie it may be doone.

Feately said Chrisippus in thys, as he dyd in many thynges mo, whoso, quoth he, runneth in ỹ race, ought to endeuour, and labour, as muche as he may, that hymselfe may wynne the game, but in no wise hee ought too trippe hym, with hom hee runnes, or to keepe hym of wyth hys hand.

So in this life it is not vnlawfull for euerye man too get himself, that maye serue hys vse, but too pull from an other, it is no right.

But most of al, duties be put out of order in frendeshippes, in the which, it is against dutie both not to do, that rightfully you maye, and too do, that is not lawfull. But of all thys matter a shorte, and no harde rule ther is.

For these, which seme profitable, honours, riches, pleasures, and other of the same kinde, ar neuer too bee preferred afore frendeship. And a good man, for hys frendes sake, nother will do againste the common weale nother against hys othe, and promes, no not thought hee shall be iuge vpon his owne frende. For he puttes of the personage of a frende, when he takes vpon him the person of a iuge. Thus much he shall leane too frendeship: ỹ he had rather, hys frendes cause were true, and that hee will graunt hym time thoroughly too pleade his cause,

Sic in vita sibi quenque petere, quod pertineat ad vsũ, non iniquum est: alteri diripere, ius non est.

Maximè autẽ perturbãtur officia in amicis, quibus & non tribuere quod rectè possis, & tribuere quod non sit æquum, contra officium est.

Sed huius generis totius breue et nõ difficile præceptum est. Quæ enim videntur vilia, honores, diuitiæ, voluptates, cæteraque generis eiusdem, hæc amicitiæ nunquam anteponenda sunt. Ac neq; contra Remp. neq; contra iusiurandum, ac fidem amici sui causa vir bonus faciet: nec si iudex quidem erit de ipso amico. Ponit enim personam amici, cum induit iudicis, tantum dabit amicitiæ, vt veram amici causam esse malit. & vt perorandæ liti tempus,

quod per leges liceat, accõmodet. Cum vero iurato dicenda sententia sit, meminerit Deum se adhibere testem, id est (vt ego arbitror) mentem suam, qua nihil homini dedit Deus ipse diuinius. Itaq; præclarum à maioribus accepimus morem rogandi iudicis (si eum teneremus) qua salua fide facere posset. Hæc rogatio ad ea pertinet, quæ paulo ante dixi, honestè amico à iudice posse concedi. Nam si omnia facienda sint q; amici velint, non amicitiæ tales, sed coniurationes putandæ sunt. Loquor autem de communibus amicitijs. Nam in sapientibus viris atq; perfectis nihil potest esse tale. Damonẽ et Pythiã Pythagoreos ferunt hoc animo inter se fuisse, vt cum eorum alteri Dionysius tirannus diem necis destinauisset,

as much as by the lawes hee may. But when by his othe hee is to gyue sentence: hee must remember, hee taketh God to witnesse, that is to meane (as I suppose) hys cõscience, for nothing more godlike than it is, hath god himselfe gyuen to man. Therfore of our auncetors wee haue receiued a goodly maner of desiring ỹ fauour of a iuge if wee would kepe it. Too do what hee may sauing his othe. This requeſt is referred to those thinges: which, a litle before is sayde, might honestly bee graunted by a iuge to his frende. For if all things should bee done whiche frendes would desire, such were to be counted not amyties, but conspiracies.

I speake now of common frendshippes. For in men wyse, and perfite, there can bee no such thing. Wen say, that Damon, and Pythias, the Pythagoreans, were so affectioned, one toward ad other, that when Dionisius, the tirant, had appointed one of them his dieng daye: and

and hee, who was condemned too dye: had required certaine dates of respite, for the disposing of his things: the other became bound body for body, for his forthecomming, vpon condition that if hee returned not at hys day, hee would him selfe dye for him. Who, when at hys day hee was cõe again: the tiraunt wondringe at their faithfulnes, required, that they would take hym in for the thirde in their frendeship. When therefore that whiche in frendshippe seemeth profitable, is compared with that, whych is honest: let the show of profit yelde, and honestye preuayle.

But when in frendeshippe those thynges shall be required, which bee not honest, let religion, & vprightnes bee preferred before frendeship: & so shall that choice of duty be had, which wee seeke after. But vnder the showe of profit, in the common weale ther is oftentimes doynge amisse, as our mẽ did in the razing of Corinth.

& is, qui morti addictus esset, paucos sibi dies commendandorum suorum causa postulauisset: vas factus est alter eius sistendi: vt si ille non reuertisset ad diem: moriendum esset ipsi. Qui cum ad diem se recepisset, admiratus eorum fidem tyrannus petiuit vt se in amicitiam tertium asscriberent.

Cum igitur id quod vtile videtur in amicitia, cum eo quod honestum est, comparatur, iaceat vtilitatis species, valeat honestas.

Cum autẽ in amicitia, quæ honesta non sunt postulabuntur: religio & fides anteponantur amicitiæ. Sic habebitur is, quem exquirimus, delectus officij. Sed vtilitatis specie in republi. sæpissimè peccatur. vt in Corinthi disturbatione nostri

durius etiam Athenienſes, qui ſtatuerũt, vt Aeginetis, qui claſſe valebant, pollices præciderentur. Hoc viſum eſt vtile: nimis.n. immi-
nebat propter propinquitatẽ Aegina Piræo. Sed nihil, q̃ crudele, vtile. Eſt.n. hominũ naturæ, q̃ ſequi debemus, maximè inimica crudelitas. Malè etiam, qui peregrinos vrbibus vti prohibẽt, coſq; exterminãt: vt Petroni⁹ apud patres noſtros, Papius nuper. Nam eſſe pro ciue qui ciuis non ſit rectum eſt non licere: quam tulerunt legem ſapientiſſimi conſules Craſſus et Scæuola: vſu vero vrbis prohibere peregrinos: ſanè inhumanum eſt.

Illa præclara in quib⁹ publicæ vtilitatis ſpecies præ honeſtate contemnitur. Plena exemplorum eſt noſtra R. publi. cum ſæpe alias,

Solon alſo dyd the Athenians, who made a decree that the Egynetes thombes, who wer ſkilled in naungation, ſhould bee cut of.

This was thought profytable: for Egina did too much ouerlooke Pireum, by reaſon of the nere bordering. But nothing, that is cruell, is profitable. For too manneſ nature, which wee ought to folow, cruelnes is moſt enemy.

They alſo doo euill, who barre ſtraungers from vſing ther citie, and doo banyſhe them: as did Petronius, in our fathers daies, and Papius of late yres.

For, one to go for a citizẽ, who is no citizen, it is reaſon, it ſhould not be lawful, the which lawe ẏ very wiſe Conſuls, Craſſus, & Scæuola did make: but too forbidde ſtraungers the vſe of the citie, it is doutleſſe an vnciuill part. Thoſe doings be notable, wherin ſhowe of comon profit is deſpiſed in reſpect of honeſty. Our cõmõ weale is full of exãples, both often at other tymes,

and

and chiefly in the secõd Punike warre: which, after the ouerthrow taken at Cãnae, had greater corages, than euer in p̃ osperitie, no token ther was of feare, no mentiõ of peas. So great is the force of honestie, that it dymmeth the show of profite.

When the Athenians no way were able to withstand the assault of the Persians: and were determined, that leauing the city, and settyng their wiues, and children in Troezen, they would take their shyps, & defend ẏ liberties of Greece, with their naue, one Cyrsilus they stoned too death, who perswaded wyth them, too keepe still the citie, and receyue Xerxes. And he seemed too foiow profit: but that was none, where honestye gainstode it.

Themistocles, after ẏ victorie of that battail, whyche was holdẽ with ẏ Persiãs, said in the opẽ assemble, that he had wealfull coũsell for ẏ state, but it was not expediẽt, it shold be opẽly knowen, here-

tũ maximè bello punico secũdo, q̃ Cannẽsi calamitate accepta maiores animos habuit, q̃ vnquam rebus secũdis. Nulla fuit timoris significatio, nulla mẽtio pacis. Tãta vis est honesti, vt speciẽ vtilitatis obscuret. Atheniensis cum Persarũ impetum nullo modo possent sustinere, statuerentq̃, vt vrbe relicta coniugibus & liberis Troezene depositis, naues cõscenderent, libertatemq̃ Graeciae ipsa defenderent, Cyrsilũ quendã suadentẽ, vt in vrbe manerent, Xerxemq̃ reciperent, lapidibus obruerunt. Atqui ille sequi vtilitatem videbatur: sed ea nulla erat repugnante honestate. Themistocles post victoriam eius belli, quod cum Persis fuit, dixit in concione se habere consilium Reipub salutare, sed id sciri opus non esse.

Postulauit vt aliquem populus daret, qui cum communicaret. Datus est Aristides. Huic ille, classem Lacedæmoniorũ, quæ subducta esset ad Gytheum, clàm incẽdi posse, quo facto frangi Lacedæmoniorũ opes necesse esset.

Quod Aristides cum audiuisset, in concionem magna expectatione venit: dixitque perutile esse consilium, quod Themistocles afferret, sed minimè honestum. itaque Athenienses quod honestum non esset, id ne vtile quidem putauerunt: totamque eam rem, quam ne audiuerãt quidem, authore Aristide repudiauerunt.

Melius hi quam nos, qui piratas immunes, socios vectigales habemus.

Mancat ergo, quod turpe sit,

he requirde, that the people should assigne some man, to whom he should tell it. Aristides was appointed. He tolde him, the naupe of the Lacedemonians, which was conueyed to Gytheum, might priuilie bee set a fyre: by which act, the Lacedemonians strength should of necessitie be abated.

Which thing whẽ Aristides had heard, he came to ẏ open assemble, with their greate expectacion, and sayde, it was verie profitable counsell, whych Themistocles dyd gyue, but nothing honest.

Therfore the Athenians, the thing, that was not honest, did not count profitable at all: and, beinge aduertised by Aristides, they reiected the holle matter, whiche they had not once heard.

Better did they, than wee doo, who haue pirates vnponnyshed, and leagefrendes tributarie.

Let thys therfore stande for a conclusion, that the thing, which is not honest,

is

is neuer profitable: no not euen then, when ye atteyne the thing, which you recken to bee profitable. For the same too thinke profitable, whiche is dishonest, a myserable case it is.

But often tymes (as I sayde before) ther so befall cases, when profit seemeth too striue against honestye, that is too bee considered, whether altogether it dothe gaynstande it, or may bee made agre with honesty.

Of that kynde bee these questions: if, for examples sake, a good manne departing from Alexandria, shall bringe too Rhodes a greate quantitie of corne, in ỹ tyme of scarcitie, and famine, and extreme derthe of corne among the Rhodians, in case the same manne know, that many marchantes bee alreadye sette forthe from Alexandrie: and sawe theyr shyppes, freighted wyth corne, in their course makynge towarde Rhodes: whether hee ought too declare it too the Rhodians,

id nunquam esse vtile: ne tum quidem, cum id, quod esse vtile putes, adipiscare. Hoc enim ipsum vtile putare, quod turpe sit calamitosum est.

Sed incidũt (vt supra dixi) sæpe casus, cum repugnare vtilitas honestati videatur: vt animaduertendum sit repugnet ne plane, an possit cũ honestate coniungi. Eius generis hæ sunt quæstiones. Si, exempli gratia, vir bonus ab Alexandria profectus Rhodum magnum frumenti numerum adduxerit in Rhodiorum inopia & fame summaq; annonæ caritate: si idem sciat complures mercatores Alexandria soluisse, nauesq; in earsu frumento onustas petentes Rhodum viderit: dicturus nè sit Rhodijs id,

an silentia suum quam plurimo venditurus?

Sapientem & bonum virum fingimus: de eius deliberatione & consultatione quærimus: qui celaturus Rhodios non sit, si id turpe iudicet: sed dubitet an turpe non sit.

In huiusmodi causis aliud Diogeni Babilonio videri solet magno & graui Stoico, aliud Antipatro discipulo eius homini acutissimo.

Antipatro omnia patefacienda, vt nequid omnino, quod venditor norit, emptor ignoret. Diogeni venditorem, quatenus iuris ciuili constitutum sit, dicere vitia oportere, cætera sine insidijs agere: & quoniam vendat, velle quàm optimè vendere. Aduexi, expossui,

or with silence shoulde sell hys owne for as muche as hee might.

Wee put the case here, of a wise, and good man: touching his deliberation, and taking of aduisement, wee question, who woulde not hide it from the Rhodians, if hee thought it dishonest: but hee douteth, whether it be dishonest, or no.

In such maner cases, one thynge Diogenes the Babilonian, a great, and graue Stoik, is wont to thinke, an other thing, Antipater, hys scholar, a very sharpe wytted man.

Antipater holdeth that all must bee opened, that the byer be ignorant of no maner thinge, which the seller knoweth, Diogenes saith, ỹ seller ought to tel ỹ faults, ỹ as farre as is appointed by the ciuill lawe, and the reste too do without deceits, and seeing hee selleth, too desyre wyth the beste auauntage too sell.

Hither haue I brought it, I haue set it forthe to sale.

I sell

I sell mine for no more than other do, perchaunce also for lesse, seeing I haue greater store, to whom is the wrong done: Ther groweth a disputation by Antipater, of the contrary syde, what go ye aboute? Sithens ye are bound too profite men, & too serue ỹ felowship of man, & ye are borne vnder suche a law, that ye shoulde keepe those principles of nature, whych ye ought too obey, & alwayes too folowe, that your profit should bee common profit, againe, and as well, common profit should be yours: wyll you hyde frō men both what commoditie, and what store also is at hād for them?

Diogenes paraduenture wyll aunswere thus: It is not all one thinge too hyde from menne, and too holde ones peas, neyther doo I now hide it from ye, though I tell ye not, what is the nature of Goddes, what is the ende of good, which thinges well knowne woulde profite you more, than

vendo meum non pluris quã cæteri, fortasse etiam minoris, cum maior est copia, cui fit iniuria? Exoritur Antipatri ratio ex altera parte.

Quid agis? tute cum hominibus consulere debeas & seruire humanæ societati: eaque lege natus sis, & ea habeas principia naturæ, quibus parêre, & quæ semper sequi debeas, vt vtilitas tua communis sit vtilitas, vicissim & æque communis vtilitas tua sit, calabis homines, quid his adsit commoditatis, & copiæ? Respondebit Diogenes fortasse sic, aliud est calare, aliud tacere, neque ego nunc te calo, si tibi non dico, quæ natura deorum sit, quis sit finis bonorum: quæ tibi plus prodessent cognita,

quam tritici vtilitas. Sed nō quicquid tibi audire vtile est, id mihi dicere necesse est immo vero, inquit ille, necesse est. Siquidem meministi esse inter homines naturā coniunctam societatē. Memini inquit ille. Sed num ista societas talis est, vt nihil suū cuiusq; sit? Quod si ita est nec vendendum quidem quicquam est, sed donandum. Vides in hac tota disceptatione nō illud dici, quamuis hoc turpe sit, tamen quoniam expedit, factum: sed ita expedire, vt turpe non sit. Ex altera autē parte, care, quia turpe sit, non esse faciendum. Vēdat ædes vir bonus propter aliqua vitia, quæ ipse norit, cæteri ignorent: pestilentes sint, & habeantur salubres: ignoretur in omnibus cubiculis appārere serpentes: malè materiata,

than ỹ cheapnes of wheat, But it is not necessarye for mee to tell, whatsoeuer is profitable for you too heare. Yes verelye, saith hee, it is necessarie, if so bee, you remember the felowshyp knyt among men by nature.

I remember it, saith the other, but is thys felowshyp such that ech man may haue nothing of hys owne? In case it bee so nothing doutelesse is to bee solde, but to be gyuen:

You se, in all thys controuersie, this is not sayde: though it bee vnhoneste, yet because it is pfitable, I will do it, but that in suche wyse it is profitable, as it is not dishoneste, & of the contrarye side, ỹ therfore it is not too bee done, bicause it is dishoneste. But the case, a good mā sell a house, for certeine discommodities, which hee knoweth, and other knowe not, set case it bee cōtagious & is taken for holsom: bee it so, it be vnknowne, that in all the chambers doo appere venomus crepinge beastes & that it is euill timbered,

and

end redy too fall, but thys none knoweth, but the owner, I demaunde, if the seller open not this to ỹ biers, & selles the house for muche more, than hee thought, hee sheld haue done, whether he doth iustlye, or vnhonestlie: Hee verily doth dishonestly saith Antipater.

For what other thinge is it, than not too shewe the wanderer hys waye, (which at Athenes was forbidden vpon paine of comõ curses) if thys bee not it: to suffer ỹ hyer to rush sodenlye, and runne hedlonge by errour into a gret deceit? yea it is more, than not to showe a manne the waye. For it is wittingly too leade one out of the waye into a false beliefe.

Diogenes replieth again, did hee compell ye to bye, who not once moued ye too it? Hee sette too sale, that lyked hym not: you bought, that lyked ye.

If they who offer too sell a good farme, & well buylded as they set it oute, bee not thought too haue deceyued, al-

ruinosa: sed hæc præter dominum nemo sciat: quæro si hæc emptoribus vẽditor nõ dixerit, ædesq; vendiderit plurismultò, q̃ se venditurum putarit: num id iuste aut improbè fecerit? Ille vero improbè, inquit Antipater. Quid.n. est aliud errantiviam non monstrare (quod Athenis execrationib⁹ publicis sanctum est) si hoc non est, emptorem pati ruere, & per errorem in maximam fraudem incurrere? plus etiã est quàm viam non mõstrare nam est, scientem in errorem alterum inducere.

Diogenes contra: num te emere cogit, quine hortatus quidem est? ille quod non placebat proscripsit, tu quod placebat emisti. Quod si qui proscribunt villam bonam, beneque ædificatam, non existimantur fefellisse,

etiam si illa nec bona est, nec ædificata ratione, multo minus, qui domum non laudarunt. Vbi n. iudicium emptoris est, ibi fraus venditoris quæ potest esse? Sin autem dictum non omne præstandũ est, quod dictum non est id præstandum putas? Quid vero est stultius, quàm venditorem eius rei, quam vendat, vitia narrare? Quid autem tam absurdum, quã si domini iussu ita præco prædicet: domum pestilẽtem vendo. Sic ergo in quibusdã causis dubijs ex altera parte defenditur honestas: ex altera ita de vtilitate dicitur vt id, quod vile videatur, non modo facere honestum sit, sed etiam non facere, turpe. Hæc est illa quæ videtur vtilium fieri cũ honestis sæpe dissensio. Quæ dijudicanda sunt.

although it bee neither good nor well buylded, much lesse thẽ they, who haue not prayſed their houſe.

For where the byers pie is his chapmã, there what deceit can ther be of the seller? and if euerye sayenge is not to bee performed, thynk ye that meete to be performed, that was not sayde? But what is more foolishe, than the seller too tell the faultes of the thyng, which he puts to sale? And what so fonde a hearing is ther, as if, at the owners commaũdemẽt, the cryer thus shoulde make a noyce? I haue a cõtagious house to sell.

Thus therfore, in some doutefull cases, of the one part is honestye defended, of the other parte, ther is speakinge of profit, that it is not onely honest too doo, but also dishonest not to doo it, that semeth profitable. This is that dissẽtiõ, which semeth often too befall betwene profitable thynges, and honest, which pointes are to bee discussed.

For

For wee haue not sette them forth to make questions, but to open them.

We thinke then, neither that same Rhodian corne-marchaunte, nor his howse-seller ought to haue hidden the foresayde thynges from the byers. For whatsoeuer you keepe in silence, you do not fully so muche, as it is to hyde: but when, for youre profittes sake, ye woulde haue those ignoraunt of that you knowe, whomit standes vppon to knowe it. Howe this kinde of hiding of what nature it is, and what maner of mannes, who seeth not? Doubtlesse it is a parte not of a plaine, not of a simple, not of a gentle, not of a iuste, not of a good man: but rather of a suttle-witted, close, wylye, deceipt-full, gylefull, craftie, foxlike, and a verye dubier. These so manie, and other moe names of vyces to enter into, is it not vnprofitable? If they bee dispraysewoorthye, who haue holde their peace: what is to bee thoughte of those, whoe haue vsed a vainnesse

Non enim vt quererem, exposuimus, sed vt explicaremus. Non igitur videtur nec frumentarius ille Rhodius, nec hic ædium venditor celare emptores debuisse. Neq; enim id est celare, cum quid reticeas, sed cum quod tuscias, id ignorare emolumenti tui causa velis eos, quorum interest id scire. Hoc autem celandi genus quale sit, & cuius hominis quis non videt? Certè non aperti, non simplicis est, non ingenui, non iusti, non viri boni: versuti potius, obscuri, astuti, fallacis, malitiosi, calidi, veteratoris, vafri. Hæc tot & alia plura, nonne inutile est vitiorum subire nomina?

Quòd si vituperandi sunt, qui reticuerunt: quid de ijs existimandum est: qui orationis vanitatem adhiben-

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runt ? C. Cannius æques Romanus, homo nec infacetus, & satis literatus, cum se Syracusas otiandi (vt ipse dicere solebat) non negotiandi causâ contulisset, dictabat se hortulos aliquos velle emere, quò inuitare amicos, & vbi se oblectare sine interpellatoribus posset.

Quod cum percrebuisset, Pythius ei quidam, qui argentariam faceret Syracusis dixit venales quidem se hortos non habere, sed licere vti Cannio, si vellet, vt suis, & simul ad cœnam hominem in hortos inuitauit in posterum diem. Cum ille promisisset, tum Pythius, vt argentarius qui esset, apud omnes ordines gratiosus, piscatores ad se cõuocauit: & ab iis petiuit, vt antè suos hortulos posterâ die piscarentur: dixitque quod eos facere vellet.

of talke?

Cãius Cannius, of the Equestriall ordre in Rome, a man not vnpleasaunt, and welynoughe learned, when he hadde gotte hym to Syracusa, euen for pleasure, and not for bysinesse (as he was wonte to tell) hee byzted, that he woulde bie some place of pleasure, whither he might bidde his frendes, and where he might delighte himselfe withoute troubles. Whiche when it was spredde abroade, one Pytheus, who kepte a banke of exchaunge at Syracusa, saide, that he hadde in deede a pleasaunte plat, howbeit not to sell, yet Cãius, yf it pleased hym, might vse it as his owne, & therewith badde hym to supper, against the nexte daye. When hee hadde promysed, then Pythius lyke a banker, who was well in fauoure with all degrees, called vnto him certaine fishermen, and required them, that the nexte daye they woulde fyshe before his grounde, and tolde thẽ what he woulde haue them doe.

Cannius

Cānius came at his time to supper. Sumptuously the there was prepared. A nomber of fisshertotes were before their eies. Eche man for his parte, broughte, that he had taken. The fisshe was powred downe at Pythius feete. Then quoth Cānius, I praye ye Pythius, what is this: that there is so greate store of fysshe, so goodlye a sorte of botes? What marualle? quoth he againe: for what so euer fisshe there is about Syracusa. it is in thys place: here is the wateringe place: this grounde thefe citizens can not well spare. Cānius kindled wyth a desire to it, was earnest wyth Pythius, that hee woulde sell it him He made it strong at the firste. What neede many wordes? he obtayneth it: the man beynge in loue with it, and riche, boughte it for so muche, as Pythius woulde aske: and bought it furnished: he putteth in furettes: and makes vp the bargaine. Cānius the nexte daye, desired his acquaintaunce thyther, and came him selfe betymes:

Ad cœnam tempore venit Cannius, erat opiparè à Pythio apparatum conuiuium. Cymbarum ante hortulos multitudo. pro se quisq; quod ceperat, afferebat: ante pedes Pythij pisces abijciebantur. Tum Cannius: quaso, inquit, quid est ò Pythi, tantum ne piscium? tantum ne cymbarum. Et ille. Quid mirum, inquit, hoc loco est, Syracusis quicquid est piscium, hic aquatio, hac villa isti carere non possunt. Incensus Cannius cupiditate, contendit à Pythio, vt vēderet: grauatè ille primò: Quid multa? Impetrat: emit homo cupidus & locuples tanti, quanti Pythius voluit: & emit instructos: nominā facit, negotiū conficit: Inuitat Cānī postridie familiares suos: venit ipse matura

ſcalmum nullũ videt, quarit ex proximo vicino, num feriæ quædã piſcatorũ eſſent, quòd eos nullos videret. Nulla (quod ſciam) inquit ille, ſed hic piſcari nulli ſolent: ita ego heri mirabar, quid accidiſſet. Stomachari Cannius, ſed quid faceret? nondum enim Aquilius collega & familiaris meus pertulerat de dolo malo formulas: in quibus ipſis cum ex eo quæreretur, quid eſſet dolus malus, reſpõdebat, cũ eſſet aliud ſimulatũ, aliud actũ. Hoc quidẽ ſanè luculenter, vt ab homine perito definiendi. Ergo & Pythius: & omnes aliud agentes, aliud ſimulantes, perfidi, improbi, malitioſi ſunt. Nullum igitur factum eorum poteſt vtile eſſe, cum ſit tot vitijs inquinatũ. Quod ſi Aquiliana definitio vera eſt, ex omni vita ſimulatio,

he ſawe neuer a bote: he enquired of his next neyboure, whether it were not ſome holy day with the fiſhermẽ, bicauſe he ſaw none of them. None, that I knowe, quoth hee: but here none of them are wonte to fiſhe: and ther fore yeſterdaye I meruailed what chaunce was befalne. Canius began to chafe: but what coulde he do? For as yet Aquilius, my officefelowe, and familiar, had not ſette forth the caſes, that ſhoulde be coumpted coumen in the whiche ſame, when I demaunded of him, what was Coume: he aunwered, when one thing was pretended, and an other done.

This doubtleſſe was veryе plainely aunſwered, as of a manne ſkilfull in definynge. Therefore bothe Pythius, and all, that doe one thinge, and pretende an other, bee falſe, wicked, and gilefull. No dede then of theirs can bee profitable, when it is with ſo mannye faultes beeſpotted. If Aquilius definition bee true: oute of all mans lyfe muſte falſe pretẽdinge, and

ding, and dissembling by bā-
nished. So euery good man
shal neither falsely pretende,
nor dissemble, that he maye
bye, or sell the better. And
tais coune also was pon-
nishable by the lawes: as
deceitfull gardenship, in the
twelue table: and craftie
begylinge youngmen of theyr
goodes, by the lawe Plec-
torian: and without lawe,
by iudgementes, where the
bill is put in, vppon good
conscience. But of all other
iudgementes these wordes
be moste notable, that bee of
course in a case of arb.tre-
mente of mariage: The bet-
ter, the luster: and in a case
of trust, or confidence: That
amonge honest men there be
honest dealing: What then?
either in ỹ, which is the bet-
ter, the luster: can ther be ant
doiat of coune: or when it is
vnder, among honest men let
yet be honest dealing: cā any
thing deceitfully, or guilfully
bee donne? But coune (as
with Aquilius) is conteined
fained pretence, & dissimu-
tion. All lyenge therefore
makinge of bargaynes is
terly to be excluded. Let

dissimulatio ꝙ tollenda est.
Ita nec vt emat malus, nec
vt vendat. quicq̃ simulabit
aut dissimulabit vir bonus.
Atq̃ iste dolus malus etiam
legibus erat vindicatus, vt
tutela. XII. tabulis & cir-
cumscriptus adulescentiũ lege
Latoria, & sine lege iudicijs,
in quib⁹ ex fide bona agitur.
Reliquarũ autem iudiciorũ
hæc verba maximè excellũt,
in arbitrio rei vxoriæ, melius
æquius: in fiducia, vt inter
bonos bene agier. Quid er-
go? aut in eo quod melius
æquius est, potest vlla pars
inesse fraudis? aut cum dici-
tur inter bonos bene agier,
quicquã agi doloſe aut mali
tioſe potest? Dolus autem
malus simulatione & dissi-
mulatione (vt ait Aqui-
lius) continetur. Tollen-
dum est igitur in rebus con-
trahendis omne mendacium

nō licitatorem venditor, nec qui contra se liceatur, emptor opponet. uteṝ si ad eloquendum venerit, non plus q̄ semel eloquetur. Quintus quidem Scæuola P. filius, cū postulasset, vt sibi fund', cuius emptor erat, semel indicaretur, idq; venditor ita fecisset, dixissetq; se pluris æstimare, addidit centū millia: Nemo est qui hoc viri boni fuisse neget, sapientis negant: vt si minoris q̄ potuisset vendidisset. Hæc igitur est illa pernicies, q̄ alios bonos, alios sapientes existimant. Ex quo Ennius. NE QVICQVAM SAPERE SAPIENTEM, QVI SIBI IPSI PRODESSE NEQVIAT. Verè id quidem, si quid esse prodesse mihi cum Ennio conueniret. Hecatonem quidem Rhodiū discipulum Panætij video,

not the seller sette a rayser of the pryce against the byer, let not the byer sette one that maye lowe the price against for him. If thei bothe come to communication, thei shal talke but once of ẏ matter. When Quintus Scæuola, Publius sonne, had required, ẏ ẏ price of ẏ ground whereof hee was a cheaper, shold once be shewed hym, & ẏ seller had so done, he saide, he valued it more worthe, & gaue him more by. xxv. honderd crownes. There is no man, that can denie, but this was the part of a good man, a wise mans parte thei denie it to bee, euen as if the other should haue solde it for lesse, than he might haue gotten. This therefore is the myschiefe, because thei reckon good to bee of one sorte, and wise, of an other. Wherupon quoth Ennius.

The wise man his wit
very vaine he may call,
If profit he can not
himselfe therewithall.

It were true in deede, yf I agreed with Ennius, what

it is to profite. I se, Hecato, the Rhodian, Panetiꝰ scholer, saithe in those bookes, whiche of duties he wrote to Quintus Tubero, that it is a wise mans parte, doinge nothinge againste customes, lawes, & ordinaūces, to haue a respecte to his substaunce. For wee owe not onely for our selues to be riche, but for oure children, our kinsfolke, oure frendes, & specially for ꝯ cōmō weale. For the substance, & wealth of euery seuerall man is the richnes of a citie. Scevolaes doinge, whereof I spake a little before, can in no wise like Hecato, for Scevola vtterly denieth, ꝯ he will doo oughte, for his owne gaines sake, that is not lawfull. To this man other greate praise, neither thanke is to be giuen. But whether both false pretending, & also dissembling be coulne or no, fewe matters ther be, wherin this coulne hath not ado, & whether he bee a good mā, who profites whō he may, & hurtes no body, full well a iuste man, but not lightly a good manne we shall finde.

in ys libris, quos de officijs scripsit, Quinto Tuberoni dicere, sapiētis esse nihil cōtra mores, leges, institutaq; facientē, habere rationē rei familiaris. Neq; enim solū nobis diuites esse volumus, sed liberis, propinquis, amicis, maximeq; Reipub. Singulorū enim facultates & copiæ, diuitiæ sunt ciuitates. Huic Scævolæ factū (de quo paulo ante dixi) placere nullo modo potest. Etenim omnino se negat facturū cōpendy sui causa, quod non liceat. Huic nec laus magna tribuēda est, nec gratia. Sed siue simulatio & dissimulatio dolus malus est: perpaucæ res sunt, in quibus dolus iste malus nō versetur. Sine vir bonus est is, qui prodest quibus potest, nocet nemini: rectè iustum virū bonum non facile reperiemus.

Nunquam igitur est vtile peccare, quia semper est turpe: & quia semper est honestum virum bonum esse, semper est vtile. Ac de iure quidem prædiorum sancitum est apud nos iure ciuili, vt in his vendendis vitia etiam dicerentur, quæ nota essent venditori. Nam cum ex XII. tabulis satis esset, ea præstari, quæ essent lingua nuncupata, quæ qui infitiatus esset, dupli pœnam subiret: à iure consultis etiam reticentiæ pœna est constituta. Quicquid enim est in prædio vitij, id statuerunt, si venditor sciret, nisi nominatim dictum esset, præstari oportere. Vt cum in arce augurum Augures acturi essent, iussissentque Titum Claudium Centimalum, qui ædes in Cœlio monte habebat, demoliri

It is neuer profitable then to do euill, because it is euermore dishonest: and because it is alwaies honest to bee a good man, it is alwaies profitable.

And surely touching the title of lande, it is ordeyned with vs by ciuill lawe: that in sellynge of it, the faultes also shoulde be tolde, whiche were knewen to the seller. For whereas by the twelue tables it was sufficiently prouyded: that those thinges should be performed, whiche were declared in woorde: whiche who so woulde denie, shoulde forfeite double damages: there was also, by the Iudges of the lawe, a paine sette for concealmente. For what so euer fault were in the land: if the seller knew it, excepte expressely he hadde declared it: they decreed, that it oughte to be made good. As when in the towre the Augurs were aboute their prophecyinge by foule flight: and had commaunded Titus Claudius Centimalus, whoe hadde howses in mount Celie, to pull those downe,

downe, whose height should let their prophecieng: Claudius did set them to sale, and solde the plande: Rubitus Calphurnius Lanarius bought it. He was commaūded the verye same by the Auguris Indso, when Calphurnius hadde pulled them downe: and understoode, that Claudius hadde set the houses to sale, after he had been commaunded of the Auguris to pull them downe: he drawe him to arbitriment: to wal, that he ought in that case, to recompence hym, of good conscience. Marcus Cato, this ourc Catoes father, made the awarde. For as other are named frō their fathers: so this, who begat suche a starre, is to be named from his sonne. He therfore as iudge, gaue sentence thus that seing he knew the thing, at the puttinge of it to sale, and did not declare it: he oughte to render the bier his damages. He therefore iudged, it stoode with good conscience: that the fault: which the seller knewe, shoulde be knowen to the byer. That

ea, quorum altitudo officeret auspicijs: Claudius proscripsit insulā: vēdidit: emit Publius Calphurnius Lanarius, Huic ab Auguribus illud idem denunciatum est. Itaq; Calphurnius cū demolitꝰ esset, cognouisseq; Claudiū ædes postea proscripsisse, quas esset ab Auguribꝰ demoliri iussus: arbitrum illū adegit: quid sibi de ea re facere oporteret ex fide bona. M Cato sententiam dixit, huius nostri Catonis pater. Vt enim cæteri ex patribꝰ, sic hic, qui illud lumen progenuit, ex filio est nominandus. Is igitur iudex ita pronunciauit: cum in venundandorem eam scisset, & non pronunciasset, emptori damnum præstare oportere. Igitur ad fidem bonam statuit pertinere, notum esse emptori vitium, quod nosset venditor. Quod

si rectè dijudicauit, non rectè frumentarius ille, non rectè ædium pestilentium venditor tacuit. Sed huiusmodi reticentiæ iure ciuili omnes comprehendi non possunt: quæ autem possunt, diligenter tenentur M. Marius Gratidianus propinquus noster C. Sergio Oratæ vendiderat ædes eas, quas ab eodem ipse paucis ante annis emerat. Hæ Sergio seruiebant, sed hoc in mancipio. Marius non dixerat, adducta res in iudicium est. Oratam Crassus, Gratidianum defendebat Antonius, ius Crassus vrgebat, quod vitium venditor non dixisset, sciens id oportere præstari, æquitatem Antonius: quoniam id vitium ignotum Sergio non fuisset, qui illas ædes vendidisset, nihil fuisse

and if hee gaue a true iudgemente, neither well did the cornemarchaunte afore, neyther well did this cõtagious house seller in holdinge hys peace. But suche manner of concealmentes canne not all be comprehended in the ciuil lawe, but suche as maye, be perfitely contained. Marcus Marius Gratidianus, oure kinsman, hadde solde to Caius Sergius Orata that howse, whiche he had bought of him a fewe yeares before. This house dyd a certaine seruice to Sergius, but Marius had not declared the same in the leuerie of seisen. The matter was brought to ỹ lawe Crassus pleaded for Orata, Antonius for Gratidianus. Crassus stoode vppon the letter of the lawe, bicause the seller, knowinge the discommoditie, hadde not tolde it, that it ought to be made good, Antonius enforced the equitie of the lawe, bycause that discommoditie was not vnknowen to Sergius, who had solde the same house, that it was nothinge needefull to bee declared,

and

and that hee was not deceiued, who vnderstoode, of what title it was, that hee hadde boughte. So what purpose tendes all this? That ye may perceiue, that couine ipked not oure auncetours. But one waie the lawes condemne couine, an other way the philosophers, the lawes, as farre as by open deede they can gather vppon matters, the philosophers, as farre as by reason, and vnderstandinge they can comprehende. Reason therefore requireth this, that nothinge sutticly nothinge fainedly, nothing deceitfully be done. Is it then anye deceite, to pytche the toyle, although you go not about to rouse, nor chase the game? For yᵗ very game lightes vpon it oftentimes, when no body folowes them. So when you offer youre house to sale, you sette vppe your byll, as a nette, you sell the house, because of the faultes, some body happes vppon it, vnware of them, thoughe I see, thus thoroughe corruption of vse, neither

necesse dici: nec eum esse deceptum qui id quod emerat, quo iure esset, teneret. Quor sum hæc? vt illud intelligas, non placuisse maioribus nostris astutos. Sed aliter leges, aliter Philosophi, tollũt astutias. Leges quatenus manu tenereres possunt: philosophi quatenus ratione & intelligentia. Ratio igitur hoc postulat, nequid insidiose, nequid simulatè, nequid fallaciter. Sunt ne igitur insidiæ, tendere plagas, etiam si excitaturus non sis bestiam, nec agitaturus? Ipsæ enim feræ nullo insequente sæpe incidunt. Sic tu cum ædes proscribas, tabulam tanquã plagam ponas, domum propter vitia vendas, in eam aliquis incurrat imprudẽs: hoc quanquam video propter depravationem consuetudinis:

neque morcturpe haberi, neque aut lege sanciri, aut iure ciuili: naturæ tamen lege sanctum est. Societas enim est (quod & si sæpe dictum est, dicendum tamen est sæpius) latissimè quidem quæ patcat, hominũ inter omnes: interior eorum qui eiusdem gentis sunt: propior eorum, qui eiusdem ciuitatis. Itaque maiores aliud ius gentium, aliud ius ciuile esse voluerunt. Quod enim ciuile non idem continuo gentium: quod autem gentium, idem ciuile esse debet. Sed nos viri iuris, germanæ que iustitiæ solidam & expressam effigiem nullam tenemus, vmbra & imaginibus vtimur: eas ipsas vtinam sequeremur. Feruntur enim ex optimis naturæ & veritatis exemplis.

Nam quanti sunt verba illa

neithe by custome is coumpted dishoneſt, neither by ordinaunce, or ciuill law of decreed: yet by the lawe of nature it is forbidden. For there is a felowship of men amongſt men (whiche thinge altho ughe it hath been often times ſpoken of, yet oftener it muſt be ſpoken) which in deede very largely extendeth: and a nerer there is of thoſe, who be of one nacion: and a nier, of them, who bee of one citie. Therefore oure auncetors wouldе needes haue the lawe of nations to be one thinge, and the ciuill lawe an other. For who ſo is the ciuill lawe, the ſame is not conſequently the lawe of nations: but what ſo is the lawe of nations, the ſame muſt needes be the ciuil law. But we kepe no ſounde, and expreſſe fourme of very lawe and meere iuſtice: we uſe the ſhadowe and ymages thereof: yea and euen thoſe ſame I wouldе, wee did folowe. For thei be taken oute of the beſt principles of nature, and paterns of trouth. For how precious bee thoſe woordes.

The

That not by you, or your p=
mes, I be snared or deceiued
how goldē wordes be those?
That among good men good
dealing ought to be, & with=
out deceiuinge.

But who be good men, and
what is good dealinge, it is
a great question. Quintus
Scæuola, the cheife bishoppe
sayde, there was greate sub=
staunce of matter in al those
arbitrementes, in whiche
the shou'de bee treatynge
accordynge to good consci=
ence: and the name of good
conscience he iudged to teach
very farre: and that it had
adoo in gardeinshippes, com=
panies, matters of truste, cō=
maundementes, thynges
bought, solde, hired, and let
oute: by whiche, the felow=
shippe of mannes life is vp=
holden: in these thynges, he
sayde, it was the office of a
greate iudge to determine,
what eche man shoulde do
to an other, specially seeinge
the iudgementes in moste
menne bee contrarye one to
an other Wherefore couine
muste bee vtterly auoyded:
and that wylinesse whych e
wil

*Vt ne propter te, fidem=
uctuam, captus fraudatusue
sim? quàm illa aurea? Vt
inter bonos bene agier opor=
tet & sine fraudatione. Sed
qui sint boni, & quid sit
bene agere, magna quæstio
est. Quintus quidem
Scæuola Pont. Max, sum=
mam vim esse dicebat in om=
nibus ijs arbitrijs, in quib'
adderetur, ex fide bona. Fi=
deique bonæ nomen existi=
mabat manare latissimè: id
quē re sæpi in tutelis, socie=
tatibus: fiduciis, mandatis,
rebus emptis, venditis, con=
ductis, locatis, quibus vitæ
societas continetur. In his
magni esse iudicis, statuere
(præsertim cum in plerisque
essent iudicia contraria)
quid quenq; cuiq; præstare
oporteret. Quocirca astu=
tiæ tollendæ sunt, eaque ma=
litia, quæ vult quidē videri*

se esse prudentiam, sed abest ab ea, distatq; plurimũ. Prudentia est enim locata in delectu bonorum, & malorum. Malitia si omnia, quæ turpia sunt, mala sunt, mala bonis, anteponit. Nec vero in prædijs solum ius ciuile ductũ à natura malitiam, fraudemq; vindicat, sed etiam in mancipiorum venditione vẽditorum fraus omnis excluditur. Qui enim scire debuit de sanitate, de fuga, de furtis, præstat edicto ædill. Hæredum alia causa est. Ex quo intelligitur, quoniã iuris natura fõs sit, hoc secũdũ naturam esse, neminem id agere, vt ex alterius prædetur inscitia. Nec vlla pernities vitæ maior inueniri potest, quàm in malitia simulatio intelligentia.

Ex quo illa innumerabilia nascuntur: vt vtilia cum

wyll needes haue it selfe seeme to be prudence, but it is farre from it, & differres very muche. For prudẽce is placed in the choise of good, & euill, wylines, if all things be euill, whiche be dishoneſt, preferreth euill before good. And not onely in matters of lande, they ciuile law, ỹ hath his originall of nature, doth punish wilinesse, and couine, but also in the sale of slaues & nieces, all couine of the sellers is forbiddẽ. For he, that shoulde haue knowne of their helthfulnesse, of their fugitiuenes, of their theuishnes, dothe make satisfaction by the Edilles decree. Otherwise is the case of inheritours. Whereof is bonne to vnderstande, bicause nature is the fountaine of lawe, that this is accordinge to nature ỹ no man go aboute by an others ignorãce, to make hys owne gaine. For any greater destructiõ of mans life cã be founde, than of a wilinesse, falsely to dissẽble ones vnderstanding. Whereof those innumerable inconueniences doo growe, that profitable

thinges seeme to fighte with honest. For howe many will be founde, who being sure to be free frō ponishmente, and knowledg of al men, can refrain frō doing wronge? Let vs make a proue (if it please ye) in those cāples, wherein ỳ cōmon sort of men perhaps do not thinke thei do amisse.

For it falleth not in thys place to speake of murderers, poysoners, wylforgers, theeues, and robbers of the common treasurie, who not with words, and reasonings of Philosophers, butte with chaines, & prisōmēt are to be punished. But these thinges let vs consider, whiche they do, who bee coumpted good. Certain men brought out of Greece to Rome a counterfet will of Lucius Minutij Basilius, a very riche mā, & to the intent they might the easelyer proue it, they did put in as heires with them, Marcus Crassus, & Quintus Hortēsius, men of moste power in ỳ same citie. Who when thei suspected it to bee forged, & wer not guilty of any fault in their owne cōscience they

honestis pugnare videantur. Quotus enim quisq; reperietur, qui impunitate & ignoratione omnium proposita abstinere possit iniuria? Periclitemur (si placet) et in ijs quidem exemplis, in quibus peccari vulgus hominum fortasse non putat. Neq; enim de sicarijs, veneficis, testamentarijs, furibus, peculatoribus hoc loco disserēdum est, qui non verbis sunt & disputatione philosophorū, sed vinculis et carcere fatigādi. Sed hæc cōsideremus quæ faciūt ij, qui habētur boni. L. Minutij Basilij locupletis hominis falsum testamentū quidē è Græcia Romā attulerūt. Quod quò facilius obtinerent, scripserūt hæredes secū M. Crassum et Quintū Hortensium, homines eiusdē ciuitatis potentissimos. qui cum illud falsum esse suspicarentur, sibi autem nullius esset conscij culpæ

alieni facinoris munuſculũ non repudiauerunt. Quid ergo? ſat in hoc eſt, vt non deliquiſſe videantur? Mihi quidẽ non videtur: quanquã alterũ amaui viuũ, alterũ nõ odi mortuum. Sed cum Baſilius. M. Satyrium ſororis filium nomen ſuum ferre voluiſſet, eumq; feciſſet hæredem hunc autem dico patronum agri Picẽti & Sabini (O turpẽ notã temporũ illorum) nõ erat æquum principes ciuis rem habere, ad Satyrium nihil præter nomen peruenire. Etenim ſi is, qui non defendit iniuriã, neq; propulſat à ſuis cũ poteſt, iniuſte facit vt in primo libro diſſerui: qualis habẽd' eſt is, qui non modò non repellit, ſed etiam adiuuat iniuriã? Mihi quidẽ etiã veræ hæreditates non honeſtæ videntur, ſi ſint malitioſis blanditijs officiorum,

thei refuſed not the prefferewarde of an other falſehood. What ſaie wee then? Is this inough, that thei ſeeme not to haue donne any fault? To mee truely it ſeemes not ſo: althoughe the one I loued beinge aliue, the other I hate not beeinge deade. But when Baſilius wouldе haue had Marcus Satirius, his ſiſters ſonne, to beare his name: and hadde made hym hys heyre: I meane hym who was protectoure of the countrie of Vicene, & Sabine, (O ſhamefull ſtaine, in thoſe dates) it was not reaſon, that the rulers of the citie hadde the goodes, and nothing butte the name deſcended to Satirius. For if he, that dothe not ſenſe of iniurie, and keepe it awaye from his, when he may, dothe vniuſtly: as in my firſt boke I haue diſputed: what maner a man is he to be coumpted: who not oneiy dothe not ſenſe of, but alſo furdereth an iniurie? And true inheritaunce alſo ſeemes to mee not honeſt if it be purchaſed by wyly flatteringe duetes:

and

and not by truth, but by false fayning. But in such cases, one thinge is wont sometime too seeme profitable, an other, honest. Yet vntruly it so semeth: for alike is the rule of profit, as of honestie. Who forseeth not this: no guile, no mischefe shall faile in him. For thus imagining, this in dede is honest, but this is profitable: he wil take vpon him by errour to sonder thinges coupled to gither by nature: which is the welspring of al deceites, wycked deedes, and mischiefes. Therfore if a good mā haue such power that if he do but becke with his finger, his name maye creepe into the testament of the riche let him not vse this power: no not thought hee know for certentie, that no manne at all wyll once mystrust it. But if ye shoulde giue this power to Marcus Crassy, that with a beck of his finger, he might bee put in as heire, beinge no here in dede, he wold (beleue me) leape for ioy in ẏ opē strete. But a iust manne, and hee,

nō veritate, sed simulatione quæsitæ. Atqui in talibus reb⁹ aliud vtile interdū, aliud honestū videri solet falso Nā cadē vtilitatis, quæ honestatis est regula, qui hoc nō prouiderit: ab hoc nulla fraus aberit, nullū facinus. Sic enim cogitans. Est istud quidē honestū, verū hoc expedit, res à natura copulatas audebit errore diuellere, qui fons est fraudū, maleficiorū, scelerum omniū. Itaq; si vir bonus habeat hanc vim vt si digitis concrepuerit, possit in locupletū testamēta nomen eius irrepere, hac vi non vtatur: nec si exploratū quidem habeat, id omnino neminem vnquā suspicaturū. At si dares hanc vim M. Crasso. vt digitorū percussione hæres posset scriptus esse, quire vera non esset hæres: in foro, mihi crede, saltaret. Homo autem iustus, isq;

quem ſentimus virum bonũ, nihil cuiquam, quod in ſe transferat, detrahet. Hoc qui admiratur, is ſe, qui ſit vir bonus, neſcire fatetur. At vero ſi quis voluerit animi ſui complicatam notionem euoluere: iam ſe ipſe doceat, eum virum bonum eſſe, qui proſit quibus poſſit, noceat nemini, niſi laceſſitus iniuria. Quid ergo? hic non noceat, qui quodam quaſi veneno perficiat, vt veros hæredes moueat, in eorum locũ ipſe ſuccedat? Non igitur faciat (dixerit quis) quod vtile ſit, quodque expediat? immo intelligat, nihil nec expedire, nec vtile eſſe quod ſit iniuſtũ, hoc qui non dedicerit, bonus vir eſſe non poterit. Fimbriam conſularem audichã de patre noſtro puer, iudicem M. Luctatio Pythiæ fuiſſe equiti Romano,

whom we count a good mã, will catche nothinge from any man, to caſte it vpon hym ſelfe. Who ſo hathe wonder at this: he confeſſeth hym ſelfe not to knowe, who is a good manne. But if a mãns wil vnfold the ſecret knowledge of his minde: by and by hee maye enfourme him ſelfe: that he is a good man, who doth good to whome he maie: and hurteth no body, but prouoked by iniurie. Howe then? dothe not he hurte an other, who worketh (as it were) with a certaine poyſon: that the true heyres he maie diſplace, and make hym ſelfe ſucceede in theyr roume? May he not then doo that, will ſome ſaye, whiche is profitable, and whiche is auayleable? May let him knowe: that nothing nether auaileth, nor is profitable, whiche is vniuſte. This who ſo hath not learned, can not be a good mã. I heard of my father, when I was a boy: that Fimbria ſometime Conſull, was iudge to Marc⁹ Luctatius Pythias one of the Equeſtriall ordre of Romes,

of Rome, in deede honest: when hee had put in sureties to aunswere the accion, if he were not founde a good mã: that therefore Fimbria saide vnto him, he woulde neuer guide iudgement of the cause: lest he shoulde either robbe a tried man of his good name if he had iudged against him: or els shoulde seeme to haue determined, that ther is some good mã: wheras that thing consisteth in dueties, & commendacions innumerable.

To this good manne then, whome also Fimbria, & not onely Socrates had conceiued: can no waie oughte appeare to bee profitable, that is not honest. Therefore suche a man will not bee so bolde to do, no nor purpose any thinge, whiche hee dare not auer. It is not a shame for Philosophers to dout in these thinges, wherein the clownes of the countrie doo make no doubte at all? From whome is spronge that prouerbe, whiche nowe is well worne by continuaunce. For when thei praise any mans conscience, and goodnesse:

sanc honesto cũ is spontionem fecisset, ni bonus vir esset. Itaq; ei dixisse Fimbriam, se illã rem nunquã iudicaturum: ne aut spoliaret fama probatum hominem, si contra iudicasset: aut statuisse videretur virum bonũ aliquẽ esse, cum ea res innumerabilibus officiis & laudibus cõtineretur. Huic igitur viro bono, quem Fimbria etiã, nõ modo Socrates nouerat, nullo modo videri potest, quicquã esse vtile, quod non honestum sit. Itaq; talis vir non modo facere: sed nec cogitare quidem quicquam audebit, quod non audeat prædicare. Hoc nonne est turpe dubitare philosophos, quæ ne rustici quidem dubitent? à quibus natum est id, quod iam tritum est vetustate prouerbium. Cum enim fidẽ alicuius, bonitatem q; laudant:

digñ esse dicunt, quicñ in tenebris mices. Hoc quã habet vim, nisi illam, nihil expedire quod non deceat, etiã si id possis nullo refellente obtinere? Vides nè igitur hoc proue bio, neq; Gygi illi posse veniam dari, neq; huic quem paulò antè fingebam, digitorum percussione hæreditates omnium posse conuertere? Vt enim quod turpe est, id quãuis occultetur, tamen honestum fieri nullo modo potest: sic quod honestum non est, id vtile vt sit effici non potest, aduersante & repugnante natura. At enim cũ permagna præmia sunt, est causa peccandi. C. Marius cũ à spe consulatus longe abesset: & iã septimũ annum post præturam iaceret, neq; petiturus vnquam consulatum videretur Q. Metellũ cuius legatus erat,

they say, hee is such a mã, as ye may play vvhim blindfold. what other meaninge hath that, but this, that nothinge is expedient, whiche is not comely, although you may obtein it without any mans resistãce. Do ye not se thã by this prouerb, ỹ neither that same Gyges, can bee borne with, nor this other, whom erewhile I fained with the wagging of his finger to be able to turne too him selfe al mens inheritaunce: For as the thinge, which is dishonest, although it bee closely kepte, can no waye yet bee made honest, so the thinge which is not honest, can not bee brought to passe too bee profitable, euen nature being against it, & withstanding it. But in where verye great brybes bee, there is occasion of euel doinge. when Caius Marius was farre of from hope of the Consulship, & seuen yeres after his Pretorshippe, lay styll nor seemed as one, that euer woulde labour for the Consulshyppe, to the people of Rome hee accused

Quintus

Quintus Metellus, a noble man, and citizen, whose ambassadour he was, when he was sent too Rome from him, being his captain, how that he prolõged ỹ warres. and sayde, if they had made hym Consull, hee woulde in a shorte space haue brought Jugurtha, eyther quicke, or dead, into the subiection of the people of Rome. And so in deede hee was made Consull, but he swarued from all trust, & iustice, who by false accusation, brought in an enuie a verye good, & graue citizen, whose ambassadour hee was, and from whom hee was sente. No nor our Gratidianus truelye did then dutie of a good manne, when he was Pretor, & the Tribunes of the people had called vnto thẽ the cõpany of the Pretors, that ther might bee set a standerd of the coyne by a cõmon consent. For in those dayes the money was made so to fall, & rise, that no man coulde knowe, what he had. They penned a decree by a cõmon agremẽt vpõ a pain,

summum virũ, & ciuẽ, cum ab eo imperatore suo Romã missus esset, apud Popu. Roma. criminatus est, bellũ illum ducere: si se COS. fecissent, breui tẽpore aut viuũ, aut mortuum Iugurtham se in potestatem Po. R. redacturum. Itaq; factus est ille quidem COS. sed à fide, iustitiaq; discessit: qui optimũ & grauissimũ ciuem, cuius legatus, & a quo missus esset, in inuidiã falso crimine adduxerit. Nec noster quidem Gratidianus officio boni viri functus est, tunc cum prætor esset collegiumq; prætorum tribuni plebis adhibuisset, vt res nũmaria de communi sententia cõstitueretur. Iactabatur enim tẽporibus illis nũmus, sic vt nemo posset scire quid haberet, conscripserunt communiter edictum cum pœna,

atq; iudicio: constituerunt q; vt omnes simul in rostra post meridiem descenderẽt, & ceteri quidem alius alio.

Marius à subsellys in rostra recta, idq; quod communiter compositum fuerat, solus edixit, & eares (si quæris) ei magno honori fuit: omnibus vicis statuæ factæ: ad eas thus & cerei.

Quid multa? Nemo vnquam multitudini fuit charior. Hæc sunt, quæ conturbant homines in deliberatione nonnunquam: cum id, in quo violatur æquitas, est non ita magnum: illud autem quod ex eo paritur, per magnum videtur, vt Mario præripere collegis, & tribunis pleb. popularem gratiam, non ita turpe: consulem ob eam rem fieri, quod sibi tunc proposuerat,

and condemnation: and appointed, that they altogither at after noone, woulde go downe into Rostra. And then all the reste wente eche man his waie: Marius from the Senatoures benche got him straight to Rostra, and alone proclaimed that, which by a common consente was made, and that thinge, yt ye desire to knowe, was to hym a greate honourr, in al the streates, images were made him, and to the same offered was incense, and lightes of waxe. What neede manye wordes? No man was there euer more beloued of the multitude. These bee the thinges whiche trouble men oftentimes, in takinge of aduisement, when the thinge wherin equitie is broken, is not counted so greate, but that, whiche is gotten by suche dealinge, seemeth marueilous greate. As to Marius it seemed not so dishonest, to gette awaie the peoples fauour frõ his felowes and the Tribunes, but to bee made Consull for that doing, which then he had set

before

before his eie, yt seemed verie profitable. But one rule there is of all, which I wold faine haue you thoroughlye to knowe, either the thinge whiche seemeth profitable, let it not be dishonest, or yf it be dishonest, lette it not seme profitable. What shal we then sate? Wyll wee either take this Marius, or that other, for a good man? Wende, and stryue your vnderstandinge, to se what shape, fourme, and image of a good man is in it. Dothe it then commonly befall in a good manne to lye for his profite, to accuse, to preuēt, or deceiue? Of a suertie nothinge lesse. Is there then any thinge so precious, or any gayne so muche to be desired, that ye shoulde therefore lese the glorie, & name of a good man? What is there so much, that this profite (as thei call it) is able to bringe vs, as it male pull frō vs, in case it take awaye the name of a good man, & spoile vs of trouth, and iustice? For what difference is there whether one shape tura him

valde vtile videbatur. Sed omnium vna regula est, quā cupio tibi esse notissimam: aut illud, quod vtile videtur, turpe ne sit: aut si turpe est, ne esse vtile videatur. Quid igitur, possumusne, aut illum Marium virum bonum iudicare, aut hunc? Explica, atque excute intelligentiam tuam, vt videas quæ sit in ea species, forma, & notio viri boni. Cadit ergo in virum bonum mentiri emolumenti sui causa, criminari, præripere, fallere? Nihil profecto minus Est ergo vlla res tanti, aut commodum vllum tam expetēdum, vt viri boni et splēdorem, & nomen amittas? Quid est quod afferre tantū vtilitas ista, quæ dicitur, possit, quātū auferre, si boni viri nomē eripuerit, fidem, iustitiāq; detraxerit. Quid enim interest virū ex homine

se conuertat quis in beluam? an in hominis figura imma mitatẽ gerat belua? Quid, qui omnia recta & honesta negligunt, dummodò potentiam consequantur? Nonnè idem faciunt quod is, qui etiam socerum habere voluit eum, cuius ipse audacia potens esse? vtile enim videbatur plurimum posse alterius inuidia. Id quam iniustum in patriã, et quã turpe esset, non videbat.

Ipse autem socer in ore sẽper græcos versus Euripidis de Phœnissis habebat, quos dicam, vt potero, inconditè fortasse, sed tamen vt res possit intelligi.

NAM SI VIOLANDVM EST IVS REGNANDI GRATIA VIOLANDVM EST, ALIIS REBVS PIETATEM COLAS.

selfe from a man to a beaste, or vnder the forme of man, beares in hym the brutishe cruelnesse of beast: what of them, who sette at noughte al good and honest thinges, so they may attaine to power: do they not, euen as hee did: who woulde needes haue him too hys father in lawe, by whose bolde enterprises hee might beare a swey: For soo hym it seemed profitable to be of much power, by an others enuie: but he saw not how vnjust, how vnprofitable, how vnhonest it was for his cõuntrey. But as for his father in lawe, he had atwapes in his mouth Euripides greke verses of the Phenissians, which I wyll expresse, as well as I can: Perchaunce without their grace, but yet so as the meanynge may bee conceiued

If breche of lawes, a man shall vndertake
Hee must them boldly breke for kingdomes sake:
In eche thing els: looke you regarde the right.

Hainous

haynous was thee Etiocles or rather Euripides: who excepted onely this, whiche was most detestable. why do we then gather these trifling cases, as concernynge inheritaunce, merchaundise, and deceitfull sale? Naye beholde hym, that sought to be king ouer the people of Rome, and al nations, and brought it too passe. This kinde of desire who so counteth honest, hee is not well in his witte: for hee alloweth the ouerthrow of law, and libertie, and the cruell, and detestable oppression of them hee reckens a glorious matter.

with what kinde of chiding thē, or rating rather may I attempt to turne him frō so great an errour, who confesseth, it is not honest to raign as king in that citie, whiche both hath been, & ought to be free, & yet accoūts it profitable for him, that can bring it to passe.

For, O ye goddes immortal, can the most shamefull & cruell murder of a mannes owne contrey be profitable, yea

capitalis Etiocles vel potius Euripides, qui id vnum quod omniū sceleratissimum fuerat, exceperit. Quid igitur minuta colligimus, hereditates, mercaturas, venditiones fraudulētas? Ecce tibi quir expo. Ro. dominus q̄ omniū gentiū esse concupierit, idq̄ perfecerit. Hanc cupiditatē si quis honestā esse dicit, amens est. probat enim legū & libertatis interitū, earumq̄ oppressionem tetram et detestabilem, gloriosā putat. Qui autē fatetur honestū nō esse ea ciuitate, quæ libera fuit, queq̄ esse debeat regnare: sed ei, qui id facere possit, esse vtile: qua hunc obiurgatione, aut quo potius conuitio à tanto errore coner auertere? Potest enim (Dij immortales) cuiquam esse vtile fœdissimum & terrimū paracidiū patriæ?

quamuis is qui se eo obstrinxerit, ab oppressis ciuibus parens nominetur? Honestate igitur dirigenda vtilitas est & quidã sic, vt hæc duo verba inter se discrepare, sed tamen vnũ sonare videantur. Nõ abeo ad vulgi opinionẽ, quæ maior vtilitas quã regnandi esse possit. Nihil contra inutilius ei, qui id iniustè consecutus sit inuenio, cũ ad veritatẽ capi reuocare rationẽ. Possunt enim cuiquã esse vtiles angores, solicitudines, diurni & nocturni metus, via insidiarũ periculorumque plenissima? MVLTI INIQ VIAT Q VE INFIDELES REGNO: PAVCI BONI SVNT. inquit Accius At cui regno? quòd a Tantalo & Pelope proditum iure obtinebatur. Nam quãto plures ei regi putas, qui

Yea though he that hath embrued himselfe in such blood, be cleaped of the oppressed subiectes parent of the common weale? Profitte therefore is to bee directed by honestie, and that so, as these twoo wordes maie seeme to differ in them selues in termes, and yet to sounde all one in meaninge. Nowe to the opinion of the common people. What greater profite canne there bee, than to reigne, and to rule? Contrarie wise I finde nothinge more vnprofitable for hym, whoe vniustly hath attained it, when I applye reason to the trouth. For can greues, cares, daylye, and nightlie feares, & a life full of snares, and daungers bee profitable to any man?

About ỳ seeking of ỳ crown: many euil, & faithlesse be. But fewe good mẽ in such a a man shallightly se. (case quoth Acti⁹. But to whiche crowne? The same, that frõ Tantalus, and Pelops descending, was by iust title possessed. For howe manyes mo, thinke ye were vntrue, & vntruslye

wntruſtie to that kinge: who with an armie of Romaine people oppreſſed the people of Rome: and forced that citie to bee ſubiecte to hym: whiche was not onely fre of it ſelfe, butte alſo a riuer of other nations: What blotts of conſcience, ſuppoſe you, hadde he in his heate: what woundes of remorſe: But whoſe life canne bee oughte worth to himſelfe: when the ſtate of his lyfe is ſuche, that who ſo takes it frō hym, ſhall be in moſt fauoure, and fame: In caſe theſe thinges be not profitable, which ſpecially ſeeme ſo to be: becauſe thei be full of ſhame and reproche, we ought nowe to be fully perſwaded, that nothig is profitable, whiche is not honeſt. Notwithſtandinge the ſame, bothe at diuers other times, & namely in the warres with Pyrrhus, was ſo aiudged by Caius Fabritius in his ſeconde Conſulſhip, and alſo by our Senate. For when kinge Pyrrhus vnprouoked had moued warre againſte the people of Rome, & the fight was all about empire & ꝑ noble, and

exercitu Populi Romani populū ipſū Romanū oppreſſiſſet, ciuitatēq; nō modo liberā, ſed etiā gētibus imperantem, ſeruire coegiſſet? Hunc tu quas conſcientiæ labes in animo ſenſes habuiſſe quæ vulnera? Cuius autem vita ipſi poteſt vtilis eſſe cum eius vitæ ea conditio ſit, vt qui illam ripuerit, in maxima & gratia futurus ſit & gloria? Quod ſi hec vtilia non ſunt, quæ maxime videntur, quia plena ſunt dedecoris ac turpitudinis, ſatis perſuaſum eſſe debet, nihil eſſe vtile, quod non honeſtum ſit. Quanquam id quidem cum ſæpe alias, tum Pyrrhi bello a C. fabritio COS. iterū & a Senatu noſtro iudicatum eſt. Cum enim rex Pyrrhus Popu Romano bellum vltro intuliſſet, cumq; de imperio certamen eſſet cum rege generoſo

ac potente, perfuga ab eo venit in castra Fabritij, eique est pollicitus, si præmium ei proposuisset, se, vt clàm venisset, sic clàm in Pyrrhi castra rediturum, & cum veneno necaturum. Hunc Fabritius reducendũ curauit ad Pyrrhum: idq; eius factum à senatu laudatum est. Atqui si speciem vtilitatis, opinionemq; quærimus, magnum illud bellum perfuga vnus, & grauem aduersarium imperij sustulisset, sed magnũ dedecus & flagitium: qui cum laudis certamen fuisset, eum non virtute, sed scelere superatum. Vtrum igitur vtilius vel Fabritio, qui talis in hac vrbe, qualis Aristides Athenis fuit: vel senatui nostro, qui nunquã vtilitatẽ à dignitate seiunxit, armis cũ hoste certare, an venenis?

e ruissaunt prince, a runaway traitour went frõ hym too Fabritius campe, and promised, that, if Fabritius wolde offer hym a good reward, as hee came priuilye, so he wolde returne priuilye to Pyrthus pauilion, and dispatch hym with poyson. Fabritius caused him to be caried back againe to Pyrthus, and that deede of hys was well commended of the Senate. But if wee seeke ỹ showe, and respecte of profit, true it is, this one runaway might haue made an end of the great warre, and that greeuous enemie of the Empire, but it had been a great shame, & fowle deede, too haue hadde hym subdued not by prowesse, but by trecherie, with whõ the fight was all for glorie. whether then was it more profitable eyther for Fabrittus, who was suche a one in our citie, as Aristides was at Athenes, or for our Senate, who neuer seuered profite from honour, too warre againste theyr enemie wyth armes, or with poyson-

If Empire be to be sought for cause of glorye, lette trecherie bee eschewed, wherin can bee no glorye, againe, if ryches be sought any maner way, they can not bee profytable if they come with infamie. Therfore that aduise of Lucius Philippus, Quintus sonne, was not profitable, that those cities which Lucius Sylla, for a certaine somme of monye, had discharged of tributes, by decree of the Senate, shoulde againe bee tributarie, and yet wee shoulde not restore them that monye, wiche for theyr beynge free, they hadde disbursed. The Senathouse agreed al with him. A sclaunder it was to the gouernement. For of Pirates better is the promise, than of the Senate. Yea tut the tributes (they wyll say) wer thereby augmented, therefore it was profitable. How longe wyll they bee bolde too call anye thing profitable, that is not honest: Can hatred, & infamie be pfitable to any state that shold bee vpholdē with glorie,

Si gloriæ causa imperium expetendum est: scelus absit, in quo non potest esse gloria. Sin ipsæ opes expetuntur, quoquo modo non poterunt esse vtiles cum infamia. Non igitur vtilis illa L. Philippi Q. filii sententia, quas ciuitates L. Sylla pecunia accepta ex sena.cons. liberauisset, vt eæ rursus vectigales essent: neque his pecuniam, quam pro libertate dederant redderemus, et senatus est assensus. Turpe imperio. Pyratarum enim melior fides, quàm senatus. At auctà vectigalia. Vtile igitur, quousq; audebunt dicere, quicquam vtile quod non honestum? potest autem vili imperio, quod gloriæ debet sultum esse,

& beneuolentia ſociorum, vtile eſſe odium & infamiã? Ego etiam cum Catone meo ſæpe deſſenſi. Nimis enim mihi videbatur præfracte ærarium, vectigaliaq; defendere: omnia publicanis negare, multa ſocijs, cum in hos beneficos eſſe deberemus, cum illis ſic agere, vt cũ colonis noſtris ſoleremus. Eoq; magis, quòd illa ordinum coniunctio ad ſalutem Reip. pertinebat. Malè etiam Curio, cum cauſam Tranſpadanorum æquam eſſe dicebat, ſemper autem addebat, vincat vtilitas, potius dicere nõ eſſe æquam, quia non eſſet vtilis Reip. quam cum vtilẽ eſſe diceret, non eſſe æquam fateretur. Plenus eſt ſextus liber de officijs Hæcatones taliũ queſtionum ſit ne boni viri in maxima caritate annonæ familiam non alere,

glorie, and good will of their leagfrends? I my ſelf oftentime haue diſagreed euen wt my Cato: for ouerſtiffyme thought he defended ye treaſurie gaine, & tributes: & denied al maner of alowãces to ye farmers of oure cuſtome, & many, to oure leagfriendes: whereas towarde theſe we ſhould be beneficiall: and ſo deale with thoſe: as we were wonte to do with our citizẽs ſent to inhabit new townes, & ſo muche the more, becauſe ye knittinge togither of thoſe degrees of men did pertaine to the ſaftie of the common wealth. Curio alſo did euil, in that he ſaid, the Tranſpadanes matter was iuſte: but yet euermore hee cryed. Let profite preuaile. He ſhoulde rather haue ſaide their matter was not iuſte, bycauſe it was not profitable for the cõmõ welth: than whẽ he ſaid, it was iuſt, he ſhold grant, it was vnprofitable.

Hecatoes ſixte boke of duties is full of ſuch queſtions: Whether it be fit for a good mã, in a very great dearth of corne, to giue ouer houſekepinge

ping: he disputes the matter on both sides: but yet at laste he thinketh, duetie is directed rather after profit, than after humanitie.

He puttes the case, if one muste needes take losse by sea: whether shoulde hee rather beare the losse of a horse muche worth, than of a slaue little worth. In this case, priuate profite leades a man one waie, & humanitie an other. If a foote in a shippewrake catch hold of a boord: shal a wise man take it from him, if he can? He saieth, no, because it were iniurious. What may the owner of the shippe doo? shall he take his owne? No, no more than hee maie caste a passenger out of the ship into the sea, because it is his. For vntyll they arriue at the place, whether the ship was hired: the ship is not the owners, but theirs that sail in it. What if twoe in a shipwrake lighte vpon one borde: and thei bothe be wise men: shold either of thē pul it to him self: or one giue ouer his holde to the other? Yes, he shoulde giue ouer: but

in vtranq; partem disputat: sed tamen ad extremum vtilitate non putat officium dirigi, magis quàm humanitate. Quæritsi in mari iactura facienda sit, equi ne precioſi potius iacturam faciat, an ſeruuli vilis? Hic aliò rei familiaris, aliò ducit humanitas. Si tabulam de naufragio ſtultus arripuerit, extorquebit ne eam ſapiens, ſi potuerit? Negat, quia ſit iniurium. Quid dominus nauis? Eripiet ne ſuum? Minimè. Non plus, quàm ſi nauigantem in alto ejicere de naui velit, quia ſua ſit. Quo ad enim perueniumſit eò, quò ſumpta nauis eſt, non domini nauis, ſed nauigantium. Quid ſi in vna tabula ſint duo naufragi, hiq́ue ſint ſapientes: ſibi vterq́ue rapiat? an alter cedat alteri? cedat vero:

ſed ei, cuius magis interſit, vel ſua vel Reipub. cauſa viuere. Quid ſi hæc paria vtroq; ? Nullum erit certamen, ſed quaſi ſorte, aut dimicando victus, alteri cedat alter. Quid ſi pater fana expilet, cuniculos agat ad erarium, indicetnè id magiſtratibus filius? Nefas id quidem eſt, quin etiam defendat patrem, ſi arguatur. Non igitur patria præſtat omnibus officijs, immò verò: ſed ipſi patriæ cõducit, pios habere ciues in parentes. Quid ſi tyrannidem occupare, ſi patriam perdere conabitur pater, ſilebitnè filius? immò vero obſecrabit patrem ne id faciat: ſi nihil proficiet accuſabit: minabitur etiam: ad extremum: ſi ad pernicie-em patriæ res ſpectabit:

but too him, whom it were more expedient to liue, eyther for his owne or the cõmon weales ſake, what if theſe be alike in both? Then ther ſhall be no ſtriuing betwene thẽ: but the one muſt yeeld to the other, as the loſer doth in lots, or at the Italian play with the fingers called Tocco.

What if the father rob cherches? or vndermine ỹ walles of the treaſurie: ſhould the ſonne open it to the magiſtrates: That were ſurely a curſed deede, yea rather he ſhould defende his father if he were accuſed therof. Is not our countrey thẽ aboue all duties: Yes truly, but it is profitable for ones countrie, too haue the inhabiters reuerence theyr parentes. what if ones father wyll go about too vſurpe, as a tiraunt, or to betray his contrey, ſhal the ſonne conceale it? May hee ſhall deſire hys father, not to do it, if he nothing preuail, he ſhall blame him, and threaten him alſo. And laſt of all, if the matter tende too the deſtruction

of

of his countrie: he shall preferre the safetie of his countrie before the safetie of hys father.

He puttes a question also: if a wyse man vnwares receiued counterfet monye in steede of good: after he perceiues it, whether he shoulde paye it oute againe for good monye, if hee were indetted to any bodye? Diogenes saith, hee maie: Antipater denie it, to whome I rather agree.

He, that wittingly selleth wine, & will not laude: whether oughte he to declare it: or no: Diogenes thynkes, it is not needefull: Antipater reckens it the dutie of a good manne. These bee (as ye woulde say) the cases, in controuersie, in the Stoikes matters of lawe. Whether, in sellinge a bondeman, his faultes are to bee tolde or no? I meane not those, whiche vnlesse you declare, the bondeman maye be tourned home againe by the ciuill lawe: but these, that he is a lyer, a dycer, a pyker, a drõkard: some thinke meete

patriæ salutem anteponit saluti patris.

Quærit etiam si sapiens adulteri nos nummos acceperit imprudens pro bonis, cũ id rescierit, soluturus nè sit eos, sicut debeat, pro bonis. Diogenes ait. Antipater negat: cui potius assentior.

Qui vinum fugiens vendat sciens, debeat ne dicere? non necesse putat Diogenes: Antipater viri boni existimat. Hæc sunt quasi controuersa iura Stoicorum, in mancipio vendendo dicenda ne vitia? Non, nisi ea quæ si non dixeris, redhibeatur mancipium iure ciuile.

Sed hæc, mendacem esse, aliatorem, furacem, ebriosum, alteri dicenda, vi-

dentur, alteri non videntur. Si quis aurum vendens, orichalcum se putat vendere indicetne ei vir bonus aurũ illud esse, an emat denario, q̃ sit mille denariũ? Perspicuũ iam est, & quid mihi videatur, & q̃ sit inter eos philosophos, quos nominaui, controuersia. Facta & promissa semper ne seruanda sint, quae nec vi, nec dolo malo, vt praetores solent dicere facta sint. Si quis medicamentum cui piam dederit ad aquam intercutem, pepigeritq̃, si eo medicamento sanus factꝰ esset, ne illo medicamento vnq̃ postea vteretur: si eo medicamẽto sanꝰ factus sit, & annis aliquot post incidat in eundem morbum, nec ab eo qui cum pepigerat impetret, vt illo medicamento vti liceat: quia faciendum sit, cum sit is inhumanus, qui non concedat vti bono cuiquã sua iniuriã

to bee tolde some other, not so. If one sellinge golde, supposeth he selles but copper, shoulde a good manne of ductie tell him, yt it is golde? or he may by for a penny that is worth a thowsande? It is already very plaine, bothe what I thinke, & what that controuersie is amonge the Philosophers, whome I named. Whether are couenãts, and promyses alwaies to bee kepte, whiche bee (as the Orators vse to speake) made neither by compulsion, nor by coninz. If one minister to an other a medicine for the dropsie, and bindes the pacient by couenaunte, that he shall neuer after vse the same medicine, in case he be made hoile by that medicine, and within a fewe yeares after, do fall into the same desease, and can not obteine of him, with whome he made the couenaunt, that hee maie vse yt likewise againe, what is to bee donne, seinge he is so vngentle, and will not graunte him to vse it, and yet he shoulde take no harme thereby.

The

The man muste haue regard to his owne life and health.

What if a wiseman bee required of one, who makes him hys heire: where two millions, and fiue hundred thousande crownes bee lefte hym by testamente: that, before he haue the possession of it, he dãce openly, on the day time, in the market: and he promiseth, so to doo, because otherwise the manne woulde not putte him in, as his heire: shoulde hee doo then, that hee promysed: or no? I woulde wishe, hee hadde made no suche promise and that, I thinke, had been a poynte of grauitie: butte seeinge he promised it, yf he counte it dishoneste to daunce in the market: he shall with the more honestie goe from his worde, if hee take nothinge of the inheritãce: except peraduenture hee wyll bestowe that same mon e vpon the commonwealth, in some time of great necessitie, that it maye be no shame for him euen to daunce when he shall procure the wealth of his countrie.

Vitæ & saluti consulendum est.

Quid? si quis sapiens rogatus sit ab eo qui cum hæredem faciat, eum & testamento sestertium milies relinquatur, vt antequam hæreditatem adeat, luce palam in foro saltet, idque se facturum promiserit, quod aliter eum heredem scripturus ille non esset: faciat quod promiserit, nec ne? promisisse nollem: & id arbitror fuisse grauitatis. Sed quoniam promissa, si saltare in foro turpe ducet, honestius mentietur, si ex hæreditate nihil cœperit, quam si cœperit: nisi forte eam pecuniam in Reipublicæ magnum aliquod tempus contulerit: vt vel saltare cum, cum patriæ consulturus sit, turpe non sit.

Ac ne illa quidem promissa seruanda sunt, quæ non sunt his ipsis vtilia, quibus illa promiseris.

Sol Phaethonti filio (vt redeamus ad fabulas) factu-rum se esse dixit, quicquid optasset, optauit vt in currũ patris tolleretur, sublatus est, ictus antequam constitit fulminis deflagra-uit, quanto melius fuerat in hoc promissum patris non esse seruatum. Quid, quod Theseus exigit promissum à Neptuno? cui cum tres optationes Neptunus dedisset: optauit interitum Hipolyti filij sui, cum is patris suspectus esset de nouerca: quo optato impetrato Theseus in maximis fuit luctibus.

Quid? Agamemnõ cũ deuouisset Dianæ quod in suo regno pulcherrimum natum

Nor those promises are to be kepte: whiche be not profitable euen for them, to whõ you made them.

Titan (that we may returne to fables) said to Phaethon hys sonne: he woulde doe whatsoeuer hee woulde desire. He desiered to bee taken vp into his fathers charret: the madde foole was hoysted vppe: and on the side where he stoode, with a flashe of lyghtninge he fell all on a fyre. Howe muche better had it been, his fathers promes had not been in this performed:

What shall wee saye to promes, that Theseus requyred of Neptunus: to whom when Neptunus had granted three boones: Theseus asked the death of Hippolitus, his sonne: when his father hadde him in a iealousie for his stepmother, whiche boone beinge obtayned, Theseus fell into verie greate lamentation.

What of Agamẽnon: When hē he had vowed to Diana that fayrest creature, that shoulde be

bee borne that yeare in his kingdome: he offered vp in sacrifice his daughter, Iphigenia: who was the fayrest creature, borne that yeare. The promise rather shoulde not haue been keepte, than so hainous a deede shoulde be committed.

Wherefore promyses also many times, are not to bee performed.

Nor at all times, thinges layde to keepe are to bee restored. As if one, well in hys witte: shall leaue a sworde with ye to keepe: and aske it agayne, when he is madde: it were a sinne, to restore it, and duetie, to keepe it.

What if one who hath left money with you to keepe, woulde make warre against youre countrey: shall ye restore, that was layde ye to kepe? No, as I suppose: for ye shall doo against the commonwealth, whiche ought to be moste dere vnto you.

So, manny thynges, whiche by nature seeme to be honest by chaunge of times become dishonest.

esset illo anno immolauit Iphigeniam, qua nihil erat eo quidem anno natum pulchrius. Promissum potius non faciendum, quàm tam tetrum facinus admittendum fuit. Ergo & promissa non facienda nonnunquam, neque semper deposita reddèda sunt.

Si gladium quis apud te sana mente deposuerit, repetat insaniens, reddere peccatum sit, non reddere officium.

Quid? si is qui apud te pecuniam deposuerat, bellum inferat patriæ: reddes nè depositum? Non credo.

Facies enim contra Rempubli. quæ debet esse charissima. Sic multa, quæ natura honesta videntur esse, temporibus fiunt non honesta.

Facere promissa, stare conuentis re, reddere deposita, commutata vtilitate fiunt nō honesta.

Ac de his quidem quæ videntur esse vtilitatis contra iustitiam simulatione prudētiæ satis arbitror dictum.

Sed quoniam à quatuor fontibus honestatis primo libro officia duximus: in eisdem versabimur cū docebimus ea, quæ videntur esse vtilia, neque sint, quam sint virtutis inimica.

Ac de prudentia quidem, quam vult imitari malitia, itemque de iustitia, quæ semper est vtilis, disputatum est. Reliquæ sunt duæ partes honestatis: quarum altera in animi excellentis magnitudine, & prestantia cernitur: altera in cōstitutione & moderatione continentiæ & temperantiæ.

To perfourme promises, to stande to couenanties, to restore that is layde vee to keepe, when it otherwyse behoueth, it becommeth dishonest. And of these whiche seeme to bee cases of profite, contrarie to iustice, vnder pretence of wyledome: I thynke it sufficiently declared.

But for as muche as, in our fyrste boke, we haue drawne all duelies, out of foure fountaines of honestie: wee shall continue still in the same: when we teach, what enemies of vertue those thinges be: whiche seeme to be profitable, & are not so in deede.

And thus of wiledome, whome wylines would resemble: & likewise of iustice whiche is alwaies profitable we haue discoursed.

The other two partes of honestie remaine: whereof the one is sene in the greatnesse, and worthinesse of an excellent courage: the other, in the framinge, and measuringe of stayednes, and temperaunce.

Je

It seemed profitable to Ulysses (as somme tragicall poets haue it set oute, for in Homer, the best author, there is no such suspicion of Ulysses) but the tragedies doo laye it as a reproche to him, that, by counterfetinge madnesse, he would haue scaped goinge a warrefare. It was no honest deuise.

Yet profitable it was (as somme peraduenture wyll saie) to rule, and to lyue quietly at Ithaca, with hys parentes, with his wife, and with his sonne.

Thinke you any honour, got in dayly daungers, and trauailles, is to be compared with this quietnesse of lyfe? I verily iudge it meete to be despised, & reiected, because what so is not honest, I count it in no wise to be profitable.

For what, thinke you Ulysses shoulde haue hearde, if he had continued styll in hys counterfeiting? who hauing done great feates in warre, yet hearde these wordes of Aiax.

Vtile videbatur Vlyssi, vt quidam poetæ tragici prodiderunt: nã apud Homerũ optimum authorem talis de Vlysse nulla suspicio est: sed insimulant cum tragœdiæ, simulatiõ: insaniæ militiam subterfugere voluisse: non honestum consilium: ac vtile (vt aliquis fortasse dixerit) regnare, & Ithacæ viuere otiose cum parentibus, cum vxore, cũ filio. Vllum tu decus in quotidianis periculis & laboribus cum tranquilitate hac conferendum putas? Ego vero istam contemnendam & abiciendã: quæ niã quæ honesta non sit, ne vtilem quidem esse arbitror.

Quid enim auditurũ putas fuisse Vlissem, si in illa simulatione perseuerasset? qui cum maximas res gesserit in bello, tamen hæc audiuit ab Aiace.

Cuius ipse princeps iusiurandi fuit,
Quod omnes scitis, solus neglexit fidem.
Furere assimulauit, ne quò iret: instítit.
Quòd ni Palamedis perspicax prudentia
Istius percepisset malitiosã audaciam,
Fide sacratum ius perpetuò falleret.

For all the consience of that othe, he passed not a fly,
Whiche he himselfe procured first, ye wot, as well as I.
He coulde put on a fained face, & fare, as he wer mad.
And not to go with them, he wrought with all the wiles he had
His slye boldnes but Palamede by depe policy did spy:
The sacred lawe of solemne othe the frek e wolde stil deny

Illi vero non modò cum hostibus, verum etiam cum fluctibus, id quod fecit, dimicare melius fuit, quàm deserere consentientem Græciam ad bellum barbaris inferendum.
Sed omittamus & fabulas et

For him no doubt it was better to fight not only with his enemies, but also with the waues of the sea, as he did: than to shrinke from thē of Greece, who had concluded togither to make warre vpon the Troians But let vs leaue of bothe fables, and forzeyne

forzeine exaumples, and come vnto trouth and deedes.

¶ When Marcus Attilius Regulus, beinge seconde time Consull, was taken by a trayne in Affrike: Xanttippus the Lacedemonian beinge the guide: & Amilcar, Annibals father, the generall: he was sent to the Senate vpon his othe: that excepte certaine gentlemenne taken prisoners were restored to the Penes, he shoulde himselfe retoure to Carthage.

¶ When he was comme to Rome, he saw wel ỹ show of profit, butte as the matter prouyth, hee iudged it verye vayne, whiche was butte on this sorte, to tarie still in hys countrey: to bee at home wyth hys wyfe, and children, to keepe his degree of Consular estate, and to take the miserie whiche he hadde felte in warre, to be common to warrefaringe fortune.

¶ Who can deni these things to be profitable? What this your Greatnesse of courage, and mãlines saith naye to it.

Loke

externa, ad rem factam nostramque veniamus. M. Attilius Regulus, cum COS. Iterum in Africa ex insidijs captus esset, duce Xantippo Lacedemonio, Imperatore autẽ patre Annibalis Hamilcare, iuratus missus est ad senatum: vt nisi redditi essent Pœnis captiui nobiles quidam, rediret ipse Carthaginem.

Is cum Romam venisset, vtilitatis speciem videbat sed eam (vt res declarat) falsam iudicauit: quæ erat talis, manere in patria, esse domi suæ cum vxore, cum liberis, quam calamitatem accepisset in bello, cõmunem fortunæ bellicæ indicãtem, tenere consularis dignitatis gradum. Quis hæc neget esse vtilia quem censes? Magnitudo animi & fortitudo negat.

Num locupletiores quaris auctores? Harum enim est virtutum proprium, nil extimescere: omnia humana despicere: nihil, quod homini accidere possit, intolerandum putare. Itaque quid fecit? In senatum venit mandata exposuit: sententiam ne diceret: recusauit: quamdiu iureiurando hostium teneretur, non esse se senatorem. Atque illud etiam (O stultum hominem, dixerit quispiam, & repugnantem vtilitati suæ.) Reddi captiuos negauit esse vtile. Illos enim adolescentes, & bonos duces se iam confectum senectute. Cuius cum valuisset auctoritas, captiui retenti sunt. ipse Charthaginem rediit. Neque eum charitas patriæ retinuit, nec suorum.

Neque verò tum ignorabat

Loke ye for more substantiall authorities? For of these vertues is it the propriete, to bee aferde of nothinge, to despise all worldlie vanities, to thinke nothinge vnsufferable that to man may befall.

Therefore what did he? Hee came into the Senate: declared that he hadde in commaundement: refused to gyue his sentence, and saide, he was no Senatoure, as longe as he was bounde by othe ministred by his enemies. Yea and this moreouer he saide (O foolyshe man, wyll some saye, and againste his owne profitte) that it was not expediente to haue the captiues restored.

For he alleaged, they were younge, and good captaines: whereas he was worne, and spent with age. Whose authoritie when it hadde preuayled: the captiues were kept still: he himselfe retourned to Carthage, and neither loue of his countrye, nor of his kinsfolke stayed him.

Yet was it not vnknowē to him

him, that hee retourned to a verie cruell ennemie, and to extreme tormentes: butte he thoughte his othe meete to be performed. Wherefore euen at that tyme, when he was put to death with cõtinuall watchinge: hee was in better state: than yf hee hadde remained an aged captiue, and a pertured Senatoure at heme.

se ad crudelissimum hostem, & ad exquisita supplicia profici: sed iusiurandum conseruandum putabat. Itaque tum cum vigilando necabatur, erat in meliore causa, quam si domi senex, captiuus periuris, consularis remansisset. At stultè: qui non modo non censuerit captiuos remittendos, verum etiam dissuaserit.

But fondlye, will some saye, he did: who not onelye iudged it vnmeete, that the captiues shoulde be restored, but also dissuaded it.

Quomodo stultè? etiam ne si Reip. conduceret: Potest autem quod inutile Reip. sit, id cuiquam ciui vtile esse? peruertant homines ea, quæ sunt fundamenta naturæ cũ vtilitatem ab honestate seiungunt. Omnes enim expetimus vtilitatem, ad eamq; rapimur, nec facere aliter vllo modo possumus. Nam quis est qui vtilia fugiat? aut quis potius, qui ea non studiosissime persequatur?

Howe, I praie ye, did he fondlye, Did he so, seeinge he auailed the common weith? May that be profitable for anie citizen, whiche is vnprofitable to the state? Men do wrest those foundations whiche nature layeth: when thei seuer profitte from honestye. For we all couet profit, and to it be caried, nor by any meanes otherwise canne we doe. For who is he, that fleeth profit: or who rather is ther that foloweth not the same moste diligentlye?

But

Sed quia nusq̃ possumus, nisi in laude, decore honestate, vtilia reperire: propter ea illa prima & summa habemus, vtilitatis nomẽ non tã splẽdidum, q̃ necessarium ducimus. Quid est igitur (dixerit quis) in iureiurando? num iratum tenem⁹ Ioue m?

At hoc quidem commune est omnium philosophorum, non eorum modò, qui Deum nihil habere ipsum negotij dicunt, & nihil exhibere alteri: sed eorum etiam, qui Deum semper agere aliquid, & moliri volunt. Nunq̃ nec irasci Deum, nec nocere.

Quid autem iratus Iupiter plus nocere potuisset, quam nocuit sibi ipse Regulus?

Nulla igitur vis fuit religionis, quæ tantam vtilitatẽ peruerteret. An ne turpiter faceret: primum minima de malis. Num igitur tãtum mali turpitudo ista habebit,

But because no where wee can finde thinges profitable but in praise semelimsse, and honestie: therefore we esteme those as chiefe, and hyest: & the commendation of profite we counte not so honorable, as necessarie. What is ther then in other? with some saye. Are we afeerd, Iupiter wyll be angry? May this is common among al philosophers not onely those, who holde, that God himselfe hathe nothinge to doo, and nothinge appointes to an other bodie: but them also, who wyll needes haue God alwayes dounge and medlinge wyth somewhat: that God is neuer angry, nor euer hurteth any creature.

What greater harme could Iupiter haue donne, beinge offended, than Regulus did to himselfe? There was then no respecte of religion, that myghte ouerturne so greate a profite. What shoulde he haue donne dishonestye? Fyrste, of euils the lest were to be chooſen. Shall then this dishonestye haue in it so muche discommoditie, as

tie, as had that torment?
Moreouer this sayinge, that is in Accius.

Haste thou thy faithed promise broke?
My faith I nother gaue, nor giue,
To any faithlesse, while I liue.

Thoughe of a wicked kinge it be saide, yet it is excellentlie saide.

Hereunto thei adde: ✠ as we say, some things seeme profitable, which are not so in deede: that thei in like manner saie, some thynges seeme honest, whiche are not so in deede: as for exaumple, this same seemeth honest that hee dyd returne to tormente, for the sauynge of hys othe: but it became dishonest: because that which had ben wrought by the violence of his enemies shoulde not haue been by him confirmed. They say also to this, that who so is verie profitable, the same groweth likewise to bee honest, although it seemed not so at firste.

quantum ille cruciatus?
Deinde illud etiam apud Accium.

FREGISTINE FIDEM? NEQ VEDEDI, NEQ VEDO IN FIDELI CVIQ VAM.

Quanquam ab impio rege dicitur, luculentè tamen dicitur.

Addunt etiam, quem admodum nos dicamus, videri quædam vtilia, quæ non sint sic se dicere videri quædam honesta, quæ non sint, vt hoc ipsum videtur honestum conseruandi iurisiurandi causa ad cruciatum reuertisse. Sed fit non honestum, quia quod per vim hostium esset actum, ratum esse non debuit. Addunt etiam quicquid valde vtile sit, id fieri honestum, etiam si antea nō videretur.

Thyse

Hæc ferè contra Regulum: Sed prima videamus. Non fuit Iupiter metuendus, ne iratus noceret: qui neq; irasci solet, neq; nocere. Hæc quidem ratio non magis contra Reguli, quàm contra omne iusiurandum valet. Sed in iureiurando, non qui metus, sed quæ vis sit, debet inesse. Est enim iusiurandū affirmatio religiosa. Quod autem affirmatè, quasi Deo teste promiseris, id tenendum est. Iam enim non ad iram deorum, quæ nulla est: sed ad iustitiam & ad fidem pertinet. Nam præclare Ennius: O fides alma, apta pennis & iusiurandum Iouis.

Qui igitur iusiurandum violat, is fidem violat: quam in Capitolio vicinam Iouis OPTIMAX. vt in Catonis oratione est,

These thinges commonlye be alleged againste Regulus. But lette vs consider the firste.

Iupiter was not to bee feared, leaste he should hurte him in his anger, because neither to be angrie, nor to do harme hee is accustomed. & his reason surely maketh nomore againste Regulus, than againste all kinde of othes. But in the othemaking, not what the feare, but what the vertue of it is, ought to bee considered. For an othe is a religious assuringe of any thinge. And what so assuredly you haue promised, as takinge God to witnesse, it oughte to bee obserued. For the othe now respectes not the wrath of the gods, whiche is none at al, but iustice, and faithfulnes. For notablye saide Ennius.

O heauenly Faith, tye to thy winges, the othe of Ioue also.

Who so then stayneth his othe, hee stayneth Ladie Faithe, whome, as it appeares in Catoes oration,

oure

oure auncestoures woulde needs haue to stande in oure Capitole, next vnto ỹ great, and mightie Ioue.

Yea but Iupiter, beinge displeased, coulde not haue done more harme to Regul⁹ than regulus did to himselfe.

That is true if there were nothinge euill, but to feele payne. But the Philosophers, that bee of the greatest auctoritie, do affyrme, that it not onely is not the vttermost euill, but also no euill at all. For whome, I pray ye, doo not refuse to take Regulus, as no meane witnes, but (I beleue) the grauest of all. For what more substantiall wytnesse do we looke for, than a pere of the commonweale, who, for the continuinge of hys duetie, did wyllinglie enter into tormentes: For wheras thei say, of euils the least are to bee chosen, meaninge it is better dishonestlye, than miserably to liue, is there anye greater euill, than dishonesty? Whiche if in the deformitie of the bodye it breedeth somme offence, how

maiores nostri esse voluerũt?

At enim ne iratus quidem Iupiter pl⁹ Regulo nocuisset, quàm sibi nocuit ipse Regulus. Certè si nihil malum esset, nisi dolere. Id autem non modo non summũ malum, sed nec malum quidem esse maxima authoritate philosophi affirmant. Quorum quidem testem nõ mediocrem, sed haud scio an grauissimum, Regulum, nolite quaeso vituperare.

Quem enim locupletiorem quaerimus, quàm principem. Po. Ro. qui retinendi officij causa cruciatum subierit voluntarium?

Nam quod aiunt, minima de malis, id est vt turpiter, potius quàm calamitosè: an est vllum maius malum turpitudine? Quae sit in deformitate corporis habeat aliquid offensionis?

quanta illa deprauatio & foeditas turpificai animi debet videri : Itaque nerui qui ista disserunt, solum audent malum dicere, id quod turpe sit: qui autem remissius, hi tamen non dubitant summum malum dicere. Nam illud quidem.

Neq; dedi, neq; do infideli cuiquam.

howe much muste nedes that corruption, and filth of a defiled minde appeare?

Therefore they whoe more pithily debate these matters are bolde to call that the only euill, whiche is dishonest: & they, who dispute them not so earnestly, doe not sticke to call ỹ same the vttereſt euill. As for that saying

My faith I neither gaue, nor giue:
To any faithlesse, while I liue.

Id circo recte à poeta dicitur, quia cũ tractaretur Atreus, personæ seruiendum fuit. Sed si hoc sibi sumant nullam esse fidem, quæ infideli data sit, videant ne quærasur latebra periurio.

Est autem ius etiam bellicum, fidesq; iusiurandi sæpe hosti seruanda. Quod enim ita iuratum est, vt mens cõciperet fieri oportere,

It is therefore wel brought in of the Poet: bicause when Atreus parte shoulde goe in hande, it was meete, the speache shoulde serue for hys person. But if hereof they take thẽselues a rule, that it is no promes which is made to a promes breaker: let them take hede, thet be not sought a startinge hole for periurie. The lawe of armes, and the promes of an othe is many times to bee kepte with oure enemy. For what so in suche sort is sworne, that the mind of the swearer conceaueth,

it is

it is necessarie to bee done: ẏ same is to be obserued: what so falleth otherwise: ẏ same if one doe not, it is no periurie. As if you bring not the ſũme of money that ye promised rouers for your lyfe: there is no deceiuinge in it, no, though beyng ſworne therto, ye do it not. For a pirate is not counted in the nomber of enemies to ones countrey, but a cõmon enemie to all men. With ſuche a one neither promes, neither oth ought a like, as with vs to bee kept. For, to ſwere an vntruth, is not too forſwere but not too performe that, which accordyng to the meaning of your herte ye haue ſworne, as by our cuſtome is expreſt in a certaine forme of wordes: ſurely it is periurie. For featly ſayde Euripides:

In word I ſware, but herte vnſworne I bare.

But it was not fit for Regulus with periurie too diſtourbe the cõditions, & couenants with his enemyes, & of warre. For with a tuſt,

id ſeruandum eſt, quod aliter, id ſi non feceris, nullum periurium eſt. Vt ſi prædonib⁹ pactum pro capite pretium non attuleris, nulla fraus eſt, ne ſi iuratus quidẽ id non feceris. Nam pirata non eſt ex perduellium numero definitus, ſed communis hoſtis omnium, cum hoc nec fides debet, nec iuſtũ dum eſſe commune. Non enim falſum iurare peierare eſt, ſed quod ex animi tui ſententia iuraueris, ſicut verbis concipitur, more noſtro, id non facere, periurium eſt. Scite enim Euripides.

Iurauĩ lingua, mentem iniuratam gero.

Regulus vero non debuit conditiones, pactionesq; bellicas & hoſtiles perturbare periurio. Cum iuſto enim

& legitimo hoſte res gerebatur: aduerſus quem & totus fecialis et multa ſunt iura communia. Quod ni ita eſſet, nunquã claros viros ſenatus vinctos hoſtibus dedidiſſet. At vero T. Veturius & Sp. Poſthumius cum iterum COSS. eſſẽt, quia cũ male pugnatum apud Caudium eſſet, legionibus noſtris ſub iugum miſſis, pacẽ cum Samnitibus fecerant, dediti ſũ his, iniuſſu enim Po. Senatuſq; fecerãt. Eodẽque tempore T. Numitius, Q. Aemilius, qui tum tribuni plebis erant, quod eorum authoritate pax erat facta, dediti ſunt, vt pax Samnitium repudiaretur. Atq; huius deditionis ipſe Poſthumus, qui dedebatur, ſuaſor et author fuit. Quod idẽ multis annis poſt C. Mã-

and lawfull enemie ẏ thing was done: towarde whom both all the fecialli law, & diuers other lawes bee in cõmon. Which if it wer not ſo: the Senate woulde neuer haue deliuered to their enemies, noble men beinge priſoners. But yet Titus Veturius, & Spurius Poſthuminus, the ſecond time, they wer Conſuls, becauſe when they had not fought it well at Caudium, & our legions beyng ſubdued, they hadde made a peas with the Samnites: they were deliuered vnto thẽ, for without commiſſion of the people, and the Senate, they had done it. And at the ſame time. Titus Numitius, & Quintus Emilius, who were then the Tribunes of the people, becauſe the peas was made by their authoritie, wer deliuered alſo, that the peas with the Samnites might bee refuſed. And Poſthumius ſelf who was deliuered, was ẏ perſwader, and cauſer of the ſame deliuerie. Whiche lykewiſe Caius Mancinus dyd, manye yeres after: who,

who, that he might bee deliuered too the Numantines, with whom without authoritie of the Senate hee had concluded a league, perswaded ỳ particuler law, whiche Lucius Furius, & Sextus Atilius made by the decree of the Senate, & whē it was receiued, hee was deliuered to the enemies. This man delt more honestly, thē Quintus Pompeius, by whose intercession, whē hee was in ỳ same case it was, brought to passe, ỳ the lawe was not receiued. With him, ỳ thyng which seemed profit, preuayled more thā honestie. With the other aforesayd, the false show of profit was suppressed by the authoritie of honestie. But that, which was done by violence, needed not to haue been confirmed. As who shoulde saye, violence coulde bee done too a manly man. why then dyd hee go to the Senate, namelye seeing he was purposed to dissuade them from the deliuerie of the captiues? What in him was moste commendable, that same ye disalowe

cin°, qui vt Numantinis, quibus cum sine senatus authoritate fœdus fecerat, dederetur, rogationem suasit eam, quam Lucius Furius & Sextus Atilius ex sen. con. ferebant: qua accepta, est hostibus deditus. Honestius hic, quam Q. Pompeius, quo, cum in eadem causa esset, deprecante, accepta lex non est. Hic ea quæ videbatur vtilitas, plus valuit, quam honestas. Apud superiores vtilitatis species falsa, ab honestatis authoritate superata est. At non debuit ratum esse, quod erat actum per vim, quasi vero forti viro vis possit adhiberi. Cur igitur ad senatum proficiscebatur, cum præsertim de captiuis dissuasurus esset. Quod maximum in eo est, id reprehenditis.

Non enim suo iudicio stetit: sed suscepit causã, vt esset iudicium senatus: cui nisi ipse author fuisset, captiui profecto Pœnis redditi essẽt Ita incolumis in patria Regulus restitisset. Quod quia patriæ non vtile putauit: idcirco honestum sibi et sentire illa & pati cecidit. Nam quod aiunt, quod valde vtile sit, id fieri honestum immo verò esse, non fieri. Est enim nihil vtile, quod idem non honestum, nec quia vtile honestum est, sed quia honestum, vtile. Quare ex multis mirabilibus, exemplis, haud facile quis dixerit hoc exemplo aut laudabilius, aut præstantius. Sed ex tota hac laude Reguli, vnum illud est admiratione dignũ: quod captiuos retinendos

For he stode not to his owne iudgement, but toke the matter in hand, that it might bee the iudgement of the Senate, wherunto if hee hadde not ben a counseler, the captiues no dout had been restored to the Cartaginers, and had Regulus remayned safe in his countrey, whiche thing bicause he toke it not to be profitable for hys contrie, therfore hee thought it honestie for him, to bee of ỹ minde, and so to suffer for where they say, ỹ it, whiche is very profitable, doth become honest, nay the shoulde saye, it is in deede, and not becomes honest. For there is nothing profitable, which same is not honest, & not bycause it is profitable, it is honest, but bicause it is honest therfore it is profitable. Wherefore of many maruayalous examples, a man shall not lightly tell either a more cõmẽdable, or a more goodly example, than this. But in al this praise of Regulus this one thing is worthye of admiration that he thought it best, the prisoners shoulde bee

bee kepte styll. For in that hee returned, I think it no wonder at all, because in those dayes, he could not do otherwise. Therefore that cõmendation is not the mans but the times. For our auncetors wrote of this mynde, that ther is no greater bõde to bynde a mannes promes than an othe. The lawes in the twelue tables declare that, our holy orders declare the same and our leages declare no lesse, whereby bound is the promes made euen to the enemie, the enteries, & ponnishmentes of the Censors declare as muche, who about no mater more heedfully gaue iudgement, than about keepinge of othes.

Marcus Pomponius, Tribune of the people, did summõ Lucius Manlius, Iulus sonne, whẽ he was Dictator to appeare at a daie, because he had takẽ vpon him ỹ occupieng of his Dictatorship a fewe dayes lẽger. than hee sholde, & accused him also, ỹ he had geuẽ his sõne Titus who afterwarde was called

censuit. Nam quòd redij, nobis nunc mirabile videtur: illis quidem temporibus aliter facere non potuit. Itaq; ista lex non est hominis, sed temporum. Nullum enim vinculum ad astringendam fidem iureiurando maiores arctius esse voluerunt. Id indicant leges in XII. tabulis, indicant sacra, indicãt fœdera, quibus etiam cum hoste denunciatur fides, indicant noctiones, animaduersionesq; CENS. qui nullade re diligentius quàm de iureiurando iudicabant. L. Manlio Aui filio, cum DICTATAT. fuisset, M. Pompmius trib. pl. diem dixit, quod is paucos sibi dies ad dictaturam gerendã addidisset, criminabatur etiã, quòd Titum filiũ qui Torquat⁹ postea est appellat⁹

ab hominibus relegasset, & ruri habitare iussisset, quod cum audiuisset adolescens filius negotiũ adhiberi patri, accurrisse Romam, & cum primaluce Pomponij domum venisse dicitur. Cui cum esset nuntiatum, quòd illum iratum allaturum ad se aliquid contra patrem arbitraretur, surrexit è lectulo, remotisq; arbitris ad se adolescentem iussit venire. At ille, vt ingressus est, confestim gladium distrinxit: iurauitq; se illum statim interfecturum, nisi iusiurandum sibi dedisset, se patrem missum esse factum. Iurauit hoc terrore coactus Pomponius rem ad populum detulit, docuit eam sibi à causa desistere necesse esse. Manlium missum fecit. Tantum tempori bus illis iusiurãdum valebat. Atq; hic

Torquatus, from companie of men: & had commaunded him to dwell in the country. Which when the pongman, his sonne, once herd of, that his father was brought in trouble, it is saide, hee ranne to Rome, & by breke of day, came to Pomponius house. To whom when it was told bicause he thought, that hee being offended wolde bring some matter vnto hym against his father, hee arose out of his bedde, and al hearers being voided out of the place, hee commaunded, the pongman shoulde come too him. But he, as soone as hee entred, by and by drewe hys swoorde, and swaare, he would kyll hym out of hand, except hee made an othe vnto hym, that he would discharge his father. Pomponius, constrained with this terreur, made an othe so, hee opened the matter to the people, hee enformed thẽ, why it was necessarie for hym to let fall the accion. Hee discharged Manlius. So greatly was an othe hadde in regarde, at those daies. And this Titus Manly-

Manius is he, who got hys surname, at the riuer of Anien, of a chain, that he pulled frō a Frenchmā, whom hee slewe, being bogged by hym, in whose thirde Consulshyp, the Latines at Aese is were discomfited & put to flight. A very noble man doutlesse, and one, who not long afore being louing towarde hys father, became sower, & seuere against hys sonne. But as Regulus is to be commended, in keping his othe, so those ten, whom Annibal, after the Cannensian fight, sent too the Senate, vpon their othe, that they should returne into the campe, wherof the Carthaginers were then in possession: except they obteined hys request, for the raūsomming of certeyne prisoners: are to be dispraised, if they did not returne. Touching whom, all men write not after one sorte. For Polibius, a special good author, writeth: that of the tenne chosen gentlemenne, who then were sent, nyne returned:

T. Manlius is est qui ad Anienem Galli, quem ab eo prouratº occiderat, torque detracto, cognomen inuenit: cuius tertio consulatu Latini ad Veserim fusi & fugati sunt. Magnus vir in primis, & qui perindulgens in patrem, idem acerbe seuerus in filium. Sed vt laudandus Regulus in conseruādo iureiurando, sic decem illi, quos post Cannensem pugnā iuratos ad senatum misit Annibal, se in castra redituros ea, quorum potiti erāt Pœni, nisi de redimendis captiuis impetrauissent, si non redierunt vituperandi de quibus nō omnes vno modo. Nam Polybius bonus author in primis scribit, ex decem nobilissimis qui tunc erant missi, nouem reuertisse

à senatu re non impetrata: vnum ex decem, qui paulo post qua egressus erat è castris redisset, quasi aliquid esset oblitus, Romæ remansisse. Reditu enim in castra liberatum se esse iure iurando interpretabatur. Non recte. Fraus enim distringit, non dissoluit periurium. Fuit igitur stulta calliditas peruersè imitata prudentiam. Itaq; decreuit senatus, vt ille veterator & callidus vinctus ad Annibalem duceretur. Sed illud maximum octo hominum milia tenebat Annibal: non quos in acie cepisset, aut qui periculo mortis diffugissent: sed qui relicti in castris fuissent à Paulo & Varone COS. Eos senatus non censuit redimendos. cum id parua pecunia fieri posset: vt esset insitum militibus nostris

when the matter coulde not bee obtained of the Senate: and that one of the tenne, who a little after, hee was gone oute of the camp, returned backe, as though hee had forgotten somwhat: remained styll at Rome. For by his retourne to the camp, hee toke himselfe too bee discharged of his othe: but that was not true. For gyle confirmeth, and not dischargeth periurie. It was then a foolish craftinesse, that did peuishly counterfet wisdome. Therfore the Senate made a decree: that the same suttle & wyly fox shoulde bee caried pinnioned vnto Annibal. But this is a marualous matter: Annibal had in hold eight thousand of our men: whom he toke not in battle, nor as flieng a way for feare of death: but they were lefte behinde in the cãpe, by Paulus, & Varro, the Consuls. The Senate did not thinke it good too raunsome them: whereas they myght haue doone it for a lyttle money, that it might sinke into our souldiours hertes, eyther

ther too winne the victorie, or manfully to dye. Whiche thing when it was knowne: the sayde Polibius writes, that Annibals herte was daunted therwith, because ỹ Senate, & people of Rome, euen in chaunces of aduersitie, were of so loftie a corage. Thus the thinges, which seeme profitable, bee ouerweyed by comparison of honestie. But that same Acilius, who wrote the storie in greeke, saith: ther were mo, whiche returned too the campe, vnder the same gyle: that they might be discharged of their othe, and that they were noted by the Cẽsors wt al maner of infamie. Here an ende of this parcell. For it is euident, that suche thinges, as bee done with a fearefull, seruile, dastardlye, & weake hert, as the doinge of Regulus had been, if eyther he had thought, concerning the prisoners, that hee sawe expedient for himselfe, and not for the cõmõweale, or els woulde haue taried styl at home, bee not profitable, because they be reprochfull

aut vincere, aut emori.

Q ua quidem re audita, fractum animum Annibalis scribit idem: quòd S. P. q. R. rebus afflictis tam excelso animo fuisset. Sic honestatis coparatione, ea quæ videntur vtilia, vincuntur. Acilius autem, qui græcè scripsit historiam, plures ait fuisse, qui in castra reuertissent, eadem fraude, vt iureiurando liberarentur: eosque à CENS. omnibus ignominijs notatos. Sit iam huius loci finis. Perspicuum est enim ea quæ timido animo, humili, demisso, fractoque fiant (quali fuisset Reguli factum, si aut de captiuis, quod ipsi opus esse videretur, nõ quod Reip, censuisset, aut domi remanere voluisset) non esse vtilia, quia sint flagitiosa,

fœda, & turpia. Restat quarta pars, quæ decore, moderatione, modestia, continentia, tẽperantia continetur. Potest igitur quicquam esse vtile quod sit huic taliũ virtutũ choro cõtrarium? Atqui ab Aristippo Cyrenaici atque Annicerij philosophi nominati, omne bonũ in voluptate posuerunt: virtutemq; cõsuerunt ob eam rem esse laudãdã, quòd efficiens esset voluptatis, quib⁹ obsoletis, floret Epicurus, eius dẽ ferè adiutor, authorq; sententiæ. Cui bit, velis equisq; (vt dicitur) si honestatẽ tueri, acre tuenda sententia est, decertãdũ est. Nã si non modo vtilitas, sed vita omnis beata, corporis firma constitutione, eiusq; cõstitutionis spe explorata (vt à Metrodoro scriptum est) continetur: certè hæc vtilitas & quidem summa (sic enim censent)

full, vile, and dishonest.

The fourt parte is nowe behinde, which consisteth in semelinesse, measurekeping, sobermoode, stayednesse, and temperaunce. May then anything be profitable, that is contrary to such an assemble of vertues? But the Cyrenaikes, and Annikerians, who had their name of Philosophers from Aristippus, placed all felicitie in pleasure: and therefore they iudged vertue too bee commendable, bicause it was a causer of pleasure. And whẽ these wer worne out of estimacion: then florished Epicurus, a furderer, and an author welnye of the same opinion. Against them must we striue with toothe, and naile (as they saye) if wee meane to defende, and preserue honestie. For if not only profit, but also al happy life consisteth in the good complexion of the body, & in a sure truste to the same complexion, as by Metrodorus it is written, doutlesse this maner profit, yea & the verie chiefe (for so do they holde)

will

wil ſtriue with honeſtie.

For firſt of all, where ſhall ther be a place appointed for wiſdom? What? mean they, that on euery ſyde ſhe ſholo ſeke after delicaties? How miſerable a ſeruice were it for vertue, too bee a wayter vpon pleaſure? But what ſhoulde be the office of wyſdome? Skilfully too chooſe out pleaſures? Admit there be nothing pleaſaunter, thã ſo too do, What can therebee imagined more diſhoneſt? Now with him, who ſaythe, that payne is the vttereſt euyll, what place ſhall manlyneſſe haue, whiche cares not for anye paines, or trauailes, that be offered? For although Epicurus ſpeakes in manye places, touchinge paine (as hee dooth in thys) ſtoutly inought: neuertheleſſe it is not too bee regarded wat hee ſaith, but what is meete for him to ſay, who hath pointed out the limites of good thinges to be in pleaſure, and of euyll thinges, in paine: as, yf I ſhoulde heare him ſpeake of ſtayednes, and temperaunce.

cum honeſtate pugnabit. Nam vbi primum prudentiæ locus dabitur? aut vt cõquirat vndique ſuauitas? quam miſer virtutis famulatu ſeruientis voluptati. Quod autem munus prudentiæ? An legere intelligetur voluptates? Facinhil iſto eſſe iucundius, quid cogitari poteſt turpius? Iam qui dolorem ſummum malum dicat, apud eum quem habet locum fortitudo, quæ eſt dolorum laborumq; contemptio? Quamuis enim multis locis dicat Epicurus (ſicut hic dicit) ſatis fortiter de dolore, tamen non id ſpectandum eſt quid dicat, ſed quid conſentaneum ſit ei dicere: qui bona voluptate terminauerit, mala dolore: vt ſi illum audiam de continentia & temperantia.

He

dixit ille quidē multa multis locis, sed aqua hæret, vt aiūt. Nā qui potest tēperantiā laudare is, qui ponat sūmū bonū in voluptate? Est enim tēperātia libidinū inimica. libidines autē consectatrices voluptatis. Atq; in his tamē trib⁹ generib⁹ quoquo modo possūt, nō incallidē tergiuersantur. Prudentiam introducūt, scientiā suppeditantē voluptates, depellentē dolores. Fortitudinē quoque aliquo modo expediūt: cum tradunt rationē negligendæ mortis, perpetiendiq; doloris. Iustiā tēperantiā inducūt nō facillimè illi quidē, sed tamē quomodo possunt. Dicūt enim voluptatis magnitudinē doloris detractione fieri. Iustitia vacillat, vel iacet potiꝰ: omnesq; hæ virtutes, quæ in cōmunitate cernuntur, & in societate generis humani. Neq; enī bonitas, nec liberalitas, nec comitas esse potest,

he talkes in deede in manye places many thynges, but he is myered by the waye, as they saye. For how can hee praise tēperance, that setteth the soueraine good in pleasure? For tēperance is enemie to lust, & lust is a waytyng seruaunt too pleasure. And yet in these thre kindes not without sutteltie, they fall too their shiftes. They bringe in wisdome, as a sciencee ministeringe pleasure, & voyding paines. They set vs out also manlynesse, after a certain sort: whē they teche a way to despise death & endure paine. They also fetche in tēperaunce, with much a do doutlesse, but yet as well as they may. For they holde, that the greatnes of pleasure ariseth by puttyng of all paine. Iustice staggereth with them, or rather lieth vnder foote, and all those vertues, that showe thē selues in the cōmō knot, & felowshyp of mē. For ther can bee neither goodnesse, neither liberalitie, not curtesie, no more then frendshyp may, if they bee not soughte after,

after, for thē selues, but bee referred too pleasure, or too profit. Let vs then drive our matter into few words. For as we haue taught, that there is no profit, which is contrary to honestie, so wee say, all voluptuousnesse is contrarye too honestie. And so muche the more I take Callipho, and Dinomachus worthy to be reproued who thought, they shold ende the controuersie, if they made a ioynyng of voluptuousnesse with honestie, as of beast & man. Honestie admits not this knot, but both abhorre, & reiect it. For truely the ende of good, & euill, which ought to bee after one sorte, may bee mingled, & tempered with thinges disagreable. But hereof hitherto, for it is a weighty matter & in an other place discoursed more at large. Now too the purpose.

After what sort thē the matter is to bee resolued, if at anye tyme profite in appearaunce doth striue with honestie, it is before sufficiently debated. But if voluptuousnes

nō pl⁹ quàm amicitia si hæc nō per se expetàtur: sed ad voluptatē, vtilitatem referantur. Conferamus igitur in pauca. Nāvt vtilitatē nullā esse docuimus, quæ honestati esset cōtraria: sic omnē voluptatē dicim⁹ honestati esse cōtrariā. Quo magis reprehēdēdos Calliphonē & Dinomachū iudico. qui se diepturos cōtroversiā putauerūt, si cū honestate voluptatem, taquā cū homine pecudē coplauissent, nō recipit istam cōiunctionē honestas: aspernatur, repellit. Nec verò finis bonorum et malorū, qui simplex esse debet, ex dissimilibus reb⁹ misceri, & tēperari potest. Sed de hoc (magna cnī res est) alio loco plurib⁹. Nūc ad propositū. Quē admodū igitur, si quando ea, quæ videretur vtilitas, honestati repugnant⁹ diiudicanda res sit satis est supra disputatum.

Sin autē ſpēciem vtilitatis etiā voluptas habere dicatur: nulla poteſt eſſe ei cū honeſtate cōiunctio. Nā vt tribuamus aliquid voluptati, condimēti fortaſſe non nihil vtilitatis certe nihil habebit

PERORATIO OPERIS.

Habes à patre mun° Marce fili, mea quidē ſentētia, magnū, ſed perinde erit, vt acceperis. Quanquā & hi tibi tres libri inter Cratippi cōmentarios tanquā hoſpites erunt recipiendi. Sed vt ſi ipſe veniſſē Athenas (quod quidem eſſet factum, niſi me è medio curſu clara voce patria reuocaſſet) aliquādo me quoq; audires: ſic quoniam his voluminibus ad te profecta vox mea eſt: tribues his tēporis, quantū poteris: poteris autem quantum voles. Cum verò intellexero, te hoc

ouſnes alſo bee counted tos haue ſhow of profite, it cā haue no felowſhip with honeſtie. For be it ſo, wee ſomwhat eteme pleaſure: ſome ſawce perhaps it ſhall haue in it, but ſurely no profite at all.

¶ The concluſion and dedication of his workes, & an exhortation to his ſonne.

Yon haue hrē your father a preſent, ſonne Marke, in my opinion verelye muche worth, but it ſhall bee euen ſo, as ye take it. Notwithſtanding theſe three bookes at, as ſtraungers, to bee entertcyned of you, amonge Cratippus notes, But as ye ſhold once haue herde me alſo, if I had come too Athenes, which hade ben done in dede, but that my countrey called mee backe with open mouth, in the mydſt of my iourney, ſo ſeeyng in theſe volumes my voyce is conueyed vnto you, ye ſhall beſtow as much tyme vpō thē as you may, & ſo muche you may, as you wyll. But whē I ſhall vnderſtand, that you take

take pleasure in this kynde of knowledge, then I both present there with you, as I trust, and in your absence, absēt will speake with you. Fare you well therefore, my Cicero, & assure your selfe that you are to me doutlesse right deere, and yet farre dearer shalbe, if in such bookes, and lessons, you wyll settle your delite.

scientiæ genere gauderetis, & præsens tecum propediem (vt spero) & dum aberis absens loquar. Vale igitur mi Cicero, tibiq; persuade, te mihi quidem esse charissimum, sed multo fore chariorem, si talibus monimentis, præceptisq; lætabere.

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¶ Cum priuilegio ad imprimendum solum.